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2ABSTRACT
This thesis is an examination of the constitutional framework of public finance 
during the reign of Henry VI, prior to the ‘Wars of the Roses’.  Its central theme is 
that the governments of Henry VI’s minority and majority rule could not transcend 
the parameters of scholastic fiscal theory and negotiate generous lay tax grants as a 
means of effectively financing the Hundred Years’ War after the Treaty of Troyes 
and expansive permanent charges.  Parliament preferred to grant low levels of lay 
taxation, the payment of which was spread out over lengthy time periods, and 
attempt to increase public revenue by alternative means, namely the granting of 
novel indirect taxes on aliens and alien poll taxes, and the underwriting of large–
scale loans.  In financial terms this strategy failed, and led to increasing problems at 
the exchequer.  Despite notable efforts to efficiently bring in lay tax revenue and 
manage creditors, a rising tide of government debt characterised the 1430s and 
1440s.  The only means of effectively resolving this fiscal crisis was through 
parliament’s granting of a higher level of lay taxation, which the Commons 
resolutely opposed.  Henry VI’s apparent absence from the politics of his majority 
regime during the mid–to–late 1440s made it more difficult for the government to 
secure the necessary level of lay taxation, though this was not, as most mid–to–late 
twentieth century historians believed, the root cause of the unprecedented royal debt 
of £372,000, declared at the parliament of November 1449.  This lay in the long–
term failure of the later medieval fiscal constitution to adapt to changing fiscal 
circumstances and provide the late Lancastrian government with the level of supply 
necessary to prevent a protracted financial crisis.  
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APPROACHING THE FISCAL HISTORY OF HENRY VI’s REIGN
The aim of this thesis is to examine trends in the parliamentary negotiation of fiscal 
policy and their financial context during the reign of Henry VI, prior to the ‘Wars of 
the Roses’.  This requires a close engagement with two principal classes of source: 
the parliament rolls and the record of exchequer finance.  An examination of the 
chancellor’s opening parliamentary addresses allows us to comment on the late 
Lancastrian government’s public framing of its financial needs.  An examination of 
the Commons’ grants of lay and indirect taxation and the parliamentary underwriting 
of credit, viewed in the context of related material such as parliamentary petitions 
from local communities seeking exemptions or remissions from lay tax payment, 
provides us with a means of gauging the impact which the government’s public 
approach towards supply had upon parliamentary fiscal political relations.  A 
quantitative examination of the record of exchequer finance enables us to assess the 
relative financial viability of royal fiscal policies negotiated in parliament.  In this 
context, the enrolled lay and customs accounts provide us with the gross and net 
yields, respectively, of the lay and indirect taxes granted by parliament.  And the 
receipt rolls provide us with the sum total of loans raised in response to 
parliamentary acts underwriting credit.  An integrated examination of the receipt and 
issue rolls allows us to estimate the efficiency with which the exchequer 
administered parliamentary–controlled tax revenue and credit, and the role played by 
these revenue sources in the royal budget.  These issues are viewed in the context of 
an examination of government debt, derived from the receipt rolls, as a means of 
assessing the relative extent to which the level of supply conceded by parliament was 
failing to meet the financial needs of the state.
The methodological approach to the fiscal history of Henry VI’s reign sketched 
above is necessary for two, inter–related, reasons.  One relates to the inadequacies of 
existing research on public finance during the reign of Henry VI, and recent moves 
towards new ways of approaching the history of public finance during this period.  
The other relates to the need to integrate a more developed, revisionist approach to 
7the fiscal history of the late Lancastrian period with recent trends in the 
historiography of pre–modern public finance, and important research on fiscal 
politics and exchequer finance during the period of the ‘long’ fourteenth century, c. 
1272–1420.  What follows is split into three sections, the first two of which consider 
these issues in turn.  The third section considers in greater detail the methodology 
employed by this thesis in approaching the fiscal documentation discussed in the 
previous paragraph.  This is necessary owing to the complexities of the fiscal 
documentation under examination.
1.1 The historiography of late Lancastrian public finance
Since the late nineteenth century, at least, historians have been aware of the 
development of serious fiscal problems during the reign of Henry VI.  W. Stubbs, 
writing in the 1870s, drew attention to financial statements brought before 
parliament in 1433 and 1450 which demonstrated the existence of a deficit between 
public revenue and expenditure.1  Stubbs viewed these statements in the context of 
what he believed to be a long-term constitutional struggle between the parliamentary 
Commons and the baronage.2  He believed that Henry V’s militarism and the long 
minority of Henry VI (1422–c.1437) had led to a baronial takeover of government, 
which during the course of the fourteenth and earlier fifteenth centuries had come to 
be a progressive joint endeavour between the Commons and the crown.  The 
Commons, representing the interests of property owners throughout the realm, 
demonstrated their dissatisfaction with this development by failing to grant a 
sufficient level of lay taxation in order to adequately finance the state.  This led the 
late Lancastrian government to draw attention to the existence of a deficit between 
available revenue and the government’s expenditure commitments in 1433.  From 
the beginning of Henry VI’s personal rule in c. 1437, a dominant clique at court, led 
by the Marquis, later Duke, of Suffolk governed in its own interests.  This led to an 
increased parliamentary reluctance to concede supply which resulted, unsurprisingly, 
in an increased level of government debt.  This was the context in which Stubbs 
discussed the statement of 1450, which outlined that the royal debt had more than 
doubled since 1433.
                                                            
1 W. Stubbs, The Constitutional History of England, 3 (Oxford, 1878), pp. 121, 148.  
2 For Stubbs’ interpretation of the constitutional framework of Lancastrian politics, upon which the 
remainder of this paragraph is based, see The Constitutional History of England, 3, pp. 2–294.
8In a number of important papers written during the middle decades of the twentieth 
century, K. B. McFarlane decisively rejected Stubbs’ understanding of the origins of 
the late Lancastrian regime’s fiscal problems.3  As far as McFarlane was concerned, 
there was no long–term conflict within the Lancastrian state between a progressive 
Commons and a regressive baronage.  McFarlane believed that an interpretation 
along these lines did not reflect the reality of later medieval politics, which was 
characterised by landowners, great and small, who sought material advancement.  
The king needed to effectively manage this competitive, self–serving elite.  If he 
succeeded, then political stability would be achieved; if not, then political stability 
would break down.  The implication of this, as far as government finance was 
concerned, was that strong kingship would result in parliament’s voting of the 
necessary level of taxation, since the Commons would be grateful for equitable royal 
oversight of landed society.  Conversely, weak kingship, whether owing to the king’s 
favouritism of a narrow baronial clique or his pliability, would result in the 
Commons’ relative unwillingness to finance the government’s needs.  McFarlane 
believed Henry VI to be an inane figure, incapable of directing political affairs, or at 
least pliable to the extent that he allowed a small group of courtiers led by Suffolk to 
take control of government in their own interests.  In this context, McFarlane was 
able to make sense of the Commons’ apparent unwillingness to grant the level of 
taxation necessary for the government to remain solvent during the period of Henry’s 
personal rule.  McFarlane was also able to suggest that Suffolk’s excessive use of 
royal patronage as a tool for self-enrichment seriously diminished the crown’s 
capital assets.4  For McFarlane, then, the fiscal crisis of the late Lancastrian state was 
entirely the result of Henry VI’s personal failure as a fifteenth–century monarch.
McFarlane’s suggestions shaped the intellectual climate in which research into late 
Lancastrian public finance was conducted during the second half of the twentieth 
century.  This is particularly clear when one considers the important work of A. B. 
                                                            
3 The following is based upon K. B. McFarlane, ‘England: the Lancastrian Kings, 1399–1461’, in The 
Cambridge Medieval History, 8, The Close of the Middle Ages, ed. C. W. Previte-Orton & Z. N. 
Brooke (Cambridge, 1936), pp. 363–416; K. B. McFarlane, ‘The Wars of the Roses’, in England in 
the Fifteenth Century (London, 1981), pp. 231–67; K. B. McFarlane, ‘Henry IV’s Government: 
Council, Parliament, Finance’, in Lancastrian Kings and Lollard Knights (Oxford, 1972), pp. 78–101; 
K. B. McFarlane, ‘Bastard Feudalism’, in England in the Fifteenth Century,  pp. 23–44.
4 McFarlane’s student B. P. Wolffe built upon this conclusion in an important monograph on 
domainal finance: B. P. Wolffe, The Royal Demesne in English History: The Crown Estate in the 
Governance of the Realm from the Conquest to 1509 (London, 1971).  
9Steel, McFarlane, G. L. Harriss and J. L. Kirby.  In 1957, Steel published a 
monumental study of the later medieval receipt rolls, which encompassed the reign 
of Henry VI.5  This illustrated the increasing squeeze on revenues both prior to and 
during the period of Henry VI’s personal rule, evident in a rising tide of abortive 
assignments which can be used as something of a barometer of later medieval 
government debt.6  Yet Steel stressed that his work was not to be viewed as an 
interpretative monograph: he was simply providing a breakdown of public revenue, 
rather than attempting to provide a thematic account of the relative stability of 
Lancastrian public finance.7  The research by McFarlane, followed by that of Harriss 
on the loans of Cardinal Henry Beaufort, illustrated the extent to which the late 
Lancastrian exchequer was dependent upon Beaufort’s loans.8  Harriss even implied 
that, towards the close of the minority, the unprecedented loans provided by Beaufort 
went some way to compensate for a severe fall in revenue from the customs and 
subsidies on trade.9   Both McFarlane and Harriss, however, preferred to view these 
loans in terms of Beaufort’s commitment to Lancastrian kingship, rather than place 
them within the context of an analysis of the budgetary problems which had led the 
late Lancastrian exchequer to become so reliant upon credit finance.  In 1951, Kirby 
published an analysis of exchequer issues at the time of the financial statement of 
1433.10  This illustrated that the exchequer was dependent upon lay tax revenue to 
make up for a shortfall between the crown’s ‘ordinary’ revenue and the customs and 
subsidies, and ‘ordinary’ expenditure, by the early 1430s.11  Yet Kirby went to great 
lengths to illustrate that all the late Lancastrian government required was a single 
fifteenth and tenth grant in order to cover this fiscal imbalance.12  
                                                            
5 A. B. Steel, The Receipt of the Exchequer (Cambridge, 1957).  
6 Steel, Receipt, especially pp. 203–71.  For a discussion of the content and structure of the receipt 
rolls which assesses the significance of assignments and ‘fictitious loans’ see Chapter 1.3.    
7 Steel, Receipt, pp. vii–xl.  
8 K. B. McFarlane, ‘At the deathbed of Cardinal Beaufort’, in England in the Fifteenth Century, pp. 
115–37; K. B. McFarlane, ‘Loans to the Lancastrian Kings, the Problem of Inducement’, in England 
in the Fifteenth Century, pp. 57–78; G. L. Harriss, Cardinal Beaufort: A Study of Lancastrian 
Ascendancy and Decline (Oxford, 1988).  
9 See Harriss’ chapter on ‘Finance and the French War, 1433–1439’ in Beaufort, pp. 277–91.    
10 J. L. Kirby, ‘The Issues of the Lancastrian Exchequer and Lord Cromwell’s Estimates of 1433’, 
BIHR, 24 (1951), pp. 121–51.
11 For a categorisation of ‘ordinary’ and ‘extraordinary’ revenue and expenditure, see Chapter 1.3.  
12 Kirby, ‘The Issues of the Lancastrian Exchequer and Lord Cromwell’s Estimates of 1433’, pp. 147–
8.
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Important work in recent years has shown signs of recognising that the unwillingness 
of the writers discussed above to question the long–term stability of late Lancastrian 
public finance was a mistake.  The later work of Harriss drew attention to the 
increasing need for the exchequer, as the Lancastrian period wore on, to employ 
revenue from lay taxation in the financing of permanent charges.  In his contribution 
to ‘The New Oxford History of England’ series covering the later medieval period, 
Harriss seemed to suggest that this revised fiscal situation necessitated a structural 
political change in order to ensure the availability of permanent or near permanent 
lay taxation.13   Meanwhile, in a number of essays concerned with long–term 
developments in the history of the later medieval English ‘tax state’, W. M. Ormrod 
has commented on the decline in the political community’s willingness to grant lay 
taxation, and the concomitant fall in lay tax revenue, during the final stage of the 
Hundred Years’ War.14  If we view Ormrod’s observation in the context of existing 
knowledge of the budgetary history of the period, discussed above, questions emerge 
regarding the extent to which the late Lancastrian government sought – and was 
unable to obtain – a higher level of lay taxation in an attempt to prevent an emergent, 
and worsening, imbalance between revenue and expenditure.  These considerations 
lead one to question the role Henry VI played in fiscal politics during the period of 
the king’s personal rule.  In light of important work undertaken since the 1990s on 
the negative impact which Henry VI’s lack of attention to political affairs had upon 
the stability of his regime, it is necessary to question to what extent the politics of 
Henry VI’s kingship during the period of majority rule increased the difficulties 
faced by the late Lancastrian government in securing the level of supply necessary to 
finance total financial commitments.15  This issue is not raised in a ‘McFarlanite’ 
                                                            
13 G. L. Harriss, Shaping the Nation: England, 1360–1461 (Oxford, 2005).  On pp. 62–3 it is stated 
‘after 1430 the steep fall in indirect taxation left it (the exchequer) dependent on a half subsidy each 
year to achieve a very precarious balance on its normal anticipated expenditure’.  See also G. L. 
Harriss, ‘Budgeting at the Medieval Exchequer’, in War, Government and Aristocracy in the British 
Isles, c.1150–1500: Essays in Honour of Michael Prestwich, ed. C. Given-Wilson, A. Kettle & L. 
Scales (Woodbridge, 2008), pp. 179–96.  
14 W. M. Ormrod, ‘The Domestic Response to the Hundred Years War’, in Arms, Armies and 
Fortifications in the Hundred Years War, ed. A. Curry & M. Hughes (Woodbridge, 1994), p. 93; W. 
M. Ormrod, ‘England in the Middle Ages’, in The Rise of the Fiscal State in Europe, c. 1200–1815, 
ed. R. J. Bonney (Oxford, 1999), pp. 38–41.  See also W. M. Ormrod, Political Life in Medieval 
England, 1300–1450 (Basingstoke, 1995), pp. 89–95.  
15 J. L. Watts, ‘The Counsels of King Henry VI, c. 1435–1445’, EHR, 106 (1991), pp. 279–98; J. L. 
Watts, Henry VI and the Politics of Kingship (Cambridge, 1996); M. C. Carpenter, The Wars of the 
Roses: Politics and the Constitution in England, c. 1437–1509 (Cambridge, 1997).  
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attempt to shift attention away from fiscal problems inherited from the minority 
regime, which clearly existed and require clarification and more detailed study, but 
in recognition of the need to understand the relationship between long–term fiscal 
problems and the political context of Henry VI’s adult kingship.    
An integrated examination of fiscal politics and exchequer finance of the kind 
outlined at the beginning of this chapter provides us with a methodological 
framework capable of addressing the questions, discussed in the previous paragraph, 
which emerge out of the insufficiencies of existing work on the fiscal history of the 
late Lancastrian period.  The thesis is divided into chapters which deal with the 
minority and majority phases of Henry VI’s reign.  The chapters on the fiscal history 
of the minority are focused on the extent to which the exchequer became 
increasingly dependent upon lay tax revenue in the ‘ordinary’ financing of the 
regime in light of increasing expenditure commitments and a collapse in indirect tax 
revenue.  The chapters on the fiscal history of the early majority and late majority, 
meanwhile, question the extent to which the king was involved in fiscal political 
negotiations over time, and how this related to broader currents within court politics 
and existing budgetary problems.  This new approach to late Lancastrian public
finance has its intellectual origins in recent trends in the historiography of pre–
modern state finance and important research on fiscal politics and exchequer finance 
in England during the ‘long’ fourteenth century.  Indeed, an analysis of the latter 
leads one to pose important questions regarding the historical context of late 
Lancastrian fiscal problems.  It is to these inter–related themes that we must now 
turn.
1.2 Fiscal constitutionalism and the historiography of the later medieval English ‘tax 
state’
In 1999, R. J. Bonney and W. M. Ormrod co–authored an important introductory 
essay to a volume of papers concerned with the fiscal history of the pre–modern 
European state.16  A central theme of this essay was the Schumpeterian fallacy that 
                                                            
16 The following paragraph is based on R. J. Bonney & W. M. Ormrod, ‘Introduction.  Crises, 
Revolutions and Self–Sustained Growth: Towards a Conceptual Model of Change in Fiscal History’, 
in Crises, Revolutions and Self–Sustained Growth: Essays in European Fiscal History, 1130–1830, 
ed. W. M. Ormrod, M. Bonney & R. J. Bonney (Stamford, 1999), pp. 1–21.  See also J. D. Tracy, 
‘Taxation and State Debt’, in Handbook of European History, 1400–1600: Late Middle Ages, 
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only late modern states faced ‘crises of the tax state’ characterised by political 
opposition to increased expenditures.17  Building upon examples ranging from the 
early middle ages to the late eighteenth century, Bonney and Ormrod demonstrated 
that a number of pre–modern states developed tax systems which were politically 
unsustainable in the wake of increased expenditures.    They pointed out that the 
dominant fiscal ideology, derived from scholastic thought, throughout the medieval 
and most of the early modern period justified national taxation only in cases of 
defensive war.  Whether or not a particular pre–modern state was able to overcome 
political opposition to taxation sought outside of periods of defensive war – i.e., 
permanent taxation – or particularly controversial levies depended, Bonney and 
Ormrod contended, upon the strength of the representative assembly which voted 
supply in the state in question.  In the event that governments were unable to enforce 
their preferred fiscal policy, their relative ability to fall back on profitable though 
less politically contentious taxes, which was often dependent on the state of the 
economy, was viewed as being highly significant since this determined whether or 
not budgetary imbalances and concomitant debt problems could be avoided.  Bonney 
and Ormrod thus concluded that enquiries into problems associated with the political 
negotiation of taxation in pre–modern states ought to be concerned with identifying 
the ‘fiscal constitution’ of such states, i.e., the relationship between fiscal theory and 
practice over time, and how this related to trends in government solvency.18
There is a particularly rich body of research into the emergence and early 
development of the fiscal constitution of later medieval England, which when 
viewed together would seem to suggest that an unstable pre–modern ‘tax state’ of the 
kind discussed above emerged during the fourteenth century.  G. L. Harriss has 
illustrated how the government of Edward III, particularly during the 1340s and 
1350s, was able to harness a plea of ‘necessity’, derived from scholastic fiscal 
                                                                                                                                                                           
Reformation and Renaissance. 1. Structures and Assertions, ed. T. A. Brady Jnr, H. A. Oberman & J. 
D. Tracy (Leiden & New York, 1994), pp. 563–84.  
17 J. A. Schumpeter, ‘The Crisis of the Tax State’, International Economic Papers, 4 (New York, 
1954), pp. 5–38.  Schumpeter’s postulation of a crisis of the late modern ‘tax state’ was centred
around the idea that twentieth–century parliaments would not be prepared to finance expansive public 
costs owing to the partial socialisation of government.  
18 For an assertion of the importance of fiscal constitutional history, framed in similar terms, see R. J. 
Bonney, ‘Introduction’, in Economic Systems and State Finance, ed. R. J. Bonney (Oxford, 1995), 
especially pp. 6–7.  See also G. Brennan & J. M. Buchanan, The Power to Tax: Analytical 
Foundations of a Fiscal Constitution (Cambridge, 1980), especially pp. 8–9, 83–4, 190–3, 202–3.  
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theory, as a means of affecting the parliamentary Commons’ granting of regular lay 
and indirect taxation.19  W. M. Ormrod’s quantitative work on tax revenue has drawn 
attention to the transformative effect which the regularisation of lay and indirect 
taxation had upon public revenues during the early–to–mid fourteenth century.20  As 
Ormrod has remarked, this signified the emergence of a precocious later medieval 
‘tax state’.21  Yet Ormrod has been quick to point out that the later medieval English 
‘tax state’ was not politically sustainable in the long–term.22  Harriss has illustrated 
this clearly in his discussion of the fiscal political and financial dynamics of the 
peace of the 1360s, after the close of the first phase of the Hundred Years’ War.23  
Peace meant that it was no longer politically possible for the crown to call upon 
parliament to grant lay taxation, yet expansive permanent charges had led to a 
structural deficit between ‘ordinary’ revenue and expenditure.  This resulted in 
parliament’s acceptance of the need to continuously re-grant the maltolt tax on wool 
exports.  Ormrod’s work on the customs and subsidies on trade during the mid–to–
late fourteenth century has illustrated that the fiscal health of the government was 
more or less ensured so long as wool exports, and thus indirect tax revenue, 
remained high.24  Yet both fell dramatically during the early fifteenth century.  This 
conditioned the fiscal political history of the reign of Henry IV, which was 
characterised by a series of parliamentary struggles instigated by the Lancastrian 
                                                            
19 G. L. Harriss, ‘Parliamentary Taxation and the Origins of Appropriation of Supply in England, 
1207–1340’, in Gouvernés et Gouvernants (Sociéte Jean Bodin, Brussels, 1965), pp. 625–54; G. L. 
Harriss, ‘War and the Emergence of the English Parliament, 1297–1360’, Journal of Medieval 
History, 2 (1976), pp. 35–56; G. L. Harriss, King, Parliament and Public Finance in Medieval 
England to 1369 (Oxford, 1975).
20 W. M. Ormrod, 'The Crown and the English Economy, 1290–1348', in Before the Black Death: 
Studies in the 'Crisis' of the Early Fourteenth Century, ed. B. M. S. Campbell (Manchester, 1991), pp. 
149–83; Ormrod, ‘England in the Middle Ages’, pp. 31–2.    
21 W. M. Ormrod, ‘The West European Monarchies in the Later Middle Ages’, in Economic Systems 
and State Finance, pp. 123–60.
22 Ibid.  See also Ormrod’s comments in ‘England in the Middle Ages’, p. 47, and also Ormrod’s 
pointing out the issue of apparent the inability of the late Lancastrian government to secure the 
necessary level of supply: see above, footnote 14.  
23 Harriss, King, Parliament, pp. 466–508. 
24 For high maltolt yields in the mid–fourteenth century, see W. M. Ormrod, ‘The English Crown and 
the Customs, 1349–63’, Ec.HR, 2nd series, 40 (1987), pp. 27–40.  Elsewhere, Ormrod has illustrated 
that, during the 1380s, parliament demonstrated its willingness to continuously re–grant tonnage and 
poundage, a new subsidy on imports of wine and imports and exports of general merchandise, as a 
means of offsetting a decline in indirect taxation which owed to long–term problems in the export 
trade in wool: W. M. Ormrod, ‘The Origins of Tunnage and Poundage. Parliament and the Estate of 
Merchants in the Fourteenth Century’, Parliamentary History, 28 (2009), pp. 209–27; W. M. Ormrod, 
‘Finance and Trade under Richard II’, in Richard II. The Art of Kingship, ed. A. Goodman & J. L. 
Gillespie (Oxford, 1999), pp. 155–86.
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government’s need for regular grants of lay taxation, unrelated to defensive war, in 
order to finance ‘ordinary’ expenditure.25
The focus of much of the scholarship outlined in the previous paragraph on the inter–
related nature of fiscal political and financial developments during the ‘long’ 
fourteenth century has shaped the methodology adopted by this thesis, outlined in the 
first paragraph of this chapter.  Moreover, the trend in scholarship discussed above 
draws our attention to the fundamental fiscal constitutional problem which 
threatened the long–term viability of the later medieval ‘tax state’: the 
‘extraordinary’ character of lay taxation which remained, by the turn of the fifteenth 
century, intricately linked in the popular consciousness to particular incidences of 
defensive war.  It follows – or at least we can hypothesise – that any fiscal political 
problems faced by the late Lancastrian government must have stemmed from an 
inability to transcend the constitutional constraints of later medieval public finance at 
a time of severely depressed indirect tax revenue as a means of securing permanent, 
or near permanent, and generous parliamentary grants of lay taxation in order to 
finance ‘ordinary’ charges.  It is thus important that our discussion of late 
Lancastrian fiscal politics is placed in the context of long–term developments in the 
later medieval fiscal constitution.  For, if the above hypothesis is valid, then the same 
fiscal ideology which had allowed the government of Edward III to coerce such a 
high level of parliamentary supply during the first phase of the Hundred Years’ War 
prevented the late Lancastrian monarchy, in very different fiscal circumstances, from 
securing the level of parliamentary supply necessary for Henry VI’s government to 
finance its total expenditure commitments.  Viewed in this context, any quantitative 
material relating to declining yields of parliamentary taxation and concomitant 
budgetary problems at the late Lancastrian exchequer which emerges from our 
analysis of exchequer finance ought to be placed alongside published fiscal data 
from the early stages of the Hundred Years’ War which illustrates the state’s ability 
to yield large sums from liberal parliamentary subsidies voted during this earlier 
period.  What we are moving towards here is a quantitative analysis of the declining 
                                                            
25 McFarlane, ‘Henry IV’s Government: Council, Parliament, Finance’, pp. 78–101; T. E. F. Wright, 
‘Henry IV, the Commons and the Recovery of Royal Finance in 1407’, in Rulers and Ruled in Late 
Medieval England. Essays Presented to Gerald Harriss, ed. R. E. Archer & S. Walker (London, 
1995), pp. 65–81.
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ability of the later medieval fiscal constitution to service the financial needs of the 
English state over time.  I have thus considered it necessary to devote the following 
chapter to a detailed discussion of the fiscal constitutional history of the ‘long’ 
fourteenth century in order to facilitate the kind of temporal comparisons which are 
necessary if we are to fully understand the fiscal constitutional history of the late 
Lancastrian period.   
To draw the above discussion together, important questions emerging from existing 
scholarship on the fiscal history of Henry VI’s reign led me to adopt a 
historiographical approach to late Lancastrian fiscal history drawn from the Bonney 
and Ormrod model of ‘fiscal constitutionalism’ and existing work on the fiscal 
constitutional history of the ‘long’ fourteenth century.  It is hoped that this approach 
will provide a satisfactory interpretative framework for the late Lancastrian fiscal 
problems which previous generations of historians have struggled to satisfactorily 
address.  Moreover, it is hoped that by placing a detailed examination of the fiscal 
constitutional history of Henry VI’s reign in the context of an overview of the fiscal 
constitutional history of the period prior to c. 1420, we will gain a meaningful 
insight into the development and subsequent decline of the later medieval English 
‘tax state’.  Before we move on to an inter–related analysis of the fiscal constitution 
during the ‘long’ fourteenth century and the reign of Henry VI, however, it is 
necessary to conclude with a methodological postscript detailing how I have 
approached working with the fiscal documentation outlined in the first paragraph of 
this chapter.  What follows begins by defining a number of key words used 
throughout this thesis in reference to fiscal material derived from the receipt and 
issue rolls.  The receipt and issue rolls, and the enrolled lay and indirect tax accounts 
and local fiscal documentation are then considered in turn.  
1.3 Methodology: using and interpreting fifteenth–century fiscal documentation
Throughout this thesis I make use of the following terms regularly in relation to 
public income and expenditure: the royal budget, parliamentary–controlled 
‘extraordinary’ revenue and ‘extraordinary’ and ‘ordinary’ expenditure.  These terms 
need to be defined and discussed in some detail as they are used in a very specific 
way.  I refer to data derived from my quantitative work on the receipt and issue rolls 
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regarding annual trends in the exchequer’s management and expenditure of lay 
taxation, indirect taxation and credit, which is viewed vis–à–vis Steel’s published
data regarding general trends in public income,26 as constituting a re–construction of 
the royal budget.  I thus employ the term royal budget in the context of a specific 
enquiry into the exchequer’s fiscal management.  This bears no relation to the often 
flawed attempts of early fiscal scholarship to present a fully audited balance sheet of 
later medieval public revenue and expenditure.27  I define parliamentary–controlled 
‘extraordinary’ revenue as lay taxation, indirect taxation and credit.28  
‘Extraordinary’ charges are defined as expenditure upon intermittent special military 
expeditions to Northern France, the maintenance of the Lancastrian position in 
Normandy, specifically in relation to the payment of the Duke of York’s wages as 
Lieutenant General in the 1440s, and the repayment of loans which it was expected 
would be raised in order to pay for special military expeditions.  ‘Ordinary’ charges, 
meanwhile, are defined as domestic expenditure and permanent defensive charges.  
It needs to be noted that previous historians’ attempts to categorise public revenue 
and expenditure in ways similar to that described above have not met with 
unanimous approval amongst late medievalists.29  B. P. Wolffe and J. R. Lander 
have argued that, whilst contemporaries may have thought, in general terms, of 
‘certain’ and ‘irregular’ revenues and charges, beyond this there was no identifiable 
                                                            
26 For a discussion of how I have used these documents vis–à–vis the published data provided by 
Steel, see pp. 19–20.
27 J. H. Ramsay, Lancaster and York: A Century of English History, A.D. 1399–1485, 2 vols (Oxford, 
1892).  For a critique, see Steel, Receipt, pp. xxi–xl.  K. B. McFarlane may have had Ramsay’s work 
in mind when he memorably commented, of historians who attempt to provide audits of later 
medieval public revenue and expenditure: ‘down that road are scattered the bones of many scholars 
and I am not yet ready to contribute mine’: K. B. McFarlane, ‘War and Society, 1300–1600’, in 
England in the Fifteenth Century, p. 142.    
28 It needs to be pointed out that clerical taxation also constituted an ‘extraordinary’ revenue source.  
The politics of clerical taxation – which was granted by the clerical elite in convocation – is, however, 
beyond the scope of this thesis, which is concerned specifically with parliamentary supply.  It follows 
that I have made no attempt to quantify the role of clerical tax revenue in the royal budget, except in 
relation to the period after 1450 as a means of differentiating between clerical tax revenue and 
‘ordinary’ revenue in order to assess the impact of the resumptions of 1450 and 1451 upon the 
‘ordinary’ financial position of the regime.  It is, in fact, well known that clerical tax revenue played a 
role in the ‘ordinary’ financing of the regime throughout the Lancastrian period: A. K. McHardy, 
‘Clerical Taxation in Fifteenth–Century England: the Clergy as Agents of the Crown’, in The Church, 
Politics and Patronage in the Fifteenth Century, ed. R. B. Dobson (Gloucester, 1984), pp. 173–4.   
29 A similar understanding of public revenue and expenditure is employed throughout Harriss, King, 
Parliament.  Harriss defended his categorisation of ‘ordinary’ and ‘extraordinary’ revenue and 
expenditure – in response to the work of Wolffe, discussed in footnote 30 – in very similar terms to 
the defence provided here: G. L. Harriss, ‘Thomas Cromwell’s “New Principle” of Taxation’, EHR, 
93 (1978), p. 723, footnote 1.  
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constitutional framework regarding public revenue and expenditure of the kind 
which the dichotomy between ‘ordinary’ and ‘extraordinary’ suggests.30  These 
historians have gone on to suggest that the lack of parliamentary institutional control 
over the royal expenditure of parliamentary–controlled taxes serves to further 
illustrate this point. 
Whilst it is true that the fifteenth–century parliament did not possess the authority to 
institutionally control – or even monitor – the exchequer’s expenditure of lay 
taxation and credit,31 the central thrust of Wolffe and Lander’s argument needs to be 
disputed.32  We have seen that medieval fiscal theory was clear that the existence of 
a particular ‘necessity’ ought to underlie governments’ seeking of taxation, and that 
the proceeds of taxes granted by representative assemblies ought to be employed in 
funding governments’ response to particular ‘necessities’.  Chapter 1.2 has shown 
that the development of the fiscal constitution of later medieval England during the 
‘long’ fourteenth century was shaped by these strictures.  The Commons granted lay 
taxes and parliament underwrote credit only in response to specific royal pleas of 
‘necessity’.  Indeed, the Commons began to continuously re–grant indirect taxation 
during the late fourteenth century in order to provide for the exchequer’s servicing of 
excess ‘ordinary’ expenditure without its needing to make recourse to lay taxation or 
loans.  Bearing in mind these important observations, the approach to parliamentary–
controlled ‘extraordinary’ revenue and ‘extraordinary’ and ‘ordinary’ expenditure 
outlined above – undertaken within the context of re–construction of the royal 
budget as outlined in the previous paragraph – is necessary in order to gauge trends 
in the relative constitutionality of the exchequer’s management of lay taxation, credit 
and indirect taxation during the late Lancastrian period.  This provides one with a 
methodology capable of addressing the important historiographical issue, regarding 
the extent to which the late Lancastrian government was employing lay taxation and 
credit in the financing of ‘ordinary’ charges during the 1430s and 1440s, which we 
                                                            
30 Wolffe, The Royal Demesne in English History, especially Chapters 1–3; B. P. Wolffe, The Crown 
Lands, 1461–1536: An Aspect of Yorkist and Early Tudor Government (London, 1970), especially pp. 
1–28; J. L. Lander, Government and Community: England, 1450–1509 (London, 1980), p. 67.  
31 Though see the discussion in Chapters 2.2 and 2.3 regarding intermittent parliamentary attempts, 
during periods of political crisis, to institutionally control and monitor government expenditure 
through the appointment of special war treasurers.  
32 What follows build upon the points made in Chapter 1.2.  
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have seen has emerged from revisionist re–appraisals of the fiscal history of the 
Lancastrian period.  
Having established, then, the purpose of my working with the receipt and issue rolls, 
it is necessary to turn to how I have used these records in order to undertake the 
enquiry into the exchequer’s management of parliamentary–controlled revenue 
outlined above.  We must begin by discussing the structure and content of the receipt 
and issue rolls.  Receipt rolls recorded, on a term by term basis, the exchequer’s 
income.33  This included cash receipts, which are identified by the marginal receipt 
roll annotation sol.34  It also included money assigned at source to particular 
government charges, which are identified by the marginal receipt roll annotation pro
followed by the charge to which the revenue in question had been assigned.  The 
procedure of assignment was rather complex and requires some explanation.  The 
practice of assigning revenue at source had developed, during the early fourteenth 
century, as a fiscal administrative expedient by which the government could avoid 
paying all its charges in cash at the exchequer yet nevertheless keep track of all of its 
revenue.  On assigning revenue to a figure to which the government owed money, 
the exchequer split a tally in two.  Half of the tally was kept by the exchequer and 
the other half was given to the individual in question.  This stipulated the sum to be 
paid and the revenue source from which payment was to be provided.  The recipient 
of the assignment would bring his tally before the official responsible for 
administering the revenue source from which his payment had been assigned – say, 
for example, the customs and subsidies at the port of London.  The tally would be 
handed over by the person in receipt of the assignment in return for payment.  The 
official – in this case the London customs officer – would then return the tally to the 
exchequer, in order for the latter to keep track of the financial transaction which had 
taken place.  It was only at this point that the exchequer acknowledged payment of 
the individual in question.  It is not true that the increased outsourcing of public 
                                                            
33 For similar discussions to that provided in this paragraph, see also Steel, Receipt, especially pp. 
xxi–x; Kirby, ‘The Issues of the Lancastrian Exchequer and Lord Cromwell’s Estimates of 1433’, pp. 
122–5.  
34 Sol was a central medieval French monetary unit which by the fourteenth century in England had 
come to be associated with cash (see R. E. Latham, Revised Medieval Latin Wordlist from British and 
Irish Sources (Oxford, 2008), p. 443).  
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expenditure during the course of the later medieval period necessarily led to fiscal 
instability.  So long as it was efficiently managed, the system of assignment provided 
the exchequer with a perfectly viable means of financing a high level of expenditure.  
Complications did arise, however, when the exchequer assigned revenue which 
failed to materialise and government charges went unpaid.  In the event of such an 
occurrence the figure who had failed to secure repayment returned his tally to the 
exchequer, often after a significant time delay.  The exchequer then crossed out the 
assignment which had been recorded on the receipt roll as servicing the aborted 
payment and added an entry next to that which had been crossed out which created 
the fiction that the unpaid charge had lent the sum of money which he was still 
owed.  This constituted a book–keeping technique, somewhat confusingly referred to 
by historians as a ‘fictitious loan’, which prevented the exchequer from needing to 
alter the total of the receipt roll and served to push the payment of the charge in 
question into the future.  The exchequer subsequently drew up a new tally against a 
future revenue source, and the charge attempted to secure payment for the second 
time.  In contrast to the complexities of the receipt rolls, the issue rolls simply 
catalogued all of the exchequer’s expenditure – both from cash receipts and 
successful and aborted assignments – in relation to which sums of money and 
sources of payment were detailed.  ‘Fictitious loans’ were not entered on to the issue 
rolls, though when the future payments which individual ‘fictitious loans’ 
necessitated were made, these would appear on the issue rolls as well as on the 
receipt rolls.35  
Bearing these points regarding the structure and content of the receipt and issue rolls 
in mind, it has been necessary to examine the receipt rolls in order to ascertain the 
level of revenue, both cash and assigned, which derived from lay taxation, indirect 
taxation and credit per annum.  A large proportion of annual assignments related to 
the repayment of loans.  It has also been necessary to note incidences when the 
exchequer repaid loans from revenue sources other than lay and indirect taxation, so 
as to gain a full understanding of the exchequer’s servicing of the repayment of 
loans.  The remainder of the exchequer’s annual assignments almost always serviced 
the payment of an assortment of ‘ordinary’ charges such as the royal household or 
                                                            
35 The significance of ‘fictitious loans’ is discussed on pp. 20–21.  
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the Calais garrison.36  The sum total of annual assignments from lay and indirect tax 
revenue servicing ‘ordinary’ charges is viewed alongside an estimate of the sum total 
of annual assignments from alternative revenue sources servicing ‘ordinary’ charges.  
This latter estimate is arrived at by subtracting annual assignments servicing the 
repayment of loans, and ‘ordinary’ assignments from the revenue sources which I 
have examined in detail, from the sum total of annual assignments derived from 
Steel’s published data relating to general trends in public income.37  In order to 
estimate how the exchequer employed cash revenue from the parliamentary–
controlled revenue sources noted above, it has been necessary to turn to the issue 
rolls.  Through calculating annual ‘extraordinary’ expenditure from an examination 
of the issue rolls, it has been possible to estimate the level of cash receipts from lay 
taxation and credit which the exchequer would have been required to employ, per 
annum, in the payment of ‘extraordinary’ charges.   An examination of the issue 
rolls, viewed alongside the assignments relating to ‘ordinary’ charges discussed 
above, allows the historian to ascertain the extent to which the exchequer’s 
remaining cash receipts from the parliamentary–controlled revenue sources outlined 
above, alongside cash revenue from alternative revenue sources derived from Steel’s 
published data,38 was employed by the exchequer, per annum, in servicing the 
payment of excess ‘ordinary’ expenditure and/or in the building–up of a cash surplus  
In addition to these lines of enquiry, an examination of aborted assignments 
(‘fictitious loans’) servicing both the repayment of loans and the payment of 
‘ordinary’ charges, per annum, provides one with a means of gauging trends in 
government debt.  This is derived from my examination of ‘fictitious loans’ incurred 
against lay tax and indirect tax revenue, which is viewed vis–à–vis Steel’s published 
data regarding total ‘fictitious loans’.
This last point is particularly important, since trends in government debt provide one 
with a means of assessing the relative success of fiscal policies negotiated in 
parliament in servicing royal financial needs and preventing a build–up of long–term 
                                                            
36 This relates both to what we might call ‘current’ charges – i.e., first time assignments – and re–
assignments relating to the payment of ‘fictitious loans’ incurred during previous exchequer 
terms/years.  For a detailed discussion of ‘fictitious loans, see the following paragraph.    
37 Steel, Receipt, pp. 436–45.  
38Ibid.
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fiscal problems.  To what extent, though, is it viable to use aborted assignments 
(‘fictitious loans’) as a simple index of government debt?  A tradition of scholarship 
from H. Jenkinson and D. Broome to Steel viewed the later medieval exchequer’s 
incurring of ‘fictitious loans’ as an inherently negative development.39  Yet this 
reflects moralistic, late modern beliefs regarding the dangers of public debt, rather 
than the realities of later medieval exchequer finance.40  It is now well known that 
the exchequer’s incurring of a low level of ‘fictitious loans’ – up to around 15% of 
total assignments – was a regular feature of fourteenth and fifteenth century public 
finance, and was manageable in the medium term.   Serious fiscal problems arose 
only when ‘fictitious loans’ increased to such a level that the exchequer’s ability to 
finance future current charges was jeopardised owing to the build–up of a back 
catalogue of aborted assignments.41  This occurred when ‘fictitious loans’ were 
allowed to rise to somewhere in the region of 20% to 30% of total assignments.  It 
needs to be noted, however, that problems related to the fiscal credibility of the later 
medieval exchequer could develop when the level of ‘fictitious loans’ was lower 
than this figure.  For example, during the 1420s – notwithstanding the relatively low 
level of ‘fictitious loans’ which characterised this period – the exchequer lost the 
support of its creditors owing to a worsening depression in the export trade.42  
Problems of this kind invariably led to a worsening debt problem, since the 
exchequer’s inability to secure the requisite level of credit tended to lead to its 
incurring of an increasing level of ‘fictitious loans’ over time, in the absence of 
viable alternative sources of revenue from which the charges which the exchequer 
had intended to pay from loan revenue could have been financed.  As Chapter Three 
illustrates, this is what occurred during the 1420s.   To draw the above points 
together, then, it is possible to use ‘fictitious loans’ as a means of assessing the 
solvency of later medieval government, so long as one is careful to avoid adopting a 
simplistic approach to the subject of debt and appreciates that problems relating to 
fiscal stability could emerge prior to the build–up of a high level of ‘fictitious loans’.  
                                                            
39 H. Jenkinson & D. Broome, ‘An Exchequer Statement of Receipts and Issues, 1339–40’, EHR, 58 
(1943), pp. 210–16; Steel, Receipt.  
40 The following paragraph draws upon points made by G. L. Harriss, ’Fictitious Loans’, Ec.HR, 2nd
series, 8 (1955–6), pp. 187–99.  
41 For this and the following sentence, see G. L. Harriss, ‘Financial Policy’, in Henry V: the Practice 
of Kingship, ed. G. L. Harriss (Oxford, 1985), especially pp. 160–1.  
42 See Chapter 3.2 for a detailed discussion.  
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This lengthy discussion of key terms employed in analysing material derived from 
the receipt and issue rolls, the structure and content of these documents and the 
manner in which I have approached working with them has been necessary in order 
to provide the reader with an understanding of the methodology employed in order to 
arrive at the budgetary data which is presented in Chapters Three to Six.    It is 
important at this point to stress, however, that the budgetary data provided in these 
chapters is viewed in the context of a broader examination of exchequer finance, 
since it follows that, if one is concerned with the role played by lay and indirect 
taxation in the royal budget, one also needs to investigate the relative efficiency of 
the exchequer in bringing in revenue from these sources.  For, if the exchequer was 
able to efficiently administer the local collection and receipt of lay and indirect tax 
revenue, then its ability to employ this revenue in the requisite manner so as to 
ensure relative fiscal stability would be enhanced.  In order to address these issues it 
is necessary to turn to the enrolled lay and indirect tax accounts and local fiscal 
documentation.  What follows considers these sources in turn.  It is possible, through 
an examination of the enrolled lay and indirect tax accounts, to ascertain the yield of 
particular lay taxes and indirect taxes.  This thesis examines the enrolled lay tax 
accounts for all of the lay taxes of Henry VI’s reign.  For each of these lay taxes, an 
attempt is made to differentiate between the value of the lay tax quota, which is 
defined as the gross yield, and net lay tax revenue, or the amount of revenue brought 
into the exchequer.  This methodology builds upon important scholarship on the 
enrolled lay taxes of the fourteenth and early fifteenth centuries, which up until now 
has not been brought forward into the late Lancastrian period.43  Regarding the 
enrolled indirect tax accounts, this thesis provides a detailed examination of S. 
Jenks’ transcription of these accounts in order to quantify revenue from the customs 
and subsidies, per exchequer annum, which is referred to in Chapters Three to Six as 
the gross indirect tax yield.
                                                            
43 Ormrod, ‘The Crown and the English Economy, 1290–1348’; W. M. Ormrod, ‘The English 
Government and the Black Death of 1348–9’, in England in the Fourteenth Century: Proceedings of 
the 1985 Harlaxton (Woodbridge, 1986), pp. 175–88; I. R. Abbott, ‘Taxation of Personal Property 
and of Clerical Incomes, 1399-1402’, Speculum, 17 (1942), pp. 471–98.  
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It has not been possible to relate trends in gross indirect tax revenue derived from the 
enrolled indirect tax accounts to local fiscal documentation regarding the 
administration of the customs and subsidies in any meaningful way.  This owes, in 
part, to the haphazard survival of local particulars of account.  It also owes to the 
extent to which the surviving particulars of account are of very limited use to the 
fiscal historian.  Issues which it might be assumed the local particulars of account 
would shine light upon – for example, the rate of tonnage and poundage paid by 
particular privileged groups – are more easily answered through making recourse to 
the enrolled customs accounts.44  Indeed, these documents are only really an 
important source for economic historians concerned with questions relating to trends 
in commerce and trade.45  More useful, as far as this thesis is concerned, is material 
relating to the local administration of lay taxation.  There was a misguided 
assumption, on the part of much twentieth–century scholarship, that local fiscal 
documentation, in relation to fifteenths and tenths granted after the fixing of the 
national lay tax quota in 1334, ceased to be of much value to the historian owing to 
the administration’s failure to re–assess wealth each time parliament granted a 
fifteenth and tenth.46  The intensive work undertaken on local particulars of account 
and related material for the later medieval and early modern lay taxes during the 
1990s which culminated in the online publication of the E 179 database cataloguing 
local lay tax documentation has, however, paved the way for subsequent important 
research which is beginning to demonstrate just how much one can learn from this 
material.47  Local particulars of account, inquisitions, exemptions and royal writs can 
                                                            
44 See, for example, Chapter 4, footnote 83.  
45 See, for example, T. H. Lloyd’s important work on Hanseatic merchants: T. H. Lloyd, England and 
the German Hanse, 1157–1611 (Cambridge, 1991).  J. L. Bolton has also made use of the local 
particulars of account in his detailed work on individual merchants: J. L. Bolton, ‘London Merchants 
and the Borromei Bank in the 1430s: The Role of Local Credit Networks’, in Parliament, 
Personalities and Power: Papers presented to Linda S Clark, ed. H. Kleineke (Woodbridge, 2011), 
pp. 53–73.  I am indebted to Professor Bolton for having discussed with me the limitations of archival 
material relating to the administration of the customs and subsidies.  
46 Thus, J. F. Willard did not extend his important study of the administration of lay taxation beyond 
1334: J. F. Willard, Parliamentary Taxes on Personal Property: A Study in Mediaeval English 
Financial Administration (Cambridge, MA, 1934).  See also J. F. Hadwin, ‘The Medieval Lay 
Subsidies and Economic History’, Ec.HR, 2nd series, 36 (1983), pp. 200–17.  
47 E 179 Database, www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/e179.  For important recent research on this material 
see C. Dyer, ‘Taxation and the Communities in Late Medieval England’, in Progress and Problems in 
Medieval England, ed. R. H. Britnell & J. Hatcher (Cambridge, 1996), pp. 168–190; C. Dyer, ‘Costs 
and Benefits of English Direct Taxation, 1275–1525’, in La Fiscalita Nell'economia Europea Secc. 
XIII–XVIII, ed. S. Cavaciocchi (Prato, 2008), pp. 909–24; W. M. Ormrod, ‘Poverty and Privilege: The 
Fiscal Burden in England (XIIIth–XVth Centuries)’, in La Fiscalita Nell'economia Europea Secc.
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be used to assess problems arising in the local administration of lay taxation, such as 
calls for exemption from tax payment, evasion and even unrest amongst taxpayers 
and the breakdown of relations between fiscal administrators and taxpayer.  And 
local assessments can, on occasion, shed light on administrative efforts to revise the 
rate of taxation which the administration sought to raise from particular areas.  In 
certain cases, this material can be built upon through recourse to related information 
derived from the memoranda rolls.  When related to the analysis of trends in gross 
and net tax revenue discussed in the previous paragraph, these avenues of enquiry 
can shed light on the exchequer’s relative ability, over time, to mobilise the lay tax 
quota.
It is fitting to conclude this Introduction by stressing that the methodological 
overview provided here does not claim to constitute a guide to how the principal 
fiscal records with which this thesis is concerned have to be used by the historian.   
Thus, notwithstanding the reservations noted above regarding attempts to produce a 
fully audited balance sheet of public revenue and expenditure from the later 
medieval receipt and issue rolls, one could perhaps validly attempt to undertake such 
an investigation for a limited time period, which focuses upon a detailed 
investigation of, for example, particular categories of ‘ordinary’ expenditure.  
Similarly, one could provide a systematic analysis of the local particulars of account 
relating to indirect taxation or a fuller examination of local lay tax documentation 
than that offered here.  Indeed, I have investigated more local lay tax material than 
that which is discussed in Chapters Three to Six.  This material deserves to be 
discussed in full and placed in a social and economic context.  Unfortunately, it has 
not been possible to do so in this thesis, owing to constraints of space and the need to 
relate local material to broader fiscal trends.  What this section has hoped to 
illustrate, however, is that the methodology outlined above is appropriate for the 
fiscal constitutional analysis offered by this thesis
                                                                                                                                                                           
XIII–XVIII, pp. 637–56; W. M. Ormrod, ‘Henry V and the English Taxpayer’, in Henry V. New 
Interpretations, ed. G. Dodd  (Woodbridge, 2013), pp. 187–216.  
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CHAPTER TWO:
THE FISCAL CONSTITUTION OF LATER MEDIEVAL ENGLAND, c. 
1272–1420 
This chapter charts the development of the fiscal constitution of later medieval 
England during the period between Edward I’s reign and the final years of the reign 
of Henry V.  It focuses upon the dynamic interplay between an emergent fiscal 
political culture centred on subjects’ obligation to support the state during periods of 
war through the provision of supply, and trends in the exchequer’s implementation 
of royal fiscal policy.  The chapter is split into three sections.  The first provides an 
overview of the fiscal constitution of the central medieval ‘domain state’, and its 
breakdown during the course of the thirteenth century amidst fiscal, economic and 
political strains.  The second section examines the transformative effect which the 
scholastic doctrine of ‘necessity’ had in affecting the emergence and development of 
a tax–centric fiscal constitution during the Edwardian period.  Attention is drawn to 
parliament’s acceptance that the government’s adjudication of a ‘necessity’ of the 
realm during periods of war required its consent to lay taxation and indirect taxation, 
and the political community’s concession, by the close of Edward III’s reign, that 
indirect taxation constituted an effectively permanent charge.  Concomitantly, the 
development of fiscal administrative practices which enabled the exchequer to 
efficiently manage tax revenue and expenditure is traced.  The third section focuses 
on the fiscal constitutional difficulties encountered by the governments of the reigns 
of Richard II and Henry IV in their attempts to secure lay taxation as a means of 
financing ‘ordinary’ charges at a time of long–term problems in the export trade in 
wool and much reduced indirect tax revenue.  The financial context of these 
developments is traced.    
2.1 Preconditions: The breakdown of the fiscal constitution of central medieval 
England
The fiscal constitution of later medieval England emerged, during the late thirteenth 
century, out of the failure of the fiscal constitution of the central medieval state to 
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adapt to changing financial and economic circumstances.  The fiscal constitution of 
the central medieval state was centred upon the primacy of revenue from the royal 
domain and feudal prerogatives in government finance.1  Prior to the advent of 
national wars, particularly during the Norman period, governments had largely been 
able to function within this straightjacket.2  Towards the close of the central 
medieval period, however, particularly during the reigns of John and Henry III, 
escalating continental military costs and a sustained price inflation combined to 
result in the government requiring national taxation in order to finance its wars and 
remain solvent.3  During this period, the government was unable to secure the level 
of taxation necessary in order to finance total military expenditure.4  The reason for 
this lay in the outcome of a protracted struggle between crown and barons during the 
period of King John’s attempted re–conquest of Normandy.  The government of 
John appears to have viewed subjects’ contribution of the new lay taxes on moveable 
property, devised by the royal administration, as an extension of the latter’s feudal 
obligations.  The barons, however, insisted that their consent was required for the 
government to levy these taxes.  In 1215 the barons forced Magna Carta on the 
crown.  Magna Carta stipulated that the crown could not levy taxation without 
consent.  This provided the barons – and increasingly, during the middle decades of 
the thirteenth century, an expansive political community which included the 
Commons in full parliament – with the constitutional right to adjudicate royal 
financial demands.5  During Henry III’s reign, only six taxes were conceded.6  
                                                            
1 For discussion of the thirteenth-century English ‘domain state’, upon which much of the following is 
based, see Ormrod, ‘England in the Middle Ages’, pp. 21–9.    
2 Ormrod, ‘England in the Middle Ages’, pp. 22–27 provides statistics illustrating the buoyancy of 
domainal and prerogative revenues up to the 1200s.  See also J. A. Green, ‘William Rufus, Henry I 
and the Royal Demesne’, History, 64 (1979), pp. 337–52; J. A. Green, The Government of England 
under Henry I (Cambridge, 1986), especially p. 223.  
3 For military expenditure see J. C. Holt, ‘The Loss of Normandy and Royal Finance’, in War and 
Government in the Middle Ages: Essays in Honour of J. O. Prestwich, ed. J. Gillingham & J. C. Holt 
(Woodbridge, 1984), pp. 92–105.  For the economic context, see P. D. A. Harvey, ‘The English 
Inflation of 1180–1220’, in Peasants, Knights and Heretics. Studies in Medieval English Social 
History, ed. R. H. Hilton (Cambridge, 1976), pp. 57–84.  
4 For this, and what follows, see S. K. Mitchell’s work on the transformative effect which the theory 
of consent had upon the fiscal politics of the early thirteenth century: S. K. Mitchell, Studies in 
Taxation under John and Henry III (New Haven, 1914); S. K. Mitchell, Taxation in Medieval 
England (New Haven, 1951)).  J. C. Holt provides a detailed discussion of the role played by baronial 
fiscal political concerns in effecting the barons’ enforcement of the Great Charter upon the crown: J. 
C. Holt, Magna Carta, (Cambridge, 1992).  
5 What follows is based upon M. C. Prestwich, English Politics in the Thirteenth Century (London, 
1990), pp. 109–28; see also J. R. Maddicott, The Origins of the English Parliament, 924–1327
(Oxford, 2010), especially pp. 119–26, 150, 176–7.
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Significantly, no taxes were granted during the political crises of the 1240s and 
1250s, when parliament appears to have consistently rejected royal overtures for 
supply.7  This resulted in the development of serious financial and administrative 
problems.8  In the absence of tax revenue, notable developments in the exchequer’s 
role as the newly established central organ of public finance from the 1230s could 
not prevent the build–up of a catalogue of debts and concomitant accounting 
problems. 
2.2 The emergence and early development of the later medieval fiscal constitution, c. 
1272–1369
In response to the developments traced above, the government of Edward I sought to 
establish a new fiscal political compact between crown and polity as a means of 
ensuring a more secure, regular supply of taxation in order to finance royal military 
campaigns.  This involved appeasing the political community, after the acrimonious 
struggles which had characterised the previous reign. The Commons – who had 
previously attended parliament only very occasionally, apparently at the behest of 
the barons as a means of strengthening the latter’s political position during the 
Barons’ War9 – were summoned to parliament more regularly between the 1270s and 
1290s.10  On several occasions during this period, the Commons were instructed to 
present their constituents’ grievances to the crown, which Edward’s government 
offered to redress.11  This trend in conciliatory politics encouraged an expansive 
political community, composed of barons and Commons, the latter of which acted 
with full authority to bind their constituents to taxation granted by parliament, to 
grant taxation, or at the very least not reject royal overtures for supply as had 
                                                                                                                                                                           
6 See Maddicott, The Origins of the English Parliament, Appendix, pp. 455–72.
7 Full details are provided by Maddicott, The Origins of the English Parliament, Appendix, pp. 455–
72; see also Prestwich, English Politics, pp. 122–8.  
8 For what follows see R. C. Stacey, Policy, Politics and Finance under Henry III, 1216–1245
(Oxford, 1987); Harriss, King, Parliament, pp. 193–201; M. H. Mills, ‘Adventus Vicecomitum, 1258–
72’, EHR, 36 (1921), pp. 481-96; M. H. Mills, ‘The Reforms at the Exchequer, 1232–42’, TRHS, 4th
series, 10 (1927), pp. 111–33; R. Cassidy, ‘Adventus Vicecomitum and the Financial Crisis of Henry 
III’s reign, 1250–72’, EHR, 126 (2011), pp. 614–27. 
9 J. R. Maddicott, ‘Magna Carta and the Local Community, 1215-1259’, Past and Present, 102 
(1984), pp. 25–65.
10 For the role of the Commons in Edward’s parliament’s in general, see M. C. Prestwich, Edward I
(London, 1988), especially pp. 448–51; Maddicott, The Origins of the English Parliament, especially 
pp. 287–93; 312–17.    
11 J. R. Maddicott, ‘Parliament and the Constituencies, 1272–1377’, in The English Parliament in the 
Middle Ages, ed. R. G. Davies & J. H. Denton (Manchester, 1981), pp. 61–87.  
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occurred during the middle period of Henry III’s reign.12  The first nineteen years of 
Edward I’s reign up to and including 1290 witnessed only three lay tax grants.13  Of 
these three grants, however, two were made by both barons and Commons, 
illustrating that the government’s ability to secure parliamentary consent to royal 
impositions was no longer dependent upon baronial consent alone, as it had been 
during the reign of Henry III.14  Even more significantly, the royal requests for 
supply which preceded these three grants were couched in the context of a so–called 
‘necessity’ of the realm: defensive war.15  The discourse of ‘necessity’ derived from 
Romano-canonical scholastic tradition which stipulated that, at a time of national 
emergency – specifically defensive war which threatened the survival of the state –
subjects were obligated to provide their prince with financial aid.16  There has been 
considerable scholarly debate regarding the extent to which contemporary 
parliamentarians understood the intellectual ramifications of the discourse of 
‘necessity’.  Given the limitations of the surviving evidence centred upon the 
government’s presentation of its financial needs and the resultant parliamentary 
grants of lay taxation, it is unlikely that we will ever be able to satisfactorily resolve 
this issue.  It needs to be noted, however, that parliament publicly framed its grants 
of lay taxation in terms of the existence of a particular ‘necessity’: the ‘defence of 
the realm’.
The developments traced in the previous paragraph shaped the fiscal politics of the 
1290s, during which time Edward I waged costly wars in France and Scotland.  
Following the parliamentary lay tax of 1290, the government coerced three further 
grants of lay taxation, made by the barons and the Commons, and an indirect tax on 
wool exports, the so–called maltolt, all on pleas of ‘necessity’.17  Combined, these 
                                                            
12 J. G. Edwards, ‘The Plena Potestas of the English Parliamentary Representatives’, in Historical 
Studies of the English Parliament, ed. E. B. Fryde & E. Miller, 2 vols (Cambridge, 1970), 1, pp. 136–
49.  
13 Prestwich helpfully tabulates lay taxes granted during the course of Edward’s reign: Prestwich, 
Edward I, Appendix A, p. 569.  
14 These were the thirteenth granted in 1283 and the fifteenth granted in 1290: Harriss, King, 
Parliament, p. 42.  
15 Harriss, King, Parliament, pp. 39–43.  
16 For what follows, see Harriss, King, Parliament, pp. 45–8.  
17 Harriss, King, Parliament, pp. 49-50.  For Edward I’s military expenditure during the 1290s, see M. 
C. Prestwich, War, Politics and Finance under Edward I (London, 1972), p. 170.  The maltolt was 
granted by a magnate council, not parliament: Harriss, King, Parliament, p. 57.  
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impositions provoked a constitutional crisis in 1297.18  The barons contended that 
the political community’s obligation to grant supply in response to the crown’s 
evocation of its ‘necessity’ was negated by the widespread poverty which it was 
claimed had been caused by the royal tax burden.19  Edward I responded that the 
royal ‘necessity’ was so great that subjects had to continue to contribute supply; the 
temporary impoverishment of the realm was a necessary sacrifice in order to prevent 
the destruction of the state at the hands of foreign enemies.20  This disagreement 
between king and barons reflected different strands within scholastic thought.  
Thomas Aquinas, in particular, had stated that subjects’ financial obligations at times 
of national emergency ought not to result in their impoverishment.21  Yet even 
Thomist thought stressed the primacy of subjects’ obligations at times of national 
emergency, irrelevant of the hardship which this may cause.22  Philosophically, then, 
the king was on stronger ground than the barons.  This was reflected in the 
settlement of differences between the two parties, the so–called Confirmatio 
Cartarum of 1297.23  In Confirmatio Cartarum, Edward I conceded that taxation was 
confined to periods of ‘necessity’ which were, by their very nature, impermanent.  
The king stressed, however, that whilst the crown could not wilfully impoverish the
nation, subjects were obligated to grant taxation in response to a royal plea of 
‘necessity’, no matter how strong baronial or popular opinion regarding the 
economic context of royal fiscal policy.  This strongly implied that the political 
community merely consented to a plea of ‘necessity’; it did not possess the 
constitutional right to adjudicate the crown’s ‘necessity’.
The fiscal constitutional settlement of 1297 shaped the development of the later 
medieval ‘fiscal constitution’ during the early-to-mid fourteenth century.  
Throughout this period the crown did not seek supply during periods of peace.  Yet 
intermittent bouts of war with Scotland during the first three decades of the 
                                                            
18 For a general overview of the crisis, see Prestwich, Edward I, pp. 401–35.  For a detailed discussion 
of the financial and fiscal political context, see Harriss, King, Parliament, pp. 49–74.
19 J. G. Edwards, ‘Confirmatio Cartarum and Baronial Grievances in 1297’, EHR, 58 (1943), pp. 
147–141, 273–300; Harriss, King, Parliament, pp. 61–2.
20 Harriss, King, Parliament, p. 63.  
21 This theme is particularly strong in Summa Theologica: see Selected Political Writings, ed. A. P. 
D’Entrèves (Oxford, 1948), p. 134; Harriss, King, Parliament, p. 61.
22 G. Post, ‘Plena Potestas and Consent in Medieval Assemblies’, Traditio, 1 (1943), pp. 355–408; E. 
Kantorowicz, The King’s Two Bodies (Princeton, 1957), pp. 284–91.
23 For what follows see Harriss, King, Parliament, pp. 67–74.  
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fourteenth century, and the continuous state of war which existed between England 
and France during the period 1337 to 1360, allowed the crown to enforce 20 
parliamentary grants of lay taxation, and 11 grants of the maltolt tax on wool, on 
pleas of ‘necessity’ between 1297 and 1360.24  Ten of the lay taxes and 9 of the 
maltolt grants mentioned above were made during the first phase of the Hundred 
Years’ War.  Notwithstanding the inability of the political community to question the 
legitimacy of the crown’s fiscal demands during these periods of war, the early-to-
mid fourteenth century parliament attempted to impress upon the crown the need for 
the latter to redress parliamentary grievances relating to arbitrary royal exactions in 
their grants of lay taxation during the 1300s and 1310s.25  Parliament also insisted, 
during the first phase of the Hundred Years’ War, that the government of Edward III 
expend tax revenue on the ‘necessity’ for which taxation had been granted.26  During 
this same period, the Commons demanded that parliament – rather than merchant 
assemblies – grant the maltolt, the proceeds of which, as with lay taxation, it was 
insisted were to be expended on war.27     
It is necessary for us to place the above analysis of fiscal politics in the first half of 
the fourteenth century in the context of trends in fiscal administration.  The early–
fourteenth century government inherited serious fiscal administrative problems from 
Edward I.  As a short-term financial expedient, Edward’s wardrobe during the 1290s 
and 1300s had issued debentures redeemable at the exchequer, without any 
consideration of whether the exchequer was able to honour these bills.28  This had 
resulted in the wardrobe ceasing to be accountable to the exchequer, which led to its 
                                                            
24 For a discussion of the correlation between a state of war and the government’s pleading of its 
‘necessity’ during this period, see Harriss, King, Parliament, pp. 79–81.  For a list of these lay taxes, 
see Harriss, King, Parliament, Index, pp. 552–3.  For the grants of the maltolt, see Harriss, King, 
Parliament, pp. 426–49.  
25 Parliamentary grievances centred on prises.  For a full discussion, see Harriss, King, Parliament, 
pp. 98-127.  Mark Ormrod has demonstrated that the Commons’ opposition to royal prises 
complemented a broader move towards the Commons playing a greater role in parliamentary politics: 
W. M. Ormrod, ‘Agenda for Legislation, c. 1322–1340’, EHR, 105 (1990), pp. 1–33.  
26 Harriss, King, Parliament, pp. 313–54.  It needs to be stressed, however, that only during the 
political crisis of 1340 did parliament attempt to institutionally control the administration of lay 
taxation: see Harriss, King, Parliament, p. 261.   
27 Harriss, King, Parliament, Chapter 18, especially pp. 429–33, 445–7.  
28 M. C. Prestwich, ‘Exchequer and Wardrobe in the Later Years of Edward I’, BIHR, 46 (1973), 1–
10; W. M. Ormrod, ‘State–Building and State Finance in the Reign of Edward I’, in England in the 
Thirteenth Century, Proceedings of the 1989 Harlaxton Symposium, ed. W. M. Ormrod (Stamford, 
1991), p. 23.  
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accumulation of some £200,000 worth of debt.29  It was against the background of 
these fiscal and administrative problems that the government of Edward II sought to 
restore the exchequer’s primacy in national finance.  Historians used to believe that 
there was an ideological dimension to the restoration of exchequer primacy.  T. F. 
Tout, in particular, believed that this represented Edward II’s forced acceptance of a 
baronial programme of strengthening the offices of state as a means of opposing 
household government.30  It is now generally recognised, however, that 
strengthening the exchequer was the most effective means by which the government 
of Edward II could oversee revenue and expenditure and thus impose a degree of 
order to the public finances after the problems of the 1290s and 1300s.31  In order to 
achieve these aims, the Ordinances of 1311 emphasised the exchequer’s role as the 
central, controlling agency of national finance, which received all revenue and 
directed all expenditure.32  This was confirmed by subsequent Ordinances, in 1319, 
1323, 1324 and 1326.33  The Ordinance of 1319 corresponded to an attempt, on the 
part of the exchequer, to compile a half yearly estimate of receipts and issues.34  A 
similar estimate appears to have been produced at the time of the Ordinance of 1324.  
Improvements in auditing procedures assisted the exchequer in its ability to produce 
these early attempts to balance revenue and expenditure.  The multiple receipt and 
jornalia rolls which had characterised the late thirteenth and early fourteenth century 
lower exchequer were abandoned in favour of triplicate rolls, per exchequer term, 
relating to receipts and issues, which served to simplify the procedure of recording 
public revenue and expenditure.35  Concomitantly, the tally of assignment was 
introduced into fiscal record keeping, which allowed the later medieval exchequer to 
record revenue assigned at source.36
                                                            
29 Prestwich, ‘Exchequer and Wardrobe in the Later Years of Edward I’, pp. 4–5, 8.  
30 T. F. Tout, The Place of Edward II in English History, ed. H. Johnstone (Manchester, 1936)
31 See, in particular, Harriss, King, Parliament, pp. 208–14.
32 Harriss, King, Parliament, pp. 208–12; M. C. Prestwich, ‘The Ordinances of 1311, in Politics and 
Crisis in Fourteenth Century England, ed. J. Taylor & W. Childs (Gloucester, 1990), pp. 6–7.  
33 M. C. Buck, ‘The Reform of the Exchequer, 1316–1326’, EHR, 98 (1983), pp. 241–60; M. C. Buck, 
Politics, Finance and the Church in the Reign of Edward II (Cambridge, 1983), pp. 163–96.  
34  For this and the following sentence see Harriss, King, Parliament, pp. 216–17.  
35 Ormrod, ‘State–Building and State Finance in the Reign of Edward I’, p. 32.  
36 Ormrod, ‘State–Building and State Finance in the Reign of Edward I’, p. 29.  It also ought to be 
pointed out that the reforms of the 1320s involved an overhaul of the upper exchequer with an aim to 
speed up accounting procedures.  The process of removing ‘foreign accounts’ from the pipe roll, 
which had begun during the late thirteenth century, was continued, and the government added an extra 
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These developments provided the administration with the means of restoring 
government solvency and expending tax revenue upon the ‘necessity’ in response to 
which it had been granted.  The multiple assertions of the fiscal administrative 
supremacy of the exchequer traced above resulted in key ‘ordinary’, or permanent, 
charges such as the wardrobe coming to be fully – or almost fully – financed through 
the exchequer.37  And the rationalisation of the records of the lower exchequer, 
alongside the emergent practice of estimating revenue and expenditure, allowed the 
exchequer to effectively match domainal and customary ‘ordinary’ revenue to 
‘ordinary’ expenditure.38  The tally of assignment, meanwhile, assisted the 
exchequer in managing a deficit, in the event that a minor imbalance between 
revenue and expenditure arose.39  Particularly significant from our perspective, tax 
revenue was now recorded on the receipt rolls40 which enabled the administration to 
get a fuller picture of public revenue in its attempts to provide budgetary estimates 
and plan ‘extraordinary’ expenditure.  Notwithstanding these achievements, 
however, the administration of tax revenue posed continuing problems into the 
1330s.  No matter how efficient the exchequer’s central auditing procedures, if it was 
not able to ensure the efficient local assessment and collection of taxation then it 
would prove impossible, or incredibly difficult, for the exchequer to accurately plan 
to expend a particular level of tax revenue on ‘extraordinary’ costs.  As far as 
indirect tax revenue was concerned, this problem was basically insoluble.  The 
exchequer could intermittently shake up the local customs administration in an 
attempt to root out administrative collusion in the under–assessment of exported 
goods, as indeed it did on a number of occasions during the early–to–mid fourteenth 
                                                                                                                                                                           
baron and four auditors in order to supervise these accounts (this is a key theme of Buck, ‘The 
Reform of the Exchequer, 1316–1326’).  
37 The minimal size of the wardrobe ‘foreign receipt’ during this period, in the context of broader 
fiscal developments, is discussed in detail by Harriss, King, Parliament, pp. 208–28. 
38 It has been estimated that, by the close of Edward II’s reign, the exchequer was able to effectively 
finance its ‘ordinary’ budget from domainal and customary revenues: Harriss, King, Parliament, pp. 
128–59, especially p. 159.  
39 Owing to the lack of a thorough investigation of government income during this early phase in the 
history of the later medieval exchequer, it is at present impossible to comment on the extent to which 
fiscal imbalances arose.  Thanks to the research of Harriss (see footnote 38), however, it is possible to 
suggest that inevitable yearly fluctuations in revenue would never bring about more than a minor 
deficit – or indeed a minor surplus – during the early–to–mid fourteenth century.  
40 Ormrod, ‘State–Building and State Finance in the Reign of Edward I’, p. 33. 
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century.41  Ultimately, however, the level of total indirect tax revenue was dependent 
upon trends in the export trade; not trends in fiscal administration.  
With regard to lay tax revenue, the situation was more complex.  During the late 
thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries, the rate at which lay taxes were granted 
fluctuated; moveable property in rural areas tended to taxed at the rate of one 
fifteenth, whilst moveable property in urban areas was taxed at rates which varied 
between a twentieth and a sixth.42  Each new tax which parliament granted thus 
involved a whole–scale re-assessment of local wealth,43 which was beyond the 
capabilities of the local fiscal administration.  This is evident in violent fluctuations 
which characterised national lay tax assessments during this period.  The fifteenth of 
1290, for example, was assessed at £117,000,44 whilst the fifteenth of 1301 was 
assessed at £49,800.45  All lay taxes granted during the reign of Edward II – at very 
different rates – were assessed at between £33,000 and £43,000, illustrating a 
downward trend in yields over time.46  Underlying these developments there was 
clearly a large degree of administrative under–assessment and a developing culture 
of exemptions ‘which amounted (in plainer language) to fraud’.47  From the 
perspective of the exchequer, this manifest failure to effectively assess national 
wealth in response to each new lay tax granted by parliament posed a serious fiscal 
problem.  War with Scotland in the early 1330s, and the lead–up to the opening 
                                                            
41 R. L. Baker, The English Customs Service 1307–1343, a Study of Medieval Administration
(Philadelphia, 1961).  
42 For a table outlining the rate of subsidy levied for the lay taxes of the thirteenth and early fourteenth 
centuries, see Hadwin, ‘The Medieval Lay Subsidies and Economic History’, p. 217.  Both the 
assessment and net yield of all the lay taxes granted between 1290 and 1346 are tabulated in Ormrod, 
‘The Crown and the English Economy, 1290–1348’, p. 153.  
43 The classic work on the administration of lay taxation in the late thirteenth and early fourteenth 
centuries is Willard, Parliamentary Taxes on Personal Property, 1290–1334.
44 Ormrod, ‘The Crown and the English Economy, 1290–1348’, p. 153.  For a discussion of the
administrative context of this tax see Willard, Parliamentary Taxes on Personal Property, 1290–
1334, p. 343.
45 Ormrod, ‘The Crown and the English Economy, 1290–1348’, p. 153.
46 Ormrod, ‘The Crown and the English Economy, 1290–1348’, p. 153; Hadwin, ‘The Medieval Lay 
Subsidies and Economic History’, p. 207.  
47 Willard, Parliamentary Taxes on Personal Property, 1290–1334, especially pp. 81–6.  Quote from 
Hadwin, ‘The Medieval Lay Subsidies and Economic History’, p. 207.  We also have to bear in mind 
the possible effect of economic problems, related to fluctuations in the money supply and agricultural 
crisis, in shaping the exchequer’s difficulties in maximising yields.  The final sentence of this 
paragraph deals with the economic context of lay taxation during this period.  It needs to pointed out 
here, however, that it does not seem believable that the massive fluctuations in assessments noted 
above reflect economic changes alone (for these points see Hadwin, ‘The Medieval Lay Subsidies and 
Economic History’, p. 207; Ormrod, ‘The Crown and the English Economy, 1290–1348’, p. 155).  
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phase of the Hundred Years’ War in the mid–to–late 1330s, necessitated stable lay 
tax yields so that the administration could effectively plan for the financing of high 
levels of military expenditure.  This led parliament to freeze the national lay tax 
quota in relation to the administration of the fifteenth and tenth of 1334 and all 
subsequent lay taxes, the local administration of which was to be based upon that of 
the fifteenth and tenth of 1332 rather than any new assessments of moveable 
wealth.48  Subsequent fifteenths and tenths yielded stable sums in the region of 
£38,000.49  The extent to which this constituted a significant achievement on the part 
of Edward III’s government is only fully appreciated when we consider that the high 
level of parliamentary lay tax grants which characterised the early years of the 
Hundred Years’ War constituted a heavy economic burden in a pre–plague economy 
characterised by high prices, high rents and low wages, a crisis in the money supply 
and agricultural problems.50
Notwithstanding the fiscal administrative developments traced above, the stability of 
the public finances was undermined during the late 1330s and early 1340s.  The very 
heavy ‘extraordinary’ expenditure which characterised this period led Edward III to 
employ his wardrobe in the government’s credit operations in a manner reminiscent 
of the 1290s and 1300s.  Edward’s wardrobe received tax revenue and large–scale 
loans advanced by Italian merchants in advance of tax revenue through its ‘foreign’ 
receipt, which ballooned, especially during the period 1338–40.51  These problems 
have been the focus of much important work,52 yet from a fiscal constitutional 
                                                            
48 Willard, Parliamentary Taxes on Personal Property, 1290–1334, pp. 123–4; Hadwin, ‘The 
Medieval Lay Subsidies and Economic History’, pp. 201–2.   
49 Ormrod, ‘The Crown and the English Economy, 1290–1348’, p. 153; Ormrod, ‘The English 
Government and the Black Death of 1348-49, pp. 182–5.  
50 Ormrod, ‘The Crown and the English Economy, 1290–1348’, provides an authoritative discussion 
of the economic context.  For a discussion of the monetary context, see M. C. Prestwich, ‘Edward I’s 
Monetary Policies and their Consequences’, Ec.HR, 2nd series, 22 (1969), pp. 406–16; M. C. 
Prestwich, ‘Early Fourteenth–Century Exchange Rates’, Ec.HR, 2nd series, 32 (1979), pp. 470–82.  
For the agricultural context, see I. Kershaw, ‘The Great Famine and Agrarian Crisis in England, 
1315–22’, Past and Present, 59 (1973), pp. 3–50. 
51 Harriss, King, Parliament, pp. 223–8.
52 This is a key theme of Harriss, King, Parliament, Chapters  9, 11 and 12; E. B. Fryde, ‘The 
Financial Resources of Edward III in the Netherlands, 1337–40’, Revue Belge de Philologie et 
d’histoire, 45 (1967), pp. 1142–93; E. B. Fryde, ‘Materials for the Study of Edward III’s Credit 
Operations, 1327–48’ BIHR, 22 (1949), pp. 105–38; E. B. Fryde, ‘Materials for the Study of Edward 
III’s Credit Operations, 1327–48’ BIHR, 23 (1950), pp. 1–30.  T. K. Moore and A. R. Bell, of the 
University of Reading Business School, are currently engaged in a project to quantify the level of 
government debt accrued as a result of Edward III’s credit schemes in the 1340s.  From our 
perspective, however, this issue is of minimal importance since the vast sums owed by Edward III 
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perspective their significance ought not to be over–emphasised.  As we have seen, 
during this period a royal plea of ‘necessity’ compelled parliament to concede an 
unprecedented level of supply, and the government was committed to employing tax 
revenue in the financing of war in line with the Commons’ stipulations.  
Concomitantly, and perhaps as a result of the absence of any serious fiscal 
constitutional disagreements between crown and parliament, there was no 
breakdown of administrative efficiency in the bringing in of taxation; indeed, as we 
have already seen, the freezing of the lay tax quota in 1334, discussed above, 
ensured markedly increased efficiency in this respect.53  Notwithstanding these 
important points, however, it was necessary for the king to abandon his wardrobe 
expedients, since these threatened the exchequer’s medium–to–long term ability to 
plan its fiscal operations.54  This led the exchequer, under the direction of Treasurer 
William Edington during the late 1340s and early 1350s, to re–assert the principle 
that all revenue and expenditure be recorded at the exchequer.55  By the close of the 
first phase of the Hundred Years’ War in 1360, the exchequer was once more firmly 
in control of the public finances. 
The dynamic interplay between fiscal politics and exchequer finance with which we 
have thus far been concerned underwent significant changes during the period of 
peace following the Treaty of Brétigny of 1360.  The military successes of the 1350s, 
specifically the English acquisition of Calais, resulted in a radically increased level 
of permanent, ‘ordinary’, expenditure.56  This led to the development of a structural 
deficit between the sum total of royal domainal and customary ‘ordinary’ revenues 
and ‘ordinary’ expenditure.  As noted above, the exchequer was capable of 
regulating a minor, short–term, imbalance between ‘ordinary’ revenue and 
                                                                                                                                                                           
were to Italian merchants.  The potential bankruptcy of foreign firms was not a concern of the English 
parliament.  This was no longer the case later in the fifteenth century, however, when large–scale 
loans from domestic lenders forged an important link between government debt and parliamentary 
fiscal politics: see Ormrod, ‘England in the Middle Ages’, pp. 36–8.  During the reign of Henry VI, 
the exchequer was placed under a great deal of pressure to demonstrate its fiscal credibility vis–à–vis 
creditors, as we shall see in Chapters Three to Six.  
53 See footnote 49.  
54 The Commons’ concern with Edward’s fiscal activities shaped, to a large extent, the political crisis 
of 1340.  In this year parliament placed national finance in the hands of a magnate council, which was 
to control receipts and issues: see Harriss, King, Parliament, p. 261.  
55 W. M. Ormrod, ‘The Protecolla Rolls and English Government Finance, 1353–64’, EHR, 102 
(1987), pp. 68–9.  
56 The following two paragraphs are based on Harriss, King, Parliament, pp. 466–508.  
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expenditure through the re–assignment of debts.  It was not possible, however, for 
the exchequer to effectively manage a deficit of substantial proportions in this way.  
In the event that such a deficit arose any attempt, on the part of the administration, to 
regulate debt accumulation through re–assignment would inevitably serve to clog up 
the public finances with incrementally rising levels of debt which the exchequer 
could not effectively tackle.  This, in turn, would seriously obstruct the financing of 
current charges, and the exchequer would be rendered increasingly insolvent.  What 
was required in the 1360s was thus a large injection of extra revenue, on a regular 
basis, which could only viably be achieved through parliament’s consistent re–
granting of taxation.  This situation forced Edward III’s government to raise the 
question of permanent, or ‘peacetime’, taxation in 1362, 1365 and 1368.  The 
manner in which the government sought taxation on these three occasions, and the 
Commons’ subsequent provision of supply, are of such significance in the history of 
the later medieval fiscal constitution that they need to be examined in full.
None of the above occasions witnessed the government plead its ‘necessity’.  In 
1362, the government did not publicly refer to its financial position, nor did it allude 
to the need for supply in terms unrelated to a ‘necessity’ of the realm.57  In 1365, the 
chancellor’s opening parliamentary address did not refer to financial matters, though 
during the course of this parliament the government instigated a discussion regarding 
the state of the public finances, specifically the development of a deficit which it was 
stated had been demonstrated to certain peers.  This served as the pretext for an 
appeal to parliament to consider some way in which the king’s ‘honour’ and ‘estate’ 
could be maintained.58  In 1368 the government was even more explicit in expressing
its financial need.  The chancellor’s opening parliamentary address equated Edward 
III’s legacy of martial success and the securing of a favourable peace with subjects’ 
provision of their goods.  Framed in this context, the subsequent statement that the 
government intended to continue to ‘preserve’ the realm comes across as an allusion 
to the need for supply.  As in 1365, the government subsequently instigated a 
discussion regarding the state of the public finances and the need for supply.59  The 
fiscal political trend traced above illustrates an increasing level of royal confidence, 
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58 Harriss, King, Parliament, p. 468.  
59 Harriss, King, Parliament, p. 468.  
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as the 1360s wore on, regarding the ability of government to seek parliament’s 
concession of peacetime supply.  This needs to be viewed in the context of the 
exchequer’s ability to build upon earlier estimates of revenue and expenditure 
discussed above and produce more detailed statements, centred not upon round 
figures relating to revenue and expenditure, but rather a more detailed list of 
principal annual charges with the sum expended upon each, set alongside estimated 
revenue.60  The explicit aim of these statements, which were produced in 1362–3 and 
1364, was to illustrate the existence of a substantial deficit.  These developments in 
the government’s fiscal strategy resulted in the Commons’ re–granting of the maltolt
on all of the three occasions discussed above.      
The trend in fiscal politics analysed in the previous paragraph marked a significant 
revision of the constitutional framework of later medieval public finance.  The 
government of Edward III had demonstrated its willingness, during a period of 
peace, to avoid insisting that parliament grant lay taxation, which the Commons 
clearly sought to reserve for ‘extraordinary’ expenditure during periods of 
‘necessity’.   As a result, and no doubt influenced by the exchequer’s ability to 
provide detailed information relating to a structural deficit, the government and the 
Commons were able to negotiate parliament’s continued provision of the maltolt.  
This illustrated the Commons’ recognition of the financial need for permanent, or 
near permanent, re–grants of the maltolt, a development which was to play a key role 
in shaping inter–related developments in fiscal politics and exchequer finance during 
the late fourteenth and early fifteenth centuries.   It is to these subjects that we must 
now turn.
2.3 The later medieval fiscal constitution revised, c. 1369–1422
Between the re–opening of the Hundred Years’ War in 1369 and the Truce of 
Leulingham of 1389, the Commons granted fourteen lay subsidies in response to 
royal pleas of ‘necessity’ as a means of allowing the crown to finance 
‘extraordinary’ expenditure.61  This level of lay tax grants during a single phase of 
                                                            
60 Harriss, King, Parliament, p. 473 (tabular information regarding these fiscal statements) and 
general discussion, pp. 471–508.  
61 For these taxes, see M. Jurkowski, C. L. Smith & D. Crook, Lay Taxes in England and Wales
(Kew, 1988), pp. 54–66; for a discussion of the military context of see J. Sherborne, ‘The Cost of 
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military conflict was unprecedented.  We need to recognise, however, that four of the 
taxes mentioned above were experimental direct taxes administered outside of the 
fifteenth and tenth quota system.  These were the parish subsidy of 1371 and the 
three poll taxes of 1377, 1379 and 1380.  The parish subsidy was a remarkable, quite 
unique, attempt, to raise a higher level of taxation than a conventional fifteenth and 
tenth.62  After almost a decade of unsuccessful war and related domestic political 
problems, however, the fixed rate poll taxes seem to constitute an attempt, on the 
part of the parliamentary Commons, to grant subsidies likely to prove remarkably 
difficult to administer and yield significantly less than quota taxes.63  This needs to 
be viewed in the context of parliamentary attempts, during the 1370s, to argue that 
the government’s total royal budget during wartime could be financed from revenue 
from the maltolt and customary and domainal ‘ordinary’ sources combined.  In 1372, 
the government felt compelled to demonstrate to the Commons that maltolt revenue 
was not sufficient to finance ‘extraordinary’ expenditure.64  In 1377, perhaps in 
response to this, the Commons seem to have produced their own ‘budget’ in an 
attempt to prove that the maltolt, alongside ‘ordinary’ domainal and customary 
revenues, did in fact suffice in the financing of total expenditure.65  This was based 
upon a grossly exaggerated estimation of ‘ordinary’ revenues, which the government 
subsequently demonstrated through its production of figures from the receipt rolls at 
the parliament of 1377.  Underlying parliament’s granting of the poll taxes and its 
spurious attempts to play up the fiscal capacity of the maltolt and ‘ordinary’ 
revenues there was a clear desire to limit the incidence and level of lay taxation.  The 
failure of parliament to convince the government that it had no need for lay taxation, 
however, and the Commons’ subsequent fifteenth and tenth grants during this period, 
                                                                                                                                                                           
English Warfare with France in the Later Fourteenth Century’, in War, Politics and Culture in 
Fourteenth–Century England, ed. J. A. Tuck (London, 1994), pp. 55–70.  
62 W. M. Ormrod, ‘An Experiment in Taxation: The English Parish Subsidy of 1371’, Speculum, 63 
(1988), pp. 58–82.  
63 Ormrod, ‘Poverty and Privilege: The Fiscal Burden in England (XIIIth–XVth Centuries), pp. 640, 
650.  
64 PROME, parliament of 1372, item 11.  
65 M. C. Prestwich, ‘An Estimate by the Commons of Royal Revenue in England under Richard II’, 
Parliamentary History, 3 (1984), pp. 147–55.  
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illustrates that, ultimately, the Commons recognised that they could not refuse the 
crown lay taxation in the context of its evocation of ‘necessity’.66  
It seems that a very large proportion of lay tax revenue was expended upon special 
expeditionary costs throughout the period up to the Truce of Leulingham.67  This 
reflects the administration’s continued ability to bring in stable yields from fifteenths 
and tenths, and differentiate between the expenditure of these subsidies and that of 
other royal revenues.68  By the 1380s, however, the onset of a downward trend in the 
export trade in wool, which appears to have been caused by a combination of 
structural economic factors relating to the foreign export market and political 
dislocations in the Low Countries, began to have seriously adverse effects upon 
maltolt revenue.69  This threatened the long–term ability of government to
successfully finance ‘ordinary’ charges from revenue from the maltolt and ‘ordinary’ 
sources.  Richard II’s government responded to this problem by attempting to revise 
the existing institutional and constitutional frameworks of indirect taxation in order
to take account of changes in the balance of trade.70  The late 1380s witnessed the 
government permanently extend the range of items subject to the cloth custom as a 
means of profiting from the long–term growth in exports of cheap ranges of cloth, a 
development which was paralleled by notable efforts on the part of the crown to 
tighten up the customs administration.71  Far more significantly, the mid–to–late 
1380s witnessed the crown persuade parliament to consistently re–grant the subsidy 
of tonnage and poundage, which had emerged during the 1350s as an irregular 
                                                            
66 It also needs to be pointed out that the broader political context of the poll taxes was so toxic that 
experimental direct taxation of any kind was not attempted again for a generation: J. A. Tuck, 
‘Nobles, Commons and the Great Revolt of 1381’, in The English Rising of 1381, ed. R. H. Hilton & 
T. H. Aston (Cambridge, 1984), p. 205.  
67 This is a key theme of Sherborne, ‘The Cost of English Warfare with France in the Later Fourteenth 
Century’.  
68 There has been no detailed examination of the late fourteenth century enrolled lay tax accounts.  
Based upon I. R. Abbott’s work on the early fifteenth century accounts, which illustrates that yields in 
the 1400s were broadly similar to the situation discussed above for the 1340s, we can suggest that late 
fourteenth century yields were consistent with this general pattern: Abbott, ‘Taxation of Personal 
Property and of Clerical Incomes, 1399 to 1402’, pp. 471–98. 
69 For the European context, see D. Nicholas, ‘The English Trade at Bruges in the Last Years of 
Edward III’, Journal of Medieval History, 5 (1979), pp. 23–61.  It is difficult to contend that high 
rates of the maltolt seriously affected the trade in wool (as does J. H. Munro, ‘Industrial 
Transformations in the north–west European textile trades’, in Before the Black Death. Studies in the 
‘Crisis’ of the Early Fourteenth Century, pp. 135–7), since there seems to be very little link between 
changes in the rate of maltolt and the domestic wool market: see T. H. Lloyd, The Movement of Wool 
Prices in Medieval England (Cambridge, 1973), pp. 13–24.   
70 What follows is based upon Ormrod, ‘Finance and Trade under Richard II’, pp. 155–86.  
71 Ormrod, ‘Finance and Trade under Richard II’, pp. 169–72, 167–8. 
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subsidy on imports of wine and imports and exports of general merchandise granted 
to support naval forces.72  Parliament’s willingness to accept the permanent need for 
this tax, at an increased rate which subjected cloth exports to payment, represented a 
considerable financial coup for the government, which amounted to an extra 
£10,000–£15,000 worth of indirect tax revenue per annum, in spite of the decline in 
wool exports which characterised the commercial history of this period.73  Trends in 
the exchequer’s administration of tonnage and poundage illustrate the extent to 
which the administration recognised the significance of these changes.  Whereas the 
administration of the early grants of tonnage and poundage had been placed in the 
hands of naval commanders, this tax was now brought within the general framework 
of the customs and subsidies.74  This allowed the exchequer to bring tonnage and 
poundage revenue into its attempts to plan revenue and expenditure.
The developments charted in the previous paragraph are highly significant in the 
history of the later medieval fiscal constitution, representing ‘the last attempts before 
Tudor times to reform the actual base on which indirect taxation was assessed’.75  It 
seems likely that the increase in indirect tax revenue noted above would have 
allowed Richard II’s government to effectively finance total expenditure through 
indirect taxation combined with the crown’s customary and hereditary revenues after 
the Truce of Leulingham, had it not been for the marked rise in expenditure on the 
royal household which characterised the final years of Richard’s reign.76  Increased 
household costs inevitably led to a rise in total ‘ordinary’ expenditure.  This situation 
was exacerbated by the regime’s need to finance diplomatic missions, upon which a 
continuation of the truce with France was dependent.  Viewed in the context of the 
dramatic decline in wool exports which characterised the mid–to–late 1390s,77  these 
                                                            
72 Ormrod, ‘Finance and Trade under Richard II’, pp. 172–6; Ormrod, ‘The Origins of Tunnage and 
Poundage’, pp. 209–227.  
73 For the inclusion of cloth exports in tonnage and poundage, see Ormrod, ‘Finance and Trade under 
Richard II’, pp. 175–6.  For the financial benefits of this subsidy see Ormrod, ‘Finance and Trade 
under Richard II’, pp. 176–8.  
74 Ormrod, ‘Finance and Trade under Richard II’, pp. 172–3.  The complex system of local accounting 
and expenditure which had characterised the earlier, irregular grants of tonnage and poundage had 
effectively placed this subsidy outside of the central control of the exchequer.  
75 Ormrod, ‘Finance and Trade under Richard II’, p. 186.  
76 C. Given-Wilson, The Royal Household and the King’s Affinity: Service, Politics and Finance in 
England, 1360–1413 (New Haven, 1986), pp. 76–141; J. A. Tuck, Richard II and the English Nobility
(London, 1973), pp. 197–8.  
77 See Ormrod’s useful tabulation of wool exports, ‘Finance and Trade under Richard II’, p. 160, Fig. 
8.1.  
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developments would have served to illustrate to the crown that a greater level of 
supply than that offered by indirect taxation was required.  Richard II’s government 
did not attempt to build upon the fiscal innovations of the previous decade in order to 
address these problems.  Underlying the Commons’ agreement to continuously re–
grant tonnage and poundage, it is possible to discern that a political limit had been 
reached regarding the level of the export trade which the crown was able to tax.  
Moreover, it was not really worth it for the crown to make a concerted effort to 
increase the level of cloth exports brought into the tax net; the rapid growth in cloth 
exports characteristic of the early–to–mid fifteenth century was a phenomenon of the 
future.  Instead, Ricardian government sought to raise the issue of what has been 
referred to as peacetime, or permanent, lay taxation.78
As unprecedented as peacetime, or permanent, lay taxation was in fourteenth century 
England, Richard’s government appears at first to have attempted to emulate the 
fiscal political tactics of the 1360s, when we have seen Edward III’s regime had 
convinced parliament to re–grant the maltolt during the peace of the 1360s through 
avoiding pleading its ‘necessity’ and opting instead to make overtures to the 
Commons regarding the need for an increased level of supply.  At the parliament of 
1391, the chancellor, in his opening address, avoided making recourse to a plea of 
‘necessity’, and instead simply asked for an increased level of supply which it was 
stated was required owing to the exigencies of maintaining the peace.  Moreover, the 
chancellor alluded to the fact that the government had demonstrated to parliament 
the crown’s financial need, which strongly suggests the exchequer’s preparation of 
budgetary estimates.79  The Commons responded by granting a half fifteenth and 
tenth.80  During the parliament of 1395, a brief bout of disturbances in Ireland 
allowed the government to argue that permanent military costs at a time of acute 
tensions required the voting of supply.  The regime had to tread carefully here: 
                                                            
78 G. L. Harriss, ‘Theory and Practice in Royal Taxation: Some Observations’, EHR, 97 (1982), pp. 
811–19.    The following paragraph draws upon a number of points made in this article.
79 PROME, parliament of 1391, item 2.  
80 PROME, parliament of 1391, item 2.  Unprecedentedly, this grant was framed not in the context of 
the ‘defence of the realm’, but rather the Commons’ goodwill.  It seems that the Commons’ wording 
of this grant was the only means by which parliament could justify a grant that was not made for 
‘extraordinary’ purposes, without appearing to legitimate lay taxation as a means of financing 
‘ordinary’ charges.  Furthermore, it is not even clear whether, ideologically, the Commons would 
have been able to publicly justify a lay tax grant in terms of the need to finance ‘ordinary’ charges: 
this directly contradicted scholastic fiscal theory. 
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historically the Commons sought to finance the permanent budget from indirect tax 
revenue alone.  In this context, however, the crown was careful not to state that 
developments in Ireland constituted a ‘necessity’; it simply asked for an increased 
level of supply.81  
It seems likely that the Commons’ grant of a fifteenth and tenth in 1395 was made 
under a considerable degree of royal pressure.82  Indeed, it is possible to discern a 
build–up of fiscal political tensions in 1395, not least since the Commons – aside 
from their antipathy to granting lay taxation outside of periods of defensive war 
which necessitated the despatching of special expeditionary forces – suspected that 
lay tax revenue was probably being expended upon the household.83  It was the 
government’s approach to supply during the final parliament of Richard II’s reign –
that of September 1397 – however, which caused a breakdown in relations between 
crown and parliament.  During the course of this parliament, which took place at 
Shrewsbury, near to the king’s power base in Cheshire, Richard’s government 
abandoned the tactics of seeking supply discussed above and pleaded its 
‘necessity’.84  This was tantamount to fabricating the existence of a defensive war.  
Viewed in the context of the government’s threat to withdraw the former Appellants’ 
royal pardons if the Commons did not concede an unprecedented life grant of the 
maltolt,85 it seems that both the one and a half fifteenths and tenths granted and the 
lifetime grant of the maltolt which followed were made under duress.86  
The events of 1398 played a key role in losing Richard his throne, as evidenced by 
popular and parliamentary pressure for Henry IV to ‘live on his own’ during the 
Lancastrian Revolution.87  It is necessary to note that this was not the first time, 
during the later medieval period, that concern with the crown’s expenditure of 
previous lay taxes had led the political community to insist upon the government’s 
                                                            
81 PROME, parliament of 1395, item 1.  
82 PROME, parliament of 1395, item 6.  The Commons’ framing of this grant in the context of a 
‘defence of the realm’ seems to suggest that they feared that goodwill grants along the lines of the 
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84 This was in the chancellor’s prorogation address: PROME, parliament of September 1397, item 44.  
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86 PROME, parliament of September 1397, item 75.  
87 McFarlane, ‘Henry IV’s Government: Council, Parliament, Finance’, pp. 78–101.  For a useful 
recent discussion see Harriss, Shaping the Nation, p. 499. 
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making do with customary and domainal revenues in financing ‘ordinary’ 
expenditure.88  Yet never before had the level of concern regarding this issue been 
even remotely sufficient to contribute to the development of a political movement in 
favour of dynastic change, let alone the success of such a movement.  The apparent 
willingness of the first Lancastrian monarch to declare his intention to ‘live of his 
own’ thus reflected the strength of contemporary opinion regarding the trend in fiscal 
politics assessed in the previous paragraph.  The financial context of government by 
the close of the fourteenth century, however, rendered absurd the idea that the crown 
ought to finance its ‘ordinary’ expenses solely through domainal and customary 
revenues.  As we have seen, for almost forty years the crown had been heavily 
reliant upon revenue from the maltolt, and later tonnage and poundage, in the 
financing of an expansive ‘ordinary’ budget.  Indeed, by the turn of the fifteenth 
century indirect tax revenue was increasingly insufficient in providing for the 
financing of ‘ordinary’ costs, as proven by the fiscal problems of the 1390s.  Henry 
IV was thus stuck between a rock and a hard place.  The toxic fiscal political legacy 
of the 1390s and the effect this had had in forcing Henry to make the financially 
impossible promise discussed above prevented the usurper king from attempting to 
make a political case for the need for lay taxation to play a new role within the royal 
budget.  Yet permanent, or near permanent, lay taxation as a means of financing 
‘ordinary’ expenditure is exactly what his government required in order to remain 
solvent, as we shall now have to illustrate.
During the early years of Lancastrian rule between 1399 and 1405, the crown sought 
supply on a plea of ‘necessity’ on four occasions in relation to serious 
‘extraordinary’ threats in Wales and Scotland.89  The Commons granted single 
fifteenths and tenths in 1401 and 1402.  In March 1404 parliament granted an 
experimental income tax, whereas in November 1404 two experimental direct taxes, 
this time on recently alienated crown lands and lands of the nobility and wealthy 
laymen, were granted alongside two fifteenths and tenths.90  This fiscal political 
                                                            
88 For example, the alleged misspending of lay taxes in 1307 and 1309 apparently contributed towards 
the intermittent baronial demands for controls over royal grants and the demand for grants to be 
resumed during the 1310s.  See Harriss, King, Parliament, pp. 164–5.    
89 These were the parliaments of 1401, 1402, March 1404 and November 1404: for the lay taxes 
granted on these occasions see Jurkowski, Smith & Crook, Lay Taxes, pp. 72–6.  
90 Ibid. 
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trend echoed that of the second phase of the Hundred Years’ War, which we have
seen had witnessed the Commons recognise the compelling force of the crown’s 
‘necessity’ though seek to limit the fiscal burden of lay taxation through the granting 
of experimental direct taxes.  Unlike during this earlier phase of warfare, however, 
when the government had expended lay tax revenue on special expeditionary costs, 
the government of Henry IV was forced to expend a high level of lay tax revenue 
from the subsidies listed above upon the royal household as a result of the need to 
buy political support for the Lancastrian dynasty.91  Moreover, a marked decline in 
wool exports after 1400 and the Commons’ failure to re–grant tonnage and poundage 
during the first two years of Henry’s reign required the government to draw very 
heavily upon the proceeds of lay taxation in the financing of other areas of the 
‘ordinary’ budget.92  These issues provoked serious parliamentary discontent in 
1406.93  Yet despite the exchequer’s unconstitutional employment of lay tax revenue 
in the financing of ‘ordinary’ expenditure, government debt had risen to levels not 
experienced again until the reign of Henry VI.94  The exchequer appears to have 
made a concerted effort to administer lay taxation as efficiently as possible during 
these years,95 presumably in an effort to ameliorate this fiscal situation, yet if 
Henry’s government was not able to secure fresh grants of lay taxation soon, the 
exchequer faced an acute fiscal crisis.
Henry IV was incredibly fortunate in this respect: continuing problems in Wales and 
Scotland and the spectre of renewed war with France afforded the government the 
ability to legitimately seek fresh lay tax grants on pleas of ‘necessity’ in 1406, 1407, 
1410 and 1411.96  Viewed together, these pleas affected four fifteenth and tenth 
grants and the granting of one special direct tax on lands.97  An important study of 
patterns in revenue and expenditure during this period illustrates that the 
administration succeeded in restoring stability to the public finances by drawing 
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upon high levels of lay tax revenue in the financing of the household and other 
‘ordinary’ charges.98  This was aided by a relatively light burden of ‘extraordinary’ 
expenditure, notwithstanding the threats mentioned above.  That these developments 
were financially necessary is evident from the reduction of government debt which 
characterised the final years of Henry IV’s reign.  Nevertheless, in pursuing the only 
fiscal policy which realistically offered to ameliorate the parlous financial situation 
discussed in the previous paragraph, the government had acted in contravention of 
the constitutional framework of later medieval public finance, ignoring both the 
Commons’ concerns of 1406 and continuing parliamentary discontent regarding the 
government’s expenditure of lay taxation into the final years of the reign.99  
The death of Henry IV in 1413 led to the succession of his son, Henry V, who was 
famously able to extract nine and one third fifteenths and tenths on pleas of 
‘necessity’ between the opening of his reign and the Treaty of Troyes in 1420 as a 
means of financing the Lancastrian conquest of northern France.100  The harmonious 
parliamentary context of a successful war during the 1410s led the fiscal political 
difficulties of the previous reign to subside.  Indeed, such was the level of 
parliamentary euphoria in light of Henry V’s victory at Agincourt that the Commons 
conceded the maltolt and tonnage and poundage for the duration of the second 
Lancastrian king’s reign.  It is common for historians to praise Henry V’s 
management of the lay and indirect taxes discussed above.  A number of important 
works have commented on the ability of the exchequer, under Henry V, to build 
upon the fiscal achievement of the council in the late 1400s and further reduce the 
level of government debt.101  It is also frequently pointed out that Henry V’s 
government expended a large proportion of revenue from the lay taxes granted 
during the mid–to–late 1410s on special expeditionary expenditure and on the 
                                                            
98 For what follows see Wright, ‘Henry IV, the Commons and the Recovery of royal finance in 1407’, 
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financing of loans raised to fund special expeditionary expenditure.102  Important 
recent work on tax structures during the 1410s, meanwhile, has illustrated that the 
second Lancastrian monarch was able to impressively administer the parliamentary 
lay subsidies outlined above on a local level.103  This trend in scholarship illustrates 
the ability of Henry V’s government to effectively mobilise later medieval fiscal 
structures and administer tax revenue in order to meet the financial exigencies of a 
successful war.  
It is equally important for us to note, however, that the mid-to-late 1410s were 
devoid of any fiscal political developments regarding the role played by lay taxation 
in the permanent, ‘ordinary’ finances of the state.  This does not owe to a general 
lack of fiscal political debate.  In this context it is striking that the period in question 
witnessed the crown begin to underwrite loans in parliament as a means of attracting 
a higher level of credit, which seems to suggest a previously unrecognised level of 
parliamentary debate regarding war finance.104  The absence of government 
initiatives to place the long–term finances of the regime on a sounder footing ought 
rather to be explained in terms of two considerations on the part of the crown.  
Firstly, Henry V and his advisors’ would have recognised that a ‘new deal’ regarding 
lay taxation was not immediately necessary.  The high level of lay tax grants and 
lack of political scrutiny regarding the expenditure of lay tax revenue which 
characterised the fiscal history of Henry V’s reign afforded the second Lancastrian 
monarch the ability to continue his father’s policy of employing lay tax revenue in 
financing ‘ordinary’ expenditure should this be required.  Given the reduction in 
government debt and general fiscal stability which we have already noted 
characterised this period, it seems very likely that the government of Henry V must 
have pursued this policy.  Secondly, and rather ominously as far as the long–term 
stability of the Lancastrian state was concerned, the government of Henry V would 
have recognised the acute fiscal constitutional difficulties associated with royal 
attempts to publicly broach the issue of permanent lay taxation.  Henry V and his 
advisors would have been only too aware that, only a generation earlier, royal 
                                                            
102 See the works referenced in footnote 101 and the discussion in C. T. Allmand, Henry V (London, 
1992), pp. 384–403.
103 Ormrod, ‘Henry V and the English Taxpayer’, pp. 187–216.   
104 This is discussed in greater detail in Chapter 3.1.  
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attempts to publicly convince the Commons of the need for permanent lay taxation 
had played a key role in inciting fiscal political tensions which had played a decisive 
role in the deposition of Richard II.  And, quite aside from the toxic fiscal political 
legacy of the 1390s, the government of Henry V would have been well aware that 
there was no legitimate ideological means by which a later medieval government 
could publicly justify permanent lay taxation. 
The problem of how the Lancastrian government would address the structural 
imbalance between ‘ordinary revenue and the customs and subsidies, and ‘ordinary’ 
expenditure, was thus left for future governments to deal with.  This issue, as we 
shall see, came to dominate the fiscal politics of Henry VI’s reign from the period of 
the late minority onwards.  The main fiscal political challenge of the final months of 
Henry V’s reign after 1420 and the early years of Henry VI’s minority between 1422 
and 1429, however, was how to secure the level of supply necessary to finance 
special expeditionary expenditure.  This owed to the fiscal constitutional context of 
the Treaty of Troyes of 1420.105  This treaty represented a formal recognition, on the 
part of the Valois government, of the claim of Henry V and his Lancastrian 
successors to the French throne.  The parliament of 1420 witnessed the Commons 
respond to the new geo–political situation by stating that future special expeditionary 
expenditure ought to be financed by the Lancastrian dynasty’s French subjects.  This 
meant that it would be difficult for the Lancastrian government, in the future, to 
secure lay taxation as a means of financing special expeditionary expenditure, let 
alone permanent expenditure.  
Before examining how the Lancastrian government, during the final months of 
Henry V’s reign and the early years of Henry VI’s minority, sought to address this 
fiscal political dilemma, it is necessary for us to comment on the extent to which the 
points regarding ‘ordinary’ and ‘extraordinary’ finance made above illustrate a 
contraction in the fiscal capabilities of the later medieval state.  In a post–plague 
economy characterised increasingly by low prices, low rents and high wages, it was 
relatively easier for a large number of taxpayers to contribute lay taxation during the 
early fifteenth century than it had been in the pre–plague economy of the 1330s and 
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1340s.106  Yet whilst, during this earlier period, parliament had granted an 
economically burdensome level of lay taxation;107 during the late fourteenth and 
early fifteenth centuries the Commons had sought to minimise their lay tax 
contributions and forcibly restrict these contributions to incidences of defensive war.  
The only exception was the short, high–taxing, reign of Henry V, though even here it 
needs to be stressed that the heavy burden of lay taxation which characterised the 
1410s was not as economically burdensome as that of the middle decades of Edward 
III’s reign, given the structural economic changes noted above.  Moreover, the 
failure of Henry’s government, during the years of successful military conquest, to 
attempt to forge a ‘new deal’ regarding lay taxation, and the likely inability of future 
governments to secure lay taxation as a means of financing a continuation of the 
French war, starkly illustrates the extent to which deep–rooted constitutional and 
political restraints, rather than economic issues, had come to determine the relative 
ability of the later medieval fiscal constitution to adapt in line with changing fiscal 
exigencies.  
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CHAPTER THREE:
THE NEGOTIATION OF A NOVEL PARLIAMENTARY RESPONSE TO 
THE GOVERNMENT’S PLEA OF ‘NECESSITY’: CREDIT, INDIRECT 
TAXATION AND THE DECLINE OF EXCHEQUER CREDIBILITY, 1420–
1429
The period of fiscal constitutional history examined in detail by this thesis begins in 
1420, with Henry V’s negotiation of the Treaty of Troyes with the Valois 
government.  The Treaty of Troyes’ recognition that Henry V and his heirs 
constituted the legitimate French royal line led the English parliament to adopt a new 
constitutional position with regard to lay taxation.1  In November 1420, the 
Commons asserted that future requests for supply ought to be brought before the 
king’s French, rather than his English, subjects.2  The logic here was that any 
continuation of the crown’s ‘necessity’ would relate to a civil war within the king’s 
Lancastrian realm, which was not the concern of the English parliament.  This 
constituted a serious obstacle for Lancastrian government at a time of continued 
special expeditionary commitments.  The first section of this chapter illustrates that, 
after initial attempts during the final two parliaments of Henry V’s reign to persuade 
the Commons to concede peacetime lay taxation, a novel fiscal political trend 
emerged.  This was characterised by the minority government of Henry VI’s 
willingness to avoid utilising a plea of ‘necessity’ as a means of enforcing 
parliament’s granting of lay taxation.  In response, the parliamentary Commons 
provided for the government’s financial needs through their underwriting of credit 
against the security of indirect taxation.  This fiscal political accord between crown 
and Commons endured until the parliament of 1427–8, when the government 
resurrected a plea of ‘necessity’ as a means of compelling parliament’s granting of 
an experimental lay tax on parishes and knights’ fees.  The second section of the 
chapter examines the financial context of these developments through a quantitative 
examination of the record of exchequer finance during the period 1422–9.  Attention 
                                                            
1 For general discussions of the Treaty of Troyes, see A. Curry, ‘Two Kingdoms, One King: 
the Treaty of Troyes (1420) and the Creation of a Double Monarchy of England and France’, in ‘The 
Contending Kingdoms’: France and England, 1430–1700, ed. G. Richardson (Aldershot, 2008), pp. 
23–41; Allmand, Henry V, pp. 144–9.  
2 The Commons petitioned that they were not to be held in ‘subjeccioun’ or ‘obeisaunce’ to Henry V 
or his heirs as kings of France: PROME, parliament of 1420, item 25.  
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is drawn to the increasing financial unviability of a fiscal policy which did not 
involve lay tax revenue in light of downward fluctuations in the export trade and a 
relatively high level of total expenditure.  The financial and administrative failure of 
the parishes and knights’ fees tax is traced.  The negative implications of these 
developments upon the exchequer’s fiscal credibility are explored through a 
discussion of the decline in credit which characterised the mid–to–late 1420s.
3.1 After the Treaty of Troyes: fiscal politics during the 1420s
Our discussion of fiscal politics during the 1420s must begin with an analysis of how 
Henry V’s government, during the final year of that monarch’s reign, responded to 
the Commons’ revised attitude towards lay taxation outlined in the previous 
paragraph.  Faced with a special expeditionary budget of some £40,000 during the 
exchequer year 1421–2, the Lancastrian government urgently required parliament to 
grant lay taxation.3  In this context, Henry V could plausibly have pleaded a 
‘necessity’ of the English realm.  This would have served to constitutionally compel 
the Commons to grant supply, yet would have been highly unpopular in parliament 
since the crown’s ‘necessity’ evidently related to its French, not its English, realm.  
As we have already had reason to comment, Henry V would have been all too aware 
of the role Richard II’s fabrication of a plea of ‘necessity’ in 1398 had played in 
bringing about that monarch’s downfall.4  Moreover, a king who placed a premium 
upon his skills of political management would naturally have preferred to secure 
supply through more consensual means.  It is therefore hardly surprising that Henry 
V’s government did not adopt this fiscal political strategy.  Instead, the Lancastrian 
government sought to persuade the Commons to freely grant peacetime supply 
during the parliaments of May and November 1421.  
Henry V’s government did not explicitly raise the issue of peacetime taxation in the 
opening address of the parliament of May 1421.5  The chancellor rather sought to 
extoll Henry V’s foreign policy achievements as a means of pressurising of the 
Commons to concede supply.  Thus, Henry V was likened to Caesar, which served to 
forcibly remind subjects of the gratitude which they owed their king.  This needs to 
                                                            
3 The best account is Harriss, Beaufort, pp. 106–7.
4 See the discussion in Chapter 2.3.    
5 PROME, parliament of May 1421, item 1.  
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be viewed in the context of the chancellor’s outlining of the government’s intention 
to seek subjects’ advice on how to ensure the wellbeing of the realm,6 underlying 
which it is possible to detect a royal desire to remedy parliamentary economic 
concerns as a means of encouraging the Commons to grant supply.  The political 
community was highly concerned about the alleged scarcity of coin which had 
resulted from an outflow of specie during the period of peak fiscal extraction, 1415–
1420.  The parliament of 1420 had witnessed the Commons’ call for a ‘hosting’ 
system to be imposed on aliens as a means of ensuring aliens did not export coin and 
stimulating the domestic money supply.7  This had been ignored by the crown, yet 
during the course of the next year the government began to take parliamentary 
monetary concerns more seriously.  This period witnessed the renewal of the lapsed 
requirement that Staplers pay all their wool duties and subsidies to the treasurer of 
Calais in domestic coin alone.8  This was in keeping with parliamentary opinion 
regarding the need to augment the domestic currency.  Yet it led to a monetary crisis 
at Calais, since a scarcity of English coins prevented traders from complying with 
the new monetary policy.  In response to this situation the Commons requested the 
opening of a Calais mint, and the forbidding of the export of domestic currency 
coined at the new mint.9  The government agreed to these proposals.
These royal attempts to convince the Commons to vote supply were complemented 
by the exchequer’s preparation, four days into the parliament in question, of a budget 
reminiscent of the fiscal statements which we have seen characterised the reigns of 
Richard II and Henry IV.10  This outlined the existence of a structural deficit 
between ‘ordinary’ revenue and total expenditure, which was listed as including the 
cost of the king’s wars.  Viewed together, the fiscal political tactics outlined above 
placed such a high level of pressure upon the Commons to vote lay taxation that 
three chroniclers mistakenly believed a fifteenth and tenth was granted at this 
parliament.11  How, then, were the Commons able to avoid granting lay taxation in 
                                                            
6 Ibid.    
7 PROME, parliament of 1420, item 21.  
8 This is evident from the wording of the Common petition referenced in footnote 9.  
9 PROME, parliament of May 1421, item 27.  For the resultant statute, see SR, 2, p. 206. 
10 PPC, 2, pp. 312–15. 
11 Henrici Quinti Gesta, ed. B. Williams (London, 1850), p. 152; Chronicle of John Strecche, ed. F. 
Taylor, Bulletin of the John Rylands Library, 16 (1932) pp. 51-2; The St Albans Chronicle, 1406–
1420, ed. V. H. Galbraith (Oxford, 1937), p. 126.  
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May 1421?  Here, it is necessary for us to return to Henry V’s unwillingness to 
browbeat a reluctant Commons to grant supply.  In the event that Henry’s 
government placed unbearable pressure on the Commons to grant lay taxation, this 
would contradict the more subtle approach to the question of peacetime supply 
which we have seen the crown had previously adopted.  The government thus sought 
to formulate a fiscal policy which would cater to the exchequer’s financial needs and 
respect the Commons’ desire not to grant lay taxation.    In so doing it turned to 
credit finance.  
The 1410s had witnessed Henry V, in co-ordination with the Lords temporal and 
spiritual, begin to underwrite loans in parliament as a means of increasing potential 
creditors’ confidence in the government’s ability to finance loans and incentivise a 
broader range of individuals to provide more generous loans.12  It is significant that, 
during the parliament of May 1421, the underwriting of credit ceased to be a matter 
for the crown and peers alone.  For the first time, the government and peers of the 
realm are not recorded as having initiated the sanctioning of loans.  Rather, the 
crown, the Lords and the Commons are depicted as having ‘ordained’ this practice.13  
This strongly suggests that the government sought the agreement of the entire 
political community in forging a populist fiscal policy centred on the underwriting of 
loans as an alternative to lay taxation.  This suggestion needs to be viewed in the 
context of an expected recovery of the export trade and indirect tax revenues in light 
of the decreasing ferocity of warfare in northern France and the economic legislation 
discussed above.14  The government, it would appear, deemed it at least possible that 
the exchequer’s financial needs could be met through the adoption of a fiscal policy 
centred on loans raised against the security of indirect taxation. 
We must relate the above observations to fiscal political developments during the 
parliament of November 1421.  The period between May and November 1421 
witnessed the exchequer attract large–scale loans as a means of financing special 
expeditionary expenditure, yet during the autumn special expeditionary costs 
                                                            
12 For a general discussion of the emergence of the parliamentary underwriting of credit, see Chapter 
2.3. 
13 PROME, parliament of May 1421, item 9.   
14 For a detailed quantitative discussion of indirect tax revenue during the 1420s, see Chapter 3.2.  
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remained high and loans were less forthcoming.15  With the king in France on 
campaign, the government came to the conclusion that a lay tax grant was now 
unavoidable.  As a means of signalling this to the Commons, the chancellor publicly 
outlined, in his opening speech at the November parliament, the need for subjects to 
meet the government’s needs through conceding lay taxation.  Thus, whereas in the 
previous parliament the chancellor had merely alluded to the need for supply through 
his forceful depiction of Henry’s achievements and the government’s desire to 
remedy economic concerns, the need for lay taxation was now explicitly addressed 
through the chancellor’s elaboration of subjects’ obligation to demonstrate charity
towards their king.16   Evidently, then, whilst the government remained unwilling to 
resort to a plea of ‘necessity’, it wished to publicly impress upon the Commons that 
lay taxation could no longer be withheld.  The Commons responded by immediately 
granting one fifteenth and tenth, on the very first day of the assembly.  This suggests 
that the government had secured a promise, on the part of the Commons in May 
1421, that the latter would grant lay taxation at the next parliament should the fiscal 
policy centred on credit and indirect taxation fail to service the government’s 
needs.17  
The above discussion illustrates that Henry V had been able to manage the 
parliamentary politics of supply, over the course of the two parliaments of May and 
November 1421, fundamentally on his own terms.  Notwithstanding initial 
parliamentary obstinacy regarding the prospect of the Commons’ continued granting 
of lay taxation, Henry had secured a fiscal political settlement which guaranteed his 
government a future grant of lay taxation should it declare that the alternative fiscal 
policy negotiated during the parliament of May 1421 had failed to meet the 
exchequer’s financial needs.  Underlying this trend in fiscal politics, we can 
reasonably discern an inability, on the part of the Commons, to deny a warrior king 
skilled in managing parliament the supply which he sought in the medium term.  
These developments, however, seem also to have been the cause of significant 
parliamentary tensions.  Here we must turn our attention to the wording of the 
                                                            
15 For discussion of the government’s financial position during the exchequer year 1421–2 see 
Allmand, Henry V, pp. 397–8; Harriss, ‘Financial Policy’, pp. 165–6; Steel, Receipt, p. 163.  
16 PROME, parliament of November 1421, item 1.  
17 A similar suggestion has been made by Harriss, ‘The Management of Parliament’, p. 151.
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Commons’ fifteenth and tenth grant of November 1421, noted above.  The 
Commons framed this grant in terms of their ‘affection’ for the king and the ‘defence 
of the realm’.18  In framing their grant in the context of a ‘necessity’ which the 
government had not declared, as well as in terms of the parliamentary goodwill 
which was being sought by the government, the Commons thus signalled their 
opposition to any continuation of the government’s seeking of lay taxation on terms 
unrelated to a ‘necessity’ of the English realm.  Given that, as we have already seen, 
after the Treaty of Troyes no ‘necessity’ of the English realm existed, this 
represented a clear parliamentary attempt to avoid future liability to pay lay taxation.  
Despite the wording of the Commons’ grant of November 1421, it is at least possible 
that Henry V would have been able to exploit the high esteem in which he was held 
by the political nation in order to continue to persuade the Commons to concede lay 
taxation.  The sudden death of the king on campaign in France, however, led to the 
ascension of his son, Henry VI, who was under one year old.  This necessitated the 
establishment of a minority regime, which was to prove itself unable to persuade the 
Commons to continue to grant lay taxation.19  A careful examination of the debating 
of supply during the first two parliaments of Henry VI’s reign serves to illustrate this 
point.  During the parliament of 1422, the minority government does not appear to 
have sought supply.  Certainly, the opening address of this parliament contains no 
public allusion to the need for subjects to demonstrate their charity to the new king.  
Neither does this address betray any sign of the government pressuring the 
Commons to grant supply through, say, offering to redress parliamentary economic 
grievances.  This is to be explained by the ability of the Lancastrian government to 
finance continued special expeditionary costs from the proceeds of the November lay 
subsidy which was still being received by the exchequer.20
It was unavoidable, however, that the minority regime would require supply in order 
to finance special expeditionary costs in the near future.  The subsequent exchequer 
year, that of 1423–4, witnessed lay tax revenue from the grant of November 1421 all 
                                                            
18 PROME, parliament of November 1421, item 10.  
19 For the establishment of the minority government and the conciliar politics of the early-to-mid 
1420s see S. B. Chrimes, ‘The Pretensions of the Duke of Gloucester in 1422’, EHR, 45 (1930), pp. 
101–3; B. P. Wolffe, Henry VI (London, 1981), pp. 25–83; Harriss, Beaufort, pp. 115–33.  
20 For a quantitative examination of the royal budget during the early–to–mid 1420s, see Chapter 3.2.  
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but dry out and special expeditionary expenditure increase in relation to the previous 
year.21  The minority regime’s response to this situation seems to have been to 
tentatively continue Henry V’s policy of seeking peacetime lay taxation.  The 
chancellor’s opening address of the parliament of 1423–4 made no public allusion to 
the need for supply, unless one views the chancellor’s evocation of the Duke of 
Gloucester’s role as the domestic head of the minority government as a sign to the 
Commons that the regime expected parliament to voice its thanks to the leading men 
of the council for rapidly establishing a stable regime through granting supply.22  On 
17 December 1423, however, the chancellor prorogued parliament and pleaded the 
crown’s ‘necessity’ in his prorogation address.  The ‘great necessities of the realm’, 
the chancellor stated, required parliament to grant ‘suitable provision for the 
aforesaid business and necessities’.23  It seems inconceivable that the minority 
regime would move from not seeking supply during the course of the first session to 
pleading its ‘necessity’, which we have seen to be fraught with constitutional and 
political difficulties after the Treaty of Troyes, at the prorogation address.  This 
development only makes sense if we suggest that the regime unsuccessfully 
attempted to negotiate a ‘goodwill’ grant of lay taxation during the course of the first 
session.  Faced with rising special expeditionary costs and unable to secure the 
Commons’ granting of supply in the manner achieved by Henry V in November 
1421, the crown thus somewhat desperately turned to a plea of ‘necessity’ in 
December 1423 in an attempt to compel parliament’s granting of lay taxation.  
This led to the development of a significant new trend in fiscal political relations 
between the crown and parliament during the second session of the parliament of 
1423–4.  The chancellor had not defined whether the crown’s ‘necessity’ related to 
its English or its French realm.  Yet it would have been clear to the Commons that
the government’s financial needs related to the cost of defending Lancastrian France, 
rather than any imminent threat to Lancastrian England.  This led the Commons to 
demonstrate a marked reluctance to grant lay taxation and propose an alternative 
                                                            
21 This statement is based upon a detailed examination of the receipt and issue roll material referenced 
in Chapter 3.2.  
22 PROME, parliament of 1423–4, item 1.  
23 Thus, the ‘grandes necessitees du roialme’ required parliament to reassemble and the Commons to 
grant ‘covenable provision et ordinance pur les bosoignes et necessitees suisditz’: PROME, 
parliament of 1423–4, item 13.  
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fiscal strategy, the aim of which was to service the government’s ‘extraordinary’ 
costs without the need for lay taxation.  Here we must turn to the parliamentary act 
underwriting credit which occurred during the second session of the parliament of 
1423–4.24  The credit act of the parliament of 1423–4 stands out as distinct from 
most of its antecedents in its emanation from a schedule delivered by the Commons.  
Most previous acts had been initiated by the crown and made no reference to the 
Commons.25  Only one act prior to the parliament of 1423–4 – that of 1417 – had its 
origins in a schedule delivered by the Commons.26  Whereas the act of 1417 had 
been framed solely in terms of the repayment of loans extended by one creditor, 
Henry Beaufort,27 however, the act of 1424 did not express the Commons’ concern 
to provide security for one creditor alone but rather their concern to provide security 
for any potential creditor willing to extend up to 5,000 marks.28    Moreover, whereas 
the schedule of 1417 had stated that Beaufort’s extension of credit was to be repaid 
from the customs and subsidies of the port of Southampton, the act of 1424 
stipulated that creditors were to secure repayment from the customs and subsidies 
granted by parliament.29  This comparison between the credit acts of 1417 and 1424 
                                                            
24 For this act, see PROME, parliament of 1423–4, item 26.    
25 See, for example, the act of 1419, which was made on the authority of the ‘dit gardein, et as 
seignurs espirituelx et temporelx en cest present parlement’: PROME, parliament of 1419, item 9.  
That the driving force behind these early parliamentary acts was the crown and the lords is also 
evident in the act of October 1416, which was similarly worded: PROME, parliament of October 
1416, item 10.  At the very end of the reign of Henry V, the Commons began to involve themselves in 
the parliamentary underwriting of credit.  This is evident in the wording of the act of May 1421: 
‘ordeinez est en ceo mesme parlement par le roi et les seignurs et communes esteantz en icelle 
parlement’: PROME, parliament of May 1421, item 9.  This was the formula which prevailed in the 
parliamentary acts of the late Lancastrian period (other than in acts such as that of 1424, examined 
here, where the Commons alone initiated the act).  This trend represents a permanent shift in the role 
of the Commons in the formulation of fiscal policy.
26 PROME, parliament of 1417, item 15.  
27 ‘Pur l'evesqe de Wyncestr': PROME, parliament of 1417, item 15.  
28 ‘Pur la seurtee de monsir de Wynchestre, et d'autres q'ont fait et ferront creaunces au roy.... pur 
defense de sa roialme, de la somme de vint .m. marcz ou dedeins’: PROME, parliament of 1423–4, 
item 26. 
29 ‘Pour les repaiementz de les creances et prests suisditz; sibien des coustumes et subsidies’.  It is 
necessary to point out that, following on from this stipulation regarding repayment from the customs 
and subsidies, the act continued ‘et toutz aultres profitz, commoditees, et revenuz, queux soient du 
roy, ses heirs, ou successours du roialme d'Engleterre, come de lour joialx, biens, et chatielx moeblez, 
et des biens, joialx et chatielx de la coroune’: PROME, parliament of 1423–4, item 26.  My 
interpretation of this is that the Commons’ preferred method of repayment for loans, accepted by the 
minority government, was indirect tax revenue, but that parliament nevertheless felt it desirable to 
offer ‘ordinary’ revenue as added security for potential creditors (though note historians’ belief in the 
diminishing returns of the crown’s landed assets at this time: R. A. Griffiths, The Reign of Henry VI: 
The Exercise of Royal Authority, 1422–1461 (London, 1981), pp. 107-8).  The reference to the 
crown’s jewels served to assure Beaufort, who loaned over £9,000 to the crown on 1 March 1424, that 
if indirect taxation could not service the full repayment of his loan he could hold crown assets as 
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demonstrates a fundamental difference in purpose.  The former had emanated from 
parliamentary concern with the terms of repayment of Henry Beaufort’s loans, 
presumably at the latter’s behest.  In contrast, the credit act of 1424 constituted a 
parliamentary attempt to ensure the viability of the Commons’ preferred fiscal policy 
centred on loans and indirect taxation. 
A discussion of when the minority government accepted the Commons’ proposed 
fiscal policy suggests that this resulted in considerable political debate.30  The second 
session closed on 28 February, 45 days after parliament had re–opened after the 
Christmas prorogation on 14 January.  For a session the sole point of which, from the 
perspective of the crown, was the granting of lay taxation in response to the plea of 
‘necessity’ contained in the prorogation address, 45 days was a long time.  During 
this period the minority government must have continued to push for a grant of lay 
taxation.  The Commons, meanwhile, would have responded by outlining their 
policy proposals discussed in the previous paragraph.  The government would not 
have permitted the Commons to grant indirect taxation, which occurred on the last 
day of the second session,31 had it not been willing to acquiesce to the Commons’ 
clear desire not to grant lay taxation by this point.  We can thus conclude that after 
over a month of what must have been hard bargaining, the parliamentary act 
underwriting credit discussed above occurred at the close of the second session, very 
probably on the same day as the indirect tax grant.  This reconstruction of 
parliamentary debate is vindicated by the fact that Lord Poynings, the leader of the 
military force being planned for the spring, indented with the crown on the last day 
of the session.32  The crown’s negotiation of a loan of over £9,000 from Beaufort and 
a £1,000 loan from the Feoffees of the Duchy of Lancaster33 and its subsequent 
                                                                                                                                                                           
security.  For a detailed discussion of Beaufort’s loan, see Harriss, Beaufort, pp. 125–6; McFarlane, 
‘At the Deathbed of Cardinal Beaufort’, p. 124.  
30 The credit act of the second session of the parliament of 1423–4, discussed in the previous 
paragraph, is not dated.  
31 PROME, parliament of 1423–4, item 14.  
32 The indenture of Poynings is TNA E 28/44.  Unless otherwise stated, all subsequent references to 
unprinted primary sources relate to TNA material.
33 For these loans see E 401/706, 1 March.  Other lenders, including Archbishop Chichele, contributed 
small sums, and the sum total of loans was £11,944.  For a discussion of the role played by credit in 
the royal budget during the early–to–mid 1420s, see Chapter 3.2.  
58
issuing of a patent promising Beaufort repayment from revenue at particular ports 
and other creditors repayment from indirect tax revenue followed on from this.34  
During the course of the second session of the parliament of 1423–4, then, the 
Commons had persuaded the minority government to adopt their preferred fiscal 
policy centred on credit and indirect taxation, notwithstanding royal reservations 
which resulted in a lengthy political stalemate during this session.  This ought to be 
viewed in light of royal recognition that the Commons’ proposed policy was 
politically viable.  As the loans negotiated by the government, discussed above, 
illustrate, the wealthy minority to whom the Lancastrian monarchy could turn for 
loans was sufficiently confident in the state of the export trade to provide the regime 
with the loans it required.  This was partly due to more settled conditions in northern 
France after the intense warfare of the late 1410s, which it would have been expected 
would encourage trade and thus lead to stable, high, indirect tax yields.35  
Anticipated stability in trade and indirect tax revenue also owed, however, to 
important new developments in the politics of indirect taxation.  The Commons seem 
to have recognised the harmful effect which increasing the rate of the maltolt, and 
granting this subsidy to Henry V for life, in 1415 had on the level of trade and thus 
the potential revenue to be gained from indirect taxation.36  The Commons thus 
reduced both the denizen and alien rates in 1422, and made their grant payable for 
two years only.37  Significantly, this grant was also framed in the context of the 
‘defence of the realm’ rather than out of love for the prince as the lifetime grant to 
Henry V had been, which served to re-establish the time–limited nature of the 
                                                            
34 CPR, 1422–9, p. 214.  See Harriss, Beaufort, p. 402 for Beaufort’s repayment.   
35 For the volume of wool exports during the early–to–mid 1420s, see Carus-Wilson and Coleman’s 
tabulations of the volume of wool exports: E. M. Carus–Wilson & O. Coleman, England’s Export 
Trade, 1275–1547 (Oxford, 1963), p. 57.  For indirect tax revenue during this period, see Chapter 3.2.  
36 In the Commons’ grant of 1415 aliens had been charged 60s. per sack and denizens 43s. 4d. per 
sack: PROME, parliament of 1415, item 15.  This was one of the highest maltolt charges of the entire 
later medieval period (another period of similarly high rates, at the turn of the fifteenth century, had 
also coincided with a striking decrease in the volume of wool exports, which Chapter 2.3 has 
illustrated contributed to the fiscal problems of Henry IV’s reign).  
37 PROME, parliament of 1422, item 19.  The rates were reduced to 53s. 4d. for aliens and 33s. 4d. for 
denizens.  On 16 February the council reduced the alien rate further to 43s. 4d: PPC, 3, p. 34.  This 
reduction was enforced by the customs’ collectors from 15 May – see the note to this effect in the 
accounts for the maltolt for the exchequer year September 1422–September 1423: E 356/16.  The 
maltolt was renewed on four occasions during the remainder of the 1420s at the same rate.  See 
PROME, parliament of 1423–4, item 14; PROME, parliament of 1425, item 17; PROME, parliament 
of 1426, item 24; PROME, parliament of 1429–30, item 25.  
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maltolt.38  The idea behind these developments seems to have been to incentivise 
merchants to engage in trade, and thus provide the government with increased 
revenues from the maltolt.39  
The fiscal political developments traced above shaped the parliamentary debating of 
fiscal policy during the two parliaments of 1425 and 1426.  Both of these 
parliaments witnessed the chancellor drop a plea of ‘necessity’ in his addressing of 
the House.  In its place the chancellor, in his opening addresses, employed language 
which emphasised subjects’ obligation to provide for the wellbeing of the state (res 
publica).40  This seems to represent a subtle royal reminder to the Commons that, 
whilst the government was prepared to do without lay taxation for the time being, the 
crown required the Commons to continue to underwrite sufficient credit to service its 
financing of special expeditionary costs.  It also illustrates the minority government’s 
desire to preserve a plea of ‘necessity’ for periods when lay taxation could not be 
avoided.  The Commons responded to this royal fiscal political strategy by 
consenting to the underwriting of credit against the security of indirect taxation.41  
The long–term viability of a fiscal policy which did not involve parliament’s 
granting of lay taxation was, however, dependent upon its relative financial success.  
The middle years of the 1420s witnessed a contraction of the government’s credit 
base in light of renewed problems in the export trade, downward fluctuations in 
indirect revenue, and a decline in the exchequer’s ability to repay loans.42  At the 
parliament of 1425, the Commons imposed tonnage and poundage upon denizen 
                                                            
38 The grant of 1422 and subsequent grants referenced in footnote 37 were framed as follows: ‘The 
whiche grauntes of subsidies been made by the said commens on the conditions that folwith; that is to 
sey, that hit ne no part ther of be beset ne dispended, to non other use but oonly in and for the defense 
of the said roialme of Engeland’.  The 1415 grant had been framed ‘a tout la vie notre dit soverain 
Seigneur le Roy, pur ent despoiser & ordeiner a sez tres gracious volunte & discretione’: PROME, 
parliament of 1415, item 15.  For a general discussion of this grant see Allmand, Henry V, p. 391.  
39 There seems to be no other plausible reason why the Commons would have sought to re–establish 
the impermanent nature of the maltolt.  
40 Thus, the address of 1425 stressed the Commons’ obligation to provide ‘in voluntaria regis et rei 
publice sustentacione et subventione’: PROME, parliament of 1425, item 2.  Similarly, the address of 
1426 sought ‘in regis et rei publice voluntaria bonorum....assistentia et subvencione’: PROME, 
parliament of 1426, items 1 and 2.
41 See PROME, parliament of 1425, item 20, and PROME, parliament of 1426, item 17.  It needs to be 
pointed out that parliament demonstrated an increasing willingness to underwrite large sums of 
money during this period: the credit act of 1425 sanctioned £20,000 worth of loans, whilst that of the 
parliament of 1426 sanctioned £40,000 worth of loans.  As we shall see in Chapter 3.2, these sums 
increasingly ceased to reflect the fiscal capabilities of the exchequer, in terms of its relative ability to 
raise large-scale credit and effectively service its repayment.  
42 This is a key theme of Chapter 3.2. 
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traders for the first time during Henry VI’s reign as a means of attempting to boost 
indirect tax revenue,43 yet this did not compensate for the decline in maltolt revenue 
which characterised this period.44    These developments coincided with a marked 
increase in special expeditionary expenditure in 1427.45  The regime’s response to 
this situation was to plead its ‘necessity’ during the parliament of 1427–8, as a 
means of signalling to the Commons that their granting of lay taxation was now 
unavoidable.  
Unlike the prorogation address of 1423, the opening address of the parliament of 
1427–8 witnessed the chancellor elaborate upon a specific ‘necessity’ – the ‘defence 
of the realm’ against foreign enemies.46   This signified the more urgent need for lay 
taxation in 1427.  Yet in light of parliament’s understanding of the scope of the 
crown’s ‘necessity’ after the Treaty of Troyes, the Commons remained intent on 
providing the crown with the bare minimum necessary to fund its special 
expeditionary commitments.  Rather than offer to grant a fifteenth and tenth, 
parliament thus pushed to grant an experimental subsidy on parishes and knights’ 
fees which was likely to be difficult to administer and yield less than a fifteenth and 
tenth.47  The minority government’s acquiescence to this fiscal arrangement is 
consonant with its earlier adoption of the Commons’ preferred policy centred on 
credit and indirect taxation from 1424.  So long as parliament provided a viable 
means by which an expansive special expeditionary budget could be financed –
which involved the Commons’ concession of more generous fiscal provision than 
that which had characterised recent parliaments – the government continued to deem 
it unnecessary to force the Commons to grant fifteenths and tenths.  Significantly, 
the Commons’ grant of the parishes and knights’ fees tax was framed in the context 
                                                            
43 The grants of tonnage and poundage at the parliaments of 1422 and 1423–4 had exempted denizen 
traders from this subsidy, and applied solely to alien traders at the same rate as the lifetime grant 
granted to Henry V (3s. per ton and 12d. per £).  The abolition of tonnage and poundage on denizen 
exports ought to be viewed in the context of parliament’s effort to incentivise traders, discussed 
above.  The parliament of 1425 subjected denizen traders to tonnage and poundage, at the same rate 
as aliens noted above.  The denizen tonnage and poundage grant of 1425 appears to have been 
intended to be temporary: it was only to run for one year.  The continuing fiscal need for this subsidy, 
however, is evident in the Commons’ re–granting of this subsidy at the parliament of 1426.  For all 
the tonnage and poundage grants during this period, see the references to the maltolt grants in 
footnote 37.  
44 See Chapter 3.2.  
45 See Chapter 3.2.    
46 PROME, parliament of 1427–8, item 4.  
47 PROME, parliament of 1427–8, item 13.  For a discussion of this subsidy, see Chapter 3.2.  
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of the defence of the English realm.  Parliament was thus publicly acknowledging 
the existence of ‘necessity’ of the English realm – which of course did not exist – in 
order to justify its granting of a relatively ungenerous subsidy.48  This was to become 
common practice during the late Lancastrian period.  The period after the Commons’ 
granting of the parishes and knights’ fees tax witnessed the fiscal and administrative 
failure of this tax, and a continued rise in special expeditionary costs.  This led to the 
development of a revised fiscal political culture centred on the Commons’ renewed 
granting of fifteenths and tenths.  We must now turn our attention, however, to the 
financial and administrative context of the fiscal policies which have been the focus 
of this section.  
3.2 Exchequer finance, 1422–1429: revenue contraction and declining fiscal 
credibility
The following section attempts to reconstruct the annual average royal budget during 
the early minority of Henry VI and place this in the context of a quantitative 
examination of credit structures, indirect tax revenue and government debt.  These 
themes are first examined in the context of the period up to parliament’s granting of 
the parishes and knights’ fees tax, as a means of commenting on the financial context 
of the fiscal policy which we have seen prevailed during the early–to–mid 1420s.  
The section concludes by examining the financial and administrative context of the 
parishes and knights’ fees tax granted during the parliament of 1427–8.    
During the period between 1422 and 1427, annual average special expeditionary 
expenditure stood at £9,200.49  The cost of financing loans, on average per annum 
during this period, was £10,400.  Annual average ‘ordinary’ charges, meanwhile, 
stood at £50,324.   In order to estimate how these charges were financed, it is 
necessary to view material relating to indirect tax revenue and loans compiled by the 
present author vis–à–vis published data regarding trends in total public revenue.50  In 
                                                            
48 As pointed out above, this was also the case in the Commons’ indirect tax grants during this period.  
49 The first three sentences of this paragraph are based upon an examination of E 403/658; E 403/660; 
E 403/663; E 403/666; E 403/669; E 403/671; E 403/673; E 403/675; E 403/677; E 403/680.  
50 The material relating to parliamentary–controlled tax revenue and loans derives from an 
examination of E 401/703; E 401/704; E 401/706; E 401/707; E 401/708; E 401/710; E 401/711; E 
401/712; E 401/713; E 401/715; E 401/716.  This has been viewed vis–à–vis material published by 
Steel regarding public income and debt: Steel, Receipt, pp. 165–71.  Unlike in subsequent chapters, it 
has seemed unnecessary to tabulate parliamentary–controlled tax revenue and loans in Appendix One, 
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keeping with the fiscal policy discussed in the previous section, annual average 
special expeditionary expenditure during this period was financed almost exclusively 
from loans (£7,031), supplemented by indirect tax cash receipts (£2,169).  The 
annual average charge for the financing of loans was met by £9,464 worth of indirect 
tax assignments and £936 worth of lay tax assignments.51  The annual average 
‘ordinary’ budget, meanwhile, was financed from the remaining £17,725 of cash 
receipts, principally from indirect tax revenue, and £32,599 worth of assignments, 
around half of which were against indirect tax revenue and half of which would have 
been against ‘ordinary’ revenue sources and clerical tax revenue.52    
Two points, in particular, emerge from the above budgetary overview.  One relates to 
the ‘ordinary’ financial position of the Lancastrian government during the early 
minority.  In the event that the crown’s revenue from indirect taxation or ‘ordinary’ 
and clerical tax sources dropped by only a couple of thousand pounds, the 
government would risk becoming dependent upon loans, during a period when lay 
tax revenue was not forthcoming, in order to finance ‘ordinary’ as well as special 
expeditionary costs.  Indeed, as we have seen, the exchequer was already over–
assigning indirect tax revenue in the financing of ‘ordinary’ charges.53  This no doubt 
accounts for the exchequer’s apparent attempts, noted above, to build up a minor 
cash surplus.54  The emergence of this budgetary imbalance placed pressure on the 
exchequer to maximise revenue from the customs and subsidies and maintain 
collegial relations with its creditors in an attempt, respectively, to prevent any 
                                                                                                                                                                           
since lay tax revenue was entirely lacking for all but the very beginning of this period, meaning that 
the government’s employment of lay tax revenue is practically a non–issue in the history of exchequer 
finance during the early years of the minority.  A major benefit of tabulating parliamentary–controlled 
revenue in relation to the late minority and majority periods of Henry VI’s reign is that, in the context 
of an attempted re–construction of the royal budget, this method effectively demonstrates the extent to 
which lay tax revenue and credit were being employed unconstitutionally, in the ‘ordinary’ financing 
of the regime.  The most important theme of the following section relates to the decline in indirect tax 
revenue as the 1420s progressed (which is tabulated through the employment of figures from the 
enrolled customs accounts), rather than the exchequer’s employment of this revenue.
51 It needs to be mentioned that an annual average of £608 worth of assignments financing loans, all 
from indirect tax revenue, failed during this period.  For a discussion of the problems encountered by 
the exchequer in financing loans, see pp. 64–5.  
52 I estimate that, after the charges traced in this paragraph had been financed, a minor cash surplus 
would have been left over consisting of around £690 worth of cash receipts.  It also needs to be 
mentioned that £4,901 worth of assignments financing ‘ordinary’ charges, all from indirect taxation, 
proved abortive and begot ‘fictitious loans’.  For a discussion of government debt during this period, 
see p. 66.  
53 See footnote 52.  
54 See footnote 52.  
63
exacerbation of the fiscal situation and to ensure the continued availability of loans 
so that revenue from this source would be available should it be required in the 
financing of the ‘ordinary’ budget.  The second point to emerge from our budgetary 
analysis is that the relative success of the exchequer in facing both of the challenges 
described above would determine the viability of the fiscal policy discussed in 
Chapter 3.1, since in the event that creditors ceased to have confidence in the 
exchequer’s ability to finance their loans from indirect tax revenue and began to 
withdraw their credit, the administration would require lay taxation to finance special 
expeditionary expenditure and/or incentivise creditors to once again lend.  It is thus 
necessary for us to trace the exchequer’s response to the challenges outlined above 
by examining, respectively, the exchequer’s management both of its creditors and 
indirect tax revenue, and subsequently viewing these issues in light of trends in the 
administration’s management of debt.  
It is necessary for us to begin by establishing who the crown’s creditors were during 
the years between 1422 and 1427.55  We have already noted that the annual average 
sum total of loans raised by the exchequer during this period was £7,031.  My 
examination of the relevant receipt roll material illustrates that 96% of this sum –
£6,755 – was extended by what we might call large–scale creditors.56  A staggering 
59% of the aforementioned £6,755 – £3,987 – was extended by Cardinal Henry 
Beaufort.  The remaining £2,768 consisted of £300 worth of loans from the Feoffees 
of the Duchy of Lancaster; £900 worth of loans from the Corporation of London; and 
£1,568 worth of loans from other sources, the largest of which were from Italian 
capitalist traders. The remaining 4% (£276) of annual average loans received by the 
exchequer during the period 1422–7 represent loans from those who we might call 
small–scale creditors; i.e., local gentry and merchants approached to provide loans 
through special commissions despatched into the shires.  This annual average 
distribution of loans for the five years in question needs to be revised to take into 
consideration the fact that the government did not seek small–scale loans until 
1426.57 Thus, the exchequer years 1425–6 and 1426–7 witnessed the administration 
                                                            
55 The following paragraph is based upon an examination of material referenced in footnote 50.  
56 i.e., individuals or groups with access to a high level of liquid capital which could be placed at the 
disposal of the exchequer, provided that the fiscal credibility of the latter could be depended upon.  
57 CPR, 1422–9, pp. 353–6.  
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raise an annual average £690 worth of loans from small–scale creditors and an 
annual average of £2,944 worth of loans from large–scale creditors.  This increase in 
the proportion of small–scale loans vis–à–vis large–scale loans is, however, far less 
significant than the dramatic annual average decline of 56% in loans extended by 
large–scale creditors in comparison with the period 1422–7 taken as a whole.  This 
latter development ensured that the annual average sum total of loans for the period 
1425–7 – £3,634 – stood at only half of the annual average sum total of loans for the 
five year period 1422–7.  
The collapse in loan revenue from large–scale creditors is accounted for principally 
by Cardinal Beaufort’s unwillingness to extend further credit after his large loans of 
1424 and 1425.  Beaufort’s withdrawal of his services as the minority regime’s chief 
financier during this period ought to be explained in terms of the exchequer’s 
inability to honour its debts to the cardinal.58  During the exchequer year 1424–5, the 
exchequer proved unable to finance £4,000 worth of Beaufort’s loan of March 1424, 
which resulted in the crown embarrassingly defaulting on the terms of repayment of 
Beaufort’s loan.  This resulted in crown jewels currently being held by Beaufort 
remaining in the cardinal’s possession indefinitely.59  These developments must have 
been the cause of considerable discomfort for lesser creditors: if Beaufort, the figure 
accorded the highest level of fiscal privilege at the Lancastrian exchequer, could not 
secure the efficient repayment of his loans, how confident could the Corporation of 
London or the Feoffees of the Duchy of Lancaster be of securing repayment?  It is no 
coincidence that, after their loan of 1424, the feoffees did not make any further loans 
during the period in question.60  And the Corporation of London and Italian 
                                                            
58 It would be a mistake, however, not to note the increasing domestic political difficulties 
encountered by Beaufort at this time, specifically regarding his relationship with Protector Gloucester: 
Harriss, Beaufort, especially pp. 134–49; Wolffe, Henry VI, pp. 25–47.  Nevertheless, it must be 
pointed out that Beaufort’s extension of further credit would have served as a means by which his 
political ascendency could have been maintained.  Viewed in this context, the fiscal dynamics of 
Beaufort’s failure to make further loans after 1425, rather than broader political considerations, ought 
to be stressed.  The accounts referenced above focus very much upon the personality politics of the 
minority council, specifically the enmity between Beaufort and Gloucester, in explaining Beaufort’s 
retreat from providing further loans.  
59 For detailed discussions of the crown’s failure to efficiently repay Beaufort’s loan of 1424, see 
Harriss, Beaufort, pp. 146–9; McFarlane, ‘At the Deathbed of Cardinal Beaufort’, pp. 125–30.  It 
needs to be pointed out that this outstanding sum was never repaid.  
60 The feoffees would only lend money again in anticipation of revenue from the fifteenths and tenths 
granted ahead of the Coronation Expedition of 1429–31.  See Chapters 4.2 and 4.4 for a detailed 
discussion of credit finance during the late minority.  
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merchants, who extended further loans in 1425, encountered difficulties securing 
repayment.61  Indeed, the exchequer year 1425–6 witnessed the exchequer fail to 
honour almost £2,000 worth of loans, all of which were assigned against indirect tax 
revenue.    
The exchequer’s declining credibility, from the perspective of its creditors, needs to 
be viewed in the context of a downward trend in gross indirect tax revenue.  My 
work on the enrolled customs accounts illustrates that, during the period 1422–4, 
gross indirect tax revenue stood, on average per annum, at £43,629.62  The following 
exchequer year, 1424–5, however, witnessed gross indirect tax revenue fall sharply, 
to £34,520.  Though there was a slight upturn in gross indirect tax revenue during the 
period between 1425–7, the period between 1424 and 1427, taken as a whole, 
witnessed revenue from the customs and subsidies continue to stand at an annual 
average of just under £40,000 (£39,423).  The exchequer’s response to these 
developments was to attempt to more efficiently administer the customs and 
subsidies.  In this context, the administration demonstrated a marked vigilance in 
restricting the level of exemptions from subsidy payment granted to traders.63  
Concomitantly, the exchequer attempted to maximise the level of indirect tax 
revenue processed on a term by term basis.  A comparative examination of material 
from receipt rolls and the enrolled accounts illustrates that, on average per annum 
during the period 1422–7, the exchequer brought in an impressive 96% of gross 
indirect tax revenue.  These exercises in fiscal administrative stringency could not, 
however, halt the decline in indirect tax revenue charted above, since this was caused 
                                                            
61 On 10 December 1425, £1,000 worth of customs and subsidies assignments servicing the 
repayment of the Corporation of London proved abortive and begot ‘fictitious loans’.  Florentine 
merchants similarly failed to cash a £250 assignment on the customs and subsidies servicing the 
repayment of a loan: E 401/712.  
62 The following discussion is based upon the material tabulated in Appendix Three.  Despite 
parliamentary confidence in the stability of indirect tax revenue during this period, noted in Chapter 
3.1, it needs to be pointed out that this sum was marginally lower than the gross yield of the customs 
and subsidies during the final three years of Henry V’s reign (For a statistical demonstration of the 
yield of indirect taxation during Henry V’s reign, see W. M. Ormrod’s data on the European State 
Finance Database (ESFD): ‘Estimated revenue from customs and subsidies on overseas trade, 1400-
1485’ (Online).  Available:
http://www.esfdb.org/table.aspx?resourceid=11404 (Site Accessed 10 September 2013)).  
63 My work on the material tabulated in Appendix Three illustrates that the exchequer lost out on an 
annual average of only £131worth of maltolt revenue per annum as a result of exemptions granted to 
merchants to trade free of subsidy.  Prior to 1427, the level of trade in wine and general merchandise
which was granted exemptions to trade free of subsidy was so negligible that an annual average of 
only 20 or so pence worth of tonnage and poundage revenue was lost out on during the period in 
question.  
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not by an inefficient or corrupt customs administration but rather the monetary 
policies of continental governments and political instability in the Low Countries.64  
Clearly, it was beyond the capabilities of the Lancastrian government to control 
these factors.  Nevertheless, the slump in indirect tax revenue had a very serious 
impact upon the fiscal capacity of indirect taxation.  The level of ‘fictitious loans’ 
incurred in the financing of total exchequer charges increased from an annual 
average of £4,342 during the period of relatively stable indirect tax revenue between 
1422 and 1424, to an annual average of £6,273 during the period of declining 
indirect tax revenue between 1424 and 1427.65  Whereas during the former period, 
an annual average just under half the sum total of ‘fictitious loans’ represent aborted 
indirect tax assignments; during the latter period, the proportion of ‘fictitious loans’ 
representing aborted indirect tax assignments had risen to 83%.66  
The breakdown in the exchequer’s relationship with its creditors during the period in 
question was therefore inextricably bound up with a decline in the fiscal capacity of 
indirect taxation.  Cardinal Beaufort was hardly going to provide new loans; nor was 
the exchequer going to have an easy job of persuading others to extend credit, so 
long as the principal revenue source from which the exchequer sought to repay loans 
was so over–assigned.  An attempt to view these problems in the context of an 
overview of the exchequer’s failure to rise to the two principal fiscal challenges 
which we have seen were faced by the exchequer during the early years of the 
minority brings into focus an emergent fiscal crisis.  The relative ability of the 
exchequer to augment loan and indirect tax revenue as a means of ensuring the future 
stability of ‘ordinary’ finance had been seriously compromised during the mid–
1420s.  In the absence of fifteenth and tenth revenue – which would serve to re–open 
credit lines and offer the exchequer a means of financing expansive ‘ordinary’ 
expenditure unrelated to the customs and subsidies – the general fiscal stability of 
Lancastrian government was threatened.  As we shall see, this situation would 
ultimately lead the late minority regime to seek lay tax revenue as a means of 
                                                            
64 It seems that aggressive coinage debasements on the continent prevented foreign traders from 
purchasing goods sold at English prices: for the continental monetary background, see J. H. Munro, 
Wool, Cloth and Gold: The Struggle for Bullion in Anglo–Burgundian Trade, 1340-1478 (Toronto, 
1972), pp. 65–92. For political instability and civil war in the Low Countries during the 1420s, see, 
for example, R. Vaughn, Philip the Good: The Apogee of Burgundy (London, 1970), pp. 31–50.
65 These figures are derived from Steel, Receipt, p. 459.  
66 This is deduced from an examination of the material referenced in footnote 50.  
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financing ‘ordinary’ expenditure.67  Of more immediate concern to the exchequer 
during the period in question, however, was the impact of a decline in the 
government’s credit base and problems relating to indirect taxation upon the viability 
of the fiscal policy discussed in Chapter 3.1.  In the event that special expeditionary 
expenditure remained at the level outlined at the beginning of this section, the 50% 
diminution in loan revenue which we have seen characterised the mid–1420s would 
have seriously threatened the exchequer’s ability to finance this charge.  The 
prospect of a marked increase in special expeditionary expenditure, however, which 
rose by 56% from an annual average of £9,200 during the period 1422–7 to £21,000 
during the exchequer year 1427–8, exacerbated this problem.68  Clearly, the 
exchequer required a new source of income as a means of financing this increase in 
special expeditionary costs/securing an increase in the level of loans necessary to 
finance this level of expenditure.  This was the fiscal context in which parliament 
granted the parishes and knights’ fees tax during the parliament of 1427–8.
An attempted reconstruction of the exchequer’s financing of special expeditionary 
expenditure during the period 1427–8 provides us with a means of assessing whether 
the parishes and knights’ fees tax succeeded in placing the regime’s ‘extraordinary’ 
finances on a sounder footing.69    During this period revenue from the parishes and 
knights’ fees tax stood at £7,281, all of which was received in cash during the Easter 
term, 1428.  Concomitantly, £7,043 worth of loans was received during the two 
exchequer terms in question.  The sum total of revenue from both of these sources –
£14,324 – fell short of the £21,000 worth of special expeditionary expenditure 
outlined in the previous paragraph.  We can therefore assume that the only way in 
which the exchequer was able to finance this level of special expeditionary 
expenditure was through its supplementing of the sums outlined above with some 
£6,676 worth of indirect tax revenue received in cash.  This seems to illustrate that 
the parishes and knights’ fees tax was not yielding what the exchequer believed it 
ought to be at this time.  Certainly, there appear to have been a number of 
complications in the local administration of this subsidy.  If the annual average value 
of a parish was 10 marks, it was charged 13s. 4d. (1 mark or 10%) of its moveable 
                                                            
67 This is a key theme of Chapters 4.3 and 4.4.  
68 This is derived from an examination of E 403/683; E 403/686. 
69 The following four sentences are based on an examination of E 401/717; E 401/718.  
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goods, and so in proportion if the annual value of the parish exceeded 10 marks.  I 
have found evidence, however, of one parish where each resident householder was 
charged the rate to be paid by the entire parish.70  Moreover, the administration of 
the subsidy appears to have caused local tensions.  In one particularly interesting 
inquisition held at Wansford (Northants), a dispute arose not over the rate to be paid 
by a parish, but rather the liability of parishioners to contribute towards the tax.71  A 
third of the inhabitants of the parish of Cotterstock claimed they ought not to 
contribute to the subsidy owing to the King’s Charter which exempted them.    
Furthermore, a number of inquisitions held after the dates set by parliament for the 
collection of this subsidy strongly indicate that these problems resulted in a lengthy 
process of assessment and collection.72  Perhaps, given the administrative practices 
discussed above, this is hardly surprising.  Certainly, the gross yield of the parishes 
and knights’ fees tax was disappointing.73  The gross yield of this subsidy was 
£12,291, of which £10,913 was brought into the exchequer. The remaining £1,378 
worth of this subsidy was owed in debts.    
Clearly, then, there was a correlation between the fiscal administrative problems 
associated with the parishes and knights’ fees tax and the exchequer’s recourse to 
indirect tax revenue in the financing of special expeditionary expenditure during the 
period 1427–8.  This latter development had serious implications upon the relative 
ability of indirect tax revenue to finance an expansive ‘ordinary’ budget during this 
period, especially when we consider that a further £6,600 worth of indirect tax 
assignments were employed in the financing of loans during the year in question.74  
Only £13,008 worth of cash revenue, principally from the customs and subsidies, a 
cash surplus of some £6,500 which I estimate was leftover from the previous 
                                                            
70 Feudal Aids, 2, p. 478.   The parish in question was Somersham (Hunts).  
71 E 179/155/70.  
72 E 179/120/75.  The four Hertfordshire inquisitions contained in this bundle are dated as being one 
year late (the collection date stipulated by parliament was May 1428; these inquisitions are dated May 
1429).    
73 The yield of this subsidy has been the cause of some confusion amongst historians: Griffiths 
erroneously states that it yielded only £3,000: Griffiths, The Reign of Henry VI, p. 110.  What follows
is based upon an examination of E 359/27.  A later exchequer estimate of all taxes levied since the 
reign of Henry VI, which seems to have been drawn up c. 1450, correctly identified the gross yield as 
£12,291: E 179/242/73.  
74 This is based upon an examination of E 401/717; E 401/718.  It needs to be pointed out that £1,147 
worth of the sum total of assignments financing loans, all from indirect tax revenue, proved abortive 
and begot ‘fictitious loans’.
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exchequer year, and £40,666 worth of assignments, remained to finance the 
‘ordinary’ budget, which stood at £60,082 during the period in question.75  This 
fiscal situation is evidence of the precariousness of the exchequer’s position by the 
close of the 1420s.  The exchequer could not be certain of its ability to regularly 
build up large cash surpluses in order to finance a structural deficit between 
‘ordinary’ revenue, clerical tax revenue and the customs and subsidies, on the one 
hand, and ‘ordinary’ expenditure, on the other.  Moreover, as noted above, £5,937 
worth of assignments financing ‘ordinary’ expenditure proved abortive and begot 
‘fictitious loans’.76  This figure needs to be viewed in conjunction with the £1,147 
worth of abortive assignments which we have seen were incurred in the financing of 
loans during this period.77  The exchequer year 1427–8 thus witnessed an increase of 
£2,000 worth of ‘fictitious loans’ in comparison with the annual average figure 
discussed above for the period 1422–7.  To make matters worse, an analysis of the 
enrolled customs accounts illustrates that gross indirect tax revenue fell by over 
£5,000 during the exchequer year 1427–8.78
                                     ……………………………………………………
It would have been clear to the minority regime, as it prepared to despatch a large, 
costly, special expeditionary force to France to crown Henry VI in his French realm, 
that it was not financially viable to continue to rely upon fiscal experiments such as 
the failed parishes and knights’ fees tax.  Chapter Four investigates the fiscal 
political strategy employed by the late minority government in an effort to bring 
about the Commons’ granting of fifteenths and tenths as a means of financing costly 
continental military activity into the final years of Henry VI’s minority.  At the close 
of the 1420s, however, the minority regime was not merely faced with a crisis 
relating to war finance.  The fiscal developments traced in Chapter 3.2 also raised 
serious questions regarding the long–term stability of the exchequer’s ‘ordinary’ 
financial position.  In light of the marked decline in profits from the customs and 
                                                            
75 £5,937 worth of assignments financing ‘ordinary’ expenditure proved abortive and begot ‘fictitious 
loans’.  See footnote 76 for further comment.  
76 This is based upon an examination of E 401/717; E 401/718.  £4,280 worth of these failed 
assignments constituted drafts against indirect tax revenue.  The remaining £1,657 worth of failed 
assignments financing ‘ordinary’ expenditure must thus have constituted drafts against ‘ordinary’ 
revenue sources and/or clerical taxation.  
77 See footnote 74.  
78 See Appendix Three.  
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subsidies and concomitant growth in government debt, the regime was faced with the 
problem, which we have seen had confronted earlier governments during the late 
Ricardian and early Lancastrian periods, of how it would seek to secure the extra 
supply necessary to effectively finance ‘ordinary’ charges and avoid a continuing 
build–up of government debt.  As we shall see, this issue cast a shadow over the 
fiscal politics of the early–to–mid 1430s and beyond.  
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CHAPTER FOUR:
THE NEGOTIATION OF A FISCAL POLICY CENTRED UPON A LOW 
LEVEL OF LAY TAXATION AND THE EXCHEQUER’S DRIVE FOR 
FISCAL ADMINISTRATIVE STABILITY, 1429–1437
We have seen that the exchequer’s struggle to maintain its credibility vis–à–vis 
creditors amidst growing financial difficulties during the early years of Henry VI’s 
minority was caused by the development of a particular trend in the politics of public 
finance.  This was centred upon parliament’s desire to respond to the government’s 
plea of ‘necessity’ in such a manner so as to avoid having to provide lay taxation, 
owing to popular reservations regarding the legitimacy of the government’s 
‘necessity’ after the Treaty of Troyes.  During the course of the parliament of 1423–
4, the Commons had lobbied for the government’s adoption of a fiscal policy centred 
on credit and indirect taxation.  The government’s acceptance of parliament’s 
proposed policy reflects its perceived viability at a time of reduced ‘extraordinary’ 
expenditure and a nascent recovery in the export trade.  Yet developments during the 
mid–to–late 1420s had conspired to render a change in fiscal policy necessary.  
Downward fluctuations in the export trade, over-charged indirect tax revenue and a 
loss of creditors’ confidence in the fiscal credibility of the exchequer, which resulted 
in a withdrawal of credit, led the Commons to recognise the need for a more liberal 
fiscal regime at a time of increased ‘extraordinary’ costs during the parliament of 
1427–8.  The striking financial and administrative failure of the parishes and 
knights’ fees tax granted in March 1428, however, required the exchequer to employ 
indirect tax revenue in the financing of ‘extraordinary’ charges, which had a negative 
impact upon the administration’s financing of the ‘ordinary’ budget. 
What follows charts the development of a revised fiscal political culture centred 
upon parliament’s granting of fifteenths and tenths, and its financial context, during 
the period of the late minority, c. 1429–1437.  Chapter 4.1 traces the parliamentary 
negotiation of a short-lived fiscal regime centred upon multiple fifteenth and tenth 
grants, which were necessary to meet radically increased special expeditionary costs 
during the coronation expedition of 1429–1431.  The exchequer’s ability to re–assert 
its credibility after the negative developments of late 1420s, despite growing 
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problems relating to the exchequer’s ‘ordinary’ financial position, is the subject of 
Chapter 4.2.  Chapter 4.3 focuses upon the move away from a fiscal regime centred 
upon a high level of lay taxation between 1431 and the mid–1430s.  This is 
explained in terms of continuing parliamentary tensions regarding the scope of the 
government’s ‘necessity’ with respect to the French war, and also the development 
of new tensions between the government and the Commons regarding the former’s 
seeking of lay taxation and credit as a means of financing ‘ordinary’ expenditure.  A 
detailed study of exchequer finance during the early–to–mid 1430s, in Chapter 4.4, 
draws attention to increasing fiscal problems as a result of the decreasing incidence 
of lay taxation and a crisis in indirect tax revenue.  Particular attention is drawn, in 
this context, to an increasing level of government debt during the early–to–mid 
1430s.  
4.1 The negotiation of a new fiscal policy centred on lay taxation, 1429–1431
During the period 1429–1431, an annual average ‘extraordinary’ budget over three 
times as large as the annual average ‘extraordinary’ budget during the early years of 
the minority shaped the development of a new trend in fiscal politics.1  It was not 
possible for the exchequer to raise the level of loans necessary to fund this level of 
expenditure without parliament’s granting of fifteenths and tenths, which would 
serve as the only viable security against which large-scale loans could be raised.  It 
was in this context that the chancellor pleaded the government’s ‘necessity’ at the 
opening address of the parliament of 1429–30.2  The plea of ‘necessity’ of 1429 was 
far more explicit than those of 1423 and 1427.  The costs of defence were mentioned 
in the context of an explicit reference to the king’s enemies.  Furthermore, it was 
stated that the military crisis in France directly affected the well–being of the English 
realm, which it was implied required the granting of supply.  Both of these points 
had been absent from the plea of 1423, and the latter point had been absent from the 
plea of 1428.3  Clearly, then, the regime sought to impress upon the Commons that 
the fiscal political compromises which had characterised the 1420s were no longer 
financially viable, and that parliament’s granting of a generous lay subsidy was now 
unavoidable.  The Commons’ subsequent grant of two fifteenths and tenths, a more 
                                                            
1 For a detailed discussion of the extraordinary budget, see Chapter 4.2.  
2 PROME, parliament of 1429–30, item 4.  
3 See Chapter 3.1.  
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liberal lay subsidy bill than any since the 1410s, illustrates that parliament 
recognised its obligation to vote a high level of lay taxation in response to this plea.  
The double subsidy bill permitted the government to negotiate the parliamentary 
underwriting of £50,000 worth of credit.4  This facilitated the negotiation of large–
scale loans which allowed the exchequer to finance total ‘extraordinary’ expenditure.  
These arrangements were not, however, sufficient to sustain the heavy financial 
demands of the coronation expedition.  By the beginning of 1431, new special 
expeditions required financing.5  In these circumstances, the government urgently 
required a new grant of lay taxation.  Yet in its negotiations for a lay tax grant at the 
parliament of 1431, the government did not plead its ‘necessity’.  The chancellor, in 
his opening address at the parliament of 1431, merely alluded to the importance of 
subjects’ obedience with their prince’s demands, viewed in the wider context of the 
need for harmony in the realm.6  Given the continuing financial exigencies of the 
coronation expedition, it seems reasonable to conclude that this represented a nod, on 
the part of the government, to the need for a parliamentary grant of lay taxation.  
Why, though, did the government not broach the issue of supply directly in public 
debate?  More specifically, why did it not continue to plead its ‘necessity’?  The 
answer to these questions lies in an emergent conflict between the government and 
the Commons regarding the scope of the government’s ‘necessity’ and the level of 
supply which parliament ought to be constitutionally obligated to grant.7  This can be 
traced back to the negotiations for supply at the parliament of 1427–8.  There was a 
significant discrepancy between the phrasing of the government’s plea of ‘necessity’ 
in 1427 and that of the Commons’ grant of the parishes and knights’ fees tax in 
March 1428.  The government’s plea at this parliament had been framed in terms of 
‘the realm’, referring neither to the realm of England nor that of France.  This 
illustrates that the government, even after the Treaty of Troyes, felt no need to 
distinguish between the two realms.  The Commons, as we have seen, disagreed with 
this.  Parliament recognised that the crown’s increasing special expeditionary costs 
                                                            
4 For the parliamentary act underwriting credit see PROME, parliament of 1429–30, item 23.  For a 
detailed discussion of the exchequer’s utilisation of loan revenue, on which the following sentences
are based, see Chapter 4.2.
5 For a detailed discussion, see Chapter 4.2.  
6 PROME, parliament of 1431, item 3.  
7 What follows builds upon points made in Chapter 3.2.  
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demanded a grant of lay taxation, evident in their granting of the parishes and 
knights’ fees tax.  Through framing their grant of this subsidy solely in terms of the 
English realm, however, the Commons sent a powerful signal to the government that 
parliament recognised that the crown’s ‘necessity’ did not genuinely relate to its 
English realm, and thus did not merit parliament’s voting of a generous subsidy bill. 
By the time of its preparations for the coronation expedition, the government had 
clearly caught on to this trend in the Commons’ thinking.  We have seen how the 
plea of ‘necessity’ of 1429 was framed in terms of the defence of the English realm; 
specifically the idea that the strains of war in a subjugated principality necessitated 
supply in defence of the English realm.  Though, as we have seen, the Commons’ 
grant of a double subsidy illustrated that parliament accepted this argument, it is 
telling that once again their grant was made in defence of the English realm.  It was 
unlikely that parliament would go on granting double subsidies in response to 
government evocations of the ‘necessity’ of the realm of England, when there clearly 
did not exist a ‘necessity’ in the realm of England but rather in that of France.  And 
if the government brought a plea of ‘necessity’ explicitly centred on the needs of the 
French realm before parliament this would likely result in a political crisis, given the 
Commons’ clear unwillingness to associate their grants with the defence of the 
French realm.  As the coronation expedition wore on, and it became apparent to the 
Commons that the continuation of a fiscal regime centred on lay taxation was 
necessary in order to meet the government’s financial needs, this issue began to have 
serious political implications.  In 1431 two urban communities, Melcombe Regis 
(Dorset) and Mablethorpe (Lincs), petitioned the king complaining that poverty 
prevented them from sustaining a heavy burden of lay taxation.  The tenants and 
landholders of Mablethorpe sought a complete respite from their lay quota for ten 
years,8 whilst the tenants and burgesses of Melcombe Regis sought the government’s 
confirmation that they pay a lower rate of subsidy than they had done in the past.9  
                                                            
8 This petition is SC 8/25/1245, and is printed in RP, 4, p. 385.  
9 This un–dated and un-enrolled petition, SC 8/126/6267, was placed by the editors of RP under the 
parliament of 1433: RP, 4, pp. 468–9.  In so doing it seems that the editors mistakenly associated it 
with a petition from the parliament of 1433 relating to impoverishment at the port of Melcombe Regis 
(SC 8/126/6255).  It can be dated to 1431 owing to its reference to a petition from 1426 (SC 
8/128/6388) which requested an inquiry into the quota to be paid for each lay subsidy.  The inquest, it 
states, was held on 28 September 1430, where it was decided that the town should pay 13s. 4d. 
towards each lay subsidy (it used to contribute £9 15s., according to the petition of 1426).  The 
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Lincoln, too, may have brought a petition to the parliament of 1431, not regarding 
the need for a respite from lay taxation specifically, but rather owing to its apparent 
inability to sustain both its lay tax and fee farm quotas.10
The government’s response to these developments was notably conciliatory.  
Mablethorpe was granted respite from lay taxation for two years, and Lincoln was 
exempted from one third of the one and one third fifteenths and tenths which the 
Commons granted in 1431.11  Owing to the absence of comment on the parliament 
roll we can only speculate regarding the negotiations which must have led to these 
exemptions, though it is reasonable to suggest that they would have occurred at more 
or less the same time as the government’s negotiations for supply.  Parallel to the 
government’s acceptance of a lay tax regime favoured by the Commons; i.e., one 
which was not based upon the government’s pleading of its ‘necessity’, which would 
have necessitated frequent, generous grants along the lines of the double subsidy of 
1429, the government thus also strove to accommodate regional desires for 
reductions in quota and/or exemptions from lay taxation owing to purported local 
poverty.  It makes sense that the government would allow the Commons to shape 
these trends in fiscal political debate.  From the government’s perspective, even a 
relatively ungenerous grant of lay taxation was significantly better than no grant, as 
this would facilitate credit operations which would enable the Lancastrian war 
machine to continue to function.  At the parliament of 1431, then, the government 
had acted to offset long–term parliamentary tensions regarding its use of a plea of 
‘necessity’ through seeking to work with the Commons in order to formulate a fiscal 
policy acceptable to parliament.  The resultant subsidy bill, of a special tax on lands 
in addition to the one and one third fifteenths and tenths noted above, must have 
                                                                                                                                                                           
burgesses requested that the government confirm this quota for a period of ten years and pardon all 
outstanding arrears.  It makes much more sense for them to have presented this petition at the next 
parliament after 1430, rather than three years later in 1433.  
10 The title in RP, 4, p. 414 states that a petition to this effect from the mayor and commonality of 
Lincoln related to the tenth year of the reign of Henry VI (1431–2), and it is grouped here with a 
cluster of petitions from the parliament of May 1432.   It is perhaps more realistic to view the petition 
in question (SC 8/26/1272) as belonging to the parliament of 1431, however, as in 1431 Lincoln was 
officially exempt from contributing towards the one and one third fifteenths and tenths granted, 
whereas the subsequent year, in 1432, it was not. Since no other evidence has survived suggesting 
that the community of Lincoln lobbied for an exemption from contributing to the subsidy of 1431, it 
is tempting to hypothesise that SC 8/26/1272 was brought to the parliament of 1431, rather than that 
of 1432, though this is of course nothing more than informed conjecture.    
11 For Lincoln’s part exemption see the Commons’ grant of 1431: PROME, parliament of 1431, item 
13.  
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represented something of a ceiling of what the Commons were willing to contribute.  
A more generous grant than this would have negated the fiscal political significance 
of the developments outlined above which had led to the government’s abandonment 
of a plea of ‘necessity’; yet a less liberal lay subsidy package would have made it 
very difficult for the exchequer to negotiate the level of credit necessary to finance 
its ‘extraordinary’ charges.12
4.2 The exchequer’s restoration of fiscal credibility, 1429–1431
The following section illustrates that the fiscal regime discussed above transformed 
the exchequer’s ‘extraordinary’ financial position.  It begins by discussing the 
administration’s restoration of its fiscal credibility vis–à–vis creditors.  This involves 
a quantitative discussion of the exchequer’s ability to raise an increased level of 
loans, the pivotal role played by loans in the financing of the ‘extraordinary’ budget, 
and the administration’s efficient financing of loans which was shaped by its 
competent management of lay taxation.  The broader fiscal context of these 
developments is subsequently traced.  Here the focus is on problems in the financing 
of ‘ordinary’ charges and a decline in indirect tax revenue.  
Material presented in Appendix One, which ought to be viewed alongside the 
discussion in Chapter Three regarding the exchequer’s problematic relationship with 
its creditors during the 1420s, illustrates the exchequer’s renewed ability to raise 
large-scale loans during the coronation expedition as a result of the lay tax grants of 
1429 and 1431.  During the period of the coronation expedition the exchequer 
received an annual average of £35,758 worth of loans.13  Of this sum, around 
£23,600 (66%) was extended by extremely wealthy individuals and associations, 
including Cardinal Beaufort, the Corporation of London and the Feoffees of the 
Duchy of Lancaster, figures which we have seen had suffered to varying degrees 
during the fiscal squeeze of the 1420s.  Meanwhile smaller creditors, who had been 
                                                            
12 See Chapter 4.2 for detailed comment.  
13 This figure is the sum total of loan revenue contracted during the terms Michaelmas 1429–30 to 
Easter 1431.  The total derived from Appendix One in this respect – £60,153 – is misleading, as it 
does not take account of a £8,333 loan extended by Beaufort and a £3,029 loan extended by the 
Feoffees of the Duchy of Lancaster.  The receipt of these two loans was not recorded on the receipt 
rolls.  Evidence of Beaufort’s loan of £8,333 is found in the assignment of this sum to the cardinal, in 
repayment of a loan, apparently from March 1430 on the receipt roll of Michaelmas 1430–1: E 
401/724; CPR 1429–36, p. 60; Harriss, Beaufort, p. 403.  For the feoffees’ contribution of £3,029, see 
p. 79, especially footnote 21.
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relatively unforthcoming during the commissions into the shires for loans in 1426, 
provided around £12,158 (34%) of this figure.14  The significance of this large 
volume of loans can only be fully appreciated if it is considered in the context of 
‘extraordinary’ expenditure.  During the period 1429–1431, special expeditionary 
expenditure stood at an annual average of £70,720.15  Material presented in 
Appendix One illustrates the extent to which the large injection of loans enabled the 
exchequer to finance the annual average special expeditionary budget during this 
period.  Total loan revenue provided the exchequer with just under half of the cash 
required to finance special expeditionary costs discussed above.  The remaining 
£36,962 worth of special expeditionary expenses would have been funded through 
the exchequer’s employment of all of the cash receipts brought in, on average per 
annum during this period, from lay taxation (£16,184); all of the cash receipts from 
the customs and subsidies (£5,740); and £13,038 worth of non-tabulated cash 
receipts from ‘ordinary’ revenue and clerical taxation.16
This discussion illustrates how increased levels of credit played a central role in 
enabling the exchequer to meet the costs of the coronation expedition.  From the 
perspective of creditors, particularly those free to dispense with large amounts of 
cash but evidently also lesser, local creditors, the exchequer was clearly once again 
deemed capable of efficiently financing loans.  To what extent was the exchequer 
able to honour these debts?  Here we must once more turn to Appendix One.17  With 
the exception of a large influx of cash from the double fifteenth and tenth grant of 
1429 during the Michaelmas term of 1429–30, all of which we have seen was 
employed by the exchequer in financing special expeditionary expenditure, 
                                                            
14 These figures are derived from an examination of the receipt rolls for the period Michaelmas 1429–
30 to Easter 1431.  For references see Appendix One.    It is worth pointing out that, on a local level, 
the administration appears to have encountered problems regarding the levying of minor loans.  In 
1431, for example, Gloucestershire commissioners for loans mention complaints regarding the burden 
of earlier loans levied by the crown: E 34/1B.  This is somewhat ironic, given that the loan 
commission of 1426 was hardly a striking success: see Chapter 3.2.  
15 This figure derives from an examination of E 403/692; E 403/693; E 403/694; E 403/696; and E 
403/698.  
16 The figures relating to revenue from the customs and subsidies cited here derive from an 
examination of the material tabulated in Appendix One.  The figure relating to non–tabulated 
‘ordinary’ and clerical tax revenue derive from my subtracting of data relating to parliamentary–
controlled revenue tabulated in Appendix One from Steel’s totals regarding total cash revenue: Steel, 
Receipt, pp. 172–6.   
17 This paragraph is concerned with successful assignments servicing the repayment of loans.  The 
issue of assignments financing loans which proved abortive is considered in the following paragraph.  
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practically all of the revenue from these taxes was assigned to repay loans.  
Similarly, all of the revenue from the one and one third fifteenths and tenths granted 
in 1431 received by the exchequer during the last two terms tabulated in Appendix 
One was employed in the repayment of loans.  The annual average sum total of loans 
repaid from fifteenth and tenth revenue during this period stood at £36,677.  In 
addition to this sum, an annual average of £3,150 worth of loans were repaid from 
assignments against the customs and subsidies, £1,196 worth of loans were repaid 
from clerical taxation and £85 worth of loans were repaid from ‘ordinary’ revenue 
sources.  An annual average of £41,108 worth of loans was thus repaid during the 
coronation expedition.  I estimate that an annual average of around £8,500 worth of 
loans repaid during this period relate to earlier loans negotiated during the late 
1420s.18  We are thus left with an annual average of £32,608 worth of loans repaid 
which were contracted during the period in question.  When it is recalled that the 
exchequer managed to attract an annual average of £35,758 worth of loans during the 
coronation expedition, the impressive ability of the exchequer to rapidly and 
successfully finance loans during this period becomes evident.
How effectively did the exchequer manage the small minority of creditors whose 
loans it was not able to efficiently finance?  The material presented in Appendix One 
illustrates that an annual average of £2,098 worth of assignments financing loans 
failed during this period.  42% were incurred in failed assignments against indirect 
taxation; 57% were incurred in failed assignments against clerical taxation; only 1% 
represented failed assignments against fifteenth and tenth revenue.  It is significant 
that an annual average of £2,048 (98%) worth of these ‘fictitious loans’ under 
examination relate to failed assignments to a relatively select group of creditors: the 
Corporation of the Staple, the Feoffees of the Duchy of Lancaster, John Earl of 
Somerset, the Archbishop of York, and Italian capitalists.19  As we have already seen 
in Chapter Three, when this class of creditor made loans they were inevitably in the 
region of several hundred, or even several thousand, pounds.  It is hardly surprising, 
therefore, that ‘fictitious loans’ would be incurred in the financing of larger loans, 
                                                            
18 These figures are derived from analysis of the receipt roll evidence tabulated in Appendix One.  
The majority of this £17,000 worth of loan re-assignments related to the loans discussed above, in 
Chapter Three, from the Corporation of London, the Feoffees of the Duchy of Lancaster and Italian 
capitalists.  
19 This information is derived from an examination of the material referenced in Appendix One.
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given how many loans were being financed from the revenue sources discussed 
above.  What is significant is that the number of such ‘fictitious loans’ was kept to 
such a low figure, and more specifically that these ‘fictitious loans’ were effectively 
managed by the exchequer.  All were successfully financed on their first re–
assignment.20  Aside from efficiently managing its debts to creditors, there is also 
evidence that the exchequer sought to take steps to delay the financing of at least one 
loan in order to avoid incurring a ‘fictitious loan’ and losing the confidence of a 
large-scale creditor.21  
These trends in the exchequer’s efficient management of its creditors need to be 
viewed in the context of the exchequer’s administration of the fifteenth and tenth 
revenue, which we have seen financed a large proportion of loans during this period.  
In Chapter Two we had reason to comment upon the relative efficiency of the 
fifteenth and tenth quota system during the early fifteenth century.  Appendix Two 
illustrates the continuing resilience of the quota system during the period of the 
coronation expedition through expressing the gross yield of the two fifteenths and 
tenths of 1429 and the one and one third fifteenths and tenths of 1431 vis–à–vis the 
gross yield of the fifteenth and tenth of 1402 which has been examined by I. R. 
Abbott.22  Gross fifteenth and tenth revenue in 1429 had decreased by less than 2% 
in comparison with the tax of 1402.  And the sum total of revenue received by the 
exchequer – or net revenue – in 1429 was 98% of the sum total received by the 
exchequer – or net revenue – at this earlier date.  A very similar picture emerges 
regarding the one and one third fifteenths and tenths granted in 1431.  The figures in 
Appendix Two illustrate that the gross yield of one and one third fifteenths and 
tenths had decreased by 3% in comparison with a projection of gross revenue for one 
and one third fifteenths and tenths based upon the figures relating to the fifteenth and 
                                                            
20 This is significant when compared with the situation during the late 1420s discussed in Chapter 3.2.  
21 During the Easter term of 1430, the Feoffees of the Duchy of Lancaster seem to have lent £3,029 
against the security of lay tax revenue.  A privy seal warrant transferring the feoffees’ repayment of 
this sum from lay tax revenue to the Southampton customs and subsidies reflects the inability of lay 
tax revenue to finance this charge: E 28/52 19 May.  This warrant is misinterpreted by Harriss 
(Beaufort, pp. 194–5), who believes that another loan by the feoffees, also of £3,029 – the 
exchequer’s receipt of which is recorded on the receipt roll – was not financed, hence the patent 
transferring repayment from lay tax revenue to the Southampton customs and subsidies.  This is 
incorrect; the loan whose receipt is recorded on the receipt roll was in fact financed, on 28 April 1430: 
E 401/724.  The obvious conclusion to draw from this is that the feoffees lent two lots of £3,029, one 
of which was not recorded as having been received on the receipt roll.  
22 Abbott, ‘Taxation of Personal Property and of Clerical Incomes, 1399 to 1402’, pp. 474–77.  
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tenth of 1402.  On the basis of this projection, the sum total of revenue received by 
the exchequer – or net revenue – stood at a 96% of the projected sum total of 
revenue – or net revenue – from one and one third fifteenth and tenth based upon the 
figures relating to the fifteenth and tenth of 1402.  
It may be that these very slight reductions in lay tax revenue reflect a degree of 
tension between resentful taxpayers and an efficient fiscal administration.  The later 
medieval lay tax quota system was notably inflexible, specifically regarding its 
inability to reflect increasing per capita wealth through a proportionate increase in 
revenue.23  The most the exchequer could hope to do in these circumstances was 
maintain the yield of the quota.  It follows that a sustained, even if slight, decrease in 
its ability to do this could have been caused by local tensions in the administration of 
taxation.  Though there do not appear to have been cases of unrest during this 
period,24 there is an interesting, though admittedly isolated, case taken from the local 
particulars of account which seems to suggest some friction in the local 
administration of lay taxation in Kent during this period.25  The assessment of the 
first fifteenth and tenth of 1429 led a number of individuals to plead that they be 
exempted from tax payment owing to a claim that they were combarons of the 
Cinque Ports.  It seems that these individuals were not permitted an exemption 
before the government had heard their case at an inquest, when it was decided that 
their claim was in fact legitimate.  The nature of the local material relating to the 
quota taxes makes it impossible to comment on how representative this case is in 
terms of the level and extent of opposition to tax payment.26  We can, however, 
                                                            
23 Though, as we have seen in Chapter Two, the lay tax quota system was not designed to reflect 
changes in national wealth; rather, the fixing of the quota was a deliberate, and successful, attempt to 
allow the later medieval exchequer to extract consistent national yields.  This ought to be contrasted 
with the clear difficulties which the exchequer encountered in the administration of novel lay taxes 
which were designed to be related to supposed patterns in national wealth (see above, Chapter 3.2, for 
the parishes and knights’ fees tax of 1428, which Appendix One illustrates was still coming in in 
trickles for almost the entirety of the period covered by this chapter; and below, footnote 26, for the 
failed direct tax on incomes and lands of 1431).  
24 For cases of local unrest/problems regarding lay tax payment during the reign of Henry V, see 
Ormrod, ‘Henry V and the English Taxpayer’, p. 202.  Chapter 5.2 suggests that such problems were 
a feature of the fiscal history during the early 1440s. 
25 E 179/387/27.  
26 The above example, however, perhaps ought to be viewed in light of evidence relating to the 
administrative breakdown of the special lay tax of 1431.  Almost all that we know regarding the 
administration of this tax relates to a number of surviving assessments and inquisitions held prior to 
the subsequent parliament’s annulment of the tax, in 1432.  Several of these assessments and 
inquisitions appear to have been delayed until the final months of 1431 (parliament had stipulated a 
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suggest that the exchequer pushed the quota system to the limit during this period in 
an attempt to maintain as high a yield as possible.  The Kent example discussed 
above seems to point us towards this conclusion, as do two further examples which I 
have found in the local material.  One is a Lincolnshire assessment for the first 
fifteenth and tenth granted in 1429, which includes a memorandum comparing the 
current assessment with an assessment of Edward III’s time.27  This led the auditor to 
annotate areas which were not taxed in the fourteenth century but were in 1429, and 
to increase the rate of subsidy payable for three areas which were taxed at a higher 
rate in the fourteenth century.  The other example relates to a Shropshire assessment 
for the first fifteenth and tenth of 1429, in which an auditor crossed out an entry 
relating to the exemption of an area which had gone untaxed since the revolt of 
Owen Glendower.28  
The evidence examined above needs to be viewed in the context of a cross–
examination of receipt roll material regarding the exchequer’s termly receipt of lay 
                                                                                                                                                                           
collection date of 25 June, 1431).  See, for example, E 179/130/49, a schedule of inquisitions from 
Lancashire which are all dated as having taken place between 10 November and 10 December 1431.  
The assessment of individuals in Kent, meanwhile (E 179/124/100; partly printed in Feudal Aids, 3, 
pp. 78–80) took place between 5 December 1431 and 12 January 1432.  Interestingly, the inquisitions 
undertaken in Kent (also E 179/124/100), are dated much earlier: 12 January 1431.  This pronounced 
discrepancy between the dates of assessments and inquisitions within one county illustrates a high
degree of administrative confusion and, quite possibly, local opposition to the tax (in this context, the 
fact that the 1431 tax was similar to the special subsidy granted in 1411, but treble the rate of the 
subsidy of 1411, is significant).  It could be argued that this body of evidence ought to be placed in 
the context of the administrative difficulties discussed in Chapter 3.2 relating to the parishes and 
knights’ fees tax.  This would lead one to conclude that there was an increasing level of local 
opposition to the assessment of a novel tax administered outside the quota system during this period 
(though see Chapter 4.4 for a discussion of the relative success of the 1435 income tax).  On an 
unrelated note, it is also worth mentioning that the only other source, at least with respect to the 
record of exchequer finance, which tells us anything about the administration of the 1431 special tax 
is the receipt rolls.  Interestingly, the receipt rolls for Michaelmas 1431–2 (E 401/729) and Easter 
1432 (E 401/731) record a number of fines relating to this tax.  Unsurprisingly, the sum total of these 
fines was negligible (around £40).  This is significant, however, in terms of the evident determination 
of the exchequer to bring in revenue even from a subsidy which ultimately proved impossible to 
administer.  
27 E 179/136/176.
28 E 179/166/70.  T. Kido, ‘English Government Finance, 1399–1413’ (University of London PhD 
thesis, 1965), p. 82, believes hundreds such as Bradford, with which this document is in part 
concerned, to have been permanently exempted from direct tax payment after the Glendower 
rebellion.  As the entry for Whitchurch, where a clerk has crossed out an annotation regarding the 
exemption of this area from taxation owing to its destruction at the hands of Welsh rebels, illustrates, 
this was no longer the case, at least for some areas, by the time of Henry VI’s reign.  For a detailed 
investigation into the impact of the Glendower rebellion on patterns of lay tax exemption in the early 
fifteenth century see H. Watt, ‘“On account of the frequent attacks and invasions of the Welsh”: The 
Effect of the Glyn Dwr Rebellion on Tax Collection in England’, in The Reign of Henry IV: Rebellion 
and Survival, 1403–1413, ed. G. Dodd & D. Biggs (Woodbridge, 2008), pp. 48–81.
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tax revenue tabulated in Appendix One and material from the enrolled lay tax 
accounts tabulated in Appendix Two, which illustrates the striking rapidity with 
which the exchequer brought in revenue from the lay taxes of 1429 and 1431.  97% 
of revenue from the two taxes of 1429 which was accounted for by the exchequer 
was brought in during the coronation expedition.  And 80% of revenue from the one 
and one third fifteenths and tenths of 1431 which was accounted for by the 
exchequer was brought in during the coronation expedition.  This lower figure is 
actually far higher than one would expect it to be; the second of the two collections 
stipulated by parliament for this tax was not until Easter 1432.29  Clearly, then, the 
exchequer’s effective management of the lay tax quota, both in terms of local and 
central fiscal administration, lay behind its much increased ability to raise and repay 
loans during the coronation expedition.  These achievements permitted the 
exchequer to fund the radically increased ‘extraordinary’ budget which we have seen 
characterised this period.  
We must now attempt to trace the broader fiscal context of the developments traced 
above.  To this end it is necessary to examine the exchequer’s financing of an annual 
average ‘ordinary’ budget of £53,493.30  As a result of financing the ‘extraordinary’ 
budget discussed above, the only cash revenue free to be expended upon ‘ordinary’ 
charges was an annual average £1,613 worth of receipts from ‘ordinary’ revenue and 
clerical tax revenue not tabulated in Appendix One.31  Assignments financing 
‘ordinary’ expenditure, meanwhile, stood at an annual average £42,146.  This figure 
consisted of £391 worth of tabulated lay tax revenue, £21,271 worth of tabulated 
indirect tax revenue and £20,484 worth of assignments from non–tabulated 
‘ordinary’ revenue and clerical taxation.32  The sum total of cash revenue and 
assignments discussed must have been added to an estimated £9,734 worth of cash 
leftover from the period prior to the coronation expedition to plug the shortfall 
between cash and assignments, on the one hand, and ‘ordinary’ expenditure, on the 
                                                            
29 PROME, parliament of 1431, item 13. 
30 From E 403/692; E 403/693; E 403/694; E 403/696; and E 403/698.  
31 The figures in this sentence are derived by subtracting the sum total of cash receipts from lay tax 
revenue and revenue from the customs tabulated in Appendix One, from the total of all cash revenue 
during this period provided by Steel, Receipt, pp. 172–6.    
32 It is necessary to note that £5,590 worth of the assignments discussed above proved abortive; 
£3,877 worth of failed assignments were drafts upon indirect tax revenue; £1,713 worth of failed 
assignments were drafts upon ‘ordinary’ revenue and clerical taxation.  See p. 85 for a discussion of 
government debt.
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other.33  This overview of the ‘ordinary’ budget illustrates that the exchequer’s 
ability to markedly increase its credit base did not correspond to increased stability 
in ‘ordinary’ finance.  This was because ‘extraordinary’ costs were so high during 
this period that, as we have already seen, the exchequer needed to make recourse to a 
large volume of indirect tax revenue and non–tabulated revenue, from ‘ordinary’ 
revenue sources and clerical taxation, in order to fund special expeditionary 
expenditure.  This resulted in the structural imbalance, outlined above, between 
revenue and ‘ordinary’ expenditure.  These negative budgetary developments owed 
in part to a sharp fall in indirect tax revenue during the period in question, to which 
we must now turn.  
Chapter Three illustrated that, despite downward fluctuations in gross indirect tax 
revenue during the 1420s, the annual average gross yield from indirect taxation stood 
at over £40,000 (£41,559).34  The parliament of 1429–30, however, witnessed the 
negotiation of a monetary policy which was to have a profoundly negative effect 
upon the export trade in wool, and thus indirect tax revenue, for the remainder of the 
reign of Henry VI.  The so–called Bullion and Partition Ordinances required all 
purchases of wool at Calais to be in cash, with a proportion in English coin, the price 
of each grade of wool to be fixed and the profits from all sales to be divided 
proportionately to the stock held by each trader, but only after all the wool from each 
shipment had been sold.35  Historians of commerce have long appreciated the 
correlation between this legislation and the pronounced slump in wool exports which 
characterised the 1430s.36  The Ordinances made it incredibly difficult for small–
                                                            
33 This is impossible to verify through recourse to detailed analysis of receipt roll evidence from the 
Easter term of 1429 owing to the fact that this roll has not survived.  Certainly, though, this level of 
cash left over from a previous term seems unusual.  An alternative possibility is that extra loans were 
raised which were not entered on to the receipt rolls.  We have already identified loans of this kind, 
from Beaufort and the feoffees: see footnote 13.  There may have been more cases such as these 
which we do not know of.  
34 The following discussion ought to be viewed in light of the data relating to gross indirect tax yields 
during the 1420s discussed in Chapter 3.2.  
35 PROME, parliament of 1429–30, items 59 and 60.  
36 See the tabulated annual wool exports provided by Carus–Wilson & Coleman, England's Export 
Trade, 1275-1547, pp. 50–70.  For comment relating to the effects of the Ordinances, see T. H. Lloyd, 
The English Wool Trade in the Middle Ages (Cambridge, 1977), pp. 257–87; E. Power, ‘The Wool 
Trade in the Fifteenth Century’, in Studies in English Trade in the Fifteenth Century, ed. E. Power & 
M. M. Postan (London, 1933), pp. 49–72; Munro, Wool, Cloth and Gold, pp. 84–90; J. H. Munro, 
‘Bullionism and the Bill of Exchange in England, 1272–1663: A Study in Monetary Management and 
Popular Prejudice’, in Bullion Flows and Monetary Policies in England and the Low Countries
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scale denizen exporters and continental traders to engage in trade, and the wool trade 
came to be monopolised by the small cabal of wealthy merchants known as the 
Corporation of the Staple.  Appendix Three illustrates the significant impact this 
recession had on gross indirect tax during the coronation expedition.  During the 
exchequer year 1429–30 gross indirect revenue fell to £28,582, and though the 
following year it rose to £35,890, annual average gross indirect revenue during this 
period stood at £32,236, a 22% fall from the average gross yield per annum 
discussed above for the early years of the minority.  
Why did the government allow such financially damaging legislation to be enacted?  
There seem to have been two reasons.  On the one hand, the Ordinances constituted a 
deal between the government and the Staple: the former agreed to legislation which 
would increase the wealth of the latter; in return the Staple agreed to extend large 
amounts of credit.37  In this context it is significant that the Corporation of the Staple 
made its first large loan of the reign in July 1430.38  On the other hand, however, it 
would be a mistake to conclude that, because the government was consenting to an 
economic agenda which benefited the Staplers, this was necessarily an economic 
agenda which others did not share, and that the obvious result, as far as 
contemporaries were concerned, would be a devastating slump in the wool trade and 
indirect tax revenue.39  The parliament roll is particularly instructive in this context.  
The Ordinances are not presented as having been proposed by the capitalists of the 
                                                                                                                                                                           
(Aldershot, 1992), pp. 169–239; M. Postan, ‘Credit in Medieval Trade’, in Medieval Trade and 
Finance (Cambridge, 1973), pp. 8–11.  
37 This interpretation is favoured by E. B. Fryde, ‘Public Credit, with Special Reference to North 
Western Europe’, in The Cambridge Economic History of Europe, 3, Economic Organisation and 
Policies in the Middle Ages, ed. M. M. Postan, E. E. Rich & E. Miller (Cambridge, 1963), p. 467; E. 
Miller, ‘The Economic Policies of Governments’, in The Cambridge Economic History of Europe, 3, 
Economic Organisation and Policies in the Middle Ages, pp. 336–7; E. Power. ‘The Wool Trade’, pp. 
83–90.
38 E 401/724.  Interestingly, this loan was negotiated against the security of clerical tax revenue rather 
than lay subsidy revenue: CPR, 1429–36, p. 104; Jurkowski, Smith & Crook, Lay Taxes, p. 87.  This 
ought to be viewed in the context of the policy, discussed above, of negotiating a certain amount of 
loans against the security of revenue sources other than lay taxation in order to prevent lay tax 
revenue from becoming over–charged and risk the incurring of ‘fictitious loans’ against this source.  
Significantly the Staple’s loan did incur a ‘fictitious loan’; see the above discussion of the distribution 
of ‘fictitious loans’ incurred in the financing of loans during this period for the broader fiscal context.  
39 The remainder of this paragraph builds upon the argument of W. M. Ormrod that we ought to pay 
greater attention to the political language employed in the framing of monetary policy, and seeks to 
place this in the broader context of fiscal policy: W. M. Ormrod, ‘Parliament, Political Economy and 
State Formation in Later Medieval England’, in Power and Persuasion. Essays in the Art of State 
Building in Honour of W. P. Blockmans, ed. P. Hoppenbrouwers, P. Janse & A. Stein (Turnhout, 
2010), pp. 137–8.  
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Staple, but rather by the Commons.  Their aim in so doing was to enhance the 
government’s profits from the customs and subsidies, for the common weal of the 
realm.40  Moreover, it is plausible that popular opinion favoured higher market prices 
at Calais, predicated upon the idea that this was in the financial interests of wool 
exporters and the government.41   
The decline in indirect tax revenue caused by the government’s adoption of a 
‘bullionist’ monetary policy was exacerbated by an apparent decline in the 
exchequer’s ability to efficiently manage indirect tax revenue.  The annual average 
of £25,766 worth of indirect tax revenue, which the receipt roll material tabulated in 
Appendix One shows the exchequer brought in during the period in question, 
represents just 80% of the annual average gross indirect tax yield of £32,236 derived 
from the enrolled customs accounts tabulated in Appendix Three.  Chapter Three 
demonstrated that the exchequer, during the early years of the minority, was able to 
bring in, on average per annum, over 95% of gross indirect tax revenue accounted 
for by the exchequer.  As a result of the developments in economic policy and fiscal 
administration traced above, then, the exchequer lost out on an annual average of 
almost £7,000 worth of indirect tax revenue.  This prevented the exchequer from 
successfully financing the annual average ‘ordinary’ assignments against indirect tax 
revenue which have seen proved abortive during this period.42 Indeed, in the event 
that the exchequer had access to this extra indirect tax revenue, it would have been 
able to shift the abortive assignments servicing ‘ordinary’ charges from ‘ordinary’ 
and clerical tax revenue on to the customs and subsidies.  Similarly, this lost indirect 
tax revenue would have allowed the exchequer to finance almost all of the £2,000 or 
so worth of abortive assignments servicing the repayment of loans.  
Even in these circumstances, however, the £10,000 or so deficit between available 
revenue and ‘ordinary’ expenditure would have remained.  This illustrates the extent 
to which the exchequer’s fiscal problems during the coronation expedition cannot be 
                                                            
40 PROME, parliament of 1429–30, item 59.  
41 These points ought to be viewed alongside the Commons’ insistence that denizens be subject to 
poundage on their cloth exports for the first time during the minority, which clearly constituted part of 
a broader parliamentary effort to increase government revenue during the coronation expedition: 
PROME, parliament of 1429–30, item 15.   
42 The remainder of this paragraph ought to be viewed in the context of the material relating to 
abortive assignments outlined in footnote 32.  
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traced back solely to a decline in indirect taxation.  At a time of such high special 
expeditionary expenditure, which necessitated the administration’s employment of 
large amounts of indirect tax revenue in the financing of ‘extraordinary’ charges, a 
structural deficit would have existed even in the event that indirect tax revenue had 
not declined markedly.  In order for the exchequer to stabilise these problems over 
the medium term, future special expeditionary costs would have to be kept at a 
minimum so as to ensure that a higher proportion of indirect taxation could be 
employed in ‘ordinary’ charges.  And in the event that this was not sufficient to 
finance total ‘ordinary’ expenditure, the exchequer would need access to lay taxation 
and credit in the financing of its ‘ordinary’ budget.  The remainder of this chapter 
traces the government’s attempts to confront these challenges during the period up to 
the close of Henry VI’s minority.  
4.3 The fiscal politics of war and ‘ordinary’ charges, 1431–1437: tensions regarding 
the function of lay taxation and credit
The period after the coronation expedition witnessed a continuation of the fiscal 
political culture discussed in Chapter 4.1, centred upon the government’s willingness 
to allow parliament’s grants of lay taxation to be shaped by the Commons’ 
questioning of the scope of the government’s ‘necessity’.  During the early–to–mid 
1430s, however, the regime’s need for lay taxation and credit in order to finance 
‘ordinary’ charges emerged as a significant new component in fiscal political debate.  
What follows deals with both these issues in turn, and concludes by commenting on 
the fiscal political implications of parliamentary tensions regarding both the scope of 
the government’s ‘necessity’ and the developing role of lay taxation and credit in 
‘ordinary’ finance.
Following the precedent set during the parliament of 1431, the government 
continued to impress upon parliament the need for supply without pleading its 
‘necessity’ during the early-to-mid 1430s.  Thus, in 1432 the chancellor’s opening 
address included a reference to the importance of subjects’ obedience to their prince, 
as we have seen the opening address of the previous parliament had.43  Interestingly, 
this was supplemented by a quote from Romans, 13:7, which outlined subjects’ 
                                                            
43 PROME, parliament of 1432, item 1.  
87
obligation to grant taxation where it ‘is due’.44  This ought to be viewed as a subtle 
reminder to the Commons that, whilst the government was willing to acquiesce to 
parliamentary preferences regarding the abandonment of a plea of ‘necessity’ 
discussed in Chapter 4.1, the Commons were still expected to grant lay taxation.  
The Commons’ grant of a half fifteenth and tenth in 1432 illustrates that the Lower 
House understood and accepted this.45 At the following parliament, in 1433, the 
government dropped an explicit allusion to taxation from its formal appeal for supply 
and simply referred to the importance of subjects obeying their prince.46  The 
Commons responded to this trend by continuing to grant lay taxation, though as in 
1431 the size of lay subsidies granted during this period was reduced.  We have 
already noted the half subsidy bill voted in 1432.  In 1433, the Commons granted a 
full fifteenth and tenth, though reduced the national quota by £4,000, purportedly in 
order to accommodate the economic circumstances of impoverished towns.47  This 
development indicates that the parliaments of 1432 and 1433 witnessed continuing 
debate regarding the lay tax quotas of urban communities, notwithstanding the 
absence of surviving petitions relating to local pleas for remissions and/or 
                                                            
44 The passage relating to taxation reads ‘et subditur, reddite, inquid, omnibus debita, cui tributum 
tributum, cui vectigal vectigal…’: PROME, parliament of 1432, item 2.  It is instructive to compare 
this request for supply with the requests of the parliaments of 1425 and 1426 phrased in terms of the 
need for subjects to serve the res publica, or state.  The absence of any such language from the 
debating of supply in the early 1430s is potentially significant.  The late minority regime may have 
feared that an appeal for financial aid framed in such terms came close to a plea of ‘necessity’ in its 
emphasis on the communitarian obligations of subjects to ensure the wellbeing of the common weal 
rather than merely the prince.  In light of the above discussion regarding increasing political tensions 
related to the government’s pleading of its ‘necessity’ during the period of the coronation expedition 
it is clear that the government would have wanted to avoid such language after 1431.  For a recent 
general discussion of the importance of res publica and similar classical ideas in fifteenth–century 
English politics see J. L. Watts, ‘“Commonweal” and “Commonwealth”: England’s Monarchical 
Republic in the Making, c. 1450–c. 1530’, in The Languages of Political Society, ed. A. Gamberini, J. 
P. Genet, & A. Zorzi (Rome, 2011), pp. 147–166.  It is worth pointing out that, in emphasising the 
increasing importance of res publica in political discourse during a period when the Yorkist and early 
Tudor governments sought to draw upon classical ideas as a means of ideologically strengthening the 
monarchy during the vicissitudes of the ‘Wars of the Roses’, Watts omits to discuss the significant 
use which the late Lancastrian government made of the idea of res publica in the parliamentary 
debating of supply in the period prior to the civil wars.  
45 PROME, parliament of 1432, item 11.  
46 PROME, parliament of 1433, item 1.  
47 For this grant see PROME, parliament of 1433, item 20.  The £4,000 national quota reduction 
applied to all future fifteenth and tenth grants.  In the 1446 the quota reduction was increased from 
£4,000 to £6,000: see Chapter 6.1 for a detailed discussion.  It is also necessary to point out that in 
1433 the Commons’ grants of lay taxation began to spread payment out over four collections during a 
two year period.  This was a trend which continued in the Commons’ grant of 1435, discussed on pp. 
89–90, and many of the later grants of the majority period were spread out over three collections.  
These developments ought to be explained in terms of the increasing tensions which characterised the 
fiscal politics of the period under discussion.  See also Ormrod, ‘The Domestic Response to the 
Hundred Years War’, p. 93.  
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exemptions from lay taxation during the parliaments of 1432 and 1433.48  Certainly, 
parliament’s reduction of the national quota strongly suggests that the longer the 
government continued to require lay taxation, the greater the Commons’ desire to 
pay less.   
This trend in parliamentary debate played a significant role in shaping the 
negotiation of lay taxation during the parliament of 1435.  At a time when 
‘extraordinary’ costs increased owing to Valois ascendancy in Normandy and a 
related serious military threat to Calais,49 the government pleaded its ‘necessity’ for 
the first time since 1429.50  The chancellor’s opening address at the parliament of 
1435, unlike the opening addresses of the previous three parliaments, was framed in 
terms of foreign policy developments which the government believed necessitated 
measures in order to provide for the ‘defence of the realm of England’. A clear link 
was made between the defection of Burgundy and a ‘necessity’ of the realm of 
England, which we have seen had been the formula of the contentious opening 
address of the parliament of 1429–30.  The tone of the 1435 address, however, 
illustrates that despite the government’s increased financial need it was wary of 
employing political language which had been the cause of considerable tension 
during the period of the coronation expedition.  Unlike the opening address of the 
parliament of 1429–30, that of 1435 did not contain an explicit reference to the need 
for supply in the context of the ‘necessity’ pleaded by the government. It was 
merely stated that the king required advice regarding his ‘necessity’, the defence of 
the English realm.  This is significant, as it illustrates the extent to which the 
government’s approach to seeking supply, even in desperate financial circumstances, 
had been conditioned by the Commons’ political preferences.  The Commons’ 
response to the government’s pleading of its ‘necessity’ is consonant with their 
response to the regime’s continued demand for lay taxation during the period 1431–
1433.  As in 1433, a single fifteenth and tenth was granted, though at the reduced 
                                                            
48 It is worth noting, however, that Lincoln, after being subject to pay its full quota again in 1432, was 
decreed to be partially exempt from the fifteenth and tenth granted in 1433: PROME, parliament of 
1433, item 20.  It is unrealistic to suggest that the government would have thought to grant this 
exemption had the community of Lincoln not sought it in parliament.  Since no petition survives to 
suggest that any such exemption was sought in 1433, however, it is impossible to come to any definite 
conclusion regarding this issue.  
49 For a detailed examination of exchequer finance during this period, see Chapter 4.4.  
50 PROME, parliament of 1435, item 2.
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rate imposed by the Commons in 1433.51  Concomitantly, pressure from local 
communities to secure exemptions from the payment of fifteenths and tenths was 
maintained.  This is illustrated by a petition brought to the parliament of 1435 from 
the inhabitants of Andover, who sought to be exempt from lay taxation for twenty 
years on a plea of poverty.52  The Commons’ grant of an additional special tax on 
lands, annuities and offices, however, illustrates their acceptance that the 
government’s explicit reference to its ‘necessity’ required a more generous subsidy 
bill.53
Despite the evident continuities between the politics of lay taxation during and after 
the coronation expedition, a comparative examination of the level of credit 
underwritten by parliament after the coronation expedition and of the annual average 
‘extraordinary’ budget during this period points to the development of a significant 
new trend in the politics of lay taxation and credit during the early–to–mid 1430s.  
With regard to the level of credit underwritten by parliament during this period, we 
must include at least half of the £50,000 underwritten in 1431,54 since this sum 
cannot have been intended solely to finance the coronation expedition.55  It seems 
reasonable, therefore, to suggest that c. £25,000 worth of credit underwritten by the 
parliament of 1431 was intended by the Commons to finance future charges.  In 
1433, parliament underwrote £66,000 worth of credit.56  In 1435, parliament 
underwrote £100,000 worth of credit.57  Overall, then, the Commons sanctioned 
some £191,000 worth of loans during the period immediately after the coronation 
expedition.  On average per annum during this period, parliament thus sanctioned 
£38,200 worth of loans.  When this is compared with annual average special 
expeditionary expenditure during the period 1431–6, £26,932,58 we are left with an 
annual average surplus of £11,268 worth of loans.  Clearly, any loans raised by the 
                                                            
51 PROME, parliament of 1435, item 13.
52 SC 8/90/4477.  
53 PROME, parliament of 1435, item 12.
54 For the credit act of 1431, see PROME, parliament of 1431, item 26.  
55 The remaining special expeditionary costs of the coronation expedition during the first half of 1431 
were significantly less than £50,000, and the exchequer financed these from lay tax revenue and 
customs revenue, alongside loan revenue: see Chapter 4.2.  It thus stands to reason that at least half –
a conservative estimate – of the credit underwritten by parliament in 1431 related to the exchequer’s 
future need for loan revenue.  
56 PROME, parliament of 1433, item 22.  
57 PROME, parliament of 1435, item 9.  
58 For an examination of special expeditionary expenditure during this period, see Chapter 4.4.    
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exchequer following on from these credit acts would need to be repaid.  We have 
already seen, in Chapter 4.2, that a large proportion of lay tax revenue was expended 
on the financing of loans.  It thus follows that the lay taxes discussed above would 
have been sought, at least in part, to enable the exchequer to repay loans raised, 
again at least in part, to provide for the ‘ordinary’ financing of the regime.   
There is good reason to believe that the fiscal concessions discussed above 
constituted parliament’s response to the crown’s raising of the issue of a crisis in 
‘ordinary’ finance in parliamentary debate, and its plea for supply as a means of 
allowing the exchequer to effectively deal with this crisis.  The parliament of 1433 
witnessed Treasurer Cromwell place a financial statement before the Commons.  
Cromwell’s statement outlined the existence of a sizeable deficit between ‘ordinary’ 
revenue, including the customs and subsidies, and ‘ordinary’ expenditure.59   This 
served as a powerful illustration of the extent to which lay taxation and credit were 
vital to the ‘ordinary’ financing of the regime by the early 1430s.  Indeed, it seems 
that the crown sought a greater level of supply to meet the exigencies of ‘ordinary’ 
finance than that which we have seen the Commons conceded.  Here we must turn to 
the Commons’ indirect tax grants during the early–to–mid 1430s, which were 
characterised by a somewhat contradictory combination of decreasing the alien 
maltolt rate in order to stimulate trade60 and increasing both the rate of tonnage and 
poundage on aliens and the range of impositions which constituted tonnage and 
poundage on aliens in an attempt to tap a greater share of a declining volume of 
trade.61  This latter phenomenon, of increasing the range of impositions, was also 
                                                            
59 PROME, parliament of 1433, item 24.  
60 Regarding the alien rates of the maltolt set by the Commons, the earlier rate of 43s. 4d. granted in 
1429 to run between 1431 and 1433 remained in force.  In 1431 the practice of making an advance 
grant prior to the existing subsidy running out was continued and the Commons reduced the alien rate 
to 33s. 4d., the same rate paid by denizens, for the period 1433 to 1434: PROME, parliament of 1431, 
item 14.  This practice was continued in 1432, when the rate of 33s. 4d. was re–granted for aliens to 
run between 1434 and 1436: PROME, parliament of 1432, item 12.   In 1433, however, when the 
lower rate ought to have taken effect, the Commons re–imposed a higher rate for aliens, 53s. 4d., ten 
shillings higher than the rate of payment which had just expired: PROME, parliament of 1433, item 
21.  
61 In their grant of tonnage and poundage in 1431, which ran from November 1431 until November 
1431, the Commons granted a tax of 3s. per ton on alien imports of sweet wine alongside the 
conventional rate of poundage to be paid: PROME, parliament of 1431, item 14.  Furthermore, the 
Commons stipulated that aliens pay 6d. per pound of imports and exports of merchandise above the 
existing rate of 12d. per pound.  Both these charges were renewed in the subsequent grant of 1432: 
PROME, parliament of 1432, item 12 and item 13, which ran from November 1432 until November 
1434.  In 1433, when tonnage and poundage was renewed from 1434 to 1437, the tax on imports of 
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evident in the Commons’ temporary re–imposition of poundage on native cloth 
exports in 1433.62  As far as the government’s ‘extraordinary’ financial position was 
concerned, these initiatives were not necessary, since we have already seen that the 
high level of loans underwritten during this period more than provided for the special 
expeditionary budget.  The Commons’ indirect tax grants can thus realistically be 
depicted as representing a parliamentary attempt to provide for excess ‘ordinary’ 
expenditure without granting any further lay taxes, or underwriting any further loans.
To sum up the above discussion, the Commons had demonstrated their willingness, 
at least for the time being, to provide for the government’s ‘ordinary’ costs through 
the sanctioning of credit and granting of lay taxation.  Yet parliament’s related 
efforts to increase indirect tax revenue illustrate the Commons’ attachment to the 
established fiscal constitutional orthodoxy that revenue from the customs and 
subsidies ought to service excess permanent costs which ‘ordinary’ revenue was 
incapable of financing.  This ought to be viewed in terms of the failure of 
contemporary fiscal political debate to formally reflect the emergent realities of late 
Lancastrian government finance.63  The developments of 1432–1433 charted above 
illustrate that there was no established means by which the government could 
legitimately demand a greater level of supply in order to meet ‘ordinary’ costs.  The 
most that the government could do was refer to the needs of the common weal or 
those of the king and allude to the need for supply, though these fiscal political 
tactics failed to compel the Commons to concede a markedly generous new fiscal 
regime.  The Commons’ continued justification of their grants of lay taxation and 
underwriting of credit in terms of the existence of a ‘necessity’ of the realm during 
this period, even though this was no longer the sole reason for their granting of lay 
taxation and underwriting of credit, illustrates the fundamental weakness of the 
                                                                                                                                                                           
sweet wine was re-granted, though the surcharge on merchandise was abolished: PROME, parliament 
of 1433, item 21.  
62 PROME, parliament of 1433, item 21.  This was framed by the Commons as a novel tax on cloth 
exports, and is misinterpreted as such by A. Curry, in her ‘Introduction’ to PROME, parliament of 
1433.  In reality, this grant constituted the Commons’ re–imposition of tonnage and poundage on 
denizen cloth exports after their exemption from the grants of the late 1420s and the period 
immediately after the coronation expedition.  This is illustrated by the absence of any accounts, either 
in the particulars of account or the enrolled accounts, relating to a ‘new’ indirect tax during the period 
1433–5.  Even more significantly, however, it is illustrated by the marked increase in tonnage and 
poundage revenue during the period of the grant in question: see Appendix Three.  
63 This issue is discussed in much greater detail in Chapter 5.2, when the fiscal context of Henry VI’s 
majority rule increased the need for a ‘new deal’ regarding lay taxation and credit. 
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government’s position.64  In this context it is necessary to briefly return to the subject 
of the increasingly ungenerous lay taxes granted during this period, and particularly 
the Commons’ imposition of a reduced national fifteenth and tenth quota from 1433, 
discussed at the beginning of this section.  It seems reasonable to suggest that these 
manifestations of parliamentary fiscal conservatism were related as much to the 
Commons’ unease regarding the potential implications of the regime’s seeking of lay 
taxation and the sanctioning of credit in order to meet ‘ordinary’ costs as they were 
to parliamentary tensions regarding the scope of the government’s ‘necessity’ in the 
context of the French war.  
4.4 Exchequer finance and the constraints of the later medieval fiscal constitution, 
1431–1437
What follows discusses the exchequer’s financing both of ‘extraordinary’ and 
‘ordinary’ charges during the late minority period in light of the trend in fiscal 
political debate discussed above.  It begins with a quantitative overview of the 
annual average budget.  Particular attention is paid to the role played by credit in the 
exchequer’s financing of ‘ordinary’ expenditure during this period.  The exchequer’s 
ability to maintain its fiscal credibility through efficiently servicing the repayment of 
loans is subsequently traced.  The chapter concludes by assessing the fundamental 
instability of exchequer finance in light of a worsening crisis relating to indirect tax 
revenue and increasing problems regarding the level of government debt incurred in 
the financing of ‘ordinary’ charges.  
In the years immediately following the coronation expedition, special expeditionary 
expenditure fell to an annual average of £26,932.65  The cost of financing loans, on 
average per annum during this period, was £25,073.  Annual average ‘ordinary’ 
expenditure, meanwhile, stood at £58,162.  An examination of the material tabulated 
in Appendix One, viewed in the context of published data relating to general trends 
in total exchequer income, allows us to reconstruct how these sums were financed.66  
Special expeditionary expenditure would have been financed by the exchequer’s 
                                                            
64 For the wording of the Commons’ grants of lay taxation and sanctioning of loans, see the references 
to the lay tax grants and credit acts in footnotes 45, 47 and 51, 54, 56 and 57.  
65 The first three sentences of this paragraph are derived from an examination of E 403/700; E 
401/703; E 403/706; E 403/709; E 403/712; E 403/715; E 403/717; E 403/719; E 403/721; E 403/723.  
66 Steel, Receipt, pp. 176–8, 203–9.  
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employment of an annual average of around £3,543 worth of cash income from lay 
taxation and £23,389 worth of loan revenue.  Loans were financed by assignments, 
mainly against lay tax revenue, which are examined in detail below.67  On average 
per annum, ‘ordinary’ expenditure would have been financed by £14,893 worth of 
cash receipts and £41,338 worth of assignments.  Of the sum total of cash receipts 
mentioned above, £7,732 was from the customs and subsidies and £7,161 was from 
non-tabulated ‘ordinary’ sources and clerical taxation.  Of the sum total of 
assignments mentioned above, £21,924 constituted drafts against indirect tax 
revenue, £867 drafts against lay tax revenue and £19,727 drafts against non–
tabulated ‘ordinary’ revenue sources and the clerical taxation.68  Added together, the 
£56.231 worth of annual average cash and assigned revenue analysed above falls 
£1,931 short of the £58,162 worth of annual average ‘ordinary’ expenditure noted 
above.  This budgetary imbalance must have been financed in exactly the manner 
that we have seen the regime sought to finance expansive ‘ordinary’ charges: 
through its employment of loans.  The material tabulated in Appendix One illustrates 
that the exchequer raised, on average per annum, £30,409 worth of loans during this 
period.  We have already established that an annual average of £23,289 worth of 
loans was employed in the financing of special expeditionary expenditure.  This left 
some £7,020 worth of loans, on average per annum, which were available for the 
exchequer to employ in its financing of ‘ordinary’ expenditure.  This sum total of 
loans would have served to plug the budgetary imbalance drawn attention to above 
and build up a small cash balance.
There is good reason to believe that the exchequer’s creditors recognised the need 
for this new exchequer policy regarding loans.  The sum total of loans raised during 
this period, discussed in the previous paragraph, represents some 80% of the level of 
credit which we have seen was underwritten by parliament at this time.  It seems 
unbelievable that the exchequer would have been able to successfully raise this level 
of credit without its creditors recognising the purpose for which the administration 
                                                            
67 See the following paragraph.  
68 It needs to be mentioned that £8,347 worth of the indirect tax assignments outlined above failed and 
begot ‘fictitious loans’, £180 worth of the lay tax assignments outlined above failed and begot 
‘fictitious loans’ and £985 worth of the assignments against non–tabulated ‘ordinary’ revenue sources 
and clerical taxation outlined above failed and begot ‘fictitious loans’. These abortive assignments are 
discussed in the context of a discussion of government debt at the close of this section. 
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sought to employ at least some of its revenue from loans, especially in light of the 
fiscal political circumstances discussed in the previous section.  Bearing this in 
mind, it is necessary to take a closer look at the loans raised during this period.  We 
must begin with an analysis of the distribution of loans.69  73% of the sum total of 
loans in question was extended by the same select group of creditors which we have 
seen had extended two thirds of the credit which financed the coronation expedition, 
specifically Beaufort, the Corporation of London, the Corporation of the Staple, the 
Feoffees of the Duchy of Lancaster and the Archbishop of Canterbury.  The 
remaining 27% was extended by lesser, local creditors.  The increasing share of the 
loan burden borne by larger creditors at this time, as the exchequer proved itself 
marginally less able to levy local loans via recourse to commissions into the shires 
than it had been during the coronation expedition, is explained by the exchequer’s 
relative ability to maintain its fiscal credibility vis–à–vis larger creditors.
The first thing to point out here is the large proportion of loans extended by the 
select class of creditors outlined above which the exchequer repaid during the period 
in question.  Thus, the exchequer repaid £80,293 worth of the £91,446 worth of 
loans contracted during this period from larger creditors – 88% – prior to the 
Michaelmas term of 1436–7.70  This illustrates a drive, on the part of the exchequer, 
to service the rapid repayment of loans, despite the exigencies of ‘ordinary’ finance 
discussed above.  How did the exchequer manage its repayment of loans?71  68% of 
the sum total of loan repayments discussed above was financed from lay tax revenue; 
12% from indirect tax revenue; 14% from clerical tax revenue; and 7% from 
‘ordinary’ revenue sources.  The large proportion of loans repaid from lay tax 
revenue, despite the much reduced level of lay taxation which we have seen 
characterised this period, provides us with evidence both of the exchequer’s attempt 
to maintain the confidence of its creditors and the inability of other revenue sources 
to bear further charges beyond the ‘ordinary’ financing of the regime.  Unlike during 
                                                            
69 The following discussion is based upon an examination of the material referenced in Appendix 
One.   
70 The remainder of these loans were financed during the period covered by the following chapter.  It 
ought to be noted that the stress which this placed upon the exchequer at a time when the ‘ordinary’ 
cost of government rose as a result of the politics of Henry VI’s majority rule was significant.  See 
Chapter 5.2 for a full discussion.    This paragraph deals with loans which were successfully financed.  
See the following paragraph for a discussion of abortive loan assignments.  
71 The following discussion is based upon an examination of the material referenced in Appendix 
One.  
95
the coronation expedition, however, when practically all loans financed from lay tax 
revenue were successful first time assignments, the exchequer encountered 
considerable problems in the financing of loans from this source during the 1430s.  
‘Fictitious loans’ incurred in the financing of large–scale loans was, in general, 
maintained at an impressively low annual average figure, £2,760, during this period, 
but £1,914 worth of these ‘fictitious loans’ – 69% – represented abortive 
assignments against lay tax revenue.72  This is a potentially misleading figure.  
Though it clearly illustrates the extent to which the fiscal capacity of lay tax revenue 
was much reduced since the coronation expedition, it would be a mistake to conclude 
that this represented a terminal decline in the credibility of the exchequer.  Two 
thirds of the ‘fictitious loans’ in question belonged to one creditor, Cardinal 
Beaufort.  Given that Beaufort extended over £50,000 during this period – an annual 
average of £10,000 – it is hardly surprising that the exchequer was unable to finance 
a proportion of these sums on their first assignment.73  Beaufort, like other large–
scale creditors, must have been aware of this problem.  What a figure such as this 
would thus have required from the exchequer was the efficient management of his 
debt in the medium term.  In this context it is significant that all of the ‘fictitious 
loans’ in question, both those relating to Beaufort and those relating to others, 
namely the Corporation of London and the Corporation of the Staple, were 
effectively financed on their first re–assignment.  
The exchequer’s ability to demonstrate such a high level of efficiency in managing 
its credit operations a time when we have seen the regime’s financial resources, lay 
taxation included, were so stretched was shaped by two administrative 
developments.  One relates to the exchequer’s imposition of a budgetary regime of 
sorts in 1433.  In the aftermath of the exchequer year 1432–3, which had witnessed a 
severe downturn in revenue from the customs and subsidies,74 Treasurer Cromwell 
attempted to impose a stop on all assignments other those employed in the 
                                                            
72 The sum total of ‘fictitious loans’ incurred in the financing of loans during this period was £14,702: 
see Appendix One.  £900 worth of these ‘fictitious loans’ related to the financing of small–scale local 
loans, all from revenue from indirect and clerical taxation.  
73 For a list of Beaufort’s loans during this period see Harriss, Beaufort, pp. 403–4.
74 For a discussion of indirect tax revenue see p. 99.  
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repayment of loans and the financing of household costs.75  Appendix One illustrates 
that this policy served to bring down the level of assignments to ‘ordinary’ charges 
excluding the household, which allowed for a greater amount of lay tax revenue to 
be channelled into the financing of loans.  As with previous budgetary measures of 
this kind, however, it was not viable for the exchequer to permanently hold back 
assignments to important administrative charges, which were dependent upon drafts 
on key revenue sources, particularly the customs and subsidies.76  Indeed, the 
exigencies of the fiscal situation during this period of declining tax revenue 
demanded that ‘ordinary’ assignments other than those for the household continue, 
albeit at a lower rate.77  
Far more important than this measure in ensuring the relatively stable financing of 
loans from lay tax revenue over the long term was the administration’s oversight of 
what could be called a ‘managed decline’ of the quota system from 1433, in order to 
ensure that there was no significant reduction in the quota of a fifteenth and tenth 
beyond that negotiated in parliament.  Appendix Two illustrates that the fifteenth and 
tenth quota in 1433 stood at £32,385, a decrease of 12% in comparison with size of 
the quota discussed above for the fifteenths and tenths granted in 1429, after 
parliament’s reduction of the quota by £4,000.78  The amount received by the 
exchequer, or net yield of this tax – which represented some 95% of this reduced 
quota – represented a very slight reduction when compared with the amounts which 
we have seen were received by the exchequer from the lay taxes of the coronation 
expedition. Very significantly, Appendix One illustrates that, during the two 
exchequer terms Michaelmas 1433–4 and Easter 1434, the exchequer brought in 
91% of the net yield of this tax, derived from Appendix Two.  It is worth considering 
                                                            
75 PROME, parliament of 1433, item 12; PPC, 4, pp. 175–6; E 28/54.  Harriss’ recognition of the 
emergence of a budgetary regime (Harriss, Beaufort, pp. 232–3) ought to be viewed in light of the 
discussion provided here.  
76 For conservative fiscal planning on the part of the exchequer, see Harriss, ‘Budgeting at the 
Medieval Exchequer’; Wright, ‘Henry IV, the Commons and the Recovery of Royal Finance in 1407’.  
It is necessary to point out that Cromwell’s budgetary regime of 1433 did not have its origins in 
political opposition from the Commons, as the more sustained budgetary policies of Henry IV’s 
council had.  Rather, in 1433 the exchequer appears to have initiated this short–lived pattern in fiscal 
management of its own accord, presumably as part of the administration’s efforts, discussed in 
Chapter 4.3, to persuade parliament of the need for continuing lay taxation in order to finance the 
‘ordinary’ as well as ‘extraordinary’ expenditure.   
77 See Appendix One, for the Michaelmas 1433–4 and Easter 1434 terms.  
78 This represented a decline of £4,270.  
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that the first payment date for this tax, the administration of which was spread out 
over a two year period in four payments, was not until April 1434.79  Clearly, a high 
level of local fiscal administrative efficiency characterised the administration of this 
tax.
Unfortunately local administrative dynamics are impossible to discern.  It is not 
possible to discern any signs of tension or administrative innovation in the 
standardised fifteenth and tenth assessments relating to the fifteenth and tenth of 
1433, which prevents us from making suggestions similar to those discussed in 
Chapter 4.2.  It is, however, significant that the central administration of the next 
fifteenth and tenth grant of 1435 marks a change of direction in the exchequer’s 
management of lay tax revenue.  Appendix Two illustrates that the gross yield of the 
fifteenth and tenth of 1435 was £32,290, a minimal decrease vis–à–vis the quota of 
1433 which seems to be explained by the exemptions and reductions which we have 
seen were negotiated in parliament in 1435.  Some 96% of this sum was received by 
the exchequer.  Thus, a similarly impressive level of administrative efficiency seems 
to have characterised the fifteenth and tenth of 1435 as we have seen characterised 
the previous fifteenth and tenth of 1433.  From Appendix One, however, we can see 
that only 61% of the net yield of this tax was received during the first two exchequer 
terms in which income from this tax was brought in.  This illustrates that almost two 
thirds of revenue from this tax was received by the exchequer before, or around the 
time of, May 1436, the date of the first of four collections which, as with the 
previous tax, were spaced out over a two year period.  Though this illustrates a 
continuing high level of local fiscal administrative capability, it represents a 30% 
decline in fifteenth and tenth revenue brought in within one year of the first receipt 
of income from the tax in comparison with the situation in 1433 discussed above.  
Underlying this development it may be possible to discern a fear, on the part of the 
exchequer, that stretching the quota system to its limit risked igniting local tensions.  
We can also suggest that the exchequer was able to slacken its earlier drive to exploit 
the quota system in 1435 owing to the success of the income tax granted by 
parliament.80  Indeed, a significant proportion of lay tax revenue which financed 
                                                            
79 PROME, parliament of 1433, item 20. 
80 The enrolled account and local material relating to this tax have been examined in detail by H. L. 
Gray, ‘Incomes from Land in England in 1436’, EHR, 49 (1934), pp. 607–639.  My work on the 
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special expeditionary expenditure during the exchequer year 1435–6 derived from 
the special tax of 1435.  
Adept fiscal management, particularly of the lay tax quota system, thus allowed the 
exchequer to efficiently finance the loans which we have seen played an integral role 
in the financing of ‘ordinary’ charges during the early–to–mid 1430s.  As we have 
seen, this resulted in creditors’ continued demonstration of their faith in the 
exchequer’s fiscal credibility, evident in their provision of a high level of loans 
throughout the period in question.  All of this serves as evidence of the exchequer’s 
ability to make a new fiscal political accord regarding ‘ordinary’ finance work.    
Yet, unless parliament was willing to formally recognise the need for a higher level 
of lay taxation granted on an almost permanent basis, in conjunction with the 
underwriting of an increased level of credit, in order to expressly fund ‘ordinary’ 
charges – which we have seen it was not – then the exchequer would function in a 
permanent state of uncertainty.    This is evident in two inter-related developments: a 
continued decline in indirect tax revenue and an increase in government debt.  What 
follows examines these issues in turn.  In 1433 the Commons sought the renewal of 
the Bullion and Partition Ordinances, which were renewed the following year, in 
1434.81  As had previously been the case during the coronation expedition, popular 
concern with increasing government revenue from the customs and subsidies on 
behalf of the ‘common weal’ led the Commons to advocate monetary protectionism.  
At the same time, the government’s need for the Staple to continue extending large 
scale credit during this period must also have played a significant role in its 
                                                                                                                                                                           
receipt rolls allows us to add to Gray’s interpretation of the relative financial success of this tax.  
Appendix One illustrates that £7,728 worth of revenue from this tax, which the enrolled account 
illustrates yielded just over £9,000, was received by the exchequer during the two terms Michaelmas 
1435–6 and Easter 1436.  Why was this special direct tax so much more successful than the 
expedients of 1428 and 1431?  One possible reason is the combination of both a high level of 
oversight and flexibility in the administration of the 1435 tax.  Thus, whilst commissioners appointed 
in the counties to make assessments were to provide the exchequer with the names of defaulters, who 
were to be summoned before the treasurer and the barons (this had not been the case with the two 
earlier taxes mentioned above), the nobility were examined separately from the commissions, before 
the treasurer and chancellor (for a brief discussion which also mentions this see Jurkowksi, Smith & 
Crook, Lay Taxes, pp. 91–2).  Another possible reason could be local communities’ greater 
willingness to recognise the need to contribute taxation in 1435–6 than in either 1428 or at the end of 
the coronation expedition.  This was, after all, a time when Calais was threatened by the French: 
Harriss, Beaufort, pp. 262–3.  An explanation along these lines would seem to be strengthened by the 
apparent success of the commissions sent into the localities for loans at this time, which emphasised 
the extent to which Calais was a ‘preciouse jeuell….to this reame’: PPC, 4, p. 352.  See Appendix 
One for the sharp increase in loans during the year 1435–6.   
81 PROME, parliament of 1433, items 62, 63 and 64.  
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acceptance of ‘bullionist’ monetary policy.82  The result of this continued cocktail of 
misplaced economic logic and government submission to mercantilist interests was a 
sustained and worsening recession in the export trade in wool, which had a 
devastating effect on the relative ability of the government to profit from the wool 
trade.  
Material from the enrolled customs accounts presented in Appendix Three illustrates 
that annual average gross indirect tax revenue during the period 1431–6 fell to 
£27,972.  This represents a 13% drop in comparison with annual average gross 
indirect tax revenue per annum during the two year period of the coronation 
expedition discussed above.  Even more significantly, however, this figure represents 
a 33% fall in gross indirect tax revenue per annum in comparison with the period 
covered by Chapter Three.  Indeed, annual average maltolt revenue during the early–
to–mid 1430s fell by almost half in comparison with the 1420s.  The gross indirect 
tax yield for all of the customs and subsidies discussed above disguises the enormity 
of the decline in maltolt revenue because of the increase in tonnage and poundage 
revenue as a result of parliament’s imposition of the indirect tax novelties discussed 
in Chapter 4.3. Interestingly, it seems that the exchequer sought to lessen the 
negative fiscal impact of these developments by more effectively managing income 
from the customs and subsidies.  Material from the receipt rolls presented in 
Appendix One illustrates that revenue from indirect taxation brought in by the 
exchequer during the course of an exchequer year stood at an annual average of 
£25,717 during this period.  This represented 91% of the gross figure for average 
indirect tax revenue per annum, which illustrates an 11% increase in the exchequer’s 
ability to bring in indirect tax revenue during the course of an exchequer year in 
comparison with the situation discussed in the second section of this chapter for the 
period of the coronation expedition.  
A marked increase in the efficiency of the exchequer in bringing in indirect tax 
revenue,83 however, could do little to offset the profoundly negative impact which 
                                                            
82 The Corporation of the Staple extended almost £20,000 worth of credit during this period (based 
upon my examination of the material referenced in Appendix One).  
83 In this context it is necessary to draw attention to evidence illustrating the exchequer’s insistence 
that Hanseatic merchants pay the alien rate of 18d./£ during the period when Chapter 4.3 has 
illustrated aliens were charged an extra 6d. worth of tonnage and poundage.  Local collectors charged 
Hanseatic merchants the lower, denizen rate at this time, yet the exchequer enforced the Hanseatics’ 
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the fall in gross indirect tax revenue had upon the fiscal capacity of the exchequer.  If 
we envisage that gross indirect tax revenue had not fallen by 13% since the period of 
the coronation expedition and remained at the level which characterised the period 
1429–1431, then, working on the assumption that the exchequer would have brought 
in 91% or thereabouts of this figure during the course of one exchequer year, the 
average amount of indirect taxation successfully brought in by the exchequer per 
annum during the period in question would have stood at some £29,335.  It is 
perhaps more meaningful to illustrate how much indirect tax revenue would have 
been successfully brought in by the exchequer, on average per annum, during this 
period had there not been a 33% fall in gross revenue between the period covered by 
Chapter Three and the period 1431–1436, since this provides us with an estimate of 
how much the fiscal capacity of indirect taxation declined over time as a result of the 
‘bullionist’ monetary policy.  Again, working on the assumption that the exchequer 
would have brought in 91% or thereabouts of whatever the gross yield during the 
course of an exchequer year, in these fiscal circumstances the exchequer would have 
brought in an annual average of some £37,819 worth of indirect tax revenue.  
The difference between the £37,819 worth of annual average indirect tax revenue 
which the exchequer could plausibly have had access to were it not for the Bullion 
and Partition Ordinances and the £25,717 worth of annual average indirect tax 
revenue which we have seen the exchequer did have access to during this period is of 
great fiscal significance.  An annual average £12,102 increase in the amount of 
indirect taxation brought in by the exchequer would have allowed the exchequer to 
successfully assign all of the revenue which had failed to materialise in its financing 
of the ‘ordinary’ budget.84  Moreover, such an increase in indirect tax revenue would 
                                                                                                                                                                           
payment of the higher, alien rate: see E 356/18, m. 33d.   Genoese and Catalan merchants, however, 
were allowed to pay the denizen rate of 12d.: see E 356/16, m. 22.  It is also necessary to mention that 
my study of the enrolled accounts, referenced in Appendix Three, illustrates that 621 tons of wine 
were permitted to pass through the customs without being charged.  The exchequer would thus have 
lost out by in the region of £93 during the period 1431–6 – an annual average loss of £17 – as a result 
of this.  Similarly, I estimate some 324 sacks of wool to have passed through the customs without 
being charged during the period 1431–1436.  All these sacks were exported by denizens.  The loss to 
the exchequer was thus something in the region of £535; an annual average loss of £107.  Despite the 
level of parliamentary concern regarding the volume of exports which were not being taxed (evident 
in the focus of the Ordinances of 1429 on the importance of all merchandise passing through the 
Staple), it seems that this was something of a non-issue during the late minority.  Certainly, the 
exchequer was remarkably effective in keeping such exemptions to a minimum during the later years 
of the minority.  
84 See footnote 68.  
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have enabled the exchequer to successfully finance almost all of the loans which the 
exchequer was unable to successfully finance during the period in question.85  This 
would have prevented the exchequer from incurring 98% of the ‘fictitious loans’ 
which were incurred during the early–to–mid 1430s.  Government debt, then, would 
have been placed firmly under control, and so long as the exchequer continued to 
have access to an ample supply of loans which could be pumped into ‘ordinary’ 
charges and financed from the proceeds of lay taxation, fiscal stability would have 
been achieved.  The fiscal reality of the early–to–mid 1430s, of course, differed 
markedly from this ideal scenario.  Faced with the level of debt outlined above, 
which represented an increase of over one third in comparison with the period of the 
coronation expedition, it was not plausible for the exchequer to continue to function 
on the level of loans and lay taxation which characterised the late minority period, 
since the future ‘ordinary’ budget was bound to rise.  Viewed in the context of the 
prospect of increased expenditure on all fronts when the king entered into his 
majority, the need for a ‘new deal’ regarding the ‘ordinary’ financing of the regime 
had reached a critical point.  
                                                            
85 See the section on ‘fictitious loans’ incurred in the financing of loans, p. 95.  
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CHAPTER FIVE:
IN SEARCH OF A REVISED FISCAL CONSTITUTIONAL CONSENSUS: 
POLITICAL TENSIONS AND EXCHEQUER CRISIS, 1437–1444
Chapters Three and Four drew attention to the political difficulties encountered by 
the minority government in its attempts to ensure the adequate financing of an 
increased level of public expenditure.  It was shown that the minority regime tended 
to seek supply either through alluding to the needs of the state or subjects’ required 
obedience to their prince.  Owing to increased political tensions regarding the scope 
of the government’s ‘necessity’ in the wake of the coronation expedition and the 
government’s requirement of supply in order to finance ‘ordinary’ charges, the late 
minority regime avoided pleading its ‘necessity’.  The negative financial context of 
these developments, specifically increasing levels of government debt to ‘ordinary’ 
charges during the early–to–mid 1430s meant that, by the beginning of Henry VI’s 
majority, an increased level of supply was required in order to finance expansive 
‘ordinary’ expenditure.  
The first section of this chapter examines the attempts made by the government of 
Henry VI’s early majority to secure an increased level of parliamentary supply.  The 
key theme of this section is the inability of government to bring about a paradigmatic 
fiscal constitutional change with the potential of ensuring parliament’s granting of a 
permanent or almost permanent, high, level of lay taxation.  This is illustrated 
through a detailed discussion of relative continuity in the government’s case for lay 
taxation between the period of the minority and that of the early majority.  By 
avoiding a plea of ‘necessity’ and alluding to the need for subjects to provide 
taxation through elaborating upon either the needs of the state or the obligations of 
subjects towards the king, the government’s pleas during this period built on a 
number of pleas which we have discussed in relation to the fiscal politics of the 
minority.  It is shown that the new political circumstances characterising Henry VI’s 
achievement of his majority did affect the development of this fiscal political trend 
in certain significant ways, specifically regarding the presentation of royal authority 
which served as a crucial context in which pleas for supply were made.  Fluctuations 
between the government’s appealing to the general needs of the state, and to the 
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obedience which subjects owed their prince, are interpreted as an evolving reaction, 
on the part of the government, to the constitutional constraints of later medieval 
English public finance.  These themes are complemented by an examination of two 
significant trends in parliamentary fiscal political debate.  One relates to the 
financing of the royal household, and the role of the king in precipitating a new trend 
in debate regarding this issue, which it is argued has broader implications on our 
understanding of Henry VI’s role in fiscal politics.  The other relates to the inter–
relationship between the politics of credit, indirect taxation and lay taxation; 
specifically the Commons’ ability to minimise their lay tax grants by underwriting 
unprecedented levels of credit, imposing novel indirect taxes upon aliens and 
granting alien poll taxes.
The second section of the chapter aims to provide a quantitative analysis of 
exchequer finance during the early majority in order to comment on the relative 
financial viability of the fiscal policies discussed in the first section.  An overview of 
the annual average budget illustrates that the exchequer employed a greatly increased 
level of loans in the financing of ‘ordinary’ charges during the early majority period.  
Yet, at just the time that loans were becoming increasingly important in the 
exchequer’s ‘ordinary’ budget, it is shown that the administration experienced 
increased difficulties in raising loans.  The reason for this lay not in a decline in the 
exchequer’s ability to successfully finance the loans which it had negotiated.  The 
fall in loan revenue is attributable, rather, to an increasing squeeze on the crown’s 
income which served to prevent creditors from being as generous in their loans as we 
have seen they had been during the late minority period.  This draws our attention, in 
particular, to the limitations of the level of lay taxation granted by parliament during 
the late 1430s and early 1440s.  The exchequer brought in lay tax revenue efficiently 
and speedily.  Yet there was insufficient available revenue from this source, given 
the heavy demands of financing special expeditionary forces, to serve as collateral in 
the raising of a higher level of loans.  Moreover, the onset of the so–called 
‘depression’ of the mid–fifteenth century further inhibited exchequer’s fiscal 
credibility.  These developments are viewed in the broader fiscal context of a 
continued crisis in indirect tax revenue.  Depressed revenue from the customs and 
subsidies forced the exchequer to assign payments to key charges, particularly 
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‘ordinary’ charges, against indirect tax revenue which had very little chance of 
materialising.  This resulted in a marked increase in the level of government debt 
which, by the mid–1440s, necessitated a radical programme of lay taxation granted 
and loans underwritten specifically for the purpose of restoring stability to the 
exchequer’s ‘ordinary’ finances.  
The chapter concludes by viewing both the fiscal politics discussed in the first 
section and the financial problems analysed in the second section in the context of 
growing conciliar concern with, and attempts to regulate, Henry VI’s patronage.  
There has been considerable scholarly debate regarding this trend in conciliar 
politics, specifically the extent to which it illustrates concern with Henry VI’s 
kingship on the part of a formal ‘council’.1  It will be argued here that the conciliar 
politics of the early years of the majority represented a political culture of financial 
restraint, emanating from within the administration, which developed as a reaction to 
the government’s inability to affect a new constitutional settlement regarding lay 
taxation and the resultant fiscal difficulties of the late 1430s and early 1440s.  The 
chapter draws to a close at 1444, as it was during this year that a complex attempt to 
                                                            
1 Broadly speaking, scholarship on this issue has moved away from the Whig–Liberal approach, 
predicated upon the idea that something akin to a permanent, institutionalised ‘council’ refused to 
allow Henry VI to begin his majority rule in the late 1430s and early 1440s (for this view see, for 
example, Stubbs, The Constitutional History of England, 3; J. F. Baldwin, The King’s Council in 
England during the Middle Ages (Oxford, 1913)).  More recent historians are divided as to whether 
the ‘council’ of the late 1430s and early 1440s existed owing to Henry’s inane personality and 
complete inability to direct political affairs (for this view see Watts, ‘The Counsels of King Henry VI, 
c. 1435–1445’; Watts, Henry VI and the Politics of Kingship), or the king’s pliable personality which 
the council felt necessitated its continuing existence in order to monitor, and possibly even attempt to 
direct, royal patronage (this has been the favoured approach of Harriss, Beaufort, Chapter 15; 
Griffiths, The Reign of Henry VI, Chapter 12; Wolffe, The Royal Demesne in English History, 
Chapter 4.  Wolffe’s later work on the reign of Henry VI led him to believe that Henry’s pliability 
stemmed not from a general lack of discipline or attention to affairs, but rather a ruthless personality 
which prevented the young monarch from recognising the need to regulate his own activities: B. P. 
Wolffe, ‘The Personal Rule of Henry VI’, in Fifteenth Century England, 1399–1509: Studies in 
Politics and Society, ed. S. B. Chrimes, C. D. Ross & R. A. Griffiths (Manchester, 1972), pp. 29–48; 
Wolffe, Henry VI).   The approaches which suggest that Henry was either behind everything or 
nothing are the least convincing.  As G. L. Harriss pointed out in a review of Wolffe’s Henry VI, we 
will ultimately never know to what extent Henry was politically engaged when he signed off on bills: 
G. L. Harriss, Review of Wolffe, EHR, 97 (1982), pp. 840–2; all we can really know is that the king 
signed off on them.  It is most likely that at times he was politically engaged, and at other times he 
was not, though even this is a subjective analysis.  The analysis offered here shifts the focus away 
from the king’s personality, and instead explores the relationship between the politics of patronage 
and broader trends in fiscal politics during the late 1430s and early 1440s.  It is argued that this allows 
for a more objective account of key developments in conciliar politics during the early years of the 
majority.  
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monitor Henry VI’s patronage appears to have broken down, thus ushering in a new 
stage in the fiscal history of the majority.
5.1 The fiscal politics of early majority government: financing the state, 1437–1444
The government’s public approach towards supply at the parliament of 1437 
exhibited certain key similarities to the pleas which we have seen characterised the 
minority period.  In 1437, following the lead of the plea of 1435, supply was sought 
through the employment of a plea of ‘necessity’.2  Given the continuing heavy 
wartime financial demands of the period immediately after the enlarged special 
expeditionary budget of 1435–6, this is not surprising.3  Three points in particular 
need to be made about this plea in order that we interpret it correctly, however.  As 
in 1435, the government did not phrase its evocation of ‘necessity’ in terms of a 
traditional, explicit, request or demand for supply, but rather asked the question of 
‘how’ the costs of defence ought to be met.  In so doing it avoided forcefully 
pleading its ‘necessity’, which we have seen risked exacerbating parliamentary 
tensions.4  Even more significantly, the plea of 1437 was framed within the context 
of a general appeal to subjects’ ‘flexibility’ in the service of the ‘prosperity’ and 
‘benefit’ of the realm, a development which connects this address to those, in 
particular, of the early minority period.5  As with earlier addresses examined in 
Chapter Three, this appeal would seem to represent an allusion, on the part of the 
government, to the need for supply in order to assist in the ‘ordinary’ financing of 
the state.6  This is interesting, in so much as it illustrates that the government was 
reverting to a tradition of appealing to subjects’ communitarian obligations which we 
have seen had been avoided by the late minority regime.  At the same time, however, 
the chancellor built upon the focus of the pleas of the late minority on subjects’ 
obedience to their prince by elaborating upon the benefits of adult kingship.  A key
theme of the chancellor’s opening address of 1437 was taken from the biblical 
sermon Isaiah 62, verse 3: ‘The royal crown is in the hand of God’,7 the point of 
                                                            
2 PROME, parliament of 1437, item 5.    
3 See Chapter 5.2 for a reconstruction of the annual average budget during this period.  
4 See Chapter 4.1.   
5 ‘Communitas deberet esse flexibilis et ductilis, ad regis honorem et regni prosperitatem et 
preservationem atque utilitatem’: PROME, parliament of 1437, item 2.  
6 See, specifically, the discussion provided in Chapter 3.1 of the pleas of 1425 and 1426.
7 ‘Corona regni in manu Dei’: PROME, parliament of 1437, item 1.
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which seems to have been to discuss the key facets of adult kingship drawn from the 
tradition of the ‘Mirrors for Princes’.8  Thus, prudence, fortitude, temperance, virtue 
and justice were listed and elaborated.9  
In 1437, then, the government adopted both of the fiscal political strategies which we 
have seen had characterised the minority period – though had yet to be brought 
together in one address – and placed these within the context of an elaboration of the 
benefits of adult kingship.  This development ought to be interpreted as a royal call 
for parliament to increase its financial commitment to the regime.10  To what extent, 
though, did the government’s public presentation of its needs at the parliaments of 
1439 and 1442 follow the template of the 1437 address?  The chancellor’s opening 
addresses of the two subsequent parliaments, those of 1439 and 1442, did not contain 
pleas of ‘necessity’.  This serves to re-enforce the point raised above regarding the 
caution with which the late Lancastrian government approached employing a plea of 
‘necessity’.  Both of these addresses, however, continued to allude to the need for 
supply in order to meet the ‘ordinary’ costs of state in the tradition of earlier pleas.11  
A detailed examination of these addresses illustrates that they represent two 
divergent means of seeking this end.    In 1439, the chancellor stated that subjects’ 
hearts were to be ‘opened’,12 this would lead to ‘unity’13 and, very significantly, ‘the 
healthy desire of each Christian for the repayment of his own debts’ would be 
attended to.14  Underlying this explicit reference to debt, we shall see, was the 
development of an important trend in fiscal political negotiations between crown and 
Commons regarding ‘ordinary’ finance at the parliament of 1439.  In terms of the 
government’s public attitude towards supply, however, this seems to illustrate an 
attempt to more explicitly, and emphatically, emphasise the ‘ordinary’ financial 
                                                            
8 PROME, parliament of 1437, item 3 and item 4.  
9 For a detailed discussion of these ideas and their possible role in shaping the politics of later 
medieval kingship see Watts, Henry VI and the Politics of Kingship, pp. 23–31.  
10 As we shall see, the fiscal situation was increasingly desperate during this period: see Chapter 5.2.  
11 As the detailed examination of exchequer finance provided in the second half of this chapter 
illustrates, the exchequer’s increasingly strained efforts to finance total expenditure from both 
parliamentary–controlled ‘extraordinary’ revenue and alternative revenue sources underlay the now 
permanent need of the Lancastrian government for lay taxation.   
12 ‘Adaperiat dominus cor vestrum’: PROME, parliament of 1439, item 1.  
13 ‘Unitatem quam universalis populus circa rem publicam affectaret et haberet’: PROME, parliament 
of 1439, item 1.  
14 ‘Desiderium saluberimum a quolibet Cristiano pro ipsius debitis reformacione et reconciliacione’: 
PROME, parliament of 1439, item 1.   
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needs of the state.  Significantly, this plea was not framed within the context of a 
discussion of the king’s regal authority, as that of 1437 had been.  Far from extolling
the role of the now adult Henry within the polity, in fact, the chancellor interestingly 
stated that parliament represented the ‘power and wisdom’ of the English realm.15  
Royal authority and all that this offered subjects was thus being side–lined in favour 
of a discussion of the obligations of subjects – who were depicted as the organic 
heart of the realm – to the broader political community, specifically, as we have 
seen, in the context of public finance.
The address at the opening of the parliament of 1442 was markedly different to that 
of 1439.  Unlike its antecedent, the 1442 address was not framed around subjects’ 
communitarian obligations, and the explicit reference to the government’s ‘ordinary’ 
financial needs evident in the 1439 address was also dropped.  The 1442 address 
instead focused very strongly on the need for subjects’ obedience to the person of the 
prince.  ‘Let the king and his throne be blameless’, the chancellor stated, quoting 2 
Kings 14, verse 9.16  Through preserving the ‘most excellent person’ of the ‘most 
dread lord king’, the chancellor continued, ‘the prosperity of his illustrious crown 
and kingdom’ will be secured.17  The logic underlying the chancellor’s statement is 
significant.  The king, rather than the kingdom or state, ought to be the focus of 
subjects’ ‘subjection’.18  Not only is the king once more at the centre-stage of the 
chancellor’s address, then, but his role as the focal point of the polity is strongly re–
affirmed.  
                                                            
15 ‘Israel namque videns princeps vel fortis directus interpretatur: ac per illa tria verba, tres status 
parliamenti possunt, ut asseruit, specialiter assignari; in quibus resident Principatus, potestas et 
prudentia, ad ipsius regni direccionem’: PROME, parliament of 1439, item 2.   
16 ‘Rex et thronus ejus sit innocens’: PROME, parliament of 1442, item 1.  
17 The need to preserve the person of the king and the prosperity of crown and kingdom are separated 
into two different statements, though the second is framed in the context of the first, illustrating the 
extent to which the king is being placed at the centre of the address. Thus, ‘primo, videlicet, 
excellentissime persone dicti metuendissimi domini regis per sapienciam preservacionem, in hoc quod 
dicit rex.  Secundo, illustrorum corone et regni suorum prosperitatem, in hoc quod dicit, et thronus 
ejus sit innocens’: PROME, parliament of 1442, item 1.  It is interesting to note that the description of 
the royal throne being ‘blameless’, the theme of the biblical quote discussed above, is repeated again.  
I take this to be an allusion to Henry’s youth, and the recent emergence of majority government.  The 
chancellor may have been attempting to convey the idea that, though the government was under 
considerable strain in the early 1440s, specifically as far as finance was concerned, this was not the 
king’s fault.  This complemented the general focus on royal authority evident in the address.  
18 Thus, subjects owed ‘benigna et humilis subjeccio, que obediencia nuncupatur’.  This is framed in 
the context of a quote from Hebrews 13:17: ‘Obedite prepositis vestris et subjcite eis’: PROME, 
parliament of 1442, item 1.  
108
This discussion of the government’s public approach to the issue of supply in the late 
1430s and early 1440s illustrates two key transitions.  One: a continuing move away 
from the government’s employment of a plea of ‘necessity’, which we have already 
discussed.  And two: a move away from the government’s allusion to subjects’ need 
to provide for common weal or state, notwithstanding the plea of 1439.  This theme, 
we have seen, had been resurrected by the government in the plea of 1437 as a 
means of more forcibly conveying the government’s financial needs alongside the 
new focus on adult kingship.  As the plea of 1442 illustrates, however, as the king 
grew older the government preferred to centre its pleas upon Henry’s kingship.  
Clearly, it was felt that this was more likely to affect parliament’s granting of the 
necessary level of supply.  What practical effect, if any, did these variations in the 
way in which the government publicly alluded to its needs have on the development 
of fiscal politics during this period?  In order to address this issue we must turn from 
the chancellors’ addresses to the development of parliamentary debating of supply 
during the parliaments in question.  It is necessary to begin with an analysis of the 
Commons’ tax grants. 
From the outset it needs to be noted that that the Commons increased their financial 
contributions during the parliaments in question.  This is especially evident in the 
sphere of indirect taxation.  Parliament increased the alien maltolt rate from 1437.19  
It raised the alien rate of tonnage on sweet wine imports from 1439.20  Tonnage and 
                                                            
19 The maltolt rates granted at the parliament of 1435 were due to expire at Martinmas, 1437.  At the 
parliament of 1437 the denizen rate of 33s. 4d. was re–affirmed, and the alien rate of 46s. 8d. was 
increased to 53s. 4d.: PROME, parliament of 1437, item 29.  These grants were to run for three years.  
Interestingly, it was also stipulated that 20s. worth of maltolt revenue per sack, from both denizens 
and aliens, was to be delivered to the treasurer in order to finance the Calais garrison.  This illustrates 
parliamentary awareness of the worsening fiscal situation discussed in Chapter 5.2.  The rates 
established in 1437 were renewed for the period 1440–1443 at the parliament of 1439: PROME, 
parliament of 1439, item 13.  At the parliament of 1442, these rates were renewed again for the period 
1443–1445: PROME, parliament of 1442, item 6.  
20 The parliament of 1437 brought denizens back into tonnage and poundage payment (the previous 
grant of tonnage and poundage on denziens, that of 1433, had not been renewed at the parliament of 
1435, so denizens did not pay tonnage and poundage between 11 November 1436 and 1 April 1437, 
when the new grant took effect).  The denizen rate was set at the standard 3s./ton and 12d./£.  Denizen 
exports of cloth and imports of grain, flower and fish, however, were exempted from payment of 
poundage.  The alien rate was raised from the reduced rate of 2s./ton granted in 1435 to the standard 
3s./ton.  The rate of poundage on aliens remained the same, however: 12d./£, as did the rate of 
tonnage on sweet wine imports: 3s/ton. These grants were to last for three years from 1 April 1437: 
PROME, parliament of 1437, item 29. At the parliament of 1439, when tonnage and poundage was 
re–granted, the denizen rate was set at 3s./ton and 20d./£.  Denizen exports of cloth, and imports of 
grain, flower and fish continued to be exempt from payment, though the level of fiscal privilege
accorded to denizens was increased through the addition of wine imports and exports of wool and 
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poundage on all traders, moreover, was increased by two thirds for a three year 
period from 1 April 1440.21  These developments need to be viewed in light of the 
Commons’ removal of an increasing range of denizen commodities from payment of 
poundage during this period.22  This seems to illustrate the emergence of a fiscal 
political accord characterised by the Commons’ public concession of a heavier 
indirect tax regime and the government’s acceptance, in return, that aliens bear the 
brunt of this and increased fiscal privileges on the part of denizens.23   
A similar trend is evident in the politics of lay taxation during this period.  The 
Commons were slightly more generous in their lay tax grants than they had been 
during the later years of the minority.  On the occasions when a single fifteenth and 
tenth was granted, in 1437 and 1442, the number of collections was reduced from 
four24 to two and three respectively.25  The parliament of 1439, moreover, granted 
one and a half fifteenths and tenths, a heavier lay tax than any since the coronation 
                                                                                                                                                                           
woolfells to the list of exempted merchandise.  The alien rate was set at 3s./ton and 20d./£.  The 
subsidy on sweet wine imports was doubled, from 3s./ton to 6s./ton.  These grants were to run for 
three years from 1 April 1440: PROME, parliament of 1439, item 13.  At the parliament of 1442, 
when tonnage and poundage was re–granted for three years from 1 April 1443, the previous rates 
remained the same, including the same exemptions for denizens, though the rate of poundage on all 
traders was reduced from 20d./£ to the conventional 12d./£: PROME, parliament of 1442, item 6.  
Hanseatic merchants were also exempt from tonnage and poundage from 1437, though this was not 
the result of the parliamentary grants discussed above, but rather the Treaty of London between the 
government and the merchants of the Hanse (for the diplomatic and commercial background to this 
treaty, see Lloyd, England and the German Hanse, 1157–1611, Chapter 3, especially pp. 153–4).    
21 PROME, parliament of 1439, item 13.
22 See the discussion in footnote 20.   
23 Yet this was clearly not an easy compromise.  At first, the government seems to have been 
unwilling to allow the Commons to exempt denizens from the payment of poundage on cloth exports 
at the parliament of 1437.  The fact that the subsidy bill had been voted illustrates that the government 
accepted it initially, but afterwards a meeting of the council on 17 April the government considered 
levying an extra–parliamentary subsidy on cloth (for this and what follows, see PPC, 5, pp. 77–9).  
This was deemed to be illegitimate, however, and the government considered alternatively taking 
bonds from cloth exporters which would be frozen until the next parliament re–imposed poundage on 
cloth exports.  This idea was then scrapped in favour of a ban on cloth exports, from which denizen 
merchants could purchase exemption on the condition that they paid poundage.  This plan was 
implemented, and the enrolled customs accounts illustrate that denizens exporting cloth during the 
year 1437–8 did indeed pay poundage.  Significantly, however, the parliaments of 1439 and 1442 
continued to exempt denizen cloth exports from poundage in their indirect tax grants, as illustrated in 
footnote 20. This illustrates the government’s recognition that a compromise was necessary if the 
fiscal burden was to be increased.  In this context, we can note the two thirds increase in the rate of 
poundage for both denizens and aliens, and the surcharge imposed on alien sweet wine exports, in the 
tonnage poundage grant of 1439, discussed in footnote 20.  These points need to be viewed in the 
context of the analysis of the fiscal politics of lay taxation and credit provided in the following two 
paragraphs.  
24 We have seen that this was the standard number of collections stipulated by parliament for the 
subsidies of the late minority: see Chapter 4.4.  
25 For the grant of 1437, see PROME, parliament of 1437, item 28.  For that of 1442, see PROME, 
parliament of 1442, item 5.  
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expedition.26  Yet, as in the politics of indirect taxation, underlying parliament’s 
granting of these subsidies there seems to have been significant debate and possibly 
even parliamentary tensions. Two points in particular need to be made in this 
respect.  Firstly, at least in 1439 and 1442, the government seems to have sought a 
higher level of lay taxation than the Commons were willing to concede.  This 
explains parliament’s granting of novel direct taxes on aliens alongside their 
fifteenth and tenth grants during these assemblies.27  Secondly, this period witnessed 
the Commons’ continuing desire to reduce the national fifteenth and tenth quota 
through seeking local exemptions from fifteenth and tenth payment, a tacit sign that 
parliament was less than satisfied with the level of lay taxation.28
                                                            
26 For this grant, see PROME, parliament of 1439, item 12.  
27 For the alien subsidy of 1439, see PROME, parliament of 1439, item 14.  Two rates were levied.  
From alien householders an annual charge of 16d./head was to be collected.  From aliens who were 
not householders, a charge of 6s./head was to be collected.  The administration of this subsidy was 
split into six collections.  For the alien subsidy of 1442, see PROME, parliament of 1442, item 7.  The 
rates for this subsidy were the same as in 1439, though the number of collections was reduced to 4 
and the social groups exempted were broadened from the Welsh, who had also been excluded from 
payment in the 1439 subsidy, to include the Irish.  This looks very much like the government was 
accepting a greater degree of fiscal privilege, which would risk reducing the gross yield, in order to 
increase the speed with which the subsidy was administered. See also Jurkowski¸ Smith & Crook, Lay 
Taxes, pp. 94–5, 96.  Chapter 5.2 provides an analysis of the fiscal impact of these taxes.  I am 
indebted to J. S. Mackman and M. Jurkowski for a number of insightful discussions regarding the 
administrative context of the alien subsidies.  
28 This continues on from the discussion in Chapters 4.1 and 4.3.  The fifteenth and tenth granted in 
1437 exempted Lincoln, as we have seen had become typical in the grants of the early 1430s.   
Andover, which had been exempt from fifteenth and tenth payment for the first time in the grant of 
1435, was once more exempted: PROME, parliament of 1437, item 28.  The one and a half fifteenths 
and tenths granted at the parliament of 1439 exempted Lincoln completely, yet Andover was only 
given relief from half of its quota in this subsidy bill.  Nevertheless, Wisbech and surrounding 
villages in Cambridgeshire were totally exempt from the 1439 subsidy: this was a new addition to the 
list of exemptions.  And Alresford (Hants) was also given relief from half of its quota, another new 
addition.  It is also necessary to note that the national quota reduction, ostensibly for impoverished 
towns, was enforced at £6,000 rather than the now standard £4,000, owing to this grant being one and 
a half fifteenths and tenths: PROME, parliament of 1439, item 12.  The following grant, at the 
parliament of 1442, continued to fully exempt Lincoln.  Andover was half exempted once again.  And 
though Wisbech was not exempted from this subsidy, there were a raft of new partial exemptions: 
Alresford, once again, was free from payment of half its quota, as was Scarborough (Yorks), 
Cheltenham (Glos) and Headington (Oxon).  Great Yarmouth, moreover, was freed from a quarter of 
its quota: PROME, parliament of 1442, item 5.  These developments strongly suggest a rising level of 
parliamentary debate and, possibly, tension.  A trend seems to have emerged whereby the government 
was willing to accept a striking increase in the number of partial exemptions, so long as most areas 
securing relief on a plea of poverty continued to at least pay part of their quota.  Hence the move 
towards bringing Andover back into tax payment, partially, from the subsidy of 1439.  The lack of 
surviving material in the Ancient Petitions series (SC 8) prevents us from being able to reconstruct 
debate in greater detail than the account offered here.  Only Lincoln’s petition for exemption at the 
parliament of 1437 has survived, out of all the examples cited above: SC 8/122/6083.  It is interesting 
to note, however, that Melcombe Regis, which Chapters 4.1 and 4.3 illustrated played a significant 
role in the negotiation of earlier exemptions, petitioned the crown once more in 1437 to attempt to 
clarify the rate of subsidy which it paid.  Apparently, despite the minority government’s previous 
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In 1439 the government seems to have deemed the one and a half fifteenth and tenth 
bill, alongside the indirect tax grants discussed above, sufficient to meet its needs.  
The same cannot be said of the grants of 1437 and 1442.  This is evident from the 
credit acts of these parliaments, in which the Commons underwrote an 
unprecedented level of loans.  Thus, in 1437 the Commons underwrote £100,000 
worth of credit, whilst in 1442 they sanctioned a staggering £200,000 worth of 
loans.29  The Commons, it seems, were unwilling to grant a higher level of taxation 
than that which had already been negotiated, and the government did not wish to 
place added pressure on parliament regarding its tax grants so long as markedly 
generous levels of credit were sanctioned.  These developments represent another 
facet of the trend in fiscal political negotiation discussed above regarding the 
government’s permitting of the Commons a certain leeway in shaping the means by 
which the latter provided for the government’s needs.  
Before we attempt to draw conclusions from the foregoing analysis of parliamentary 
fiscal politics, it is necessary to consider who engineered the government’s role in 
overseeing the fiscal policy compromises traced above.  Was Henry VI beginning to 
play an active, personal role in managing parliament’s provision of financial aid?  Or 
is the level of government direction evident from the above discussion indicative of 
the continued labours of the minority regime?  To a certain extent, these are the kind 
of questions which historians of the late Lancastrian government have spent too long 
futilely attempting to answer.  Just as we will never know to what extent, if at all, 
Henry’s signature on warrants illustrates his personal attention to council business; 
so any attempt to assess the extent of personal royal intervention in the developments 
analysed above, based upon the evidence which we have so far analysed, risks 
                                                                                                                                                                           
permitting of Melcolmbe Regis to pay a reduced rate of subsidy, the exchequer had continued to 
enforce the old, higher rate.  In 1437, interestingly, Henry VI re–iterated their payment of the lower 
rate: CPR, 1436–41, p. 74.  This may fit in with the general trend, which this footnote has already 
identified, towards the government’s willingness to concede partial reductions to multiple areas, so 
long as most of the areas in question continued to pay at least part of their quota.  
29 For the act of the parliament of 1437, see PROME¸ parliament of 1437, item 30.  For the act of the 
1442 parliament, see PROME, parliament of 1442, item 9.  K. B. McFarlane pointed out the extreme 
unviability of underwriting such a high level of credit: McFarlane, ‘Loans to Lancastrian Kings: A 
Problem of Inducement’, p. 65.  Unless we identify this as a key facet of the fiscal political debate 
discussed above, it appears incomprehensible.  See Chapter 5.2 for an investigation of the problems 
encountered by the exchequer in raising loans during the early majority period.    
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subjective interpretation.30  There is, however, alternative material which provides us 
with a greater degree of insight into the driving force behind the parliamentary fiscal 
political debate of the late 1430s and early 1440s than that with which we have so far 
been concerned, to which we must now turn.
The parliaments of 1439 and 1442 witnessed the development of an important new 
trend in the debating of household finance, which it is difficult to understand if we 
do not factor in the role of the king.31  This trend in debate is so significant that it 
needs to be discussed in full.  If one were to take the parliament roll at face value, the 
parliament of 1439 would seem to have witnessed the Commons’ expression of 
concern at the insolvency of the household.32  The roll depicts the government as 
having responded to this in two stages.  First, the government acknowledged the 
severity of popular concern with household finance, and arranged to employ revenue 
from non–enfeoffed Duchy of Lancaster lands and revenue from the Duchy of 
Cornwall in the financing of the household.33  Secondly, the government presented 
two schedules to the Commons in response, apparently, to continuing popular 
concern with the financing of the household.  The first ambiguously outlines the 
government’s intention to find a solution to the household’s financial problems.34  
The second is more specific, outlining the means by which the government claimed 
to have resolved this issue: the employment of revenue from enfeoffed Duchy of 
Lancaster lands in the financing of the household.35  The parliament roll then 
presents the Commons as having petitioned the government to employ a quarter of 
the one and a half fifteenths and tenths granted during this assembly in the financing 
                                                            
30 For Henry VI’s role in signing bills see above, footnote 1, and the references cited there.  For the 
fiscal context of patronage, see the final four paragraphs of this section for a detailed discussion.   
31 What follows covers somewhat similar ground to Harriss’ briefer discussion of the politics of 
household finance during the late 1430s and early 1440s: Harriss, Beaufort, pp. 308–9, 321.  I believe 
Harriss’ attempt to re–interpret the parliamentary evidence discussed in this paragraph in terms of 
attempts from within the regime, rather than from the Commons, to secure a new means of funding 
the household, to be fundamentally sound.  A detailed re–appraisal of the evidence which Harriss 
draws upon, however, does not suggest that a shifty conglomeration of private interests around the 
king precipitated government concern with household finance, but rather that this is likely to have 
emanated from the king.
32 PROME, parliament of 1439, item 16.  
33 PROME, parliament of 1439, item 16.  
34 PROME, parliament of 1439, item 17.  
35 PROME, parliament of 1439, item 19.  Significantly, the assent of the Commons to this government 
initiative is followed by a longer clause of approval by the king, who, it is said, deliberated twice with 
the lords.  This needs to be viewed in the context of the discussion of Henry’s role in the fiscal 
politics of the household provided on pp. 114–17.  
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of the household.36  This gives the impression that parliament was dissatisfied with 
the government’s attempts to resolve household insolvency.  
The ‘official’ recording of the politics of household finance at the parliament of 1439 
outlined above needs to be critically analysed.  Household finance was indeed in an 
increasingly troubled state by the late 1430s.37  On balance, however, it is more 
likely that the trend in debate outlined above was precipitated by the government’s 
broaching of this issue, rather than the Commons’ petitioning of the crown.  Both the 
royal response to the first common petition and the two royal schedules discussed in 
the previous paragraph demonstrate a strong desire, on the part of the government, to 
secure a new means for the financing of the household. Thus, the royal response to 
the first common petition witnessed the government’s earmarking of domainal 
revenue for the household.  This ought to be viewed in the context of the first royal 
schedule’s evocation of the government’s intention to find a suitable means of 
financing the household.  Then the second royal schedule, which seems to have been 
brought before parliament at about the same time as the Commons’ subsidy bill, 
focused on the need to find a new means of financing the household – the clear 
inference being that the previous fiscal plan was insufficient.  Viewed in the context 
of the chancellor’s address of the 1439 parliament, discussed above – which we have 
seen was the only address of this period in which a vague discussion of subjects’ 
obligations was framed specifically in terms of finance, significantly the importance 
of paying down debt38 – these developments seem to represent the government’s 
stepping up of its search for a fiscal solution regarding household finance.  It seems 
as though this whole trend in debate was stage–managed from the outset, presumably 
in an attempt to see how far the Commons could be coerced on the issue of 
household finance.  Viewed in the context of these observations, the second common 
petition discussed in the previous paragraph appears as though it was imposed on 
parliament by a government which felt that a striking break from constitutional 
                                                            
36 PROME, parliament of 1439, item 61.  
37 Yet this did not constitute a crisis.  The wardrobe was running no more than a £2,000 or so annual 
deficit at the close of the 1430s (see E 101/409/6, 7, 8 for Michaelmas 1438–9, Michaelmas 1439–40, 
and Michaelmas 1440–1).  See also Griffiths, The Reign of Henry VI, pp. 310–12 and J. S. Roskell, 
The Commons and their Speakers in English Parliaments, 1376–1523 (Manchester, 1965), p. 220, for 
the financial state of the household in the early 1440s.  Both these historians take the trend in fiscal 
political debate discussed above at face value, as evidence of parliamentary concern to find a new 
fiscal settlement for the household.  
38 See footnote 14.  
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tradition regarding the employment of lay tax revenue in household finance had to be 
seen to come from the Commons.39   
What is particularly interesting about this fiscal political trend is the extent to which 
it makes very little sense unless we consider the potential role of Henry VI.  There is 
no plausible reason why those around the king would have been concerned, to the
extent that these developments illustrate the government was concerned, with 
household finance.  As we have seen, the fiscal problems of the regime at the close 
of the minority related to the stability of the ‘ordinary’ finances of the government, 
in general, rather than the finances of the household in particular.40  Leading 
councillors well versed in the details of exchequer finance such as Treasurer 
Cromwell were well aware of this.41  Their concern was with having access to a 
sufficient supply of loans and lay taxation in order to finance both special 
expeditionary and ‘ordinary’ charges, a task which we have seen was increasingly 
difficult by the mid–1430s.  This brings us back to the vague public overtures for 
supply on the part of the governments of the late minority and early majority, 
discussed above.  It would surely be incredible to suggest that a continuation of the 
minority council during the late 1430s, however we conceive of this, contradicted its 
own public approach to supply in order to forcibly and publicly make the case for a 
new deal regarding household finance.  And as far as Cardinal Beaufort, who is 
conventionally viewed as being the key councillor of the late 1430s and early 1440s, 
was concerned, if anything a formal prioritisation of household finance would have 
ran contrary to his personal interests.  This would have risked the cardinal’s 
continued stranglehold over lay tax revenue, and more generally the financial 
interests of the influential creditor class of which Beaufort was still the key 
member.42  The suggestion that an un–identifiable new court grouping in the 
                                                            
39 Later governments, during the ‘Wars of the Roses’, attempted to legitimise fiscal expedients 
emanating from the regime by formally presenting them as having originated from parliamentary 
initiative through a petition of the Commons.  This was the case with the Yorkist imposed resumption 
of 1455, following on from Richard, Duke of York taking over government after the first battle of St 
Albans: see Chapter 6.1 for a discussion of fiscal politics during this period.  It was also the case with 
Henry VII’s resumption of 1485, as P. R. Cavill has recently illustrated: P. R. Cavill, The English 
Parliaments of Henry VII (Oxford, 2009), p. 46.  
40 See Chapter 4.4.  
41 For Cromwell’s role in the fiscal politics of the minority see Chapter 4.3.  For his role in the 
conciliar fiscal politics of the early years of the majority see the last four paragraphs of this section.  
42 This trend in debate also placed serious pressure upon the feoffees, a group of which we have seen 
Beaufort was a key member.  The cardinal, surely, would not have sought the termination of an 
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ascendant pushed the issue of household finance in 1439 ought to be viewed with a 
similar degree of scepticism.  It could perhaps be argued that, as politics gravitated 
towards the court during the early years of the majority, the king’s familiars, 
positioning themselves around Henry VI in his domestic environment, sought to 
strengthen the financial resources of the household.  Yet here we risk falling into the 
trap of assuming that politicians predicting a move towards court government would 
have sought to formally strengthen, in particular, the finances of the household rather 
than focus more generally on the solvency of state, the central problem facing the 
exchequer at this time. Even more significantly, there is very little evidence to 
suggest that any such court ‘party’ was even in existence as early as 1439.43   
It follows, then, that the debate regarding household finance at the parliament of 
1439 must have emanated from the personal intervention of Henry VI.  All other 
potential explanations, we have seen, simply do not add up.  Yet why was Henry VI 
so concerned with the financing of his household, and how does his personal 
intervention relate to broader trends in the government’s formal approach to supply 
and fiscal political debate discussed in the first part of this section?  What follows 
                                                                                                                                                                           
enfeoffment in which he was a key figure.  Harriss explicitly recognises this in his discussion, 
suggesting that a shadowy, un–identified court grouping was, at least partly, motivated by the aim of 
reducing the cardinal’s political power: Harriss, Beaufort, pp. 308–9. Yet this contradicts this same 
author’s statement that the termination of the enfeoffment was ‘a carefully constructed bargain 
between crown and Commons at the expense of the feoffees’: Harriss, Beaufort, p. 308.  This reads as 
though Harriss, aware of the lack of evidence to suggest that court intrigue lay behind the fiscal 
politics of the household, falls back on an interpretation predicated upon the role of the council and 
popular support.  Given strong evidence suggesting the continued political importance of the council 
in government during this period (see the last four paragraphs of this chapter for a discussion), it is 
surely implausible that a regime which must have been strongly shaped, if not driven, by the council, 
would have chosen to attack the feoffees.  Not only would it have surely wished to avoid a potential 
confrontation with Beaufort, a principal member of the council, but on a more fundamental level, 
there is no plausible reason why it would have had the policy aim of a new fiscal deal for the 
household.  Moreover, the speaker of the Commons at the parliament of 1439 was William Tresham, 
a Northamptonshire gentleman and lawyer with strong links both to Beaufort, whom he had served 
legally when Gloucester had served the cardinal with a writ of praemunire in 1432, and the Duchy of 
Lancaster, after having been appointed a steward of the Duchy in four midland counties where 
Beaufort was a surviving feoffee: J. S. Roskell, 'William Tresham of Sywell', Northamptonshire Past 
and Present , 2 (1957), pp. 189–203.  It seems highly implausible that Tresham would have sought to 
oversee any bargain which involved a serious attack on the feoffees.  
43 As R. A. Griffiths has convincingly demonstrated, there is no reason to suggest that the Marquis of 
Suffolk was in a position to direct – or even play a central role – in influencing royal policy during the 
late 1430s and early 1440s: Griffiths, The Reign of Henry VI, Chapters 12, 13 and 14.  Affairs of state 
remained in the hands of the council and possibly, as the period wore on, the council and the king.  
Affairs of grace, meanwhile, were dictated by Henry’s personal intervention, despite the council’s 
concern with patronage (for a detailed discussion of this, see the last four paragraphs of this chapter).  
Any account which attempts to super–impose Suffolk or his later retinue onto the politics of the late 
1430s and early 1440s does so despite a fundamental lack of evidence to suggest that this is a 
legitimate endeavour.  
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addresses these questions in turn.  The development of the debate regarding 
household finance at the parliament of 1442 provides us with greater insight into 
Henry’s potential motivations.  As with the developments of the 1439 parliament, 
the ‘official’ record of events in 1442 ought not to be taken at face value.  The 
parliament roll presents the Commons as having continued to express serious 
concern with household finance, this time via two common petitions.  The first is 
depicted as a representation of popular opinion in favour of the arrangement 
negotiated in the 1439 parliament, for the household to be financed partly through 
revenue from enfeoffed Duchy of Lancaster lands, being continued for a further five 
years.44  The second depicts popular concern as having continued to be such that 
previous arrangements regarding revenue from enfeoffed Duchy of Lancaster lands 
needed to be taken a step further, through the winding up of the enfeoffment of the 
Duchy of Lancaster in order to service the financing of the household.45  
Additionally, the Commons are presented as having desired 5,000 marks per annum 
from the exchequer to finance the household.46  Preferably this was to come from the 
Southampton customs and subsidies, though if revenue from this source did not 
suffice, the exchequer ought to use whatever other revenue was available to meet this 
charge.  It seems unbelievable that the Commons, in the interval between the 
parliaments of 1439 and 1442, suddenly became deeply concerned with household 
finance.  In keeping with our analysis of the common petitions of the 1439 
parliament, then, we ought to suggest that these petitions were driven by continuing 
royal meddling in the politics of household finance.  If we approach the two petitions 
from this perspective, two significant themes emerge.  
One is the extent to which, underlying the politics of household finance in 1442, as 
in 1439, there was an increasingly forceful royal attitude towards the use of revenue 
from enfeoffed Duchy of Lancaster lands in order to achieve household solvency.  
Thus, whereas in 1439 royal pressure for duchy revenue to be utilised in the 
financing of the household developed into pressure for revenue from enfeoffed 
duchy lands to be employed in this way; in 1442 royal pressure in favour of the 
household’s continuing utilisation of revenue from enfeoffed duchy lands developed 
                                                            
44 PROME, parliament of 1442, item 35.  
45 PROME, parliament of 1442, item 29.  
46 PROME, parliament of 1442, item 29.
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into pressure for the enfeoffment to be terminated in order to establish a more 
permanent financial reserve for the household.  The other significant theme is that, in 
1442, the increasing pressure being exerted on the Feoffees of the Duchy of 
Lancaster coincided with the negotiation of a less generous fiscal solution regarding 
the financing of the household from non–domainal sources than in 1439.  The 
Commons’ stipulation that 5,000 marks per annum from the Southampton customs 
and subsidies be employed in the financing of the household appears very much like 
a compromise between the king and the Commons.  Henry VI, who was presumably 
pushing for the continued formal earmarking of lay tax revenue for the household, 
can realistically be depicted as having faced a parliament which sought to be seen to 
comply with the king’s request for a greater level of household funding, but in a 
manner which did not involve the Commons’ continued concession of a proportion 
of lay tax revenue for the household.  If we place this discussion within the broader 
context of the negotiation of household finance during the two parliaments in 
question, it is clear that, though the king failed to secure a formal settlement 
regarding the financing of the household from lay tax revenue which was viable in 
the long term, he did achieve such a settlement centred on the winding up the 
enfeoffment of the Duchy of Lancaster and the Commons’ willingness to continue to 
provide extra funding for the household.  Henry VI’s achievement, in this context, 
can only be understood when one appreciates that a large amount of this revenue was 
ultimately used to finance the royal foundations of Eton and King’s College, 
Cambridge.47  The above analysis of trends within the parliamentary debating of 
household finance would thus suggest that Henry VI had the financing of these 
endowments in mind from a relatively early point in his majority.48  
                                                            
47 Immediately after the feoffees surrendered their trust in May 1443, a valuation was made for a new 
enfeoffment.  This was made in four instalments between November 1443 and June 1445: see R. 
Somerville, History of the Duchy of Lancaster (London, 1953), pp. 206, 210.  The function served by 
this enfeoffment was unclear until the parliament of 1445, when it was ambiguously publicly declared 
to serve royal ‘voluntas’: PROME, parliament of 1445, item 17.  In December 1444, £1,000 per 
annum was granted to each both Eton and King’s College, Cambridge from named Duchy estates.  A 
year and a half later, an extra 400 marks per annum was earmarked for Eton and an extra £400 per 
annum was earmarked for King’s College, Cambridge: Somerville, History of the Duchy of 
Lancaster, p. 221.  
48 It is worth pointing out that this analysis is consonant with most historians’ interpretations of 
Henry’s personal interest in the royal foundations.  See, for example, Griffiths, The Reign of Henry 
VI, pp. 242–8, & Wolffe, Henry VI, Chapter 8. Even Harriss, despite his contradictory beliefs 
regarding the fiscal politics of the household discussed above, footnotes 31 and 42, states that the 
royal foundations became a ‘consuming concern’ of the king: Harriss, Beaufort, p. 349.  Only Watts 
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We must now place the foregoing examination of Henry VI’s role in the politics of 
household finance at the parliaments of 1439 and 1442 in the context of the analysis 
provided by the first half of this section regarding the politics of supply during this 
period.  It seems reasonable to suggest that Henry’s active, and apparently vigorous, 
concern with the financing of the household influenced the chancellor’s particularly 
forceful appeal to subjects’ obedience to the prince evident in his opening address at 
the parliament of 1442.    Similarly, it is likely that the council would have attempted 
to channel Henry’s obvious interest in household finance into concern with, and 
possibly even intervention in, the debating of lay taxation.  Not only would it have 
been hoped that the participation of an active adult king in the debating of supply 
would incentivise the Commons to open the purse strings; this would also have 
provided an opportunity for the council to school Henry in the art of informally 
pushing parliament to grant the level of supply necessary in order to meet the 
exchequer’s total charges.  All of this, of course, must remain informed conjecture.  
What is crucial is that, even if the chancellor and other stalwarts of the minority 
council sought to bring the king into the negotiating of supply on the basis of the 
latter’s active concern with household finance, or alternatively if the king entered 
into negotiations of his own volition, this did not fundamentally alter the parameters 
of fiscal political debate.  We have seen that the manner in which the government 
publicly expressed its needs during this period demonstrates a significant continuity 
with the fiscal politics of the minority.  Even the new emphasis on royal authority 
evident in the chancellor’s depiction of Henry VI’s adult kingship represented a 
natural development from earlier pleas’ focus upon the need for obedience.  The 
council could have depicted royal authority in light of Henry’s active kingship 
whether he was emerging to be a vigorous and active king or not.49
These points are vital to a proper understanding of the fiscal politics the late 1430s 
and early 1440s.  They illustrate that, regardless of Henry VI’s role in the politics of 
                                                                                                                                                                           
refuses to ascribe to Henry any personal involvement or interest in the foundations: Watts, Henry VI 
and the Politics of Kingship, pp. 185–6.  
49 Since, in a sense, it did not matter whether the king was genuinely ruling or not; the key point was 
that he had reached an age that he could now be publicly presented as ruling, which would assist in 
the regime’s framing of subjects’ obligations in the manner discussed above.  It needs to be noted 
here, however, that a regime which presented the king as ruling when he was, in fact, not ruling faced 
serious political difficulties.  This would not have been a problem when the king was still very young, 
and could reasonably have been growing into his kingship.  For the very different situation during the 
mid–to–late 1440s, see Chapter 6.1.  
119
supply, the late Lancastrian government could not transcend the ideological 
constraints of later medieval public finance.  Lay taxation, in particular, continued to 
be publicly recognised, by the government as much as by the Commons, as 
‘extraordinary’; as only constitutionally legitimate and thus publicly justifiable in 
cases of ‘necessity’.  This is reflected in the changing depiction of royal authority in 
the chancellors’ addresses, discussed above.  The government was grasping for a 
more effective, compelling, means of framing subjects’ financial obligations to the 
state.  In this context, the fact that it drew upon widespread later medieval ideas 
extolling kingly authority and its role at the epicentre of the polity – the so–called 
‘politics of kingship’50 – is very significant.  The political vocabulary of effective 
kingship was common currency amongst elite contemporaries.51  The value system 
of early–to–mid fifteenth century public finance, however, had no place for supply as 
a means of funding permanent costs.52  It was not until the later fifteenth century that 
fiscal theorists, significantly on the continent, began to move beyond the scholastic 
understanding of public finance and consider the possible legitimacy of permanent or 
near permanent taxation.53  Since there was no public justification for it to do 
                                                            
50 This phrase was coined by Watts, Henry VI and the Politics of Kingship.  It is interesting to note 
that Watts’ interpretation of the so–called ‘conceptual framework’ of fifteenth century England is 
predicated almost entirely on a reading of the role played by ideas relating to the mechanics of 
kingship drawn from the ‘mirrors for princes’ genre of advice literature.  Without wishing to dispute 
the claim that these ideas ‘rested on secure academic foundations’ (Watts, Henry VI and the Politics 
of Kingship, p. 18), or that they played an important role in shaping the political culture of the 
majority rule of Henry VI, it is clear from the material discussed in this section that alternative ideas 
relating to public finance, and their reception by both the crown and the Commons in parliament, also 
played a very significant role in shaping the parameters of public debate during this period.  
51 See the detailed discussion provided by Watts, Henry VI and the Politics of Kingship, pp. 16–39.  
52 Fiscal theorists of the late fourteenth and early fifteenth century remained firmly in the scholastic 
tradition, viewing the royal domain as the basis of public finance.  In this context we could cite 
Francesco Petrarch (1304–1374), Giovanni Sercambi (1347–1424), and also mid–to–late fifteenth 
century writers such as Francesco Patrisi (1412–1492), Ritter Ludwig von Eyb the Elder (1417–
1502), and Sir John Fortescue (c. 1385–1479).  For the Italians cited above see G. Ricca–Salerno, 
Storia delle dottrine finanziarie in Italia (Palermo, 1881) and E. Isenmann, ‘Medieval and 
Renaissance Theories of State Finance’, in Economic System and State Finance, p. 37.  For Ludwig 
von Eyb see Isenmann, see ‘Medieval and Renaissance Theories of State Finance’, p. 39.  For 
Fortescue, see Wolffe, The Royal Demesne in English History, especially pp. 227–8, and the 
conclusion of this thesis.  
53 Thus, the Italian theorist Diomede Carafa (1407–1487) believed that ‘the resources of subjects 
should be regarded as the foundation of royal power’ (‘subditorum facultates potentiae regiae 
fundamentum existimare oportet’: D. Carafa, De Regis et boni principis officio (Naples, 1668), pp. 
66–7).  This has been viewed as a proto–mercantilist statement regarding the need for princes to avoid 
intervention in trade, industry and commerce: Joseph Schumpeter, History of Economic Analysis 
(New York, 1954), pp. 163–4; Isenmann, ‘Medieval and Renaissance Theories of State Finance’, p. 
45; M. N. Rothbard, Economic Thought Before Adam Smith. An Austrian Perspective on the History 
of Economic Thought (Auburn, 1995), p. 187.  Yet it is also significant that Carafa’s thought was not 
framed within the scholastic parameters which characterised the work of all previous fiscal 
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otherwise, then, the late Lancastrian government, at least publicly, had no alternative 
but to approach parliamentary fiscal politics with great care.54  Informally the 
government could, of course, place a great deal of pressure on the Commons to grant 
a higher level of supply.  Yet as we have seen, this resulted in increasing 
parliamentary tensions which resulted in the regime permitting the Commons to 
shape a royal fiscal policy centred, in particular, upon credit as a means of 
minimising parliament’s lay tax contributions.  It remains for us to demonstrate that 
the fiscal political culture which has been the subject of the foregoing analysis was 
not financially viable, and resulted in increasing problems at the exchequer.
5.2 Deficit finance and administrative efforts to maintain fiscal credibility: the 
exchequer crisis of Henry VI’s early majority, 1437–1444
The annual average budget during the early years of Henry VI’s majority was 
characterised by an increased level of expenditure.55  Annual average special 
expeditionary costs during this period stood at £20,125.  The annual average sum 
                                                                                                                                                                           
theoreticians.  Thus, though Carafa stated that taxation is to be kept at a minimum, he did not view the 
legitimacy of taxation in the context of a particular ‘necessity’.  Significantly, Carafa elaborated upon 
this by stating that a king cannot be poor when he has subjects who are very rich: Carafa, De Regis et 
boni principis officio, p. 72; Isenmann, ‘Medieval and Renaissance Theories of State Finance’, p. 44.  
The implication here is that the wealth of subjects, at least at time of fiscal crisis, ought to finance the 
state.  In this context it is also significant that Carafa suggests that the abolition of customs duties 
would enhance economic growth and thus national output, in which the prince would ambiguously 
profit: Carafa, De Regis et boni principis officio, pp. 76–9; Isenmann, ‘Medieval and Renaissance 
Theories of State Finance’, p. 44.  The only way in which it is possible to envisage the prince 
profiting from this proposed arrangement is if increased national wealth is tapped through the 
imposition of new taxes, which Carafa seems to be implicitly recommending.  Carafa’s ideas are very 
much ahead of their time; the extent to which they can be related to the work of other late fifteenth 
and sixteenth century writers who seemed much more wedded to conventional notions of taxation for 
purposes of defence is questionable (Lodovico Ghetti, for example, stated that subjects ought to 
finance the costs of defence alone: Isenmann, ‘Medieval and Renaissance Theories of State Finance’, 
p. 46).  Niccol Machiavelli has been viewed as positing important new fiscal theories which broke 
from the medieval tradition (see, for example, R. de Roover, Rise and Decline of the Medici Bank, 
1397–1494 (Cambridge, 1963), pp. 21–22).  Yet Machiavelli was focused on the creation of an 
equitable tax infrastructure to serve the commonwealth, and did not focus on the ideological 
relationship between taxation and particular kinds of state expenditure: Isenmann, ‘Medieval and 
Renaissance Theories of State Finance’, p. 47.  Irrelevant of the relationship between Carafa’s 
thinking and that of his contemporaries, the important point from our perspective is that there was no 
‘Renaissance’ trend in fiscal thought during the period with which this chapter is concerned.  
54 By the time that an ideological justification for permanent lay taxation did exist during the later 
decades of the fifteenth century, a belief in the financial potential of the royal domain had taken hold 
in England alongside a new brand of dynastic fiscal politics characterised by resumption.  For further 
comment on this issue, see the conclusion.  
55 The following three sentences are based upon an examination of the material referenced in 
Appendix One, and E 403/725; E 403/727; E 403/729; E 403/731; E 403/733; E 403/734; E 403/736; 
E 403/738; E 403/740; E 403/741; E 403/743; E 403/745; E 403/547; E 403/749; E 403/751; E 
403/753.  
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expended on servicing the repayment of loans, meanwhile, was £25,571.56  And 
annual average ‘ordinary’ charges stood at £60,419.  Data presented in Appendix 
One relating to the exchequer’s management of parliamentary–controlled revenue, 
viewed in the context of published data relating to general income trends, allows us 
to attempt to reconstruct how these expenditure totals were financed.57  A 
combination of total cash receipts from lay taxation – £5,739, £7,543 worth of loans, 
and £6,843 worth of lay and clerical tax assignments servicing the payment of the 
Duke of York’s military wages would have financed the annual average special 
expeditionary budget.58  If we subtract the assignments servicing York’s wages, and 
the £25,571 worth of assignments servicing the repayment of loans, from the sum 
total of assignments, £65,828, we are left with an annual average of £33,414 worth 
of assignments servicing the payment of ‘ordinary’ charges.59  This figure needs to 
be viewed alongside available cash revenue after the exchequer’s employment of 
cash income from lay taxation in the special expeditionary budget: £16,179.  The 
sum total of assignments financing ‘ordinary’ expenditure and cash income available 
to be employed, on average per annum, on ‘ordinary’ finance was £49,593.  An 
annual average deficit of £10,826 thus existed between assignments and cash 
revenue financing the ‘ordinary budget’, and total ‘ordinary’ charges, during the 
early years of the majority.  The only means by which this surplus ‘ordinary’ 
expenditure could be financed was through the exchequer’s employment of a large 
                                                            
56 This included £4,680 worth of assignments which failed and begot ‘fictitious loans’.  For a detailed 
discussion of these failed assignments see the analysis of credit finance provided on p. 127.  
57 Material relating to parliamentary–controlled revenue tabulated in Appendix One has been has been 
viewed in the context of Steel’s data relating to termly totals of revenue from cash, assignments, loans 
and ‘fictitious loans’: Steel, Receipt, pp. 209–222.  The figures arrived at in this paragraph 
substantiate Harriss’ claim that by the late 1430s a significant amount of ‘extraordinary’ revenue was 
being employed in the financing of permanent charges: G. L. Harriss, ‘Marmaduke Lumley and the 
Exchequer Crisis of 1446–49’, in Aspects of Late Medieval Government and Society, ed. J. G. Rowe 
(Toronto, 1986), p. 147.  Whereas Harriss focused on the fiscal history of the later 1440s, what 
follows seeks to investigate in detail the fiscal strains caused by the exchequer’s increased need to 
make recourse to credit in the financing of ‘ordinary’ costs during the early majority.  Viewed 
alongside our discussion of the fiscal politics of the early majority in Chapter 5.1, this forces us to 
approach the history of exchequer finance during Henry VI’s majority from a new perspective.  
58 It needs to be mentioned that an estimated annual average of some £5,384 worth of assignments 
from these sources servicing the payment of York’s wages failed.  For a discussion of government 
debt during this period see the closing paragraphs of this section.  
59 This latter figure consisted mainly of successful indirect tax assignments.  It needs to be noted, 
however, that it also included £5,467 worth of failed indirect tax assignments and an estimated £614 
worth of non–tabulated failed ‘ordinary’ assignments and assignments against clerical tax revenue.  
For a discussion of government debt during this period, see the closing paragraphs of this section.  
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proportion of the annual average £16,919 worth of loan revenue left over after the 
financing of the special expeditionary budget discussed above.  
Had it not been for the loans discussed above, the exchequer would have been forced 
to attempt to finance this sum exclusively from assignments.  This would inevitably 
have led to the incurring of an extra £11,000 or thereabouts in ‘fictitious loans’.60   
At a time when we have seen the early majority government of Henry VI was unable 
to overcome the constitutional constraints of later medieval public finance, however, 
the exchequer could take neither the availability of £11,000 worth of credit, nor the 
revenue necessary to finance the repayment of this level of loans, for granted.  This 
situation increased the need for the exchequer to demonstrate its fiscal credibility.  
Political difficulties aside,61 if the exchequer were to stand any chance of continuing 
to raise the level of annual average of loans cited in the previous paragraph in the 
long term, it needed to be able to prove that creditors’ cash was safe in its hands.  
This called for administrative skill, on the part of the exchequer, in managing 
creditors, especially in light of a worsening agrarian crisis during the period in 
question which we shall see had a negative effect upon the government’s credit base.  
It also necessitated the exchequer’s successful oversight of both the quota system of 
lay taxation and revenue from the customs and subsidies, since as we shall see 
revenue from these sources financed a large proportion of credit during this period.  
What follows investigates these issues in turn, after providing an overview of the 
distribution of loans during the early majority.    
We have seen that parliament underwrote a total of £300,000 of credit during the late 
1430s and early 1440s.62  The exchequer brought in £195,693 worth of loans 
between the years 1436–7 and 1443–4.63 This represented 65% of the ceiling set by 
parliament.64  It will be recalled that, during the early–to–mid 1430s, the exchequer 
had managed to raise 80% of the level of credit sanctioned by parliament.65  This 
                                                            
60 Since there were no available revenue sources from which this sum could have been successfully 
financed.  
61 In terms of the relative ability of the regime to continue to secure the level of supply necessary to 
raise the required level of loans, see Chapters 5.1 and 6.1.  
62 See Chapter 5.1.  
63 The exchequer thus brought in an annual average of £24,462 loans during the early majority.   
64 This is based upon an examination of the material referenced in Appendix One.  
65 This had allowed the exchequer to bring in over £30,000 worth of credit on average per annum 
during the later years of the minority.  See Chapter 4.4 for a detailed analysis.  
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comparison illustrates a notable decline in the willingness of creditors to provide 
loans, yet this decline was not yet terminal.  In order to illustrate this we must turn to 
the individuals and groups which extended credit during the late 1430s and early 
1440s.  During the period covered by this chapter, large–scale creditors, namely 
Beaufort, the Corporations of London and the Staple, and the Feoffees of the Duchy 
of Lancaster, provided 81% of total loans.66  Thus, on average per annum, £19,814 
worth of loans was extended by large–scale creditors.  This represented an 8% 
increase when compared with the level of loans extended by large-scale creditors 
during the later years of the minority.   Conversely, credit raised from small–scale 
local creditors came to occupy a reduced proportion of the annual average sum total 
of loans: only £4,648.  This constituted 19% of the annual average sum total of 
loans; in the early–to–mid 1430s loans extended by lesser, local creditors had 
constituted 27% of annual average loans.  Notwithstanding an annual average 
decrease in loan revenue of over £5,000 during this period, then, large–scale 
creditors continued to demonstrate a high level of financial commitment to the 
regime relative to a continuing, and worsening, crisis in the exchequer’s ability to 
attract credit from the lesser individuals in the shires.  
The changes in the distribution of loans described above were shaped by increasing 
problems in the agrarian economy during the early majority period.  The post–plague 
economy, characterised by relatively high wages, low rents and low prices,67 had 
squeezed landlord revenues for around half a century by c. 1440.68  Yet during the 
                                                            
66 It is interesting to note that, of the annual average sum total of loans extended by large–scale 
creditors cited above, the Corporations of the Staple and London extended a combined total of £9,313 
(47%).   This was more than Beaufort lent during this period (the cardinal contributed, on average per 
annum, £8,150 during the years in question: for a tabulation of Beaufort’s loans, see Harriss, 
Beaufort, pp. 404–406).  The exchequer may have been attempting to ensure that these groups would 
take over Beaufort’s role as ‘key creditor’ at a time when the cardinal was scaling down his financial 
contributions (see the final paragraph of this section for further comment). 
67 The literature on this topic is extensive.  Good general accounts of the dynamics of the post-plague 
economy are to be found in J. L. Bolton, The English Medieval Economy, 1150-1500 (London, 1980); 
J. Hatcher, Plague, Population and the English Economy, 1348-1540 (London, 1977).   
68 In the 1960s K. B. McFarlane believed that falling incomes and increased outgoings on the part of 
the nobility did not correspond to a decline in aristocratic profits.  McFarlane drew attention to 
particular aristocratic families which seemed to increase their incomes notwithstanding squeezed 
economic circumstances through better estate management: K. B. McFarlane, The Nobility of Later 
Medieval England (Oxford, 1973).  A number of subsequent studies endorsed McFarlane’s thesis: 
see, in particular, M. C. Carpenter, Locality and Polity: A Study of Warwickshire Landed Society, 
1401–1499 (Cambridge, 1992); I. Acheson, A Gentry Community: Leicestershire in the Fifteenth 
Century, c. 1422–1485 (Cambridge, 1992); C. Dyer, ‘A Small Landholder in the Fifteenth Century’, 
Midland History, 1 (1972), pp. 1–14.  Historians have, however, become increasingly sceptical of the 
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late 1430s and early 1440s, a range of powerful, depressive factors combined to 
further threaten landlords’ livelihoods.69  A series of very cold winters, bouts of 
animal murrain, outbreaks of plague and poor harvests served to further depress 
market prices, which reached their lowest trough in a century in relation to a broad 
canvass of commodities.70  Most landowners were unable to make up for their 
financial losses at market through more effectively augmenting landed revenues, 
given the long–term downward trend in rents and upward trend in wages.71  
Moreover, since a large proportion of tenant farmers would have suffered along with 
their landlords from the fall in market prices, it was hardly viable for landlords to 
harry their tenants regarding the payment of arrears.  These points are incredibly 
significant when we consider that the individuals hardest hit by these economic 
problems were the local gentry with whom the previous paragraph illustrated the 
                                                                                                                                                                           
idea that landowners were uniformly able to maintain, if not increase, their rents through instigating 
improvements in their administration of lands.  As A. J. Pollard has pointed out, it is often not 
possible to draw positive conclusions from estate records which appear to demonstrate the vitality of 
lords’ finances, owing to obscure accounting practices: A. J. Pollard, ‘Estate Management in the Later 
Middle Ages: The Talbots and Whitchurch, 1383–1525’, Ec.HR, 2nd series, 25 (1972), pp. 553–66.  
More seriously, however, it is increasingly evident that historians who draw attention to the 
apparently healthy finances of particular landowners focus either on atypical, extremely wealthy, 
individuals with lands in various areas of the country or individuals in areas uniquely able to weather 
the economic storm.  Thus, it is hardly surprising that work on Richard, Duke of York is able to 
conclude that the duke was able to improve his finances through better estate management (see, in 
particular, J. Roesenthal ‘The Estates and Finances of Richard, Duke of York (1411–1460)’, Studies 
in Medieval and Renaissance England, 2 (1965), pp. 115–204; J. M. W. Bean, 'The Financial Position 
of Richard, Duke of York', in War and Government in the Middle Ages: Essays in Honour of J. O. 
Prestwich, pp. 182–98).  Nor is it surprising that work on Warwickshire, such as that listed above, 
concludes that landlords fared well financially: Warwickshire cattle was known internationally, which 
provided a means by which landlords could maintain sales and profits despite hardening economic 
times.  For points such as these see, for example, J. M. W. Bean, ‘Landlords’, in The Agrarian 
History of England and Wales, 3: 1350–1500, ed. E. Miller (Cambridge, 1991), pp. 526–86; M. Mate, 
‘Pastoral Farming in South-East England in the Fifteenth Century’, Ec.HR, 2nd  series, 40 (1987), pp. 
523–36; J. Hatcher, ‘The Great Slump of the Mid–Fifteenth Century’, Progress and Problems in 
Medieval England, pp. 237–272.  Considerations along these lines have led historians such as J. 
Hatcher, R. H. Britnell and E. B. Fryde, amongst others, to draw attention to the problems faced by 
fifteenth–century landlords (see footnote 69).  
69 Excellent accounts of the ‘mid–fifteenth century depression’ include J. Hatcher, ‘The Great Slump 
of the Mid–Fifteenth Century’; R. H. Britnell, ‘The Economic Context’, in The Wars of the Roses, ed. 
A. J. Pollard (New York, 1995), pp. 41–64; E. B. Fryde, Peasants and Landlords in Later Medieval 
England, c. 1380–c. 1525 (Stroud, 1996), especially Chapters 10 and 11; E. B. Fryde, ‘Economic 
Depression in England in the Second and Third Quarters of the Fifteenth Century: Effective 
Resistances of Tenant to Landlords as one of the Consequences: Defiances and Rent Strikes’, in 
Violence and Medieval Society, ed. R. W. Kaeuper (Woodbridge, 2000), pp. 215–26.
70 See D. L. Farmer, ‘Prices and Wages’, 1350–1500’, in Agrarian History of England and Wales, 3, 
1350-1500, pp. 444, 467.  For the situation in the North of England, which appears to have been 
particularly severe, see A. J. Pollard, North–Eastern England during the Wars of the Roses (Oxford, 
1990); A. J. Pollard, ‘The North–Eastern Economy and the Agrarian Crisis of 1438–40’, Northern 
History, 25 (1989), pp. 88–105.  For a detailed discussion of wool prices, see Lloyd, The Movement of 
Wool Prices in Medieval England.  
71 See the various examples discussed by Hatcher and Britnell in the works cited in footnote 69.  
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exchequer struggled to negotiate loans during the period in question.72  Evidence 
from the 1442 loan commissions73 illustrates that individuals were unable to lend 
due to animal murrain and the poverty which this had caused.  A number of 
individuals also refer to problems of personal indebtedness.  Given the economic 
circumstances of the early majority, then, it is unsurprising that the exchequer 
became increasingly dependent upon the loans of large–scale creditors.  As is well 
known, great magnates were less affected by the mid–century ‘depression’ than local 
gentry owing to the scale and geographical scope of their properties and commercial 
activities.74  Yet even the extremely wealthy were not completely immune to 
unstable economic conditions.  It seems likely that a generally negative economic 
climate would have led even creditors such as Beaufort to be increasingly insistent 
upon the exchequer’s efficient repayment of loans.75  This served to place added 
pressure upon the exchequer to demonstrate its fiscal credibility.
How successful was the exchequer, then, in servicing the repayment of loans and 
thus maintaining the confidence of those who continued to provide loans during the 
early majority?76  Indirect tax revenue, on average per annum, serviced the 
repayment of 46% of the £20,877 worth of annual average loans repaid during the 
early majority.  In comparison, lay taxation financed 35% of this annual average sum 
total; clerical taxation 15% and ‘ordinary’ revenue 4%.  This marked a significant 
move away from the situation described in Chapter Four for the early–to–mid 1430s 
when, on average per annum, indirect tax assignments had accounted for 29% of the 
sum total of loans which were repaid, and lay taxation, clerical taxation and 
‘ordinary’ revenue had accounted for 35%, 34% and 2% respectively of the sum total 
of loans which were repaid.77  It is not clear why the exchequer altered the 
distribution of assignments servicing the repayment of loans in this way.  Possibly it 
                                                            
72 The commissions despatched into the shires in 1439 do not elaborate upon reasons given by local 
notables who refused to lend, though a number of nil returns were recorded (see, for example, the 
commissioners appointed in Staffordshire: E 163/7/19).  
73 For the following examples, see E 34/1B.  See also the comments of Jurkowski, Smith & Crook, 
Lay Taxes in England and Wales, pp. 93, 96–7.  
74 See the works by Bean and Roesenthal referenced in footnote 68.  
75 Indeed, Beaufort’s extreme wealth remains something of a mystery: for comment on this issue, see 
Harriss, Beaufort, pp. 411–13.  
76 The following discussion is based upon an analysis of the material referenced in Appendix One.  It 
deals with successful loan assignments first, then moves on to the subject of ‘fictitious loans’ incurred 
in the financing of loans.  
77 For a detailed analysis of the situation in the early–to–mid 1430s see Chapter 4.4.
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was hoped that a recovery of sorts in indirect tax revenue would allow the customs 
and subsidies to successfully finance a higher level of loans, freeing up lay and 
clerical tax revenue to play a greater role in other areas of the budget.  Whatever the 
reason, an analysis of the level of ‘fictitious loans’ incurred in the financing of loans 
during this period illustrates that the exchequer had miscalculated.  Indirect tax 
revenue seriously struggled to finance the level of credit which it had been 
assigned.78  On average per annum, £3,975 worth of a sum total of £4,680 worth of 
‘fictitious loans’ incurred in the financing of loans – a staggering 85% – represented 
failed assignments against indirect tax revenue.  This represents an increase of two 
thirds when expressed in relation to the annual average figure for ‘fictitious loans’ 
incurred in the financing of loans from indirect taxation during the later years of the 
minority.79  The reason for this development lies in the extent to which, in light of 
the budgetary situation discussed in the first paragraph of this section, the exchequer 
was forced into attempting to finance an increased level of ‘ordinary’ charges from 
indirect tax revenue.  As we shall see, indirect tax revenue during the early majority 
was simply insufficient to successfully service all of the charges which the 
exchequer sought to finance from this source.80  
The incurring of a high level of ‘fictitious loans’ against indirect tax assignments 
servicing loan repayments clearly did not bode well for the exchequer.  We have 
seen, in Chapter Three, how ‘fictitious loans’ incurred in the financing of loans from 
indirect taxation on a much lesser scale than that noted above had contributed to a 
marked reduction in the fiscal credibility of the exchequer during the early years of 
the minority.  It will be recalled that, after the fiscal problems of the 1420s, the 
exchequer restored its fiscal credibility by shifting a large proportion of loan 
assignments on to lay tax revenue during the early–to–mid 1430s.81  In light of the 
increased squeeze on revenues during the early majority, however, such a course of 
action was no longer possible.  And, as we have already illustrated, the economic 
context of the late 1430s and early 1440s placed greater pressure upon the exchequer 
to maintain the confidence of its creditors.  How did the exchequer respond to this 
                                                            
78 The following discussion is based upon an analysis of the material referenced in Appendix One.
79 For a detailed analysis of the situation in the early–to–mid 1430s see Chapter 4.4.    
80 For trends in gross indirect tax revenue during this period, see p. 128.  
81 See Chapters 4.1 and 4.3.   
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situation?  The answer lies in its management of the ‘fictitious loans’ discussed in 
the previous paragraph.82  It is significant that the vast majority of these ‘fictitious 
loans’ – £4,399 – which constituted 94% of total fictitious loans incurred in the 
financing of loans, related to the very select group of large–scale creditors discussed 
on the previous page.  The exchequer made a point of efficiently financing debts to 
this group of creditors.  Of the annual average sum total of ‘fictitious loans’ incurred 
in the financing of loans, £4,259 – 91% – were financed on the first re–assignment.  
And 93% of ‘fictitious loans’ financed on the first re–assignment related to loans 
made by Beaufort, the Corporations of London and the Staple and the Feoffees of the 
Duchy of Lancaster.  
There was no serious rise in ‘endemic’ ‘fictitious loans’ requiring multiple re–
assignments (whether relating to re–assignments against indirect taxation or any 
other revenue source).  And an annual average of only £603 worth of ‘fictitious 
loans’ incurred in the financing of loans represented re–assignments which had 
previously proven abortive.  All of these re–assignments related to loans made by the 
group of creditors listed at the close of the previous paragraph.  It is true that this 
represented an increase in ‘endemic’ ‘fictitious loans’ incurred in the repayment of 
loans when viewed in comparison with the situation during the final years of the 
minority, when we have seen that the level of ‘fictitious loans’ incurred in the 
financing of loans which the exchequer had previously attempted, and failed, to 
finance was negligible.  Yet £470 worth of the £603 worth of ‘fictitious loans’ 
incurred in the financing of loans which the exchequer had previously failed to 
finance during the early majority period relates to loans which were financed on the 
second re–assignment.  And significantly, 44% of the £603 mentioned above 
represented assignments against clerical tax revenue.  The exchequer’s continuing 
ability to efficiently manage ‘fictitious loans’ incurred in the repayment of loans 
undoubtedly lay behind its ability, noted above, to actually increase the level of loans 
extended by large–scale creditors notwithstanding the decline in the sum total of 
loans during the early majority.  Lesser creditors whom the exchequer sought to 
contract were a different matter, however.  For prospective creditors amongst the 
local gentry, problems relating to the fiscal capacity of indirect tax revenue would 
                                                            
82 The remainder of this paragraph and the next paragraph are based upon a detailed examination of 
material referenced in Appendix One.  
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have combined with the economic insecurities of the late 1430s and early 1440s to 
prevent them from lending.  In these circumstances, no amount of renewed efforts on 
the part of the exchequer to demonstrate its fiscal credibility had the potential of 
shoring up the support of small–scale creditors.  
The exchequer’s ability to efficiently manage and maintain the confidence of its 
large–scale creditors was facilitated by its competent oversight of the operative 
systems of lay and indirect taxation during this period.  Since we have seen that 
indirect taxation played the principal role in the exchequer’s credit operations during 
the early years of the majority, it makes sense to begin by discussing the 
administration’s oversight of revenue from the customs and subsidies.  Appendix 
Three, derived from an examination of the enrolled customs accounts, charts gross 
revenue per annum from indirect taxation.  It demonstrates that the annual average 
sum total of indirect tax revenue had increased slightly, from £27,972 during the 
later years of the minority, to £30,918 during the early years of the majority.83  This 
welcome development may have owed to the increasing inability of the government 
and merchant monopolists to enforce the harmful Bullion and Partition Ordinances.  
First, sometime before 1442, the ‘bullionist’ monetary policy was revised so that 
credit could once again be used by traders in paying for wool.84  Then, on 12 October 
1442, lesser wool merchants seized control of the Staple administration and refused 
to continue to obey the Ordinances, despite the council’s protestations.85  
The exchequer speedily brought in indirect tax revenue during this period.  The 
receipt roll material tabulated in Appendix One illustrates that the exchequer brought 
in an annual average £27,381 worth of the gross total discussed above.  This 
                                                            
83 This owed to significant increases in the gross yield of the maltolt, especially at the beginning and 
towards the end of the period in question.  It is necessary to point out that the benefits derived from 
increased maltolt yields were offset, slightly, by a disappointing very slight reduction in the annual 
average yield of tonnage and poundage in comparison to the final years of the minority (during this 
earlier period the annual average sum total of tonnage and poundage revenue was £8,260; during the 
early years of the majority it was £8,165).  This is likely to have owed to the exemption of Hanseatic 
and denizen merchants from paying tonnage and poundage from 1437.  See Chapter 5.1 for the fiscal 
political context.   
84 SR, 2, p. 325.  
85 PPC, 5, pp. 216–17.  For a detailed discussion of these developments see Munro, Wool, Cloth and 
Gold, pp. 122–6.  The government’s strong attachment to the Ordinances is significant; Beaufort, by 
this point no longer a regular at council, argued in favour of the Ordinances: PPC, 5, pp. 216–17.  
This strengthens the argument in Chapter 4.2 regarding contemporary belief in the importance of a 
‘bullionist’ monetary policy.  
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represents 89% of the annual average gross figure cited above, more or less the same 
proportion of gross revenue than that which had been brought in by the exchequer on 
average per annum during the late minority, which we have seen witnessed an
striking effort to rapidly process indirect tax revenue.86  Continued efficiency in the 
exchequer’s administration of the customs and subsidies would have been driven by 
the administration’s recognition of the precarious situation regarding credit finance 
traced above.  The treasurer and his colleagues would have recognised that an 
increased reliance on indirect tax revenue in the financing of loans was less likely to 
have a seriously negative effect on its relationship with the regime’s large–scale 
creditors if indirect tax revenue could be processed as efficiently and quickly as 
possible.87  More generally, the administration would have recognised the need to 
maximise indirect tax revenue given the principal role which this played in the 
financing of ‘ordinary’ charges.  
It was no less important for the exchequer to successfully manage the lay tax quota 
system.  As illustrated above, lay tax revenue still played an important role in 
servicing the repayment of loans, and thus in the ‘ordinary’ financing of the regime, 
during the early years of the majority.  The exchequer needed to ensure that, at a 
time when it was putting so much effort into efficiently repaying loans from indirect 
taxation, lay tax revenue did not fail to finance its share of loan assignments.  Lay 
tax revenue also played a key role in the financing of special expeditionary 
expenditure, as we have seen.  The figures presented in Appendix Two demonstrate 
the quite remarkable degree of control the exchequer exerted over the quota system 
during the early years of the majority.  Gross fifteenth and tenth revenue increased
                                                            
86 See Chapter 4.4.  
87 It is also important to point out that a detailed analysis of the customs accounts does not necessarily 
justify the opinion that regarding merchants who were exporting their goods un–taxed constituted a 
serious fiscal problem.  Based upon an examination of the material referenced in Appendix Three, I 
estimate that an annual average £121 was exported free of payment of tonnage.  Granted, this is 
substantially higher than the annual average £17 lost through exemptions in the sphere of tonnage 
payment during the late minority, yet it still represents a practically insignificant figure in budgetary 
terms.  The early majority government seems to have been considerably more lax in giving away 
licences to export wool and wool fells free of subsidy.  Based upon an examination of the material in 
Appendix Three, I estimate that an annual average of £3,779 worth of maltolt revenue was missed out 
on as a result of exemptions.  When this is compared with the annual average of £107 worth of maltolt
revenue missed out upon owing to licences to export free of subsidy during the late minority, this 
begins to take on the character of an important fiscal development.  It is no exaggeration to say that, 
in the context of Lancastrian public finance at the turn of the 1440s, £4,000 or so, especially of 
maltolt revenue, could have served to help finance the growing burden of government debt (see the 
final two paragraphs of this section).  
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from an average of £32,338 for the last two fifteenths and tenths of the minority, 
following on from the national quota reduction of 1433, to an average of £33,186 for 
the three and a half fifteenths and tenths of the early years of the majority.88  
Concomitantly net fifteenth and tenth revenue increased, from £30,918 for the last 
two fifteenths and tenths of the minority to £31,858 for the three and a half fifteenths 
and tenths of the early years of the majority.89  The limitations of local evidence 
make it very difficult to comment on the local dynamics of these developments.  An 
isolated case regarding the fraudulent under–assessment of the hospital of St John 
the Baptist, Oxford, in 1442, perhaps suggests a degree of local opposition to 
efficient fiscal administration.90  Similarly, the restoration of the practice of 
appointing separate sets of collectors for Holland, Lindsey and Kesteven in 
Lincolnshire in 1440 perhaps implies a drive to maximise yields.91
It is unlikely that we will ever know the extent to which the exchequer, in attempting 
to maximise lay tax revenue, succeeded in overcoming local problems in order to 
increase the size of the quota and its net yield.  What we can say for certain is that 
the exchequer brought in revenue from the fifteenths and tenths of the early years of 
the majority far more rapidly than parliament had stipulated in its grants.92  
Regarding the fifteenth and tenth of 1437, for example, £19,572 worth of this tax –
61% of its total net yield – was received by the exchequer during the Easter term of 
1437.  The first payment date of this fifteenth and tenth was not until Michaelmas 
1437-8.  £11,846 worth of the fifteenth and tenth granted as a part of the one and a 
half fifteenths and tenths of 1440 – 37% of the total net yield of the one fifteenth and 
tenth part of this tax – was received during Michaelmas 1439-40, a term prior to its 
first collection date of 24 June 1440.  £32,554 worth of revenue from this one and a 
half fifteenth and tenth grant had been received by the exchequer by the close of the 
Michaelmas term 1440-1.  This was more than the total yield of the one fifteenth and 
tenth part to this grant (£32,017), yet the sum total of the one fifteenth and tenth was 
                                                            
88 See Chapter 4.4 for a detailed discussion of gross yields during the late minority.  
89 i.e., revenue which the enrolled accounts list as being received by the exchequer.  
90 The exchequer investigated an erroneous assessment of the hospital, which had contributed only £4 
10s. to the lay subsidy granted that year.  Rather than re–assessing the hospital, its outstanding debts 
were not pursued by the exchequer: E 368/214, status et visus comportorum, rot. 13.  
91 E 179/136/203.  This practice had lapsed in 1433.  
92 What follows compares the receipt roll evidence in Appendix One with the net revenue discussed in 
the previous paragraph.  For the time frame which parliament had stipulated that fifteenth and tenth 
grants were to be collected during this period, see Chapter 5.1.
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not meant to be raised until the Easter term of 1441.  The same trend is discernible in 
the exchequer’s receipt of the fifteenth and tenth of 1441.  This time, 15% of the 
total was brought in a term prior to the official date of the first collection.  By the 
close of the Easter term, 1442–3, when the first eighth of this tax was meant to have 
been collected, the exchequer had received £24,190: 76% of the net yield of this tax.   
Why was the exchequer able to extract high gross and net yields from the lay tax 
quota when we have seen it manifestly failed to achieve success in securing the local 
gentry’s extension of credit during the early majority?  The answer may lie in the 
changing dynamics of local fiscal administration during the period in question.  C. 
Dyer has suggested, based upon detailed work on surviving local material mainly 
from the mid–to–late fifteenth century, that the close of the late medieval period 
witnessed moves towards a local tax system in which those beneath the level of the 
propertied classes, specifically urban wage earners and rural labourers dependent 
upon cash earnings, contributed increasing amounts of lay taxation.93  We must be 
careful to avoid drawing broad reaching conclusions from this material, which is 
necessarily limited in geographical and temporal scope.  It needs to be said, however, 
that the administration’s shifting of a greater proportion of the lay tax burden onto 
wage earners during the period in question would have made a great deal of 
economic sense.  It seems that practically the only ‘winners’ from the mid–century 
‘depression’, aside from great magnates the scope of whose landholdings and 
commercial activities we have seen could act as a buffer from the squeeze on 
aristocratic incomes,94 were labourers dependent upon cash wages and 
unencumbered by either estates or expensive tenancies.95  Such individuals could 
take advantage of the marked rises in wages characteristic of the period and afford a 
                                                            
93 This is a key theme of Dyer, ‘Taxation and the Communities in Late Medieval England’, pp. 168–
90; Dyer, ‘Costs and Benefits of English Direct Taxation, 1275–1525’, pp. 909–24; R. H. Britnell, 
‘Tax–Collecting in Colchester, 1487–1502’, Historical Research, 79 (2006), pp. 477–87. See also the 
comments of Ormrod, in ‘Poverty and Privilege: The Fiscal Burden in England (XIIIth–XVth 
Centuries)’, especially p. 646 and ‘Henry V and the English Taxpayer’, especially p. 214.  
94 See footnote 68.  
95 Unfortunately, however, it is difficult for us to comment on the extent we can viably believe that 
labourers were uniformly better off during this period, owing to the narrow geographical scope of E. 
H. Brown and S. V. Hopkins’ data regarding fifteenth century wages: E. H. Brown & S. V. Hopkins, 
A Perspective on Wages and Prices (London, 1981).  For a recent discussion of this problem, see J. 
Hatcher, ‘Unreal Wages: Long–Run Living Standards and the ‘Golden Age’ of the Fifteenth 
Century’, in Commercial Activity, Markets and Entrepreneurs in the Middle Ages: Essays in Honour 
of Richard Britnell, ed. B. Dodds & C. D. Liddy (Woodridge, 2011), pp. 1–24.  
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greater range of products the prices of which were incredibly cheap owing to the 
acute deflation.  If there is merit in this thesis, then it follows that those who were 
coming to pay a greater share of lay taxation could afford to do so.  Viewed in this 
context, the apparent lack of widespread unrest regarding lay tax payment makes 
good sense.  It also appears telling that the case discussed above regarding tensions 
related to tax payment (the hospital of St John the Baptist, Oxford) relates to an 
institution which depended financially upon its success as a landowner.96  Like the 
vast majority of contributors to local loan commissions who were of the same class 
as this institution, the hospital would have been suffering from the agrarian crisis 
characteristic of the early majority period.     
The developments in fiscal administration discussed above allowed the exchequer to 
efficiently manage large–scale creditors’ loans over the medium term, and to employ 
the level of parliamentary–controlled tax revenue discussed at the beginning of this 
section in financing total royal expenditure.  It is important to stress, however, that 
none of the exchequer’s administrative practices with which we have so far been 
concerned in this section could offset the development of worsening, structural 
problems which beset late Lancastrian public finance.  We have already seen that an 
annual average of some £11,465 worth of assignments financing the Duke of York’s 
wages and the ‘ordinary’ budget proved abortive during the late 1430s and early 
1440s.97  Most of the failed assignments financing York’s wages constituted drafts 
against clerical tax revenue.98  Of the £6,081 worth of failed assignments financing 
‘ordinary’ expenditure, however, £5,467 worth of these failed assignments 
represented drafts against indirect tax revenue.99  This draws our attention to the 
serious fiscal limitations of the exchequer’s programme of continuing to maximise 
indirect tax revenue, discussed above.  This served to maintain creditors’ confidence 
in the fiscal credibility of the exchequer, as we have illustrated.  Yet within the 
broader context of continued commercial problems, low gross yields of indirect tax 
revenue and expansive ‘ordinary’ expenditure, it was inevitable that the exchequer 
would accrue a high level of debt to ‘ordinary’ charges.  Moreover, the high level of 
                                                            
96 See footnote 90.  
97 See footnotes 58 and 59.  
98 This statement is based upon an examination of the material referenced in Appendix One. 
99 This statement is based upon an examination of the material referenced in Appendix One.  
133
priority accorded to financing abortive loan assignments on their first–re-assignment 
discussed above meant that failed assignments financing ‘ordinary’ expenditure had 
less chance of success on re–assignment.  I estimate that some 47% of ‘fictitious 
loans’ incurred in the financing of ‘ordinary’ charges, on average per annum during 
this period, related to previously aborted assignments.100  A build–up of apparently 
endemic government debt to ‘ordinary’ charges signalled a future growth of the 
‘ordinary’ budget.  Given the exchequer’s need to prioritise the repayment of loans 
as a means of continuing to attract high level of credit which was now playing such 
an integral role in the ‘ordinary’ budget, it was highly improbable that the 
administration would be able to halt the this trend towards increased government 
indebtedness, at least not in light of the fiscal regime negotiated by the early majority 
government.
In order to elaborate upon this last point it is useful to place the government’s 
indebtedness towards ‘ordinary’ charges in the context of total government debt (i.e., 
including indebtedness to creditors).  During the early majority period the annual 
average sum total of ‘fictitious loans’ represented 25% of total assignments.  The last 
year covered by this chapter, 1443–4, however, witnessed the sum total of ‘fictitious 
loans’ markedly increase to an unprecedented 39% of total assignments.  This highly 
unstable level of government debt could not have come at a worse time for the late 
Lancastrian regime.  Beaufort no longer served as the crown’s chief creditor, and 
was on the verge of retirement from public life.101  The Feoffees of the Duchy of 
Lancaster, who had proven to be such an important source of credit since the mid–
1420s, ceased to provide loans with the termination of the feoffment.102  And we 
have already seen how commissions for loans into the shires no longer yielded the 
                                                            
100 In the absence of a detailed examination of trends in ‘ordinary’ and clerical tax revenue, we cannot 
speak with any certainty regarding whether the charges financed by these revenue sources were first 
time assignments (i.e., current charges) or previously aborted assignments which had been re–
assigned.  Thus, irrelevant of the level of ‘fictitious loans’ relating to re–assigned (i.e., non–current) 
‘ordinary’ charges from material tabulated in Appendix One, I take the level of ‘fictitious loans’ 
relating to re–assigned ‘ordinary’ charges from non–tabulated revenue to be half the total of non–
tabulated ‘fictitious loans’.  Since in this case the percentage of tabulated ‘fictitious loans’ relating to 
previously re–assigned ‘ordinary’ charges is very close to 50% – 47% – of the sum total of tabulated 
‘fictitious loans’, the percentage of ‘fictitious loans’ relating to previously re–assigned ‘ordinary’ 
charges from non-tabulated revenue is also taken to be 47%.  
101 Beaufort would make only two further, small, loans after 1444: Harriss, Beaufort, p. 406.  This is 
likely to be related as much to the changing political situation around about this time, in terms of the 
move towards the government of the court, as to Beaufort’s deteriorating health.  
102 See Chapter 5.1.  
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level of credit which they once had.  Whilst it is true that gross indirect tax revenue 
was a good £10,000 per annum higher than it had been at the turn of the 1440s, the 
potential benefits to be gained from this were more than offset by the uncertain fiscal 
political situation discussed in Chapter 5.1.  As we have seen, the government could 
not realistically expect parliament to provide generous grants of lay taxation.  And 
any continuation of the fiscal regime which had characterised the late 1430s and 
early 1440s, in the fiscal climate discussed above, would simply exacerbate the 
government’s debt problem.  This section has illustrated that, on average per annum 
during the early years of the majority, some £11,000 worth of credit was employed 
by the exchequer in the financing of ‘ordinary’ charges.  What was really needed 
was the Commons’ granting of a higher level of lay taxation which could be used 
either to incentivise sizeable loans from new large–scale creditors or, more 
realistically, to directly finance expansive ‘ordinary’ expenditure.  Revenue 
equivalent to half of the annual average sum total of ‘fictitious loans’ incurred in the 
financing of ‘ordinary’ charges and York’s wages – around £5,000 to £6,000 –
would most likely have served this purpose.  This means that something in the region 
of £16,000 to £17,000 per annum of credit and lay taxation in excess of the loans 
which we have seen was employed in the annual average budget was required.   At a 
time when credit would most likely continue to contract and the fiscal political 
situation was uncertain, this was simply not viable.  When we further consider that 
expenditure was soon to increase owing to the king’s imminent marriage and 
increased household charges, it seems that we are justified in stating that the crisis of 
exchequer finance at the close of the period covered by this chapter was acute.103  
                                                           ………………………………………………………
The constitutional constraints of parliamentary fiscal politics and the resultant crisis 
of exchequer finance which have been the key themes of this chapter led to the 
development of a very significant trend in what might be called the fiscal politics of 
the council.  Quite naturally, the king’s growth into adulthood had led the council to 
                                                            
103 Chapter 6.2 discusses these developments in full.  
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permit the king to dispense of royal grace, i.e., patronage, from 1436.104  The history 
of the council during the late 1430s and early 1440s, however, illustrates a 
significant, and growing, level of conciliar concern with Henry VI’s use of patronage 
stemming from financial considerations.  As early as February 1438, the council 
minutes refer to the need to speak with the king about his grants of a pardon and two 
offices which had cost the government 3,000 marks.105  A more striking example of 
conciliar concern relates to a petition which John Beaufort brought before Henry at 
Eltham for 1,000 marks of land.106  Despite the lords of the council’s advice against 
Beaufort’s petitioning of ‘the kyng to depart from suche livelode’, Henry told the 
duke that he could have lands of his choice to the value of 600 marks.  A couple of 
months later, Treasurer Cromwell refused to submit to Beaufort documentation 
relating to lands and their value so that the latter could choose which he wanted, 
stating that he required the recorded agreement of five other councillors.107  These 
examples demonstrate the limits of the council’s ability to intervene within a system 
predicated upon royal prerogative and informal counsel.  The lords of the council, 
significantly the treasurer, could advise and even warn the king about the adverse 
financial context of his patronage, but they could not act with sovereign authority to 
restrain his actions.108  The strains which this caused are evident in an examination 
of Treasurer Cromwell’s attendance at council during this period.  For most of the 
early years of the majority Cromwell attended council more frequently than all other 
councillors with the exception of Chancellor Stafford.109  Significantly, the 
exchequer years during which the two occasions of conciliar concern discussed 
above occurred witnessed Cromwell’s markedly increased attendance in comparison 
with the antecedent year.  On a similar note, the treasurer seems to have been present 
                                                            
104 The most recent account is Watts. ‘The Counsels of King Henry VI, c. 1435–1445’, pp. 279–298.  
105 PPC, 5, pp. 88–9, 90.  
106 PPC, 5, p. 253.  
107 PPC, 5, p. 281.  
108 I follow Watts in taking a formal, institutionalised ‘council’ to be an aberration in early-to-mid 
fifteenth century England (this is a central theme of Watts, ‘The Counsels of King Henry VI, c. 1435–
1445’).  
109 This is derived from statistics deployed by Watts regarding council attendance during the early 
years of the minority: Watts, Henry VI and the Politics of Kingship, p. 136, figure 1 and p. 150, figure 
2.  
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at key meetings in which the king made grants to the financial loss of the 
government.110  
The inability of Cromwell and his colleagues on the council to actively restrain 
Henry’s patronage led the council to attempt to establish a system of monitoring 
patronage around 1444.111  Bills requiring royal grace were to be given to specially 
appointed readers before they reached the king.  The readers would produce 
‘abstracts’ of the contents, which they were then to pass on the king.  The king’s 
response was to be noted on the dorse.  Approved bills were to pass under the signet 
to the keeper, who was to disclose important issues to the council before sending the 
bill on to the chancellor to be engrossed.  The council seems to have been attempting 
to achieve two things here.  Firstly, it sought to formalise its own political role so 
that, as affairs of state gravitated towards the court, the council would at least still be 
a regular feature of political life with the ability to continue to attempt to oversee 
royal patronage.  Secondly, and much more importantly, the council sought to 
institutionalise a means by which it could effectively regulate patronage after the 
failed attempts at regulation discussed in the previous paragraph.  Thus, the idea of 
readers’ producing ‘abstracts’ of bills reads very much like an attempt, on the part of 
the administration, to formally commend certain bills to the king at the expense of 
others.  And the role envisaged of the council as a forum for debate on certain, 
undefined, issues before bills reached the chancellor for engrossment sounds rather 
like an attempt to formalise the council’s role as a last recourse should the king sign 
off on bills which it was deemed he ought not to have.  Drawing these two points 
together, then, we can suggest that the council was attempting to secure its formal 
                                                            
110 Alongside the example cited in this paragraph regarding Cromwell’s intervention in the Beaufort 
case, the treasurer was present at the meeting which witnessed the sale of Chirk: E 28/60/25.  For 
further comment regarding the sale of Chirk, see the penultimate paragraph of this section. 
111 PPC, 6, pp. 316–20.  This document is undated, and is simply stuck into Nicolas’ collection on the 
back of the minutes of 4 March 1444. Watts has suggested a possible earlier dating, to 1441, owing 
principally to a great deal of conciliar activity during this year (Watts, ‘The Counsels of King Henry 
VI, c. 1435–1445’, pp. 296–7), though I am inclined to follow conventional opinion (Griffiths, The 
Reign of Henry VI, p. 283 and Wolffe, Henry VI, p. 115) and date these Ordinances to in or around 
1444.  On 7 November 1444, a privy seal letter informed the chancellor that letters patent made since 
the tenth year of the reign which had been warranted by means other than the privy seal were to be 
considered as valid as if they had been warranted by the privy seal: CPR, 1441–6, pp. 312–13.  It is 
difficult not to view this as very strong evidence suggesting a royal effort to clarify Henry’s position 
in response to the Ordinances.  The remainder of this paragraph discusses the Ordinances in the 
context of the trend in conciliar fiscal politics analysed in the previous paragraph.  
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survival in such a way so as to establish itself as a more effective regulator of royal 
patronage.  
It is well known that the political circumstances of the mid–1440s, specifically the 
royal marriage and the growth of a dominant governing faction within the household, 
led to the failure of this attempt to establish a new, institutionalised council.112  The 
question which we must address here is why contemporaries were so concerned with 
the fiscal context of royal patronage during the early years of Henry VI’s majority.  
Conventionally, historians look to the personality of Henry VI to answer this 
question.113  Henry was too liberal in his patronage, it is believed, which seriously 
threatened the stability of government finance.  There are two serious and inter-
related problems with this suggestion, however.114  Firstly, Henry did not have all 
that much royal capital of which he was free to dispense, owing principally to the 
enfeoffment of the Duchy of Lancaster and the Queen Mother’s annuities.  Secondly, 
Henry’s patronage emphatically did not fatally damage the fiscal position of the 
regime.  In the first place, the role played by domainal revenue in the royal budget 
during this period was minimal, to say the least, as is evident from our budgetary 
analysis in Chapter 5.2.  And the examples of patronage which we have seen caused 
such immediate financial concern so as to provoke conciliar warnings relate to 
reasonably small amounts of money.115  The only bill signed by Henry VI during this 
                                                            
112 As John Watts has illustrated, it was not until the vicissitudes of dynastic civil war that Chief 
Justice Fortescue theoretically explored the legitimacy of a permanent, institutionalised ‘council’ in 
which the king’s power ‘was effectively in the hands of a corporate representation of his public body’: 
Watts, Henry VI and the Politics of Kingship, p. 49.  For the rapid decline of the council during the 
period 1444–5, see Wolffe, ‘The Personal Rule of Henry VI’, p. 36; Watts, Henry VI and the Politics 
of Kingship, pp. 149–80.  
113 For what follows see, in particular, Watts, Henry VI and the Politics of Kingship and Griffiths, The 
Reign of Henry VI.    
114 The following points build upon the recent work of M. A. Hicks, The Wars of the Roses (London, 
2010), pp. 62–3.  
115 Though these were still considerably larger than most – possibly all – other grants of a similar 
nature or, for example, releases from fee farm payment.  For example, on 28 April 1438 Richard 
Duke of York was released from paying the whole farm for Montgomery and part of Builth.  The 
amount that York had been paying for the Montgomery farm, however, was under £20 per annum: 
Somerville, History of the Duchy of Lancaster, p. 640.  On a different, though related note, Wolffe’s 
analysis of the varying rates by which recipients of royal patronage held crown lands vis–à–vis the 
value of crown lands illustrates that, though the rent was invariably smaller than the value, the sums 
involved were small.  Thus, Henry VI’s grant of two thirds of the manor of Burwell to Cromwell in 
1442 involved the treasurer’s payment of a rent of £42/annum, yet a contemporary ‘valor’ of the two 
thirds of this manor held by Cromwell illustrates that it was actually worth £105 12s. 4d./annum.  The 
terms of the grant therefore seem to have led to the government losing out by just over £60 per 
annum.  Most examples cited by Wolffe involve less of a difference between rental rate and value, 
and even if they did not, it is necessary to point out how incredibly small these sums are when viewed 
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period which could seriously be interpreted as representing the ‘wasting’ of the 
crown’s capital assets was the infamous sale of Chirk to Cardinal Beaufort for 
£8,900 on 25 May 1439.116  Yet this represented more of an agreement between the 
government – possibly even Henry specifically – and Beaufort than an act of 
patronage.  Moreover, Henry sold Chirk at much more than double the price than his 
father had bought the estate for.117    
There was no wanton squandering of the royal domain during the early years of 
Henry VI’s majority, then.  All that seems to have happened was the re–emergence 
of patronage owing to the growth into adulthood of the king, a development which 
became unprecedentedly politicised owing to the worsening fiscal political and 
financial crisis which beset the late Lancastrian government.  The government, as we 
have seen, was doing all it could to ensure parliament’s continued granting of the 
level of supply discussed in Chapter 5.1.  Yet constitutional constraints did not allow 
for the possibility of a ‘new deal’ in the financing of the state and, as a result, the 
financial situation went from bad to worse.  This led the council to search for an 
alternative fiscal solution.  In so doing, it attempted to clamp down on domainal 
finance.  Such a policy was incredibly unrealistic in the context of late Lancastrian 
public finance; it is not credible to suggest that a figure such as Treasurer Cromwell 
would have genuinely believed that royal patronage was either a key fiscal problem 
for the late Lancastrian government, or that through attempting to regulate and 
curtail Henry’s patronage the fiscal problems of the government could be alleviated.  
Indeed, Cromwell, more than anyone else, would have been acutely aware of the 
minimal role played by domainal revenue in the royal budget.  Yet seriously 
straightjacketed finances, and the prospect of a worsening fiscal crisis once the king 
married, would have shaken the council.  Unable to secure a ‘new deal’ regarding the 
financing of the state, Cromwell and his colleagues thus turned to a constitutionally–
                                                                                                                                                                           
in the broader fiscal context of the royal budget.  It also needs to be pointed out that because of the 
resumptions of 1450–1 and 1455 we possess a great deal more information about these issues in the 
context of the late Lancastrian government than we do regarding the fiscal history of earlier periods.  
Any suggestion that Henry’s patronage ‘de–valued’ the royal domain to the financial loss of the 
government cannot, therefore, be considered to be objective.  For the example of Burwell, discussed 
above, and a general discussion of these issues drawn attention to in this footnote, see Wolffe, The 
Royal Demesne in English History, p. 101, and in general chapter 4.  
116 See above, footnote 110.  For the ‘wasting’ of crown assets see Steel, Receipt, pp. 213–14. 
117 Henry V had purchased Chirk for 4,000 marks from his grandmother, Joan de Bohun: CPR, 1416–
22, p.172.
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acceptable, though financially unviable, means of increasing public revenues centred 
on the management of the royal domain.  These developments did not bode well for 




THE FAILURE OF THE FISCAL CONSTITUTION: DOMAINAL FISCAL 
POLITICS AND THE EXCHEQUER CRISIS OF HENRY VI’s LATE 
MAJORITY, 1445–c. 1453
Chapter Five illustrated the constitutional impossibility, owing to the constraints of 
medieval fiscal theory, of Henry VI’s early majority government securing a 
permanent, and high, level of supply in order to finance ‘ordinary’ expenditure.  This 
resulted, increasingly, in the early majority regime formally alluding to the 
compelling nature of active, adult kingship, and its placing of an increasing level of 
pressure upon the Commons, in an attempt to persuade parliament to concede a 
heavier burden of taxation.  In response to these developments, the Commons were 
willing to concede a marginally more liberal fiscal regime than that of the late 
minority.  This was centred on an increased indirect tax burden, especially on aliens, 
special alien direct taxes, and the underwriting of an increased level of credit.  
Significantly, the level of fifteenth and tenth grants was not markedly changed in 
comparison with the final years of the minority.  The high level of tension evident in 
the negotiation of these tax grants and credit acts illustrates that a ceiling of 
parliamentary fiscal tolerance was reached during the late 1430s and early 1440s.  
These fiscal concessions, however, fell far short of providing for stability in 
exchequer finance.  Despite the exchequer’s employment of an increased level of 
loans, on average per annum, in the financing of ‘ordinary’ charges, increased levels 
of expenditure led to a spiralling debt problem.  By the close of the period covered 
by Chapter Five, annual debt constituted around one third of total assignments; by 
far the worst fiscal predicament which Lancastrian government was yet to confront.  
The inability of the early majority government to enforce the necessary fiscal 
solution to these problems paralysed the council.  Its increasing focus on domainal 
fiscal rectitude, which in budgetary terms offered no fiscal relief whatsoever for the 
exchequer, is indicative of a growing desperation within governing circles.  Faced 
with an apparently insoluble fiscal crisis which was getting worse, the council gave 
way to a governing clique within the household during the period c. 1444–5.  
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This chapter seeks to examine how the regime led by the Marquis, later Duke, of 
Suffolk during the mid–to–late 1440s, and its successor of the early 1450s led by the 
Duke of Somerset, sought to confront the fiscal constitutional and financial crises 
which characterised the late majority period.  The first section examines fiscal 
political developments during this period.  This focuses on the attempts of the 
government of the court, during the mid–to–late 1440s, to secure an increase in the 
level of supply which we have seen had characterised the early majority in order to 
allow the exchequer to restore a measure of stability to ‘ordinary’ finance.  The fiscal 
political problems encountered by the Suffolk regime are viewed not in terms of its 
alleged attempt to hegemonise the government as a means of furthering Suffolk and 
his associates’ private material interests, the favoured approach of conventional 
accounts of government finance during the late majority period.1  Rather, the 
impossibility of any regime to easily secure the level of supply required by the 
exchequer during the late 1440s, in light of the development of a complex crisis in 
court politics which characterised the late 1440s, is emphasised.  It is shown that, 
once the Commons had developed a programme of resumption and forced it upon 
the crown, there was nothing that the court regime could do but endorse this.  An 
overview of both the Lancastrian and Yorkist preference for resumption as a fiscal 
political strategy over previous regimes’ attempts to secure supply illustrates the 
extent to which these developments impacted upon the fiscal political attitudes of 
those in government by the final years of Lancastrian rule.  
The second section of the chapter traces the impact of the fiscal regimes negotiated 
during the late 1440s and early 1450s upon exchequer finance.  There are two key 
themes here.  One is the ability of the exchequer, during the late 1440s, to stabilise 
the regime’s ‘ordinary’ finances through its efficient management of lay tax revenue 
and credit as a means of instigating a programme of fiscal consolidation.  The other 
is the temporary, and distinctly limited, success of this programme.  It is shown that 
an upsurge in ‘extraordinary’ expenditure during the period 1449–50, and the 
continuing build–up of a large backlog of debt, resulted in renewed fiscal crisis.  The 
politics of resumption, we shall see, failed to resolve this crisis.  A marked increase 
                                                            
1 See, in particular, Wolffe, The Royal Demesne in English History.  Also B. P. Wolffe, ‘Acts of 
Resumption in Lancastrian Parliaments 1399–1456’, in Historical Studies of the English Parliament, 
ed. E. B. Fryde & E. Miller, 2 vols (Cambridge, 1970), 2, pp. 61–91.
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in domainal revenue brought in by the exchequer in the immediate aftermath of the 
resumptions of 1450–1 came to be employed by the Somerset regime as a fiscal tool 
in its bid for political survival, and was in any case not sustainable in the long–term.  
Moreover, a new reliance on domainal revenues, in the context of the troubled 
politics of the early 1450s, affected important changes in the nature of the 
exchequer’s fiscal administrative role.
6.1 Changing parameters of fiscal political debate: taxation and the royal domain
The fiscal politics of the mid–to–late 1440s were shaped by important governmental 
changes occurring during this period, which it is necessary for us to begin by 
surveying.2  After a brief upsurge in conciliar activity during 1444 discussed in 
Chapter Five, the revived council we have seen was motivated by fiscal 
considerations petered out and political affairs gravitated towards the court as Henry 
VI moved into his mid–twenties and, in April 1445, married.3  It seems, however, 
that a loose coalition of upper nobles and outgoing councillors were uneasy about 
this political transition.  The only policy which we can be sure contemporaries 
unanimously believed the king was personally involved in formulating and 
implementing was the royal foundations.4  Indeed, as we have seen, Henry’s 
apparently vigorous attempts to secure a fiscal settlement for the foundations had 
likely conditioned the council’s playing up of his kingship as a means of publicly 
alluding to the need for supply.5  There is a similar lack of evidence to suggest 
coherent royal initiatives in the period after 1444, and with the completion of 
arrangements for the financing of the foundations, it seems probable that a large 
proportion of upper nobles in the orbit of the court would have recognised that any 
                                                            
2 This paragraph is drawn largely from Watts, Henry VI and the Politics of Kingship.  
3 See Watts, Henry VI and the Politics of Kingship, pp. 180-99 for a detailed discussion of the 
conciliar evidence.   
4 See Chapter 5.1 for a discussion with references.  Wolffe cites a variety of examples of 
contemporaries who believed that Henry was in control of his government, (see, for example, Wolffe, 
‘The Personal Rule of Henry VI’, p. 36; Wolffe, Henry VI, p. 69).  As Watts has illustrated in detail, 
however, contemporaries’ belief in the king’s personal rule does not necessarily mean that the king 
was ruling.  Indeed, those who were in control of the government would need to create a façade of 
proactive royal rule as a means of upholding constitutional niceties (see Watts, Henry VI and the 
Politics of Kingship, Chapter 5, for a full discussion).  As we have seen, during the early majority the 
only evidence which cannot be convincingly interpreted without factoring in the role of the king is the 
trend in fiscal politics regarding the financing of the household.  
5 For the substantive argument, see Chapter 5.1.  
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further royal policy interventions, at least in the near future, were improbable.6  
These circumstances must have led to something of a panic amongst the upper 
nobility.  Fiscally, the securing of peace was urgently required by the mid–1440s.7  
Moreover, domestic political affairs could not be allowed to go unmanaged.8  Yet 
these policy requirements necessitated a strong, purposeful royal will, which 
contemporaries must have been beginning to sense was asking rather too much of 
Henry VI.  Notables from divergent political backgrounds thus tacitly, though 
unanimously, provided Suffolk – Beaufort’s former ‘man’ at court – with a mandate 
to form a court regime with the aim of ‘manufacturing’ royal policy on behalf of the 
king.9  
These radical political changes had serious implications upon the emergent Suffolk 
regime’s public approach towards supply.  The central reason why the Commons had 
tolerated the council’s regular public references to subjects’ communitarian 
obligations and, increasingly, subjects’ obligations towards royal authority, 
specifically that of the adult Henry VI, as a means of alluding to the need for supply, 
was the widely–held belief that Henry would take over affairs of state and ensure 
political stability through so doing.  Indeed, in the late 1430s and early 1440s this 
belief must have been all the more strongly held as the king reached manhood and 
appeared to be making, albeit limited, moves towards actively framing policy in 
relation to the royal foundations and their financing.  In light of the highly unsettling 
political developments at court from the mid–1440s, however, it would have been 
clear to the government that it could not publicly be seen to be continuing to seek 
supply as though political circumstances had not changed.  Sitting in the Commons 
were representatives of local communities which were being directly affected by a 
                                                            
6 During the period after 1445, all foreign policy and policy relating to the management of landed 
society was managed through the court.  When Henry was required to consent to important business, 
such as the making of peace, or the management of landed disputes, he was almost always 
accompanied either by Suffolk or members of Suffolk’s court affinity.  This is such an unusual pattern 
of government that Watts has convincingly concluded that the king was being managed by Suffolk 
and his court network.  See Watts, Henry VI and the Politics of Kingship, Chapter 6, for a full 
discussion of these issues. 
7 In order to facilitate the exchequer’s diverting of resources towards financing the regime’s debts.  
See Chapter 5.2, for a detailed discussion of the fiscal situation c. 1444.  
8 This is a key theme of Watts, Henry VI and the Politics of Kingship, Chapter 6.  
9 For a discussion of Suffolk’s political background see Watts, Henry VI and the Politics of Kingship, 
pp. 161–2.  
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re–ordering of the local polity instigated by Suffolk’s local supporters.10  Moreover, 
Suffolk publicly directed the so–called ‘peace policy’ which characterised this 
period.11  In all areas of policy, it was Suffolk – not the king – who publicly 
appeared to be in control.  In these circumstances, any attempt on the part of the 
Suffolk regime to publicly depict Henry VI as an active, purposeful monarch or to 
appeal to subjects’ communitarian obligations would have risked appearing as 
though Suffolk and his associates insincerely sought to use political rhetoric as a 
means of securing supply for their own private gain.  It is in this context that we need 
to view the chancellor’s opening addresses of the parliaments of 1445–6 and 
February 1449, the two parliaments which witnessed fifteenth and tenth grants 
during the period in question.  Neither of these addresses alluded to subjects’ 
obligations towards an active, adult king, nor did they appeal to subjects’ obligations 
to the state, as a means of securing supply.  
Despite the public move away from alluding to subjects’ need to provide supply, 
however, Suffolk’s government actually required a higher level of lay taxation than 
that which we have seen had characterised the early majority period.12  This created 
a serious dilemma for his regime.  Not even the early majority government, in much 
more favourable political circumstances, had been able to persuade the Commons to 
grant more than one and a half fifteenths and tenths during the course of one 
parliament.  How could Suffolk’s regime, in the political circumstances outlined 
above, hope to negotiate an increased level of supply without inciting serious 
parliamentary tensions?  What follows approaches this issue through a re–
construction of fiscal political negotiations during the parliaments of 1445–6 and 
February 1449 respectively.  At the parliament of 1445–6, the Commons seem to 
have been willing to grant a reduced level of lay taxation almost from the outset of 
the assembly.  Thus, parliament opened on 25 February; half a fifteenth and tenth 
                                                            
10 See footnote 25, for a discussion of Suffolk’s relations with the localities and references.  
11 See Watts, Henry VI and the Politics of Kingship, pp. 221–234.  It is interesting to note that the 
only major policy area which must have seemed as though it was not completely dominated by 
Suffolk was fiscal policy, where the new treasurer, Marmaduke Lumley, apparently guided by his 
predecessor Lord Cromwell, publicly formulated a programme of fiscal consolidation.  Even this was 
implemented in co–ordination with Suffolk, however (this is a key theme of Harriss, ‘Marmaduke 
Lumley and the Exchequer Crisis’).    
12 This owed to Lumley’s attempts to implement a programme of fiscal consolidation: see Chapter 
6.2.1 for a detailed discussion.  
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was granted on 15 March.13  We can suggest that the Commons’ prompt willingness 
to make this grant reflected a certain parliamentary gratitude towards the regime for 
not seeking to publicly allude to the need for supply.  
That the regime sought a much greater level of supply which was turned down by the 
Commons is, however, illustrated by the government’s response of proroguing the 
assembly on the same day that the Commons made their grant and pleading its 
‘necessity’.14  We have already discussed at length the problems associated with the 
government pleading its ‘necessity’ during the 1430s, which owed to the 
constitutional implications of the Treaty of Troyes.15 During the period in question, 
however, the government’s pleading of its ‘necessity’ was an even riskier tactic.  
After the Truce of Tours, there was no call on the exchequer to fund special 
expeditionary expenditure.16  This meant that political concerns regarding the 
government’s employment of a plea of ‘necessity’ no longer related solely to the
scope of the royal ‘necessity’.  The expenditure of any lay subsidies which were 
publicly sought in the context of the defence of the realm was now at risk of 
becoming a politically contentious issue.  Moreover, the potential for serious fiscal 
political tensions was heightened by the fact that Suffolk was particularly vulnerable, 
owing to the developments in court politics discussed above, to parliamentary 
criticism that he was fabricating a plea of ‘necessity’ as a means of securing supply 
in order to enrich himself and his allies.
These points considered, then, why did Suffolk and his colleagues change their fiscal 
political strategy and plead a ‘necessity’ of the realm?  Here we must return to the 
broader political context of Suffolk’s regime, outlined above.  We have already 
noted that Suffolk’s mandate to lead the regime of the mid–to–late 1440s rested upon 
a noble consensus that the government of the realm required a well–placed courtier 
to control and direct royal policy in the absence of effective royal leadership.  In 
                                                            
13 PROME, parliament of 1445–6, item 14.  
14 PROME, parliament of 1445–6, item 10.  The plea was predicated upon the idea that business 
relating to the ‘defence…of the realm of England’ (‘qualiter varia negocia parliamenti predicti, pro 
statu et defensione regni Anglie’) was unresolved; when parliament re–opened on 29 April, it 
continued, this would have to be dealt with for the ‘profit of king and (the said) realm’ (‘commodum 
et utilitatem dicti regni’).  This focus on the need for subjects to decide how the ‘necessity’ was to be 
met, rather than explicitly stating that subjects must meet the ‘necessity’ in a particular way: i.e., 
through providing supply, was in the tradition of the two pleas of ‘necessity’ of 1435 and 1437.
15 See, in particular, the discussion in Chapter 4.1.
16 For a detailed discussion of exchequer finance during this period see Chapter 6.2.1.  
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terms of fiscal policy, if Suffolk failed to secure the level of supply necessary for the 
exchequer to begin to stabilise the government’s ‘ordinary’ finances and reduce the 
build–up of debt discussed in Chapter 5.2, then his regime would have manifestly 
failed to provide effective leadership.  A half fifteenth and tenth grant, which was not 
even supplemented by the Commons’ underwriting of credit or their renewal of the 
maltolt and tonnage and poundage, did not provide the exchequer with the level of 
supply necessary to instigate a programme of fiscal consolidation.  Suffolk thus 
needed to force the Commons to grant a more generous fiscal package.  It is in this 
context that we ought to view the regime’s employment of plea of ‘necessity’, 
discussed above.   There is good reason to believe that Suffolk, or perhaps colleagues 
with more experience of government from the now defunct minority council, was 
aware of the need to tread with care here.  In this context, it needs to be noted that 
Speaker Burley, a figure with varied political connections,17 voiced gratitude towards 
Suffolk, signalling out in particular the latter’s decisive positive contributions to 
foreign policy and the royal marriage.18  And parliamentary concerns regarding the 
financing and victualing of the household were addressed.19  Somewhat 
contradictorily, then, the government sought to browbeat the Commons to concede a 
higher level of supply through the fabrication of a plea of ‘necessity’ and curry 
favour with the Lower House.
These initiatives failed to affect the Commons’ immediate opening of the purse 
strings.  The remainder of the parliament of 1445–6 witnessed the development of a 
fiscal political stalemate more pronounced than any which had characterised the 
parliamentary negotiating of supply during the earlier years of Henry VI’s reign.  It 
took an unprecedented three further prorogations over a period which lasted more 
                                                            
17 Burley had links with Gloucester, Talbot and York: see Roskell, The Commons and their Speakers 
in English Parliaments, 1376-1523, p. 226.  
18 PROME, parliament of 1449–50, item 18 and item 19.  
19 British Library Lansdowne MS 1, folios 86a–93b, printed in A. R. Myers, ‘Some Household 
Ordinances of Henry VI’, in Crown, Household and Parliament in Fifteenth Century England, ed. A. 
R. Myers (London, 1985), pp. 231–50.  Unlike in the parliaments of the early majority, when it has 
been argued that active concern on the part of Henry VI led to the financing of the household 
becoming a central facet of fiscal political debate, the low key nature of the trend in debate regarding 
the household during 1445–6 suggests that it was no longer the king, or even the regime, that 
precipitated this discussion (after all, the king had already secured provisions for the financing of his 
foundations; there was no need for any further negotiations as far as this was concerned).  
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than a year before a fiscal settlement satisfactory to the regime was reached.20  
Moreover, parliament’s eventual grants strongly suggest unresolved fiscal political 
tensions.  On the final day of the parliament, one and a half fifteenths and tenths 
were granted.21  Combined with the half fifteenth and tenth which we have seen had 
been granted over a year beforehand in the opening month of the first session, this 
represented a larger lay subsidy bill than any since the parliament of 1429–30.  Yet 
this grant seems to have been made under a great deal of political pressure.  This is 
evident in the one and one half fifteenth and tenth grant: the Commons added the 
proviso that the national quota reduction of £4,000 which we have seen had applied 
to every fifteenth and tenth bill since 1433 be increased to £6,000.22  
Parliament’s attitude towards other fiscal impositions in 1446 is also telling.  In their 
indirect tax grants, also made at the close of the parliament, the Commons halved the 
rate of poundage on alien imports of sweet wine from the rate set during the early 
period of the majority.23  No alien direct tax, which had characterised the fiscal 
packages negotiated during the early years of the majority, was granted.  Even more 
significantly, parliament failed to underwrite credit.  These developments suggest 
that the Commons lobbied, as we have seen they had during the late 1430s and early 
1440s, to service the regime’s financial needs through continued innovations in the 
granting of indirect taxation, the granting of novel alien taxes and the continued 
sanctioning of loans.  The government would have refused to accept such proposals 
owing to their failure to alleviate late Lancastrian fiscal problems during the late 
1430s and early 1440s.24  Once it was clear to the Commons that continued debate 
would be to no avail – that the crown was simply not willing to accept their 
                                                            
20 J. S. Roskell states that the parliament of 1445–6 was the first to ever have four sessions: Roskell, 
The Commons and their Speakers, p. 227.  
21 PROME, parliament of 1445–6, item 15.  
22 Unfortunately, the lack of surviving petitions prevents us from providing any detail on the debating 
of the quota reduction.  All we can say, based upon the evidence of the parliament roll, is that Lincoln 
and Great Yarmouth were exempted from payment of the one and one half subsidies granted and, 
obviously, that the national quota was reduced: PROME, parliament of 1445-6, item 11.  
Notwithstanding the lack of evidence it seems as though, given the broader fiscal political 
circumstances discussed above, there must have been intense debate regarding the quota reduction.  
23 PROME, parliament of 1445–6, item 16.  The maltolt was simply renewed at the same rates as 
before on 2 April for 4 years.  Similarly, tonnage and poundage rates remained the same other than 
the rate on alien sweet wine imports, which was dropped to 3s.  The same exemptions regarding 
exports of cloth, imported grains, flour and fish which we have seen characterised earlier grants 
applied to this grant.  
24 See Chapter 5.2.  
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proposals – parliament must have reluctantly granted the required level of lay 
taxation in the most conservative manner possible: hence the quota reduction.  
Concomitantly, the Commons sent a clear signal to the crown that if it was no longer 
willing or able to compromise with parliament, parliament was no longer willing to 
compromise with the crown: hence the effective refusal to underwrite credit and to 
continue with the novel fiscal impositions of the early majority period.  
The tensions which underlay the parliamentary debating of supply during the 
parliament of 1445–6 can realistically be viewed as having fed into, and exacerbated, 
broader political concerns with Suffolk’s regime.  Important research on county 
society in Warwickshire, East Anglia and the West Country illustrates that an 
increased penetration on the part of Suffolk’s affinity into local political society 
resulted in a rising tide of baronial discontent towards the court amidst effective 
anarchy in the localities during the period between 1446 and 1449.25  Moreover, it 
has recently been suggested that the stage–managed disgrace of the Duke of 
Gloucester during the Bury parliament of 1447 brought together concern with 
Suffolk’s rule in the localities and parliamentary antipathy towards the regime.26  
These developments seriously undermined Suffolk’s ability to maintain the level of 
fiscal political pressure on the Commons which we have seen characterised the 
parliament of 1445–6, since this would have served to further incite an increasingly 
volatile political situation.  Yet by 1449 the truce which Suffolk had secured four 
years earlier was no longer effective, which meant that the regime needed to finance 
renewed special expeditionary expenditure as well as facilitate the exchequer’s 
                                                            
25 This is a key theme of a number of important works.  See, in particular, Carpenter, Locality and 
Polity: A Study of Warwickshire Landed Society, 1401–99, pp. 399–486; H. Castor, The King, the 
Crown and the Duchy of Lancaster: Public Authority and Private Power, 1399–1461 (Oxford, 2000), 
pp. 119–27; R. Stansfield, Political Elites in South West England, 1450–1500: Politics, Governance 
and the Wars of the Roses (Lampeter, 2009).  See also M. Cherry, ‘The Struggle for Power in Mid–
Fifteenth Century Devonshire’, in Patronage, the Crown and the Provinces in Later Medieval 
England, ed. R. A. Griffiths (Gloucester, 1981), pp. 123–44; S. J. Payling, ‘The Ampthill Dispute: A 
Study in Aristocratic Lawlessness and the Breakdown of Lancastrian Government’, EHR, 104 (1989), 
pp. 881–907.  Watts speaks of an anarchic state of affairs in the provinces: Watts, Henry VI and the 
Politics of Kingship, p. 220.  
26 This was a key theme of an unpublished paper by A. Curry, ‘The Tyranny of Henry VI’, delivered 
at the ‘Political Culture Research Group’ at the University of York in May 2012.  It is likely that the 
acrimonious fiscal political debate during the parliament of 1445–6 discussed above marked the 
beginning of serious parliamentary concern with Suffolk, though we ought to note that this appears to 
have been prior to the breakdown in local political society which occurred a little later, around the 
period 1447–9, according to most accounts (see, for example, Watts, Henry VI and the Politics of 
Kingship, pp. 216–220; Griffiths, The Reign of Henry VI, Chapter 14).  
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continuing programme of debt consolidation.  The government thus required a 
subsidy bill more generous than that of 1445–6.  Having effectively lost control of 
the localities, Suffolk’s ability to credibly replicate royal authority and thus satisfy 
his coalition of noble supporters was dissipating.  The duke’s only hope – however 
slim – of retaining his support base was to demonstrate his continued ability to 
finance the regime’s needs and thus his government’s ability to effectively steward at 
least one major area of government policy.  It is in this context that we need to 
approach the fiscal politics of the parliament of February 1449.
From the outset of this parliament, it seems that the Commons were made aware of 
the urgent need for supply.  The act of resumption of the parliament of November 
1449 states that the unprecedented level of exchequer indebtedness which was 
publicly outlined during the assembly of 1449–50 had also been declared to the 
realm ‘at your parliament last held at Westminster’.27  This would suggest that the 
Suffolk regime sought to persuade the Commons, during the assembly with which 
we are presently concerned, of the urgent need for parliament to grant the level of 
supply required by the regime in order for the exchequer’s programme of fiscal 
consolidation to remain viable at a time of renewed military conflict.  That the 
Commons granted half a fifteenth and tenth,28 and re–granted tonnage and 
poundage,29 which was due to expire, during the first session of the parliament in 
question illustrates that the government’s overtures for supply had not fallen on 
completely deaf ears.  Yet revenue from half a fifteenth and tenth and tonnage and 
poundage was hardly capable of sustaining an increased level of public expenditure.   
Moreover, the Commons were yet to underwrite credit, let alone grant an extra lay 
subsidy.  
Notwithstanding the dangers of attempting to coerce the Commons into granting 
extra supply in light of the broader political context of the parliament in question, 
discussed above, the regime once again prorogued parliament and pleaded its 
                                                            
27 PROME, parliament of November 1449, item 53.  
28 PROME, parliament of February 1449, item 8.  
29 PROME, parliament of February 1449, item 9.  The maltolt was not due to be renewed until the 
next parliament.  
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‘necessity’.30  This was followed, during the second session of the parliament, by the 
Abbot of Gloucester – spokesman of the Duke of Somerset, Lieutenant–General in 
France – pleading with parliament to finance and despatch a large army so that 
Normandy could be saved.31  This latter development resulted in constructive 
discussion amongst the Lords regarding possible means of financing a special 
expeditionary force.  A surviving fragment of what appears to have been a 
parliamentary debate from around this time includes, significantly, a proposal by 
Treasurer Lumley that the Commons ought to be urged to contribute towards the 
expenses of a special expeditionary force.32  This is tantamount to an appeal to 
negotiate with the Commons, rather than simply browbeat the Lower House into 
conceding a higher level of supply.  Despite attempting to publicly force the issue of 
supply on the Commons in the prorogation address, then, as during the parliament of 
1445–6 the regime clearly sought to convince the Commons to willingly grant 
further lay taxation.
That Lumley’s advice seems to have been taken on board by the regime is implied 
by the chronology of parliament’s underwriting of credit and granting of further lay 
taxation.  The second session of the parliament seems to have been concerned solely 
with the issue of supply.  At least as far as the parliament roll is concerned, a credit 
act which sanctioned loans of up to £100,000 is the only enrolled item of business 
between the second and third prorogations.33    We have seen that the parliament of 
1445–6’s refusal to underwrite credit illustrated the Commons’ obstinacy regarding 
loans when being forced to make a particularly heavy lay tax grant. Viewed in this 
context, it is possible that parliament’s renewed willingness to underwrite loans at 
this point in the parliament of February 1449 illustrates some kind of agreement 
between the regime and the Commons centred on the latter’s willingness to provide a 
                                                            
30 PROME, parliament of February 1449, item 10.  The formula was the same as in the first 
prorogation address of the previous parliament: ‘qualiter negocia parliamenti predicti pro statu et 
defensione regni Anglie’ is stated to be the reason why parliament must reconvene.  
31 PROME, parliament of February 1449, item 17.  M. K. Jones has dated this to the second session of 
the parliament, based upon French evidence: M. K. Jones, 'The Beaufort Family and the War in 
France' (University of Bristol PhD thesis, 1982), p. 256.   
32 ‘And they (the Commons) to be entreated to consider the great dillegence/would put theyr handes to 
theyr goode benevelonce to see how goode might be had to performe the purpose of sending for the 
the sayd armys’: British Library, Harleian MS. 6849 f. 77a, printed in A. R. Myers, ‘A Parliamentary 
Debate of the Mid–Fifteenth Century’, in Crown, Household and Parliament in Fifteenth Century 
England, p. 84.  
33 PROME, parliament of November 1449, item 11.
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greater level of supply so long as this was part of a fiscal package of parliament’s 
own choosing.  Yet the government and the Commons were clearly struggling to 
agree upon the issue of further lay taxation.  Parliament was prorogued again, and it 
was not until sometime during the third and final session that the Commons granted 
another half fifteenth and tenth and an alien direct tax along the same lines as those 
of 1440 and 1442.34  Despite the regime’s attempts to reconcile with the Commons 
during the second and third sessions, then, it seems as though, as in the parliament of 
1445–6, the Commons were ultimately forced to concede the government’s preferred 
fiscal regime.  At the close of this parliament, fiscal political tensions ran high.  
Bale’s chronicle states that at this time the Commons expressed their unwillingness 
to grant supply in the future unless the crown was to resume its grants.35  
Parliament’s broaching of resumption had a profound effect on the politics of supply 
during the course of the subsequent parliament, that of November 1449.  The 
opening parliamentary address of this assembly contained a plea of ‘necessity’, the 
first in an opening parliamentary address since 1437.36  Concomitantly, the 
government declared a royal debt of £372,000.37  These developments reflect a 
certain desperation on the part of the regime.  The political situation which 
confronted Suffolk in the autumn of 1449 was markedly worse than that during the 
spring.  The collapse of public order noted above had been exacerbated by the 
development of popular insurrection throughout the southern English counties, a 
rapid decline in the Lancastrian position in France and the breakdown of the 
exchequer’s policy of fiscal consolidation.38  In these circumstances, Suffolk’s 
ability to continue to successfully replicate royal policy was no longer merely 
seriously threatened; it collapsed.39  Suffolk’s constituency amongst the upper 
nobility subsequently crumbled, as the Commons’ ability to impeach the duke serves 
                                                            
34 PROME, parliament of February 1449, item 13 and item 14.  
35 Six Town Chronicles, ed. R. Flenley (Oxford, 1911), p. 125; Wolffe, ‘Acts of Resumption in 
Lancastrian Parliaments’, p. 75.  
36 The parliament is expressly stated to have been called because of ‘urgent business concerning the 
defence of the realm of England’ (PROME, parliament of November 1449, item 1).     
37 PROME, parliament of November 1449, item 53.  
38 The best accounts of the crisis of 1449–50 are Woffe, Henry VI, Chapter 12; Griffiths, The Reign of 
Henry VI, Chapter 21.  
39 Watts, Henry VI and the Politics of Kingship, pp. 251–4.  
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to illustrate.40  Suffolk seems to have believed that his only hope of re–gaining the 
political initiative lay in his continuing to seek the level of supply necessary in order 
to despatch an army to France in order to recoup the Lancastrian military position.  
This serves to explain the plea of ‘necessity’ outlined above.  Yet this plea proved to 
be politically toxic.  The exchequer had been employing a markedly increased level 
of lay taxation in the ‘ordinary’ financing of the regime, notwithstanding increasing 
fiscal political tensions during the parliaments of 1445–6 and February 1449, 
throughout the period of Suffolk’s rule.41  Yet now Suffolk was appealing to the 
Commons to continue to grant lay taxation so that the exchequer could fund a 
renewal of war alongside its existing programme of fiscal consolidation regarding 
the regime’s ‘ordinary’ finances, against a background of aristocratic and popular 
rebellion against his government.
The Commons were unwilling to tolerate this.  In the parliamentary articles of 
Suffolk’s impeachment, the duke was accused of having un–constitutionally 
employed lay tax revenue in the financing of ‘ordinary’ charges.42  This needs to be 
viewed alongside the Commons’ grant of a special lay tax on lands, wages and fees 
on the last day of the parliament, 5 June 1450.43  Like earlier experimental lay taxes, 
this subsidy seems to have represented a parliamentary attempt to comply with the 
government’s wartime financial needs through the granting of a tax which would 
yield less than a fifteenth and tenth.44  Significantly, however, the tax on lands, 
wages and fees was to be administered by four special war treasurers who would 
directly finance special expeditionary expenditure.45  Moreover, in the wake of 
Suffolk’s impeachment the Commons imposed a resumption upon the crown.46  In 
1450, then, parliament not only denounced the Suffolk regime’s un–constitutional 
use of lay tax revenue; it went further in institutionally imposing upon government 
both the constitutional expenditure of revenue from the special subsidy conceded 
                                                            
40 For a general account of the fall of Suffolk, see R. Virgoe, ‘The Death of William De La Pole, 
Duke of Suffolk’, Bulletin of the John Rylands Library, 47 (1965), pp. 489–502.  For the inter–
relationship between fiscal political concerns and the duke’s fall, see the following paragraph.  
41 This is a key theme of Chapter 6.2.1.  
42 PROME, parliament of November 1449, item 38.  
43 PROME, parliament of November 1449, item 12.  
44 For earlier late Lancastrian experimental direct taxes, see Chapters 3.2 and 4.2.  
45 Revenue from the special lay tax of 1450 was not recorded on the receipt rolls.  
46 PROME, parliament of November 1449, item 53; Wolffe, The Royal Demesne in English History, 
pp. 124–30.    
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during this assembly and a resumption, as a means of forcing the crown to ‘live of its 
own’ in the immediate future.  These developments marked a decisive parliamentary 
rejection of the fiscal policies which Suffolk’ government had pursued as a means of 
restoring a degree of stability to the public finances.  They ought to be viewed 
alongside the better–known parliamentary rejection of Suffolk’s vast retinue and its 
control over the localities in order to afford us a full insight into the breakdown of 
the Suffolk government.
The events of 1449–50 shaped the way in which both the government and the 
Commons viewed lay taxation throughout the 1450s.  The final years of Henry VI’s 
reign witnessed a move away from the government seeking lay taxation and credit as 
a means of financing ‘ordinary’ expenditure, towards the government’s attempted 
financing of a large proportion of total expenditure from revenues from resumed 
domainal lands, as parliament intended.47  In return, the Commons attempted to 
strengthen the regime’s ability to finance permanent costs without the need to make 
recourse to lay taxation or loans by imposing another resumption on the crown in 
1451.48  Impressed by the government’s apparent success in ‘living of its own’, the 
Commons granted the maltolt and tonnage and poundage to Henry VI for life, at 
increased rates, in 1453.49  The parliament of 1453 witnessed the regime of the Duke 
of Somerset plead the government’s ‘necessity’ as a means of securing the level of 
supply necessary to finance a proposed expedition to Gascony.50  The Commons’ 
grant of one and one half fifteenths and tenths, generous by the standards of the late 
1440s, reflected the spirit of parliamentary generosity mentioned above.  Indeed, it 
looks as though Somerset may have sought to revert to the old practice of siphoning 
lay tax revenue into ‘ordinary’ charges: parliament sanctioned, at the behest of the 
                                                            
47 This comment is vindicated by the examination of exchequer finance in Chapter 6.2.2.  
48 PROME, parliament of November 1450, item 17.  As Wolffe has illustrated, this resumption was 
characterised by a hardened attitude towards exemptions.  This suggests an increased level of political 
commitment to resumption on the part of the regime, which most likely illustrates the government’s 
acceptance of the new fiscal political situation discussed above: Wolffe, The Royal Demesne in 
English History, pp. 130–8.  
49 PROME, parliament of 1453, item 14 and  item 9.  The maltolt rate for denizens was increased by 
10s. to 43s. 4d.; for aliens the maltolt rate was almost doubled, to 100s.  Tonnage and poundage rates 
were unchanged.  It is worth pointing out that my examination of the enrolled customs accounts 
illustrates that the 10s. increase in denizen payments of the maltolt noted above was not enforced by 
the exchequer.  This ought to be viewed in the context of the discussion, in Chapter 6.2.2, of the fiscal 
and fiscal administrative problems which characterised exchequer finance during the early 1450s.  
50 The second aim of the parliament’s calling is stated by the chancellor to have been the need to 
provide for ‘ac defensione ejusdem exterius habendum’: PROME, parliament of 1453, item 1.  
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regime, that a proportion of lay tax revenue be expended upon the financing of the 
Calais garrison.51  What is interesting about this development, however, is that 
Somerset considered it important to have parliament’s public authorisation to 
employ lay tax revenue in this way.  This provides a clear illustration of how far the 
fiscal political situation had changed since the period of Suffolk’s regime.  Indeed, 
after Somerset’s death and the collapse of the king’s health in 1455, the government 
of Richard, Duke of York imposed a new resumption on parliament as a means of 
further enhancing domainal revenues.52  Rather than seek lay taxation, then, the 
government during the opening phase of the ‘Wars of the Roses’ had been reduced to 
attempting to increase ‘ordinary’ revenue as a means of making ends meet from the 
proceeds of the royal domain.  This can be said to represent the failure of the later 
medieval fiscal constitution to service the needs of the English ‘tax state’.53  
6.2 Abortive fiscal consolidation and the loss of exchequer credibility
What follows traces the impact which the changes in fiscal regime discussed in the 
preceding section had on exchequer finance.  It is split into two sections.  The first 
section focuses on the relative ability of the exchequer, through its management of 
the taxes discussed in Chapter 6.1, to restore fiscal order in response to the crisis of 
over-assignment detailed in Chapter 5.2.  An attempted re–construction of the annual 
average budget during the mid–to–late 1440s illustrates that the exchequer employed 
a large proportion of lay taxation in the financing of ‘ordinary’ charges as a means of 
compensating for the marked decline in loans which characterised this period.  This 
is viewed in the context of the exchequer’s continuing ability to impressively 
                                                            
51 See Chapter 6.2.2.  
52 PROME, parliament of 1455, item 47.  This resumption is less well understood than those of 1450 
and 1451.  The resumption petition of 1455 is framed as a petition of the Commons.  It seems, 
however, as though Richard, Duke of York, having taken control of the government after the first 
battle of St Albans, sought to enforce a resumption, amidst financial chaos after three years during 
which the exchequer had effectively broken down as a central fiscal administrative agency and 
become a fiscal tool in the political agenda of a dominant court clique (see Chapter 6.2.2 for a 
discussion of the fiscal and administrative problems at the exchequer in the early 1450s).  This would 
explain the apparently ‘strenuous efforts’ of the Yorkists to influence elections to the parliament of 
1455, since a parliament sympathetic to Richard, Duke of York would be more likely to consent the 
regime’s request that the Commons call for a resumption:  Wolffe, The Royal Demesne in English 
History, p. 138.  It is also worth pointing out that P. R. Cavill has shown that the 1485 act of 
resumption was drafted as a Commons’ petition, yet emanated from the crown: Cavill, The English
Parliaments of Henry VII, 1485–1504, pp. 47–8.  Cavill is surely correct to state that this practice had 
its origins in the Yorkist act of resumption of 1455.  
53 See also the final two paragraphs of this chapter and the conclusion.  
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manage the operative systems of lay and indirect taxation.  Serious limitations to 
these positive developments are subsequently traced.  The exchequer’s ability to 
raise large–scale credit declined dramatically during the late 1440s in light of serious 
economic and political difficulties.  Even more significantly, the exchequer’s use of 
an unprecedented level of lay taxation in the ‘ordinary’ financing of the regime 
failed to address the long–term debt problem drawn attention to in Chapter 5.2, and 
was politically unsustainable in the long–term.  The second section is centred on the 
financial and administrative context of the important fiscal political developments 
which we have seen characterised the period after 1450.  An attempted re–
construction of the annual average budget during the early 1450s illustrates that lay 
taxation played a markedly reduced role in financing ‘ordinary’ charges during this 
period.  Concomitantly, an examination of the exchequer’s administration of tax 
structures during the early 1450s illustrates a pronounced decline in the ability of 
government to efficiently manage tax revenue.  This is viewed in the context of the 
Somerset regime’s employment of public income, specifically enhanced domainal 
revenues, as a means of building up a political support base.  
6.2.1 1445–1450
The annual average budget during the period of Suffolk’s regime was characterised 
by radically reduced special expeditionary costs following the Truce of Tours.54  
Special expeditionary costs almost disappeared from the budget, standing at a 
negligible annual average of £1,217.55  The annual average sum spent on the 
financing of loans, meanwhile, dropped to only £11,208.  And the annual average 
sum expended on ‘ordinary’ charges and war debts to the Duke of York during this 
period stood at the much increased sum of £77,673.  Data presented in Appendix 
One, viewed in the context of published data relating to general income trends, 
allows us to reconstruct how these expenditure totals were financed.  Cash receipts 
                                                            
54 The following paragraph is based upon an examination of the material referenced in Appendix One, 
and E 403/755; E 403/757; E 403/759; E403/762; E 403/765; E 403/767; E 403/769; E 403/771; E 
403/773; E 403/775; E 403/777; E 403/779.  Material relating to parliamentary-controlled revenue 
tabulated in Appendix One has been viewed in the context of Steel’s data relating to total public 
revenue: Steel, Receipt, pp. 223–234.  
55 Strictly speaking, this annual average of £1,217 worth of expenditure does not represent special 
expeditionary expenditure as such, since it constitutes occasional payments made for the keeping of 
the seas.  I have felt it fitting to include this sum as special expeditionary expenditure, however, since 
these were short–term, naval costs related to the defence of the realm.  
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from lay taxation would have financed the £1,217 worth of annual average special 
expeditionary costs cited above.  And if we subtract the annual average sum total of 
assignments financing loans, £11,208,56 from the annual average sum total of 
assignments, £64,929, we are left with £53,721 worth of annual average assignments 
financing ‘ordinary’ charges and war debts to Richard, Duke of York.  This sum total 
of assignments included £3,830 worth of lay tax assignments.57   Alongside the 
£53,721 worth of assignments outlined above, £15,511 worth of cash receipts which 
consisted of £6,460 worth of lay tax revenue, £6,080 was indirect tax revenue and 
some £2,971 worth of non–tabulated ‘ordinary’ and clerical tax revenue, and the sum 
total of loan revenue – £10,284 – was available, on average per annum, to be 
employed in financing ‘ordinary’ charges and York’s debts.58  
Were it not for the £25,000 or so worth of available loans and cash revenue from lay 
taxation discussed in the previous paragraph, it would have been impossible for the 
exchequer to finance the level of ‘ordinary’ charges outlined above and attempt to 
bring the worsening debt problem discussed in Chapter Five under control.59  Yet 
since the exchequer was so highly dependent upon lay tax revenue in financing 
‘ordinary’ charges and thus attempting to reduce the debt burden, it was more 
important than ever before that the administration prove itself able to efficiently 
administer lay tax revenue.60  The exchequer was also placed under increased 
pressure to demonstrate its fiscal credibility owing to a worsening macro–economic 
climate and heightened political concerns with the late majority government.  This 
necessitated administrative efficiency in managing creditors and the skilful 
management of the quota system of lay taxation and the customs and subsidies, 
revenue from which continued to be employed in servicing the repayment of a large 
                                                            
56 This included £2,483 worth of abortive assignments.  See pp. 158–9 for a discussion of government 
debt to creditors.  
57 It needs to be mentioned that £21,615 worth of assignments financing ‘ordinary’ expenditure failed.  
This included £17,161 worth of indirect tax revenue, £6 worth of lay tax revenue and £4,448 worth of 
‘ordinary’ and clerical tax revenue.  For a discussion of government debt incurred in the financing of 
‘ordinary’ charges see pp. 168–71.  
58 This left the exchequer with an estimated annual average cash surplus of somewhere in between 
£1,000 and £2,000.    
59 This would inevitably have led to the incurring of some £15,000 worth of ‘fictitious loans’, since 
there were no alternative, free, revenue sources from which this level of expenditure could have been 
financed.  For the exchequer’s relative success in reducing debt during this period, see pp. 168–71.  
60 Since any decline in the ability of the exchequer to successfully administer lay taxation and 
speedily bring in high levels of lay tax revenue would directly, and negatively, impact upon the 
viability of this fiscal policy.  
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proportion of loans.  What follows addresses all of the above issues, beginning with 
a consideration of credit finance and moving on to an analysis of structures of lay 
and indirect taxation.  The section concludes by examining the exchequer’s 
management of government debt.  
Parliament underwrote a total of £200,000 of credit during the period in question.61  
The exchequer brought in £61,710 worth of loans between the years 1444–5 and 
1449–50.62  This represented 31% of the ceiling set by parliament.  We have seen 
that, as late as the early 1440s the exchequer had been able to raise 65% of the credit 
ceiling set by parliament.63  The mid–to–late 1440s thus witnessed a marked decline 
in the exchequer’s ability to raise loans.  In large part this reflected the disappearance 
from the scene of Cardinal Beaufort and the Feoffees of the Duchy of Lancaster, 
whose extensions of credit had inflated loan revenue during the 1430s and early 
1440s.64  In these circumstances, and despite the Corporations of London and the 
Staple continuing to regularly provide large loans, it was inevitable that the sum total 
of loans from large–scale creditors would fall sharply.  Thus, whilst in the late 1430s 
and early 1440s large–scale creditors had extended an annual average of £19,814, 
during the period in question this class of creditor extended an annual average of 
£8,948.65  The generosity of local communities in their extension of credit also 
dropped during this period.  During the early majority period we have seen that loans 
                                                            
61 For the fiscal political context, see Chapter 6.1.  What follows is based upon an examination of the 
material tabulated in Appendix One. 
62 We have already expressed this as an annual average figure: see the above annual average 
budgetary overview.
63 This had allowed the exchequer to bring in an annual average of £24,462 worth of loans during the 
early majority: see Chapter 5.2 for a detailed analysis.  
64 The enfeoffment of the Duchy of Lancaster had been wound up towards the end of the conciliar 
period of government as a means of financing the royal foundations (see above, Chapter 5.1), and 
Beaufort had retired from public life.  During the period in question, the cardinal only extended a sum 
total of £2,333 6s. 8d. in July 1445 and August 1446: Harriss, Beaufort, p. 406.  
65 An examination of the material tabulated in Appendix One illustrates that 64% of this sum (an 
annual average of £5,763) represents loans extended by the Corporations of London and the Staple.  It 
would seem that these creditors’ shouldering of such a large proportion of the diminishing level of 
credit at the close of the 1440s illustrates the extent to which the mercantile elite 1) had a vested 
interest in the crown’s solvency in terms of the exchequer’s ability to finance the Calais garrison (W. 
I. Haward, ‘Financial Transactions between the Lancastrian Government and the Merchants of the 
Staple from 1449 to 1461, in Studies in English Trade in the Fifteenth Century, pp. 293–320; E. B. 
Fryde & M. M. Fryde, ‘Public Credit, with Special Reference to North–Western Europe’, in The 
Cambridge Economic History of Europe, 3, Economic Organisation and Policies in the Middle Ages, 
p. 467), and 2) sought to express their gratitude to the government owing to its continued ‘bullionist’ 
monetary policy: see pp. 165–6 for a discussion of monetary policy.   
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from local communities raised through commissions into the shires stood at an 
annual average of £4,648.  During the mid–to–late 1440s this figure fell to £1,337.  
The exchequer’s inability to attract new large–scale creditors,66 or sustain even the 
low level of loans which the early majority regime had secured from local 
communities, did not reflect a decline in administrative competence.  In comparison 
with the exchequer’s miscalculation of indirect tax revenue during the late 1430s and 
early 1440s, which had led to an increased level of abortive assignments financing 
loans,67 the record of the exchequer in managing debt to creditors actually improved 
during the mid–to–late 1440s.68  The main burden of loan finance was transferred 
from indirect tax revenue to lay tax revenue.69  Thus, whilst in the late 1430s and 
early 1440s indirect taxation had, on average per annum, serviced the repayment of 
46% of and lay taxation had serviced the repayment of, on average per annum, 35% 
of loans, during the period covered by this chapter the annual average proportion of 
loans repaid from indirect taxation and lay taxation stood at 19% and 50% 
respectively.  These developments suggest that the exchequer recognised that its 
earlier hope that dwindling political commitment to ‘bullionist’ monetary policy 
would result in a marked improvement in indirect tax revenue was ill–conceived.70  
Moreover, the exchequer’s repayment of an increased proportion of loans from 
clerical tax revenue served to free as much lay tax revenue as possible so this could 
be employed in the financing of ‘ordinary’ expenditure.  The proportion of loans 
repaid from clerical tax revenue rose from an annual average of 15% during the early 
majority to 29% during the mid–to–late 1440s.  
The exchequer’s commitment to more effectively managing its creditors and 
demonstrating its fiscal credibility had a positive impact upon the level of 
                                                            
66 It is interesting to note that, after the re–enfeoffment of the Duchy of Lancaster in 1445, which we 
have seen served to finance the royal foundations, the new enfeoffment, in stark contrast to that of the 
minority, did not provide any loans.  This may have owed to the economic problems faced by 
landowners during the mid–century recession: see pp. 159–61.  
67 See Chapter 5.2 for a detailed discussion of credit finance during the early majority.    
68 The following discussion is based on an analysis of the material referenced in Appendix One.  
69 The remainder of this paragraph considers successful loan assignments.  For abortive loan 
assignments see the following paragraph.  
70 It may even be that the exchequer feared there would be a downturn in indirect tax revenue owing 
to the Suffolk government’s renewal of ‘bullionist’ monetary policy, and so acted accordingly, 
shifting the burden of loan assignments on to lay tax revenue (see pp. 166–8 for an analysis of the 
inter–related issues of gross indirect tax yields and monetary policy).  
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government debt to creditors.71    On average per annum, the level of ‘fictitious 
loans’ incurred in the financing of loans, expressed in terms of the sum total of 
‘fictitious loans’, fell from around 33% during the early majority to only 11% during 
the period covered by this chapter.72  And, whilst the level of ‘fictitious loans’ 
relating to previously aborted loan assignments during the early majority period had 
been allowed to rise; no such ‘endemic’ ‘fictitious loans’ were incurred during the 
mid-to-late 1440s.  To a certain extent the marked reduction in debt to creditors 
during this period merely reflected the decline in total loans towards the end of the 
1440s; at a time when the role of loan revenue in the budget declined markedly, it is 
relatively unsurprising that the exchequer found it easier to satisfy creditors.  In this 
context it is worth pointing out that the proportion of failed assignments financing 
loans from indirect tax revenue expressed vis–à–vis the sum total of failed 
assignments financing loans remained very high during the period covered by this 
chapter.  During the early majority period, 75% of ‘fictitious loans’ incurred in the 
financing of loans were against indirect tax revenue; during the mid–to–late 1440s 
the exchequer was only able to reduce this figure to 73%.73  Nevertheless, creditors 
were considerably more likely to have their loans repaid during the mid–to–late 
1440s than during the period of the early majority.  
In order to appreciate the exchequer’s declining ability to raise loans we must extend 
the above discussion of trends in central fiscal administration to include, 
respectively, a consideration of the economic and political dynamics of credit 
finance during the period in question.  The recession which we have seen had begun 
in earnest during early majority continued into the mid–to–late 1440s.74  Continued 
outbreaks of murrain and plague served to further push down market prices at a time 
when labourers’ wages remained high and rents were low.75    This meant that the 
                                                            
71 What follows derives from an examination of the material tabulated in Appendix One.  
72 On average per annum during the period in question, £2,483 worth of ‘fictitious loans’ represented 
aborted loan assignments.  
73 This reflects the decline in gross indirect tax yields during the mid–to–late 1440s (see p. 165 for a 
discussion).  As during the early period, a very large proportion of these ‘fictitious loans’ represented 
abortive assignments to large-scale creditors, particularly the Corporations of London and the Staple 
(on average per annum during the mid–to–late 1440s £2,093 worth of ‘fictitious loans’ represented 
aborted assignments financing the loans of this class of creditor: this constituted 84% of ‘fictitious 
loans’ incurred in the financing of loans).  
74 For the onset of the mid–century recession and its fiscal context during the early majority, see the 
discussion in Chapter 5.2.  
75 For these developments see the works cited in Chapter 5.2.  
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county elite were under a considerable degree of economic strain.  Merchant traders, 
in particular, suffered badly during this period owing to a sharp drop in the prices of 
commodities dependent upon the export trade.76  An examination of material from 
local loan commissions allows us to comment on the effect which this situation had 
upon local creditors’ willingness to lend to the crown.  In the commissions sent into 
the counties in 1446, local landowners in Nottinghamshire and Derbyshire cited low 
rents as the reason why they were unable to contribute.77  In these same two 
counties, merchants claimed that they were suffering from the burden of indirect tax 
payment;78 a clear indication that the marked fall in cloth and wool and cloth prices 
was seriously affecting traders’ economic position.   Shortages of money and grain 
were also cited as reasons why local landowners were unable to contribute in 
Herefordshire, Nottinghamshire and Derbyshire in 1446.79  The full scale of this 
problem is appreciated when one considers that, of the 32 counties to which loan 
commissions were sent in 1446, 17 failed to produce any loans.80  The loan 
commissions of 1449 were not quite so dismal a failure as those of 1446, yet there is 
reason to believe that this reflected pressure placed upon local communities to 
contribute credit in order to avoid being forced to serve in France rather than an 
increased willingness to provide loans.81  Returns remained disappointing.82  And 
with regard to the claim that £12,250 worth of loans was raised as part of the 1449 
                                                            
76 Lloyd, The Movement of Wool Prices in Medieval England, especially p. 26 and Table One.  Also, 
more generally, Farmer, Prices and Wages, 1350–1500’, pp. 444, 467, and for a discussion, J. 
Hatcher, ‘The Great Slump of the Mid–Fifteenth Century’, pp. 240–45.  
77 C 47/7/6(19).  The commissions in these two counties failed to bring in any loans.  Commissions in 
Warwickshire, Derbyshire, Cambridgeshire, Huntingdonshire, Lincolnshire, Nottinghamshire and 
Leicestershire also failed to yield any loans: C 47/7/6; Jurkowski, Smith & D. Crook, Lay Taxes, pp. 
99–100.    
78 The merchants complained at being oppressed through having to pay indirect taxation at Calais: C 
47/7/6(19).
79 C 47/7/6(15, 16); H. Kleineke, ‘The Commission De Mutuo Faciendo during the reign of Henry 
VI’, EHR, 116 (2001), p. 15.  
80 This point is made by Kleineke, ‘The Commission De Mutuo Faciendo during the reign of Henry 
VI’, p. 23.  
81 Thus, one John Newton esquire, provided £10 provided that ‘he go nat over with my lord of Suffolk 
or another chieftain in the king’s service: E 34/1B; Jurkowski, Smith & Crook, Lay Taxes, p. 102.  
82 Interestingly, the exchequer instructed the commissioners in Cornwall, Wiltshire, Somerset, Dorset 
and Devon to strike 40 tallies, inscribed with a sum total of £6,000, which it was expected they would 
raise: E 404/65/211.  On a national level, the commissions failed to bring in over four and a half 
thousand pounds.  Even in cases where small loans were provided, creditors were notably concerned 
about the exchequer’s ability to efficiently service their repayment.  Thus, the abbot of Keynsham, 
Somerset, agreed to provide a loan of 20 marks by 12 November 1449, provided that he receive 
‘sufficiant assignement’, which was agreeable to him, on that date: E 34/1B.  
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commissions,83 it needs to be pointed out that this conflates loans extended by large–
scale creditors with loans contracted in the shires.84  
Aside from purely economic considerations, this local evidence provides us with an 
insight into the Suffolk regime’s troubled relationship with local political 
communities.  In 1444 Suffolk had re–imposed the Bullion and Partition Ordinances 
which we have seen had been repealed during the early majority.85  As merchants 
would surely have been aware, this directly contributed towards worse trading 
conditions.  This would explain the merchants’ complaints in 1446, noted above.86  
The commissions of 1446 also illustrate a feeling amongst that the county elite that it 
ought not to have to contribute loans on top of the lay taxation granted in 1445 and 
1446.87  This development needs to be viewed in light of the high level of political 
tension which we have seen characterised the granting of these taxes.88  Though it 
would be a mistake to attempt to draw definite conclusions from this material, it 
seems as though emergent tensions between the exchequer and the localities on the 
issue of loans reflected the broader political breakdown which we have noted 
characterised relations between Suffolk and the local polity in the mid–to–late 
1440s.89  Moreover, it is significant that in the aftermath of the failure of the first 
commissions despatched into the localities in 1446, the exchequer attempted to 
placate and incentivise local communities to provide loans by instructing 
commissioners to negotiate with potential creditors on the basis of the taxes granted 
at the parliament of 1446.  Interestingly, this did not affect returns in 
Nottinghamshire and Derbyshire, which remained nil,90 yet in Yorkshire a number of 
indentures between commissioners and creditors survive.91  This perhaps reflects a 
geo–political difference between the north of the country, in which Suffolk and the 
court’s political influence was less extensive and developed, and midlands and south, 
                                                            
83 Jurkowski, Smith & D. Crook, Lay Taxes, pp. 101–2; Griffiths, The Reign of Henry VI, p. 391.   
84 I have come to this conclusion based upon an examination of the material referenced in Appendix 
One.  
85 See also pp. 165–7.  
86 See footnote 78.  
87 This was a particular concern in Nottinghamshire and Derbyshire: C 47/7/6(19); Kleineke, ‘The 
Commission De Mutuo Faciendo during the reign of Henry VI’, p. 15.  
88 See Chapter 6.1.  
89 See the discussion in Chapter 6.1 of the political context of Suffolk’s rule.
90 See footnote 87.  
91 Interestingly, two lenders specified that they be repaid by assignment from fifteenth and tenth 
revenue at Scarborough as a condition of their provision of loans: E 34/1B. 
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where Suffolk’s affinity was in the process of seriously disrupting existing political 
relationships.92  
The above discussion illustrates that, during the mid–to–late 1440s, the exchequer’s 
relative success in securing credit was not determined, first and foremost, by its 
ability to demonstrate administrative competence in managing loan assignments.  
The fiscal credibility of the exchequer vis–à–vis its creditors had become tied up 
with broader questions relating to the economic prospects of the elite and the 
political standing of the Suffolk regime, which it was beyond the exchequer’s 
capabilities to effectively control.  This situation placed a great deal of pressure on 
the exchequer to efficiently manage lay taxation and the customs and subsidies, since 
revenue from these sources would have to be made to compensate, in large part, for 
the declining role played by loan revenue in the financing of ‘ordinary’ charges.  
Furthermore, any decline in the exchequer’s relative ability to administer revenue 
from lay taxation and indirect taxation would threaten to undermine the exchequer’s 
efficient financing of loans discussed above, and thus risk alienating potential 
creditors yet further.  The figures presented in Appendix Two illustrate that gross 
fifteenth and tenth revenue fell from an average of £33,186 for the three and a half 
fifteenths and tenths granted during the early years of the majority, to an average of 
£31,153 for the three fifteenths and tenths granted during the period covered by this 
section.  The difference between these two sums reflects the £2,000 reduction in the 
value of the national fifteenth and tenth quota enforced by parliament in 1446.93  It 
could be pointed out that the £31,153 cited above is £33 less than it ought to have 
been, signifying a marginally larger quota reduction than that imposed by 
parliament.  Yet this hardly marked a serious decline in fiscal administrative 
competence.  The mid–to–late 1440s did, however, witness a rather more serious 
decline in the relative ability of the exchequer to bring in as high a proportion of 
gross revenue to the exchequer as possible.94  Whilst, during the early years of the 
majority, the average net yield of a fifteenth and tenth was £1,328 less than the 
average gross yield of this tax, during the mid–to–late 1440s the amount which did 
                                                            
92 See Chapter 6.1.
93 See Chapter, 6.1.  
94 The following figures derive from an examination of the enrolled account, referenced in Appendix 
Two.  
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not find its way to the exchequer almost doubled, averaging £2,013 for the three 
fifteenths and tenths granted during these years.  
This latter development reflects increasing tensions in the local administration of lay 
taxation.  We have already noted that gentry discontent regarding fifteenth and tenth 
payment can be inferred from the loan commissions of 1446.  Material relating to the 
local administration of fifteenths and tenths during the mid–to–late 1440s allows us 
to build upon this analysis.  A royal writ included in a local assessment relating to 
the county of Lancashire for the one and one half fifteenths and tenths of 1446 
authorised the sheriff to arrest two tax collectors and distrain their goods and lands.95  
The sheriff responded by stating that the collectors were not present in his bailiwick, 
although he distrained and seized all of their lands and tenements.  This case seems 
to illustrate a striking decline in either the willingness, or the ability, of local officials 
to collect lay taxation.  It ought to be viewed in the context of other cases drawn 
from the local tax material which suggest local tensions regarding the payment of lay 
taxation.  Regarding the one and a half fifteenths and tenths of 1446, a writ of 
abatement survives which orders the deputy sheriff of Worcestershire to delay the 
collection of the city of Worcester’s lay tax quota.96  Clearly, the administrators of 
the subsidy in Worcester felt that they needed more time to contribute the city’s 
quota.  In relation to the half fifteenth and tenth of 1445, a writ survives amongst the 
Essex assessment material ordering that lands pertaining to Syon Abbey, Essex, be 
exempt from payment of this tax.97  This would suggest that local landowners had 
begun to lobby the exchequer for exemptions.  In this context, it may be significant 
that the enrolled account for the fifteenth and tenth of 1449 notes that the lands and 
goods of Eton College and King’s College, Cambridge in six counties were exempt 
                                                            
95 E 179/130/68, rot. 14.  It is not clear why the government sought to take action against Lancashire 
tax collectors in relation to the administration of the lay taxes of 1446.  It may be that the Lancashire 
collectors stood accused of under–assessing either themselves or their associates, or that they were 
believed to have demonstrated a lack of commitment, or even to have refused, to undertake their 
duties.  To a certain extent, however, details such as these are immaterial; what is significant is that, 
from this evidence we can discern that a breakdown, or near breakdown, in local fiscal administration 




from contributing to this tax.98  This implies that the foundations’ demand for 
exemptions pre–dated the early 1450s.  
In all the cases discussed in the previous paragraph, we can discern a clear desire, on 
the part of the local elite, for fiscal privilege; either through being giving more time 
to pay their tax bills, or through being taken out of tax payment.99  Perhaps even 
more significantly, in all these cases the exchequer capitulated to local landowners’ 
demands.  This opened the door to large–scale exemptions and administrative delays 
in the collections of the last fifteenth and tenth grants of the reign, in 1453.100  Yet, 
as far as the exchequer was concerned, in the short–term these were necessary 
concessions.  By making a concerted effort to address local fiscal administrative 
demands, the exchequer may well have staved off a widespread fiscal administrative 
breakdown – along the lines, perhaps, of what seems to have occurred in 
                                                            
98 Norfolk (Eton College property to the sum of £36 10s. 10d.); Suffolk (King’s College, Cambridge 
property to the sum of £11 7s. 8d.); Oxfordshire (Eton College property to the sum of £6 10s.); Dorset 
(King’s College, Cambridge property to the sum of  £2 12s. 8d.); Devon (Eton College property to the 
sum of £2 12s.); Holland, Lincs (King’s College, Cambridge property to the sum of £13 3s. 4d.): E 
359/31, rots. 27–29.  No local material seems to have survived relating to the implementation of the 
royal foundations’ exemptions in relation to the fifteenth and tenth of 1449, however.  This stands in 
contrast to the situation in 1453, when a large level of local documentation regarding the royal 
foundations’ exemptions survives regarding the last lay tax grant of the reign.  
99 It is significant that all the cases discussed above – particularly the striking Lancashire example –
emanated not from popular insurrection but rather from problems within the ranks of the local elite.  
This needs to be viewed in the context of the discussion in Chapter 5.2 of the changing dynamics of 
lay tax payment in the localities as the fifteenth century progressed.  Labourers and peasants who 
appear to have been shouldering an increasing burden of lay tax payment had little reason to complain 
about this development since their material wealth was increasing during this period.  Landowners, 
who suffered as a result of the structural economic changes of the mid–century period, however, 
either found it increasingly difficult to pay tax, simply did not want to pay as much tax, or perhaps a 
combination of both.  As the recession of the early majority dealt a further blow to the county elite, it 
looks as though at least some landowners began to attempt to defraud the exchequer through illegally 
lowering their tax quotas.  The isolated, though very interesting, case of St John’s hospital, Oxford 
has been discussed in this context (see Chapter 5.2).  It would seem that the Lancashire case outlined 
above stands in this tradition, though the punitive action taken against the Lancashire collectors 
suggests that they stood accused of something rather more serious than revising a local tax quota.  
This would make sense since, as we have seen with regard to credit finance, an increased level of 
local elite disengagement with the exchequer is consonant with the economic and political climate of 
the mid–to–late 1440s.  This discussion seems to vindicate W. M. Ormrod’s recent suggestion that a 
detailed examination of the fifteenth and tenth material of the early–to–mid fifteenth century period 
may bring to light significant changes in local cultures and practices of tax payment, and that this may 
have serious implications on our understanding of the financial – and broader political – history of the 
period (this is a key theme of Ormrod, ‘Poverty and Privilege: The Fiscal Burden in England (XIIIth–
XVth Centuries)’).  
100 See Chapter 6.2.2.  
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Lancashire.101  This enabled the exchequer to bring in lay tax revenue remarkably 
efficiently, notwithstanding the decline in the proportion of gross revenue received 
and the local tensions noted above.  This is particularly true of the exchequer’s 
receipt of revenue from the half fifteenth and tenth of 1445.  Almost all net revenue 
from this tax was brought into the exchequer during the Easter term of 1445.  Yet the 
sole collection of this subsidy was not scheduled until the Michaelmas term of 1445.  
In the context of the local problems discussed above, it is not surprising that it took 
an increased amount of time for the exchequer to receive revenue from the subsidies 
of 1446 and 1449.  Nevertheless, with regard to both of these taxes, the exchequer 
continued to bring in a much reduced proportion of net revenue prior to the date of 
the first official collection.  Regarding the one and one half fifteenths and tenths of 
1446, 3% of net revenue was received during the Easter term of 1446.  The first 
official collection of this tax was not scheduled until the Michaelmas term of 1446–
7.  And regarding the fifteenth and tenth of 1449, 13% of net revenue was received 
during the Easter term of 1449.  The first official collection of this tax was not 
scheduled until the Michaelmas term of 1449–50.  Moreover, a large proportion of 
the revenue from both of these taxes was received by the exchequer more or less 
when it should have been, according to the terms of the grant.  
We must now assess the extent to which the exchequer’s purposeful management of 
local fifteenth and tenth administration was complemented by its skilful 
administration of indirect taxation.  Appendix Three charts gross revenue, per 
annum, from the maltolt, tonnage and poundage, the wool and cloth customs and the 
combined customs and subsidies.  It demonstrates that the annual average sum total 
of indirect taxation had fallen from £30,918 during the early years of the majority to 
£28,630 during the period in question.  This reflects the Suffolk regime’s re–
imposition of the Bullion and Partition Ordinances from 1444.102  Why Suffolk and 
                                                            
101 What follows views the net yield for the fifteenths and tenths tabulated in Appendix Two, vis–à–
vis fifteenth and tenth revenue as it was processed by the exchequer, on a term by term basis 
(tabulated in Appendix One).  
102 On 8 February, 1444, the government ratified and re–confirmed the Staplers’ ‘franchises, 
Ordinances and liberties as were in force before this present time’ (i.e., before the revoking of the 
Bullion and Partition Ordinances discussed in Chapter 5.2).  This change was justified in terms of a 
‘great deterioration’ in wool prices which, ironically, was blamed upon a relaxation of proto–
mercantilist monetary protectionism.  Hamo Sutton and his associates were protected against possible 
charges of illegality, regarding the contravening of earlier ‘anti–bullionist’ legislation, by the 
government’s empowering of them to enforce the restored Ordinances, ‘notwithstanding any other 
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his associates would resurrect such a fiscally damaging protectionist, proto–
mercantilist monetary policy, especially in light of the upsurge in customs and 
subsidies revenue which had characterised the period following the overturning of 
the Ordinances during the early years of the majority, has not been addressed by 
historians.103  There is, in fact, a logical explanation for this development.  Around 
1444 Hamo Sutton, a prominent merchant capitalist and long–time advocate of the 
Bullion and Partition Ordinances, seized control of the Staple administration from 
the consortium of lesser merchants opposed to ‘bullionist’ monetary policy which 
had governed the Staple during the early 1440s.104  In these circumstances, it seems 
very likely that the Staple’s continued provision of loans was dependent upon 
Suffolk’s instigation of a u–turn in monetary policy, since Sutton and his colleagues 
benefited from lesser merchants and aliens being pushed out of the export trade in 
wool.  At a time when a much increased proportion of credit was derived from Staple 
loans owing to the general contraction in credit discussed above, it was vital for the 
government to placate the Staple.105  It follows that, on balance, Suffolk would rather 
maintain the financial support of the Staple and contribute to a worsening crisis in 
the export trade than lose the Staple’s loans and hope that the minor upturn in 
indirect tax revenue which had characterised the early majority would continue, 
which was far from certain.106  As in the case of lay taxation, then, so in that of 
                                                                                                                                                                           
statutes…ordinances….made to the contrary’: C 76/126 m. 13; Munro, Wool, Cloth and Gold, p. 128.  
Perhaps the most interesting aspect of this renewal of monetary protectionism is the Commons’ 
opposition to it.  As we have seen in Chapter 4.1, during the initial promulgation of ‘bullionist’ 
monetary policy in the late 1420s the Commons had played a key role in lobbying for ‘bullionist’ 
measures.  At the parliament of 1445, however, a Commons petition contended that a faction of 
merchants had illegally brought outsiders into the Staple and used their votes to elect officials who 
would promote that faction’s interests: PROME, parliament of 1445, item 29.  This suggests that 
‘bullionism’ was no longer the popular policy it had been, and provides us with an insight into the 
negative political and fiscal context of the Suffolk regime’s adherence to this policy. 
103 Despite confusingly citing the evidence discussed in footnote 102, Eileen Power did not even 
recognise that there was a significant change in monetary policy during the mid–to–late 1440s: 
Power, ‘The Wool Trade’, p. 89.  Munro discusses this evidence in detail, and recognises a significant 
shift towards renewed ‘bullionism’ during the period in question, yet, perhaps owing to his focus on 
monetary dynamics, does not investigate the fiscal context.  For this reason, on reading Munro’s 
account, one is left knowing a great deal more about the economics of ‘bullionist’ policy during the 
late 1440s, but somewhat puzzled as to why ‘bullionist’ monetary policy was renewed from 1444: 
Munro, Wool, Cloth and Gold, Chapter 5, especially pp. 127–132.  
104 The evidence regarding Sutton’s ascendancy is discussed in detail by Munro, Wool, Cloth and 
Gold, p. 127.  
105 For the increasing fiscal importance of the Corporation of the Staple’s loans, see the discussion 
provided on p. 157, especially footnote 65.   
106 Indeed, it seems that certain aspects of the decline in trade which characterised this period may 
have been unrelated to the ‘bullionist’ monetary policy.  See, for example, W. R. Childs’ discussion 
of problems in Anglo–Portuguese trade during this period: W. R. Childs, ‘Anglo–Portuguese Trade in 
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indirect taxation: the exchequer was charged with maximising revenue 
notwithstanding a stagnating economy.  It was remarkably successful in this respect.  
What follows discusses three key aspects of the exchequer’s skilful oversight of 
customs and subsidies’ revenue.  
Firstly, existing collectors of the customs were dismissed and new appointments 
were made for every port with the exception of Bristol.107  Coinciding with the 
appointment of Treasurer Lumley, this had the combined effect of re–affirming the 
exchequer’s control over the customs establishment and invalidating all tallies issued
in the names of former customs collectors, which amounted to a stop on all 
assignments as the exchequer prepared to pump a higher level of revenue into 
‘ordinary’ charges.108  Secondly, the level of exemptions which the exchequer 
permitted with regard to the taxation of wool and general merchandise was closely 
monitored.  Based upon an investigation of the material referenced in Appendix 
Three, I estimate that the annual average value of exemptions from tonnage rose 
from £121 during the early majority to £534 during the mid-to-late 1440s.  Similarly, 
whilst we have seen the early majority government lost a negligible amount of 
annual average revenue through exemptions from poundage, around £45 worth of 
poundage revenue was lost, on average per annum, during the period in question 
through exemptions.  Yet the annual average value of exemptions from maltolt
revenue, which had risen to a striking £3,779 during the early majority, shrank by 
76% to £905 during the mid-to-late 1440s.  This meant that the overall value of 
exemptions from indirect taxation fell by 62%, from £3,900 during the early majority 
to £1,484 during the period in question.  Thirdly, and most impressively, the annual 
average sum total of indirect tax revenue brought by the exchequer – £30,395 –
which is derived from the receipt roll material referenced in Appendix One, 
constituted over 100% of the annual average gross yield of indirect taxation –
                                                                                                                                                                           
the Fifteenth Century’, TRHS, 6th series, 2 (1992), pp. 195–219, and Lloyd’s discussion of a 
breakdown in Anglo-Hanseatic trade: Lloyd, England and the German Hanse, 1157–1611, especially 
Chapters 3 and 4.  
107 CFR, 1445–52, pp. 51, 53, 55; this material is also discussed by Harriss, in the context of Lumley’s 
prioritisation of current ‘ordinary’ expenditure: Harriss, ‘Marmaduke Lumley and the Exchequer 
Crisis’, p. 153.  The reform was instigated in December 1446.  
108 Harriss provides a detailed examination of warrants for issues during the period in question: 
Harriss, ‘Marmaduke Lumley and the Exchequer Crisis’.  
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£28,630 – which is derived from the material referenced in Appendix Three.109  
These three marks of exchequer efficiency in the administration of indirect taxation 
complement each other and, taken together, constitute a concerted programme of 
revenue maximisation which mirrors the exchequer’s handling of the fifteenth and 
tenth quota system analysed above. 
The foregoing discussion has illustrated that exchequer finance during the mid–to–
late 1440s was characterised by the administration’s efficient management both of 
lay taxation and indirect taxation as a means of maximising revenue from these 
sources so that the annual average budget outlined at the beginning of this section 
could be financed.  These developments need to be viewed in the context of an 
examination of the exchequer’s management of government debt during the mid–to–
late 1440s.  We have seen that the fiscal crisis of the early–to–mid 1440s was 
characterised by a sharp and unsustainable increase in the sum total of ‘fictitious 
loans’, which constituted an annual average of 39% of total assignments by the close 
of the early majority period.  Two thirds of this much increased sum total of 
‘fictitious loans’ was incurred in the financing of ‘ordinary’ charges and the wages 
of the Duke of York.  Moreover, around half of the sum total of ‘fictitious loans’ 
incurred in the financing of ‘ordinary’ charges constituted previously aborted 
assignments.110  The first three exchequer years of the period with which this chapter 
is concerned consideration, 1444–7, witnessed the level of government debt continue 
to rise.  ‘Fictitious loans’ constituted 42% of total assignments during this period and 
I estimate that around three quarters of an increased level of ‘ordinary’ assignments 
constituted previously aborted ‘ordinary’ assignments.111  These developments 
                                                            
109 This very striking demonstration of the exchequer’s administrative efficiency can only be 
explained by the exchequer’s bringing in of outstanding indirect tax sums from previous exchequer 
years alongside unprecedented efficiency in the management of current gross indirect tax revenue.  
110 What follows is based upon an examination of total ‘fictitious loans’ expressed vis–à–vis total 
assignments, derived from Steel, Receipt, pp. 223–234.  
111 I follow the same method as that employed in Chapter 5.2 in order to arrive at this conclusion.  
Briefly, in the absence of a detailed examination of trends in ‘ordinary’ and clerical tax revenue we 
cannot speak with any certainty regarding whether the charges financed by these sources were first 
time assignments (i.e., current charges) or previously aborted assignments which had been re–
assigned.  Thus, irrelevant of the level of ‘fictitious loans’ relating to previously aborted ‘ordinary’ 
assignments from material tabulated in Appendix One, I take the level of ‘fictitious loans’ relating to 
previously aborted ‘ordinary’ assignments from non–tabulated revenue to be half of the total of non–
tabulated ‘fictitious loans’.  The annual average sum total of ‘fictitious loans’ incurred in the 
financing of ‘ordinary’ charges from ‘ordinary’ revenue and clerical taxation during the period 1444–
7 is £4,829 (this figure has been arrived at by subtracting the annual average sum total of ‘fictitious 
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required the exchequer’s future commitment to finance an increased level of 
previously aborted assignments, which made it impossible for the administration to 
prioritise current charges and thus prevent a continuing build–up of debt.  In order 
for this situation to be reversed, a stop needed to be placed on all assignments so that 
the exchequer could prioritise current ‘ordinary’ assignments.  We have already 
noted that the exchequer’s appointment of new customs collectors at the close of 
1446 represented just such a move.112  During the period 1447–50, the exchequer
postponed the re–assignment of a large proportion of previously aborted assignments 
to ‘ordinary’ charges as a means of placing current ordinary’ expenditure on a 
sounder footing.  This is reflected in the sharp decrease in the proportion of 
‘fictitious loans’ vis–à–vis total assignments, which more than halved in comparison 
with the previous three exchequer years, falling to 18%.113  
                                                                                                                                                                           
loans’ incurred in the financing of loans, and the annual average sum total of ‘fictitious loans’ 
incurred in the financing of ‘ordinary’ charges from revenue tabulated in Table Two, from the annual 
average sum total of ‘fictitious loans’ derived from Steel: Receipt, pp. 223–234).  This leaves us with 
an estimated annual average of £2,415 worth of ‘fictitious loans’ incurred in the financing of 
previously aborted assignments financing ‘ordinary’ charges from ‘ordinary’ and clerical tax revenue 
during the period 1444–7.  On average per annum during the period 1444–7, £21,535 worth of 
tabulated ‘fictitious loans’ incurred in the financing of ‘ordinary’ charges from tabulated tax revenue 
(Table One) constituted previously aborted assignments.  Thus, on average per annum during the 
period 1444–7, an estimated sum total of £23,950 worth of assignments financing ‘ordinary’ charges 
constituted previously abortive assignments.  This figure represents 73% of the annual average sum 
total of ‘fictitious loans’ incurred in the financing of ‘ordinary’ charges (£32,796).  It is worth 
pointing out that, since the level of ‘fictitious loans’ incurred in the financing of previously aborted 
assignments financing ‘ordinary’ charges from tabulated tax revenue is so much higher than 50%, it is 
likely that the level of ‘fictitious loans’ incurred in the financing of previously aborted assignments 
financing ‘ordinary’ charges from ‘ordinary’ and clerical tax revenue is much higher than 50% during 
the period in question.  This would leave us with a higher sum total of ‘fictitious loans’ incurred in the 
financing of previously aborted ‘ordinary’ charges than that noted above (73%).  In the absence of a 
detailed examination of trends in ‘ordinary’ and clerical tax revenue, however, this must remain 
conjecture.  
112 See footnotes 107 and 108.   
113 Significantly, I estimate that the proportion of ‘fictitious loans’ incurred in the financing of 
previously aborted ‘ordinary’ assignments fell to 11% of the sum total of ‘fictitious loans’ incurred in 
the financing of ‘ordinary’ charges.  If we take the level of ‘fictitious loans’ relating to previously 
aborted assignments financing ‘ordinary’ charges from non–tabulated revenue to be half of the total of 
non–tabulated ‘fictitious loans’, we arrive at an estimated annual average sum total of £208 worth of 
‘fictitious loans’ incurred in the financing of previously aborted ‘fictitious loans’ during the period 
1447–50.  If this is added on to the annual average sum total of ‘fictitious loans’ incurred in the 
financing of previously aborted assignments financing ‘ordinary’ charges during the period 1447–50 
from tabulated tax revenue – £910 – we arrive at an estimated annual average sum total of ‘fictitious 
loans’ incurred in the financing of previously aborted assignments financing ‘ordinary’ expenditure 
from both tabulated and non-tabulated revenue: £1,118.  This constitutes 20% of the annual average 
sum total of ‘fictitious loans’ incurred in the financing of ‘ordinary’ charges (£5,468).  This represents 
a 53% fall in the proportion of ‘fictitious loans’ incurred in the financing of previously aborted 
assignments financing ‘ordinary’ charges in comparison with the period 1444–7 (see footnote 111).  
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In noting the successes of this policy of debt management, we must also draw 
attention to its serious limitations.  The long–term accumulation of debts to 
‘ordinary’ charges, which we have seen had brought about a fiscal crisis by the mid–
1440s, could at best be delayed; the financing of these debts could not be written off.  
It is interesting to speculate whether, had economic and political factors not 
conspired to strip the exchequer of its fiscal credibility in the eyes of creditors, and 
the level of credit during the mid–to–late 1440s had remained similar to that of the 
early majority period, the exchequer would have been able to begin paying down the 
large backlog of debts to ‘ordinary’ charges.  We will, of course, never know the 
answer to this question.  All we can say is that, in light of the collapse of credit 
which characterised this period, fiscal consolidation became ever more dependent 
upon lay tax revenue, and focused exclusively on stabilising current ‘ordinary’ 
expenditure.  It is also necessary for us to stress that either the re–opening of war, 
which would require lay tax revenue to be diverted to the financing of a much higher 
level of special expeditionary expenditure, or the development of a political crisis 
regarding the exchequer’s increased use of lay tax revenue in ‘ordinary’ finance, 
would imperil the exchequer’s achievement of relative stability in the financing of 
current ‘ordinary’ expenditure.  
As we have seen, both of these scenarios occurred during the exchequer year 1449–
50.114  It was decided that an expeditionary force needed to be despatched to France, 
and though no force was ever despatched, its planning was enough to derail the 
exchequer’s rigid prioritisation of current ‘ordinary’ expenditure.  Recognising the 
hopelessness of the situation, Treasurer Lumley resigned from office.115  To make 
matters worse, at the parliament of November 1449 Suffolk was accused of un–
constitutionally utilising lay tax revenue.116  As we have seen, this signalled the end 
of the late Lancastrian government’s long–term reliance on increased levels of lay 
taxation and credit in ‘ordinary’ finance.  The breakdown of the exchequer’s policy 
of the mid–to–late 1440s amidst growing fiscal and political strains coincided with a 
                                                            
114 What follows builds upon the discussion of the fiscal political context of renewed ‘extraordinary’ 
expenditure, provided by Chapter 6.1.  
115 Harriss, ‘Marmaduke Lumley and the Exchequer Crisis’, p. 169.  
116 See Chapter 6.1, footnote 42.  This was hardly a fair charge: as we have seen, the exchequer had 
been forced to rely on loans in the financing of ‘ordinary’ charges since the 1430s (though it is 
undeniable that a much greater level of lay tax revenue was being employed to finance ‘ordinary’ 
charges during the mid–to–late 1440s than during the early majority period).  
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politicisation of government debt.  As we have seen, the regime declared an 
unprecedented royal debt of £372,000 at the parliament of November 1449, in the
hope that this would result in the granting of new fifteenths and tenths which would 
allow the exchequer to attempt to resurrect the fiscal strategy of the late 1440s.117  
The Commons’ alternative response of imposing a resumption on the crown re–
iterates the fiscal and political collapse of the financial strategy which had 
characterised the period prior to 1450s.  This heralded the beginning of a new era in 
the history of the late Lancastrian exchequer.  Resumption forced the exchequer to 
function within a new fiscal framework centred on domainal revenue supplemented 
by the customs and subsidies, to which we must now turn.  
6.2.2 1450–1453
There were two distinct phases in the fiscal history of this early 1450s.118  The first, 
during the period 1450–2, was characterised by a concerted effort, on the part of the 
exchequer, to function within the fiscal straightjacket imposed by parliament in 
1450–1.119  This period witnessed a significant rise in special expeditionary 
expenditure, which constituted an annual average of £13,392 during this two year 
period.  The annual average sum expended on financing loans dropped to £3,384.  
Annual average ‘ordinary’ expenditure, meanwhile, fell very sharply, to £40,007.  
Data presented in Appendix One, viewed in the context of published data relating to 
general income trends, provides us with a means of analysing how these expenditure 
totals were financed.  During this period an annual average of £9,940 worth of loans 
was received by the exchequer.  On average per annum, then, the exchequer would 
have had to supplement this sum with £3,452 worth of cash revenue from the 
customs and subsidies, in order to finance the sum total of special expeditionary 
expenditure outlined above.  Excluding the tabulated revenue discussed above which 
was employed, on average per annum, by the exchequer in the financing of loans and 
special expeditionary expenditure, the exchequer was left with an annual average of 
                                                            
117 For what follows see Chapter 6.1.  
118 The following section owes a great deal to the unpublished doctoral thesis of W. Smith, ‘Royal 
Finance and Politics in England, 1450–55’ (University of Manchester PhD thesis, 1998).  My 
budgetary estimates and work on tax structures has been viewed in light of Smith’s detailed research 
on the Somerset regime’s fiscal preference of political supporters at the exchequer.  
119 What follows is based upon an examination of the material referenced in Appendix One, and E 
403/782; E 403/785; E 403/786; E 403/788.  For termly totals of revenue from cash, assignments and 
loans, see Steel, Receipt, pp. 235–39.  
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£5,221 worth of tabulated cash revenue, almost all of which derived from the 
customs and subsidies, and £6,480 worth of assignments from tabulated revenue 
sources, principally indirect taxation, to finance ‘ordinary’ expenditure.120  These 
sums were supplemented by some £16,051 worth of assignments from ‘ordinary’ 
revenue,121 £4,027 worth of assignments from clerical taxation, £5,487 worth of cash 
receipts from ‘ordinary’ revenue, £1,106 worth of cash receipts from clerical 
taxation, and £2,425 worth of cash gifts to finance the ‘ordinary’ budget outlined 
above.
The statistics presented in the previous paragraph illustrate the profound impact 
which the resumptions of 1450 and 1451 had upon the ‘ordinary’ financing of the 
regime.122  The £21,538 worth of ‘ordinary’ revenue discussed above – or £19,996 if 
abortive assignments from this revenue source are excluded – financed around half 
of total ‘ordinary’ expenditure.  It has been estimated that, during the 1440s, less 
than £10,000 worth of ‘ordinary’ revenue was free to be employed in the financing 
of ‘ordinary’ charges.123  And whilst, during the mid–to–late 1440s, lay taxation and 
credit had financed one third of ‘ordinary’ expenditure, during the first two years of 
the 1450s revenue from these sources almost ceased to play any role whatsoever in 
the financing of ‘ordinary’ charges.  These developments had broader political and 
fiscal implications.  Politically, they helped to pave the way for parliament’s 
relatively generous grants of 1453, discussed in Chapter 6.1.  Fiscally, they played a 
small role in strengthening the exchequer’s credibility vis–à–vis its creditors.124  
During the period in question, annual average loans stood at £9,940, all from large–
scale creditors, specifically the Corporations of the Staple and London.  We have 
                                                            
120 It needs to be noted that £1,636 worth of these tabulated assignments failed and begot ‘fictitious 
loans’.  
121 What follows is based upon a detailed examination of ‘ordinary’ revenue and clerical tax revenue, 
which has been deemed necessary as a means of gauging the effect of the resumptions upon the 
exchequer’s ‘ordinary’ financial position.  It needs to be noted that £1,542 worth of assignments 
financing ‘ordinary’ expenditure from ‘ordinary’ revenue failed during this period and begot 
‘fictitious loans’, as did £3,136 worth of assignments against clerical taxation.  For a discussion of 
government debt during the early 1450s, see Chapter 6.2.2.  A cash balance of between £500 and 
£1,000 would have been left over.  
122 This discussion provides us with an understanding of the broader fiscal context of the resumptions 
of 1450 and 1451 discussed by Wolffe, The Royal Demesne in English History, Chapter 5.  
123 Harriss, ‘Marmaduke Lumley and the Exchequer Crisis’, p. 145.  Clearly, it is not possible to 
provide a more exact comparison between the role played by ‘ordinary’ revenue in the royal budget 
during the period in question and earlier periods owing to the absence of a thorough investigation of 
trends in ‘ordinary’ revenue during the 1420s, 1430s and 1440s.  
124 What follows is based upon an examination of the material referenced in Appendix One.  
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seen that annual average loans from similar large–scale creditors during the mid–to–
late 1440s had been just under £1,000 less than this sum.  It therefore seems 
reasonable to suggest that a belief, on the part of large–scale creditors, that the 
efficient financing of their loans was less likely to be compromised by the 
exchequer’s utilisation of parliamentary–controlled revenue, specifically lay tax 
revenue, in the financing of ‘ordinary’ expenditure, affected a modest increase in 
loans from such creditors.  The impact which this development had on exchequer 
finance, however, was slim since no loan commissions were despatched into the 
shires during the period in question, meaning that loan revenue from local creditors 
was nil.  Thus, the annual average sum total of loans during the first two years of the 
1450s was actually marginally lower than during the mid–to–late 1440s, 
notwithstanding the apparently improved standing of the exchequer in the eyes of 
large–scale creditors.125  
In spite of the points raised in the previous paragraph, the realities of government 
rendered a new focus on ‘ordinary’ revenue in exchequer finance untenable in the 
long–run.126  The quite substantial increase in ‘ordinary’ revenue noted above which 
followed on from the resumptions could not simply be directed towards the 
financing either of key current ‘ordinary’ charges or the backlog of debts to these 
charges, since political factors related to the need to reward supporters needed to be 
taken into consideration.127  ‘Ordinary’ revenue had never played a central role in the 
financing of, for example, Calais or the household.128  Rather, monarchs had 
traditionally used this revenue to manage a competitive and acquisitive nobility.   As 
we have already had reason to comment, during the late Lancastrian period the 
enfeoffment of the Duchy of Lancaster for the financing of the royal foundations and 
the annuities held by the queen for the financing of her household meant that the 
                                                            
125 On average per annum during the mid–to–late 1440s, the exchequer had brought in £10,285 worth 
of loans from large–scale creditors and local loans from loan commissions combined: see Chapter 
6.2.1. 
126 The following paragraph is based, in large part, upon W. Smith, ‘Royal Finance and Politics in
England, 1450–55’, especially Chapters 2 and 3.  
127 What follows goes some way to substantiate the general argument of J. L. Lander that an excessive 
reliance upon ‘ordinary’ revenue was untenable owing to political considerations: see Lander, 
Government and Community: England, 1450–1509, pp. 102–3; J. L. Lander, The Limitations of 
English Monarchy in the Later Middle Ages (London, 1989), p. 12.  
128 As we have seen in Chapter Two, the inability of ‘ordinary’ revenues to finance expansive charges 
lay behind parliament’s recognition of the need to continuously grant the maltolt from the 1360s and 
tonnage and poundage from the 1380s. 
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government had relatively less ‘ordinary’ revenue available, in comparison with 
earlier monarchs, in order to provide for gifts and rewards.129  In the wake of the 
resumptions, then, the availability of ‘ordinary’ revenue previously privatised by the 
late Lancastrian government placed immediate political pressure on the emergent 
court regime of the Duke of Somerset.  The growth of a ‘Yorkist’ opposition in the 
country during the early 1450s,130 moreover, underlined the need for Somerset to 
direct a large proportion of this revenue towards the building up of a loyal support 
network.  This appears to have been exactly what Somerset did during the period in 
question.  On average per annum during the period 1450–2, 71% of non-tabulated 
revenue was assigned, as opposed to 29% which was brought in as cash receipts.131  
A detailed recent study of this revenue and its expenditure has illustrated that the
high level of assignments against ‘ordinary’ revenue reflects, to a large extent, the 
fiscal preference accorded to Somerset himself, and key supporters such as the 
Percys.132  Payments to Somerset and his allies principally constituted annuities and 
remuneration for past service in, for example, Ireland and the Northern Marches.133  
Correspondingly, Somerset exploited customs and subsidies revenue for the same 
purpose.134  The increase in ‘ordinary’ revenue discussed above, then, appears to 
have played an integral role in the forging of a fiscal policy aimed at the political 
survival of the Somerset regime.  
The fiscal context of Somerset’s ascendancy seems to have been the source of 
tensions between the court and the exchequer.  The treasurer, John, Lord 
                                                            
129 See the concluding paragraphs of Chapter Five.  
130 For the best, recent, account of the development of ‘Yorkism’ in the early 1450s, see J. L. Watts, 
‘Polemic and Politics in the 1450s’, in The Politics of Fifteenth–Century England: John Vale’s Book, 
ed. M. L. Kekewich, Colin Richmond, A. F. Sutton, Livia Visser–Fuchs & J. L. Watts (Stroud, 1995), 
pp. 3–42.   
131 These percentages have been calculated by deducting the figures relating to cash revenue and 
assignments from tabulated tax revenue (Appendix One) from Steel’s figures for total cash revenue 
and assignment: Receipt, pp. 235–39.  It needs to be noted that this calculation may include a small 
amount of clerical taxation, since in the absence of a detailed examination of ‘ordinary’ revenue and 
clerical taxation it is not possible to differentiate between these two revenue sources as we did in 
relation to the period 1450–2.  Yet no clerical tax was granted until the summer of 1453, so any 
income from this source during the period in question would have been minimal: McHardy, ‘Clerical 
Taxation in Fifteenth–Century England’, p. 187.  
132 See Smith, ‘Royal Finance and Politics in England, 1450–55’, pp. 117–61.  
133 This involved the financing of debts to the Percys which dated back to their service as Wardens of 
the East March against Scotland in the 1420s: Smith, ‘Royal Finance and Politics in England, 1450–
55’, pp. 154–8.  
134 It would appear that Somerset used indirect tax revenue from the port of London as a means of 
paying himself an increased annuity, at the expense of payments to the Duke of York (Smith, ‘Royal 
Finance and Politics in England, 1450–55’, pp. 128–9, and generally Chapter 3). 
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Beauchamp, attempted, sometime prior to October 1451, to deny the queen – who 
was politically close to Somerset – preference regarding the exchequer’s financing of 
the annual payment of her dower settlement ahead of other charges.  The queen’s 
preference ahead of other creditors was re–affirmed in a warrant for issue of October 
1451.135   This development goes some way to illustrate the predicament of the 
exchequer in the early 1450s.  Not only was the exchequer being forced to function 
within the fiscal straightjacket discussed above, which must have been difficult 
enough to achieve after a period of around fifteen years during which lay tax revenue 
and credit had become integral facets of the ‘ordinary’ budget.  Its ability to plan 
expenditure had also been seriously affected by the political need of Somerset to 
maintain a tight control over issues.  It was in this fiscal and political climate that the 
central fiscal administration of later medieval England appears to have been placed 
under a great deal of strain.  It has long been known that during the period in 
question payments to key charges, such as Calais and the household, recorded on the 
receipt and issue rolls became irregular and ceased to account for the same level of 
expenditure as they had done during the earlier period of Henry VI’s reign.136  This 
does not mean that such charges ceased to be financed.  On the contrary, important 
examinations of surviving enrolled accounts relating to the household and Calais 
suggest that the level of funding for these key areas of the ‘ordinary’ budget 
remained more or less constant up to around the period of York’s first protectorate, 
at which point the lack of survival of this class of evidence presents serious obstacles 
for the historian.137  It therefore appears that a large proportion of this funding was 
simply taken out of the hands of central government.  An insight into the 
administrative process by which this occurred is derived through a comparison of 
gross indirect tax revenue from the enrolled customs accounts (Appendix Three) and 
the exchequer’s termly receipt of indirect taxation (Appendix One).  On average, per 
annum, during the early 1450s, 41% of gross indirect tax revenue was not received 
by the exchequer.  Thus, an annual average of £10,091 worth of indirect tax revenue 
                                                            
135 The order prioritising alternative issues over those owed the queen has not survived.  Yet we can 
be fairly certain that such an order had been issued, perhaps late in 1450 or early in 1451, since the 
warrant which re–affirms the Queen’s priority ahead of other creditors survives: see E 404/68/27; 
Smith, ‘Royal Finance and Politics in England, 1450–55’, p. 40.  
136 It was A. B. Steel who first pointed this out, in general terms: Steel, Receipt, Chapters 8 and 9. For 
Calais, see Smith, ‘Royal Finance and Politics in England, 1450–55’; for the household, see G. L. 
Harriss, ‘The Finance of the Royal Household, 1437–60’ (University of Oxford D.Phil thesis, 1953).  
137 See the works referenced in the previous footnote.  
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did not reach the exchequer.  This development needs to be viewed alongside the 
exchequer’s re–affirmation of its control over the local customs administration 
through appointing new officials as collectors at key ports.138  It looks as though the 
exchequer was attempting to ensure the highest possible level of efficiency in the 
management of indirect tax revenue prior to its outsourcing ‘ordinary’ 
expenditure.139
These developments do not quite mark the final chapter in the history of late 
Lancastrian exchequer finance.  This can be demonstrated through a reconstruction 
of the budget during the year 1452–3.140 During this one year period, a sum total of 
£24,200 worth of special expeditionary expenditure was financed through the 
exchequer’s utilisation of £21,293 worth of credit, £2,740 worth of cash gifts, the 
£67 worth of fifteenth and tenth revenue received in cash, and £100 worth of cash 
revenue from indirect taxation.  £21,331 worth of assignments tabulated in Appendix 
One was employed in the financing of loans during this period.141  This left £48,037 
worth of assignments servicing the financing of ‘ordinary’ expenditure.  This sum 
total of assignments included £11,268 worth of lay tax assignments, £16,965 worth 
of indirect tax assignments and some £19,804 worth of assignments from ‘ordinary’ 
revenue and clerical taxation.142  Concomitantly, £10,436 worth of cash receipts 
remained, which mainly consisted of revenue from indirect taxation and the customs 
and subsidies.  Together the sum totals of assignments and cash revenue outlined 
above served to finance £57,693 worth of ‘ordinary’ expenditure.143  The above 
analysis illustrates that a high level of lay tax revenue, from the one and one half 
fifteenths and tenths granted in 1453, was employed in the financing of ‘ordinary’ 
                                                            
138 CFR, 1445–52, pp. 191–3.  Unlike the reform of 1446/7, discussed in Chapter 6.2.1, that of 
February 1451 did not constitute a wholesale re–ordering of the customs administration across the 
country.  The reform only affected London and Southampton, and individuals were moved between 
posts over a period of six days.  
139 This complements the developments in the fiscal administration of lay taxation traced on pp. 178–
81 with regard to the one and one half fifteenths and tenths of 1453.
140 What follows is based upon an examination of the material referenced in Appendix One, and E 
403/791; E 403/793.  My own material relating to parliamentary–controlled revenue has been viewed 
in the context of Steel’s data relating to termly totals of revenue from cash, assignments and loans: 
Steel, Receipt, pp. 272–4.  
141 This included £982 worth of failed assignments.  
142 Some £150 worth of the lay tax assignments outlined here proved abortive, as did £6,755 worth of 
indirect tax assignments and an estimated £4,619 worth of assignments against ‘ordinary’ revenue and 
clerical taxation.  For a discussion of government debt during this period, see p. 183.  
143 This left a cash surplus of some £1,500 at the exchequer.  
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expenditure during the period in question.  Strikingly, well over three quarters of this 
fifteenth and tenth revenue was assigned to Calais and the household, the very 
charges which we have noted were beginning to disappear from the purview of the 
exchequer.  Both of these developments represent significant u–turns when viewed 
in the context of the budgetary and fiscal administrative history of the period 1450–
2, examined above.  It is therefore necessary to question what occurred at the 
exchequer, in 1452–3, to bring about these changes.
We must begin by taking a closer look at the large–scale assignments from lay tax 
revenue to Calais.  It needs to be noted that the parliament of 1453 sanctioned £9,300 
worth of assignments to Calais from the one and one half fifteenths and tenths 
granted at this assembly.144  Yet, £5,300 worth of this sum was meant to derive from 
the first collection of the first fifteenth and tenth of the one and one half fifteenths 
and tenths granted, and this was not due until Michaelmas 1453-4.  The remaining 
£4,000 was meant to be paid during later collections of this same tax.145  My analysis 
of the material referenced in Appendix One illustrates that £7,640 worth of the 
£11,268 worth of lay tax assignments discussed in the previous paragraph relates to 
payments to Calais.  Thus, a larger amount than the £5,300 worth of fifteenth and 
tenth revenue which ought to have been directed to the financing of Calais was 
employed in the financing of this charge one exchequer term before it ought to have 
been.  Moreover, the £1,330 worth of lay tax revenue assigned to the financing of the 
household was not sanctioned by parliament.  Nor was the remaining £2,000 or so of 
revenue from this source which financed the council wages of a small group of 
figures, including the new courtier treasurer, the Earl of Worcester.  
Surveying these developments, it looks as though Somerset was attempting to speed 
up the practice sanctioned by parliament, and supplement this with technically un–
constitutional fiscal expedients.  In order to understand why Somerset would have 
felt this necessary we must turn to the broader political history of the period.  The 
Duke of York had taken up arms against the crown at Dartford in 1452, an event 
which some historians are inclined to believe heralded the opening of the so–called 
                                                            
144 PROME, parliament of 1453, item 17.  
145 Ibid. 
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‘Wars of the Roses’.146  Somerset had defeated York, yet in so doing political and 
personal grievances on the part of York and his provincial allies only grew.  
Somerset appears to have reacted to this situation by attempting to further strengthen 
his political position:147 the Duke appointed himself captain of Calais.  It follows 
that, now that Somerset had a direct, personal concern with Calais, he would wish to 
secure funding for Calais in as efficient a manner as possible.  Hence the attempt to 
bring the financing of Calais back into the purview of the exchequer, discussed 
above.  This coincided with an apparently increased level of fiscal prioritisation 
accorded to Somerset’s supporters.  Hence the assignment discussed above to the 
new treasurer, the Earl of Worcester, which apparently coincided with an increased 
squeeze on ‘ordinary’ revenue on the part of an increasing number of figures which 
have been identified as Somerset’s allies.
Only on a very superficial level can the developments traced above be said to 
represent a re–asserting of the role of lay tax revenue in the financing of ‘ordinary’ 
expenditure and the primacy of the exchequer in fiscal administration.  It is 
important to stress that the manner in which Somerset mobilised the exchequer in 
1452–3 was intricately bound up with short–term developments in the politics of his 
government.  And, since 1453 witnessed the final fifteenth and tenth grants of the 
reign of Henry VI, and after this the record of the exchequer ceases to provide us 
with an idea even of general trends in revenue and expenditure, Somerset’s use of 
the exchequer during the period 1452–3 was evidently short–lived.  Indeed, it is 
questionable whether, in the fraught political circumstances of the first phase of the 
‘Wars of the Roses’, the various regimes of mid–to–late 1450s would have even 
been able to mobilise the exchequer to manage lay tax revenue in the same way that 
Somerset had during 1452–3.  The one and one half fifteenth and tenth grant of 1453 
was the most difficult of the fifteenths and tenths of the reign of Henry VI to 
administer.148  Following the precedent of earlier fifteenths and tenths, 52% of the 
net yield of this tax was brought in to the exchequer one term before the first 
                                                            
146 See, for example, K. Dockray, ‘The Origins of the Wars of the Roses’, in The Wars of the Roses, p. 
66; A. Goodman, The Wars of the Roses (1981), p. 8.  For a detailed narrative of the politics of this 
period see Griffiths, The Reign of Henry VI, Chapter 22.  
147 The remainder of this paragraph is based on Smith, ‘Royal Finance and Politics in England, 1450–
55’, Chapter 3.  
148 The following two sentences are based upon an examination of the material referenced in 
Appendix One.  
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collection was due.  This illustrates that the exchequer was still able to very speedily 
bring in fifteenth and tenth revenue.  Significantly, however, the exchequer’s 
adeptness at bringing in a large amount of lay tax revenue quickly was not matched 
by its ability to bring in a high proportion of the yield of lay taxation to the 
exchequer.149  Interestingly, the gross yield of the one and one half fifteenths and 
tenths of 1453 was two per cent higher than that of the one and one half fifteenths 
and tenths of 1446.  Yet, whilst 99% of the gross yield of the one and one half 
fifteenths and tenths of 1446 had been brought into the exchequer; only 81% of the 
1453 subsidy was brought into the exchequer.  This constituted a lower proportion of 
revenue brought into the exchequer than in any of the earlier fifteenths and tenths 
granted during Henry VI’s reign.  It seems, therefore, that in 1453 the regime was 
placing pressure on the exchequer to keep a tight grip on the size of the quota and the 
speed with which revenue was brought into the exchequer, but that the success 
achieved in this respect was compromised by a very serious decline in the relations 
between the exchequer and the local fiscal administration.  
The enrolled account for the one and one half fifteenths and tenths of 1453, viewed 
alongside local tax documentation, allows us to expand upon the analysis provided 
above.  Firstly, the enrolled account illustrates that £4,180 worth of revenue from 
this tax from eight counties, which was not brought into the exchequer, was directed 
to Calais.  The exact procedure by which this expenditure was administered is 
unclear.  Amongst the local tax material relating to Northamptonshire, indentures 
drawn up between the collectors and the treasurer and victualler of Calais survive 
which testify to receipts from the fifteenth and tenth.150  These indentures perhaps 
represent a record of transactions which did not pass through the exchequer.  This 
would make sense in light of the comments made above regarding the exchequer’s 
attempt to oversee an efficient devolution of fiscal administration.  The Calais 
expenditure which did not pass through the exchequer is also significant in that it 
suggests that the exchequer was unable to fully comply with the apparent political 
preference of the regime, discussed above, regarding the central administration of 
this expenditure.  Thus, the exchequer was able to put into practice a devolved 
                                                            
149 The following three sentences are based upon an examination of the material referenced in 
Appendix Two.    
150 E 179/155/103, mm. 4 and 5.  
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administrative procedure whereby the tax revenue not received centrally was 
expended upon the regime’s desired charge, Calais.  Yet the fact that this co–existed 
alongside the bringing in of a large quantity of revenue from the tax to be 
administered centrally seems to be symptomatic of the extent to which the role of the 
exchequer as a central organ of government was in retreat, and indicates a certain 
degree of fiscal administrative confusion.  
This fraught general climate appears to have bred an increased local demand for 
exemptions from lay tax payment.  Robert Grey, a Dorset collector, petitioned to be 
exonerated from administering the subsidy.151  A writ addressed to the collectors in 
Cornwall, meanwhile, includes a schedule of exemptions relating to properties in the 
Penwith hundred.152  It is reasonable to assume that that there must have been a high 
level of local clamour for exemption in or around Penwith for the exchequer to grant 
such an exemption.  The exchequer’s relationship with the local fiscal administration 
in the sphere of exemptions is best documented in the case of schedules for 
exemptions drawn up regarding the royal foundations, Eton and King’s College, 
Cambridge.  Numerous such schedules survive, the most comprehensive of which is 
a file relating to Eton College property in Buckinghamshire.153  The material in this 
file in fact relates to a much wider range of exemptions.  The hospital of St John, 
Oxfordshire, which we have seen had sought to defraud the exchequer regarding the 
rate of tax payable in 1442, was exempted from tax payment.154  Property belonging 
to New College, Oxford; Bisham Priory; Merton College, Oxford; New College, 
Oxford; Chapel Royal, Windsor; and Westminster Abbey, was also exempted from 
tax payment.  In order to assess the broader implications of the increased level of 
widespread local calls for exemptions discussed above we must return to the enrolled 
account.155  £3,665 worth of revenue from the one and one half fifteenths and tenths 
in question failed to be collected.  This sum, presumably, represents communities 
                                                            
151 E 179/103/94.
152 E 179/87/104, m. 1.  Unusually, this constituted an exemption in the form of a writ.  
153 E 179/77/69A for the Buckinghamshire example.  See also, for example, Warwickshire schedules 
of exemptions (E 179/192/86) and Somerset schedules of exemptions (E 179/169/106) which relate 
solely to the royal foundations.  It is interesting that ample local material relating to the exemptions of 
the royal foundations survives from 1453, but not 1449 (for the situation in 1449, see 6.2.1).  This 
may reflect the chance survival of the exemption material from 1453.  It is also likely, however, to 
reflect the increased level of local calls for exemptions in 1453.   
154 For the 1442 case, see Chapter 5.2.  
155 What follows is based upon an examination of the material referenced in Appendix Two.  
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which had sought exemptions, did not receive them and subsequently refused to 
comply with collectors’ demands.  For several counties, it is explicitly noted that 
sums which ought to be outstanding, specifically from the royal foundations, were 
not owed to the exchequer.  This seems to reflect an official recognition that, 
nationally, properties owned by the foundations were exempted from payment of the 
tax.  The sum total of such exemptions was £326.  
The significance of this extended consideration of the administration of the one and 
one half fifteenths and tenths of 1453 lies in the extent to which it suggests that the 
problems and complexities of managing the final lay tax of Henry VI’s reign serve as 
a microcosm of the broader crisis which we have seen afflicted the exchequer by 
1453.  Thus, just as the general thrust of the exchequer’s policy during the early 
1450s seems to have been to devolve key areas of the ‘ordinary’ budget as 
expenditure managed centrally came to be closely controlled by Somerset’s need to 
buy political support; so the administration of the one and one half fifteenths and 
tenths of 1453 was characterised by a devolution of expenditure.  Moreover, the 
general loss of fiscal control on the part of the exchequer was mirrored by the 
problems encountered in administering the lay subsidy of 1453.  The general picture, 
both nationally and locally, then, is one of fiscal and administrative atrophy.  It could 
be contended that the ability of the exchequer to bring in a much higher level of 
loans during the year 1452–3, noted above, contradicts these points, yet this 
development is in itself misleading.  The marked increase in loan revenue surely 
represents, in part, local communities’ willingness to provide credit towards a 
proposed military expedition, rather than a feeling that the exchequer had regained 
its fiscal credibility.156  It is telling that the next attempt to raise loans in the shires, at 
a time when no expedition was planned, in 1455, yielded nil.157  Moreover, three 
quarters of the sum total of loans tabulated in Appendix One derived from large–
scale creditors with strong links to the regime.158  Tellingly, around half of the sum 
                                                            
156 The money raised was employed in the abortive Gascon expedition.  See PPC, 6, pp. 143–4; CFR, 
1452–6, pp. 52–3.  In any case, it does not seem possible that this development could represent the 
exchequer’s regaining of its fiscal credibility, since as we have seen the exchequer had been reduced, 
effectively, to a fiscal tool in the hands of the dominant political faction during the opening phase of 
the ‘Wars of the Roses’.  It is difficult to see how this situation could have bred confidence, on the 
part of creditors, in the fiscal competence of the exchequer.  
157 PPC, 6, pp. 234–44; Jurkowski, Smith & Crook, Lay Taxes, pp. 108–9.  
158 What follows is based upon a detailed examination of the material referenced in Appendix One.  
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total of loans provided by large–scale creditors related to loans extended by the 
garrison of Calais, which had reason to be financially generous now that Somerset 
was captain of Calais, and the treasurer, the Earl of Worcester, who was a member of 
Somerset’s inner circle.159
                                           ………………………………………….
We are now in a position to draw together the key themes from the above discussion 
of fiscal politics and exchequer finance during the late majority of Henry VI.  The 
most striking aspect of the fiscal political and financial history of the late majority 
period is the profoundly negative impact which the ascendancy of domainal fiscal 
politics after 1450 had on exchequer finance and fiscal administration.  The politics 
of resumption developed out of growing parliamentary hostility towards the 
exchequer’s employment of an increased level of parliamentary–controlled 
‘extraordinary’ revenue, specifically the proceeds of lay taxation, in the ‘ordinary’ 
financing of the regime, amidst the general political crisis of Suffolk’s rule.  The 
Commons’ intention, in enforcing resumption upon the government, was to strong–
arm the exchequer into financing ‘ordinary’ expenditure exclusively from the 
proceeds of resumed ‘ordinary’ revenue, supplemented where necessary by indirect 
tax revenue.  In purely fiscal terms, this was incredibly unrealistic.  The exchequer’s 
employment of a high level of lay tax revenue in the financing of ‘ordinary’ charges 
during the mid–to–late 1440s had permitted Lumley’s programme of fiscal 
consolidation, which had restored a degree of stability to the ‘ordinary’ financing of 
the regime.  We have drawn attention to the limitations of fiscal consolidation: the 
government failed to finance debt and was dependent upon a continuation of peace.  
Yet, stripped of the ability to pump lay tax revenue into the financing of ‘ordinary’ 
expenditure after 1450, the fiscal situation was bound to deteriorate further.  As we 
have seen, the increase in domainal revenue after 1450, coinciding as it did with the 
fraught politics of the early 1450s, resulted in the exchequer becoming a fiscal tool 
                                                            
159 Unprecedentedly, the treasurer extended £5,000 worth of loans during the exchequer year in 
question.   
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employed by Somerset as a means of political survival.  This seems to have directly 
resulted in the disintegration of central fiscal administrative control and, especially 
significantly from the perspective of the historian of tax structures, a very marked 
decline in the ability of the exchequer to efficiently manage the administration of lay 
taxation. 
Clearly, the exchequer could not, in these circumstances, make a concerted effort to 
reduce the burden of debt declared at the parliament of November 1449.  It is 
impossible to tell from the surviving documentation just how parlous the level of 
debt was during this period, since the outsourcing of a high level of expenditure 
means that ‘fictitious loans’ recorded by the exchequer no longer serve as an 
accurate barometer of debt during the early 1450s.  Certainly, the radical decrease in 
‘fictitious loans’ vis–à–vis total assignments which characterised the exchequer 
record during this period is illusory, reflecting the fiscal administrative crisis faced 
by the exchequer during the early 1450s rather than a continuation of the earlier 
programme of fiscal consolidation.160  In all probability, the level of debt continued 
to rise, as it had throughout the 1430s and 1440s; the exchequer simply ceased to be 
able to effectively record this, let alone attempt to do anything about it.  Ultimately, 
these developments serve to illustrate the extent to which the political breakdown of 
the uneasy consensus regarding the role of lay taxation and credit in ‘ordinary’ 
finance which had characterised the fiscal politics of the 1430s and 1440s was 
intricately bound up with the fiscal and administrative breakdown of the late 
Lancastrian state.  
                                                            
160 On average per annum during the period 1450–3, ‘fictitious loans’ constituted 18% of total 
assignments.  
CONCLUSION:
THE CRISIS OF THE LATER MEDIEVAL FISCAL CONSTITUTION 
DURING THE REIGN OF HENRY VI
A decade or so after the fall of the Lancastrian dynasty, Henry VI’s exiled former 
Chief Justice, Sir John Fortescue, sought to explain the fiscal problems which had 
beset the late Lancastrian government.1  Fortescue contended that the late 
Lancastrian government had been rendered insolvent through the former monarch’s 
wanton alienation of domainal lands.  This had led Henry VI’s regime to unlawfully 
impose lay taxation upon the political community in order to finance ‘ordinary’ as 
well as ‘extraordinary’ charges.  Fortescue believed that these developments were 
wholly avoidable.  In the event that the Lancastrian monarchy was restored, he 
stressed that it ought to adopt resumption as a royal policy and concomitantly avoid 
lavish patronage as a means of ensuring maximum yields from the crown lands.  
Indeed, Fortescue believed that royal distribution of patronage ought to be regulated 
by the council.  Underpinning these strictures was the belief that, so long as a fiscal 
system centred on domainal revenues supplemented by indirect tax revenue was well 
administered, this would effectively service the financing of the crown’s permanent 
expenditure commitments, and ensure that the government would only require lay 
taxation in the event of a defensive emergency.
Fortescue’s call for a ‘new foundation’ of the public finances echoes the 
parliamentary demand for resumption and domainal fiscal rectitude which we have 
seen characterised the fiscal politics of the early 1450s.  Yet as this thesis contends, 
the late Lancastrian government’s fiscal problems were largely unrelated to Henry 
VI’s management of the crown lands and trends in domainal revenue.  The 
worsening budgetary imbalance and concomitant growth in government debt which 
had characterised, in particular, the 1440s was entirely the result of the late 
Lancastrian government’s inability to secure the level of supply necessary to finance 
total expenditure, specifically the cost of expansive ‘ordinary’ charges and 
‘extraordinary’ charges unrelated to the defence of the English realm.  Given the 
restrictive parameters of scholastic fiscal theory, the late Lancastrian government 
                                                            
1 The following discussion is drawn from John Fortescue, The Governance of England, ed. C. 
Plummer (Oxford, 1885), pp. 113–15, 154–5, 274–5.  See also John Fortescue, De Laudibus Legum 
Anglie (Cambridge, 1942), Chapter 35.  
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had been unable to publicly justify the need for supply to meet ‘ordinary’ charges, 
and the constitutional and political difficulties of pleading the regime’s ‘necessity’ as 
a means of securing lay taxation to finance the French war after the Treaty of Troyes 
had proven too great for this to be a viable alternative fiscal political strategy.  The 
government had thus been forced to attempt to informally negotiate more generous 
lay taxes, a task in which we have seen it failed during the late minority and early 
majority periods.  As the exchequer’s financial situation deteriorated during the mid–
1440s, the regime of the Marquis of Suffolk had strong-armed the Commons into 
conceding a higher level of lay taxation.  Viewed in the context of an increasingly 
unstable political situation characterised by the king’s apparent absence from the 
political decision making process, however, this fiscal policy resulted in a 
breakdown of parliamentary relations and the development of the fiscal politics of 
resumption.
Our ability to differentiate between mid–to–late fifteenth century misconceptions 
regarding the fiscal problems faced by the late Lancastrian government and the 
realities of the late Lancastrian government’s fiscal problems is highly significant 
when viewed in the context of the two key themes which we drew attention to in 
Chapter One: the long–term context of the fiscal constitutional history of the late 
Lancastrian period and the historiography of public finance during the reign of 
Henry VI.  What follows examines these themes in turn.  The long–term 
constitutional significance of the late Lancastrian government’s fiscal political 
difficulties and the worsening debt crisis of the 1430s and 1440s can be grasped 
through a comparison between material relating to lay tax revenue during the late 
Lancastrian period compiled by the present writer and material published by W. M. 
Ormrod relating to lay tax revenue during the first phase of the Hundred Years’ 
War.2  Ormrod has shown that during the early years of the Hundred Years’ War, 
which were characterised by markedly generous parliamentary grants of lay taxation, 
the exchequer registered an annual average net income of some £27,778 worth of 
fifteenth and tenth revenue.  In contrast, during the late Lancastrian period between 
1429 and 1453, when the governments of Henry VI encountered such serious 
                                                            
2 The following data relating to the 1330s and 1340s derives from Ormrod, ‘The Crown and the 
English Economy, 1290–1348’.  The data relating to the late Lancastrian period is drawn from 
Chapters Three to Six of this thesis.  
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difficulties in raising generous lay taxes, the exchequer received only £13,040 worth 
of net revenue from lay taxation, on average per annum.  The £14,000–£15,000 
difference between these two figures would have served to plug the deficit of some 
£12,000 which we have seen threatened the fiscal stability of late Lancastrian
government by the time the king came of age.  This, in turn, would have prevented 
the resultant build–up of government debt which led to an ever increasing budget 
deficit as the public finances spiralled out of control.  
It was not merely that the exchequer, during the first phase of the Hundred Years’ 
War, received a higher level of lay taxation than the late Lancastrian exchequer.  The 
exchequer’s income from the customs and subsidies was also significantly higher 
during the 1330s and 1340s than a century later.  Ormrod has illustrated that an 
annual average of just under £45,000 worth of indirect taxation was received by the 
exchequer during the period between 1337 and 1346.3  In comparison, our figures for 
the late Lancastrian period suggest an annual average income from indirect taxation 
of just over £30,000 for the period spanning the reign of Henry VI.  This lay behind 
the late Lancastrian government’s need for a greater level of lay taxation discussed 
in the previous paragraph.  Indeed, after parliament’s enforcement of the Bullion and 
Partition Ordinances we have seen that gross indirect taxation fell well below 
£30,000 on a number of occasions.  The full significance of the above illustration of 
a marked decline in lay and indirect tax revenue over the hundred year period which 
separated the first and last stages of the Hundred Years’ War is grasped only when 
we move beyond a analysis centred solely upon fiscal data to consider the economic 
context of parliamentary taxation during 1330s and 1340s and the late Lancastrian 
period respectively.  Ormrod has illustrated that the crown’s fiscal demands during 
the 1330s and 1340s, particularly in the sphere of lay taxation, were a significant 
economic burden in a pre–plague economy characterised by low wages, high rents 
and high prices.4  In stark contrast, the late Lancastrian government failed to attempt 
to profit from the marked increase in cloth exports which characterised the early–to–
mid fifteenth century, and continued to depend to a large extent upon the proceeds of 
taxation upon wool exports, the market of which we have seen went into terminal 
                                                            
3 Indeed, profits from indirect taxation rose to between £50,000 and £100,000 for most of the 1350s: 
Ormrod, ‘The English Crown and the Customs, 1349–63’, p. 33.  
4 See the discussion in Chapter 2.2.  
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decline during the reign of Henry VI.  Even more significantly, the taxpaying 
population seems to have been more economically capable of sustaining lay taxation 
during the late Lancastrian period than at any previous point during the later middle 
ages owing to apparent an increase in the wealth and purchasing power of the 
labouring classes, who seem to have borne an increasing share of the lay tax burden 
as the fifteenth century progressed.5  
The crisis of the later medieval fiscal constitution during the reign of Henry VI thus 
lay in its inability to continue to provide the fifteenth–century crown with the 
required level of parliamentary taxation in economic circumstances which, it is hard 
to avoid concluding, ought to have made it easier for a large proportion of the 
taxpaying population to sustain the financial needs of the state.  This needs to be 
viewed in the context of recent trends in the historiography of the pre–modern ‘tax 
state’.  R. J. Bonney and W. M. Ormrod have suggested that medieval and early 
modern ‘tax states’ ought not to be judged solely on their relative ability to bring in a 
majority of their revenues from tax sources.6  These writers consider it more 
important to ascertain whether such ‘tax states’ were able to bring about a dynamic 
new relationship between tax revenue, expenditure and credit which was viable in 
the long term and hence would allow for so–called ‘self–sustained fiscal growth’.  
Edward III’s government, in securing the granting of unprecedented levels of lay and 
indirect taxation, allowed the mid–fourteenth-century exchequer to finance equally 
unprecedented levels of ‘extraordinary’ expenditure and begin to contract loans from
domestic creditors against the security of tax revenue.7  This constitutes the kind of 
dynamic new fiscal framework which Bonney and Ormrod had in mind.  Yet this 
was not sustainable in the long–term, given that the later medieval fiscal constitution 
only ensured a consistent and high level of lay taxation in the event that a defensive 
threat to the English realm could be depicted by the crown as having existed.  The 
inter–twined fiscal political and financial crisis of Henry VI’s reign illustrates the 
inability of the later medieval fiscal constitution to ensure the crown the level of 
supply necessary to finance expansive expenditure unrelated to the defence of the 
                                                            
5 These points summarise the discussion in Chapters 5.2 and 6.2.1.  
6 For this and the following sentence see Bonney & Ormrod, ‘Introduction.  Crises, Revolutions and 
Self–Sustained Growth: Towards a Conceptual Model of Change in Fiscal History’, pp. 3–11. 
7 For the development of credit mechanisms during this period see Fryde, ‘Materials for the Study of 
Edward III’s Credit Operations, 1327–48’. 
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English realm.  In fact, as we have seen, fiscal constitutional problems had begun to 
emerge during the reigns of Richard II and Henry IV.8  These earlier problems were 
resolved largely through continuing relative vitality in indirect tax revenue and 
strong fiscal political management on the part of the two monarchs in question and 
the early Lancastrian council which secured a temporary increase in the level of lay 
taxation in order to avoid an exacerbation of budgetary problems.  During the reign 
of Henry VI, however, the budgetary imbalance caused by the collapse in indirect 
tax revenue was simply too great, and Henry VI’s fiscal political management was 
too weak, to allow for the formulation of an effective fiscal policy which offered a 
resolution to the exchequer’s problems.  
This last point raises the question of to what extent Henry VI’s weak kingship 
contributed to the fiscal decline of the late Lancastrian period.  It is undeniable that 
the fraught political conditions of the mid–to–late 1440s, which were caused by the 
king’s inability, or unwillingness, to take a decisive lead in political decision 
making, made it increasingly difficult for the government of the court to secure the 
Commons’ granting of the necessary level of lay taxation.  Yet it is very important 
that we recognise that the origins of the late Lancastrian government’s fiscal 
problems lay not in the politics of Henry VI’s kingship but the constitutional 
inability of the late minority regime to secure the necessary level of lay taxation to 
finance expansive total expenditure.  Indeed, as we have seen, Henry VI’s apparent 
personal involvement in the politics of household finance during the early years of 
his majority, prior to the foundation of Eton and King’s College, Cambridge, and the 
likelihood that the council attempted to bring the young monarch into broader fiscal 
political negotiations in the wake of this development, did not lead the Commons to 
provide generous lay tax contributions on the scale which was required by the 
exchequer.  The only plausible conclusion to draw from this seems to be that it 
would have been beyond the capabilities of any early–to–mid fifteenth century 
government to persuade the Commons to concede the level of lay taxation necessary 
to cater to the fiscal exigencies of government at this time – irrelevant of the political 
capabilities of the monarch who sat on the throne.  A more capable, politically 
focused, monarch – Richard, Duke of York, being the obvious candidate – would 
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undoubtedly have attempted to personally involve himself in managing the fiscal 
crisis of the mid–to–late 1440s and thus, presumably, would have been able to avoid 
incurring the same level of parliamentary and popular wrath as Henry VI endured in 
1450.  Yet it is simply not viable to suggest that a stereotypically ‘strong’ king 
would have been able to bring about the fundamental fiscal constitutional changes 
necessary in order to compel the Commons to grant the level of lay taxation 
necessary to provide for fiscal stability during the 1440s.9
The fiscal policies of the Yorkist monarchs serve as evidence of the final point made 
in the previous paragraph.  If it had been possible for a purposeful fifteenth century 
monarch to instigate the kind of fiscal constitutional change which Henry VI 
manifestly failed to attempt to bring about, Edward IV and Richard III would surely 
have made concerted efforts in this direction.  Both of these monarchs possessed 
strong personalities and actively directed political affairs during their respective 
reigns.10  Yet far from resurrecting the abortive attempts of the 1430s and 1440s to 
secure lay taxation as a means of financing ‘ordinary’ expenditure, the two adult 
Yorkist kings adopted as royal policy the populist fiscal political strategy which we 
have seen was expounded by Fortescue, and indeed had already been tacitly accepted 
by the governments of the final decade of the late Lancastrian period: the resumption 
of previously alienated royal lands and prudent management of resumed crown lands 
as a means of achieving solvency.11  These fiscal political developments resulted in 
profound fiscal administrative change during the mid–to–late fifteenth century, as 
the two monarchs in question employed the royal chamber to manage domainal 
revenues and, increasingly, revenue from the customs and subsidies and even lay 
taxes.  This led the exchequer to cease administering large quantities of public 
                                                            
9 The reader will recall that Henry V – conventionally praised for his political astuteness – failed to 
bring about a ‘new deal’ in the financing of Lancastrian government: see the discussion in Chapter 
2.3.   
10 The classic accounts are C. D. Ross, Edward IV (Berkeley, 1974) and C. D. Ross, Richard III
(London, 1981). 
11 For this and the following three sentences, see Wolffe, The Royal Demesne in English History, 
Chapters 6 and 7; Wolffe, The Crown Lands, 1461–1536: An Aspect of Yorkist and early Tudor 
Government; J. L. Lander, ‘Council, Administration and Councillors, 1461–85’, in Crown and 
Nobility 1450–1509 (London, 1976), pp. 191–219; J. L. Lander, ‘Introduction: Aspects of Fifteenth–
Century Studies’, in Crown and Nobility 1450–1509, pp. 38–48; J. L. Lander, ‘Edward IV: the 
Modern Legend and a Revision’, in Crown and Nobility, 1450–1509’, pp. 164–9; Lander, 
Government and Community: England, 1450–1509; Lander, The Limitations of the English Monarchy 
in the Later Middle Ages, Chapter 1.
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revenue and expenditure.  There is a tendency amongst historians to praise the 
system of public finance developed by the Yorkist monarchs, on the grounds that it 
was made to effectively service the financial needs of Yorkist government. This, 
however, is highly questionable.  Despite the complete absence of the Yorkist 
chamber accounts, none of which have survived, C. D. Ross has pointed to local 
evidence which suggests that new methods of estate administration adopted by the 
surveyors of crown lands did not yield marked increases in revenue.12  This is 
consonant with R. Horrox’s discussion of an important fiscal memorandum brought 
before the council during the period of the future Richard III’s Protectorship, which 
has survived amongst various port books of the Yorkist period.13  This memorandum 
provides us with a rare insight into the quite serious difficulties encountered by the 
Yorkist government in financing total charges.  At least as far as the early 1480s are 
concerned, then, we can conclude that the crown lands were not providing the 
Yorkist government with the fiscal lifeline which some historians seem to have 
assumed they were.   
What impact did the development of the system of Yorkist chamber finance have 
upon the long–term trajectory of the English fiscal constitution?  Certainly, it is 
striking that, at the same time that Italian fiscal theorists were moving beyond the 
parameters of scholastic fiscal ideology and beginning to make the case for 
permanent taxation as a means of financing permanent state expenditures,14 and a 
number of European states, including the Italian city states, the Low Countries and 
Catalonia, were developing fiscal mechanisms which allowed them to administer a 
long–term public debt,15 the English state moved in the opposite direction.  Viewed 
in this geo–fiscal comparative context, the inability of the later medieval fiscal 
constitution to adapt in order to cater for the fiscal exigencies of the late Lancastrian 
period, and the subsequent development of the system of Yorkist chamber finance, 
                                                            
12 C. D. Ross, ‘The Reign of Edward IV’, in Fifteenth Century England: Studies in Politics and 
Society, pp. 54–61, especially p. 59.  
13 R. Horrox, ‘Financial Memoranda of the Reign of Edward V’, Camden Miscellany, 29 (Camden 
Society, 4th series, 34, 1987), pp. 200–72.  
14 Isenmann, ‘Medieval and Renaissance Theories of State Finance’, pp. 44–52.  
15 Ormrod, ‘The West European Monarchies in the Later Middle Ages’, p. 159; M. Korner, ‘Public 
Credit’, in Economic Systems and State Finance, pp. 508–15; A. MacKay, Spain in the Middle Ages: 
From Frontier to Empire, 1000–1500 (London, 1977), pp. 162–3; J. D. Tracy, A Financial Revolution 
in the Habsburg Netherlands: Renten and Renteniers in the County of Holland, 1515–1565 (Berkeley, 
1985). 
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must be considered a mark of fiscal constitutional failure.16  Following the advice of 
Fortescue, the governments of the Yorkist and Tudor periods sought lay taxation 
only in order to finance ‘extraordinary’ charges.17  And though the exchequer 
regained its principal role as the central fiscal organ of state during the reign of 
Henry VIII,18 no new credit mechanisms were developed during this period which 
had the potential of sustaining a long–term public debt.19  It is therefore hardly 
surprising that there was no structural increase in public revenues during the Tudor 
period commensurate with that which we have seen characterised the mid–fourteenth 
century, which resulted in the governments of the sixteenth century experiencing 
serious difficulties in their attempts to finance heavy expenditures, especially in light 
of the sustained inflation which characterised the early modern period.20  It was not 
until the Stuart century that important structural changes in the revenue base of the 
crown occurred, interestingly in the context of a trade boom and the negotiation of 
new indirect taxes rather than through the negotiation of large–scale lay taxes or a 
new system of direct taxation.21  This allowed for the development of long–term 
                                                            
16 For a similar interpretation of the Yorkist land revenue experiment, see Ormrod, ‘England in the 
Middle Ages’, p. 47.  
17 G. R. Elton argued that Thomas Cromwell’s employment of lay tax revenue upon a number of 
‘ordinary’ charges during the 1530s constituted a ‘new principle’ of peacetime taxation: G. R. Elton, 
‘Taxation for War and Peace in Early Tudor England’, in War and Economic Development: Essays in 
Memory of David Joslin, ed. J. M. Winter (Cambridge, 1975), pp. 33–48.  This fit in with Elton’s 
broader ‘Tudor Revolution in Government’ thesis: G. R. Elton, The Tudor Revolution in Government: 
Administrative Changes in the Reign of Henry VIII (Cambridge, 1953).  As G. L. Harriss 
demonstrated, however, the Tudor regime was not seeking supply on any new intellectual grounds: 
indeed, throughout this period Henry VIII’s government employed a plea of ‘necessity’ as a means of 
securing an increased level of wartime lay taxation: Harriss, ‘Thomas Cromwell’s “New Principle” of 
Taxation’, pp. 721–38.  Indeed, the royal plea of ‘necessity’ continued to shape the parliamentary 
discourse of supply until after the Civil War: G. L. Harriss, ‘Medieval Doctrines in the Debates on 
Supply, 1610–1629’, in Faction and Parliament. Essays on early Stuart History, ed. K. M. Sharpe 
(Oxford, 1978), pp. 73–103. 
18 For the exchequer’s re–emergence as a war treasury receiving and expending large–scale tax 
revenues, see R. W. Hoyle, ‘War and Public Finance’, in The Reign of Henry VIII: Politics, Policy 
and Piety, ed. D. MacCulloch (Basingstoke, 1995), pp. 75–99, 262–7.  Note that J. D. Alsop argues 
that throughout the period of the Yorkist and early Tudor period the exchequer continued to play a 
greater fiscal role than the works cited in footnote 11 suggest: J. D. Alsop, ‘The Exchequer in Late 
Medieval Government, c. 1485–1530’, in Aspects of Late Medieval Government and Society. Essays 
presented to J. R. Lander, pp. 179–212.  
19 Thus, late Tudor and early Stuart credit operations remained more or less later medieval in their 
short–term, rather unstable character: R. Ashton, ‘Deficit Finance in the Reign of James I’, Ec.HR, 2nd
series, 10 (1957), pp. 15–29; R. Ashton, The Crown and the Money Market, 1603–1640 (Oxford, 
1960).  
20 For the failure of the Tudor monarchy to tap the wealth of the nation, see P. K. O’Brien & P. Hunt, 
‘England, 1485–1815’, in The Rise of the Fiscal State in Europe, c. 1200–1815, pp. 75–87.
21 Ibid.  This is also a key theme of P. K. O’Brien & P. Hunt, ‘The Rise of a Fiscal State in England, 
1485–1815’, in Historical Research, 66 (1993), pp. 129–76; P. K. O’Brien & P. Hunt, ‘The 
Emergence and Consolidation of Excises in the English Fiscal System before the Glorious 
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credit mechanisms and an explosion in public expenditure.22  Nevertheless, that it 
took early modern English government almost two centuries after the period covered 
by this thesis to foster these developments is a potent indicator of the restrictive 
impact which the crisis of the later medieval fiscal constitution during the late 
Lancastrian period had upon the subsequent development – or rather lack of 
development – of the fiscal state in England.  
Now that we have situated the fiscal constitutional history of Henry VI’s reign in the 
context of long–term developments during the ‘long’ fourteenth century and the 
early modern period, it remains for us to consider where the conclusions drawn from 
this thesis stand in relation to trends in the historiography of public finance during 
the reign of Henry VI.  Chapter One drew attention to an important trend in mid–to–
late twentieth century scholarship which sought to play down the long–term, 
structural, nature of the fiscal problems faced by the late Lancastrian government.  
We have seen that this scholarly approach owed, intellectually, to McFarlane’s 
critique of the Stubbsian fallacy that deep–rooted constitutional tensions between a 
progressive Commons and a regressive baronage resulted in the emergence of a 
protracted political crisis with grave fiscal political and financial consequences 
during the late Lancastrian period.  McFarlane and subsequent writers were correct 
to reject this teleological interpretative framework as a Whig–Liberal anachronism.  
It was a mistake, however, for this generation of scholars to conclude that, because 
there was no endemic crisis within the late Lancastrian landowning class which 
brought about a fiscal decline, Henry VI’s inadequacies must have lain behind the 
fiscal problems of the late Lancastrian period.  As we have already had reason to 
comment, this thesis has illustrated beyond all reasonable doubt that Henry VI’s 
weak kingship exacerbated an existing fiscal crisis which was caused by the 
ideological inability of the late Lancastrian government to secure the necessary level 
of supply.  This clarifies the relationship between the politics of the royal court and 
                                                                                                                                                                           
Revolution’, British Tax Review (1997), pp. 35–8; P. K. O’Brien & P. Hunt, ‘Excises and the Rise of 
a Fiscal State in England, 1586–1688, in Crises, Revolutions and Self–Sustained Growth: Essays in 
European Fiscal History, 1130–1830, pp. 198–223; P. K. O’Brien, ‘Fiscal Exceptionalism: Great 
Britain and its European Rivals from Civil War to Triumph at Trafalgar and Waterloo’, in The 
Political Economy of British Historical Experience, 1688–1914, ed. D. N. Winch & P. K. O’Brien 
(Oxford, 2002), pp. 245–65.
22 The classic account is P. G. M. Dickson, The Financial Revolution in England: A Study in the 
Development of Public Credit, 1688–1756 (London, 1967).  
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the financial problems faced by the late Lancastrian government.  Moreover, and 
perhaps more importantly, it complements recent general moves to illustrate the 
implausibility of approaches to late Lancastrian politics which are centred solely on 
the personality of Henry VI.23  
                                                            




TABULAR INFORMATION REGARDING THE EXCHEQUER’S 
MANAGEMENT OF PARLIAMENTARY–CONTROLLED REVENUE, ALL 
REVENUE EMPLOYED IN THE FINANCING OF LOANS AND LOAN 
INCOME, 1429–1453
It is necessary for me to make a number of points regarding the material deployed in 
this table.  The category ‘administration’ refers to the exchequer’s ‘ordinary’ 
financial commitments, excluding the royal household.  These commitments include 
the domestic costs of state and permanent defensive costs.  I have tabulated 
household assignments under a separate category.  It needs to be noted that during 
the majority period of Henry VI’s reign a number of lay tax assignments which I 
have categorised as ‘administration’ were actually military payments to Richard, 
Duke of York.  These technically constituted ‘extraordinary’, special expeditionary 
payments, although they were paid with regularity owing to the duke’s tenure as 
Lieutenant–General of Normandy.  I recognise this fact in Chapter 5.2, when I view 
these charges as part of the special expeditionary budget (see pp. 120–22).  
Sources: E 401/723; E 401/724; E 401/725; E 401/727; E 401/729; E 401/731; E 
401/732; E 401/733; E 401/734; E 401/737; E 401/740; E 401/742; E 401/744; E 
401/747; E 401/749; E 401/751; E 401/752; E 401/754; E 401/756; E 401/759; E 
401/760; E 401/762; E 401/763; E 401/765; E 401/767; E 401/768; E 401/770; E 
401/771; E 401/774; E 401/775; E 401/778; E 401/780; E 401/781; E 401/784; E 
401/786; E 401/788; E 401/790; E 401/792; E 401/794; E 401/796; E 401/799; E 
401/801; E 401/803; E 401/806; E 401/808; E 401/810; E 401/812; E 401/813; E 
401/815; E 401/818; E 401/821; E 401/823; E 401/825; E 401/829; E 401/831.  
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Exchequer Term Cash Administration Household Loans
Michaelmas, 1429-30
Double 15 & 10, Yr 8 £27,270 £433 £6,178
Parishes and Knights’ Fees Tax £72
Indirect Taxation £5,375 £9,010 £2,692 £1,280
Fictitious Loans
Indirect Taxation £2,221 £433
Loans £3,880
Easter, 1430
Double 15 & 10, Yr 8 £391 £25,712
Parishes and Knights’ Fees Tax £97
Indirect Taxation £538 £3,474 £941 £2,676
Ordinary Revenue £20
Fictitious Loans
Indirect Taxation £1,232 £487 £224
Loans £10,489
Michaelmas, 1430-1
15 & 10, Yr 8 £4,680 £227 £100 £4,247
1 & 1/3 15 & 10, Yr 9 £30,981
Parishes and Knights’ Fees Tax £278 £1




Indirect Taxation £3,746 £67 £1,550
Clerical Taxation £1,814
1 & 1/3 15 & 10, Yr 9 £20
Loans £36,115
Easter, 1431
Double 15 & 10, Yr 8 £25 £1
1 & 1/3 15 & 10, Yr 9 £1 £6,236
Parishes and Knights’ Fees Tax £7 £13
Indirect Taxation £4,550 £8,396 £141 £2,141
Ordinary Revenue £33
Fictitious Loans
Indirect Taxation £850 £187
Clerical Taxation £588
Loans £9,669
TABULAR INFORMATION REGARDING THE EXCHEQUER’S 
MANAGEMENT OF PARLIAMENTARY–CONTROLLED REVENUE, ALL 




15 & 10, Yr 8 £129 £3 £35
1 & 1/3 15 & 10, Yr 9 £1,839 £200 £4 £5,974
Parishes and Knights’ Fees Tax £33 £4 £8
Indirect Taxation £2,499 £3,855 £935 £174
Clerical Taxation £1,880
Fictitious Loans
Indirect Taxation £5,075 £866 £100
Parishes and Knights’ Fees Tax £30
Loans £7,839
Easter 1432
1 & 1/3 15 & 10, Yr 9 £2,469 £134
1/2 15 & 10, Yr 10 £25 £15,402
Parishes and Knights’ Fees Tax £3 £2




Indirect Taxation £5,834 £4,583
1/2 15 & 10, Yr 10 £215 £315
Loans £24,640
Michaelmas, 1432-3
Double 15 & 10, Yr 8 £3 £2
1 & 1/3 15 & 10, Yr 9 £65 £70 £5
1/2 15 & 10, Yr 10 £420 £30 £1,000
Parishes and Knights’ Fees Tax £2 £9




Indirect Taxation £4,098 £183 £883
Ordinary Revenue £67
1 & 1/3 15 &10, Yr 9 £15
Loans £8,399
Easter, 1433
Double 15 & 10, Yr 8 £19
1 & 1/3 15 & 10, Yr 9 £10 £5
1/2 15 & 10, Yr 10 £13
Parishes and Knights’ Fees Tax £4









1 & 1/3 15 & 10, Yr 9 £92 £20
1/2 15 & 10, Yr 10 £412 £23
15 & 10, Yr 11 £133 £7,278
Parishes and Knights’ Fees Tax £5




Indirect Taxation £2,900 £820
15 & 10, Yr 11 £144
Loans £11,758
Easter, 1434
1 & 1/3 15 & 10, Yr 9 £1 £72
1/2 15 & 10, Yr 10 £5 £9 £114
15 & 10, Yr 11 £2,587 £17,925
Parishes and Knights’ Fees Tax £5 £12
Indirect Taxation £593 £2,617 £1,670 £1,056
Clerical Taxation £6,055
Fictitious Loans
Indirect Taxation £1,722 £735




Double 15 & 10, Yr 8 £20
1/2 15 & 10, Yr 10 £3 £40 £11
15 & 10, Yr 11 £310 £1,277 £17
Parishes and Knights’ Fees Tax £6 £3
Indirect Taxation £2,451 £4,489 £1,972 £1,653
Ordinary Revenue £1,237
Fictitious Loans
Indirect Taxation £1,723 £221




1 & 1/3 15 & 10, Yr 9 £1
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1/2 15 & 10, Yr 10 £40
15 & 10, Yr 11 £380 £30 £46
Parishes and Knights’ Fees Tax £3
Indirect Taxation £488 £6,765 £4,298 £2,286
Clerical Taxation £243
Fictitious Loans





1/2 15 & 10, Yr 10 £3
15 & 10, Yr 11 £1,106 £23 £36
15 & 10, Yr 14 £200 £15,929
Special Tax, Yr 14 £1,680 £40




Indirect Taxation £3,453 £434
15 & 10, Yr 14 £2,848
Loans £34,322
Easter, 1436
1/2 15 & 10, Yr 10 £1
15 & 10, Yr 11 £283 £121 £18
15 & 10, Yr 14 £130 £3 £40 £2,517
Special Tax, Yr 14 £5,733 £275




Indirect Taxation £67 £597 £333





1/2 15 & 10, Yr 10 £75
15 & 10, Yr 11 £18 £40
15 & 10, Yr 14 £2,719 £329
Special Tax, Yr 14 £1,258 £83 £67










15 & 10, Yr 11 £3
15 & 10, Yr 14 £6,034 £17 £27
15 & 10, Yr 15 £115 19,572
Special Tax, Yr 14 £32 £5




Indirect Taxation £543 £100 £3,108
Loans £21,533
Michaelmas, 1437-8
15 & 10, Yr 11 £2 £30 £10
15 & 10, Yr 14 £1,743 £132 124
15 & 10, Yr 15 £44 £22 £8 £5,570
Special Tax, Yr 14 £7 £40




Indirect Taxation £1,350 £60 £2,081
Loans £18,532
Easter, 1438
15 & 10, Yr 11 £26 £18
15 & 10, Yr 14 £132 £40 £34
15 & 10, Yr 15 £24 £659 £183
Special Tax, Yr 14 £45




Indirect Taxation £2,647 £229 £5,966





15 & 10, Yr 11 £2 £8 £18
15 & 10, Yr 14 £7 £15
15 & 10, Yr 15 £447 £111
Special Tax, Yr 14








15 & 10, Yr 14 £1 £58
15 & 10, Yr 15 £3 £54 £1
Parishes and Knights’ Fees Tax £5
Special Tax, Yr 14 £9 £4
Indirect Taxation £653 £2,231 £1,046 £13,130
Ordinary Revenue £423
Fictitious Loans




15 & 10, Yr 14 £51
15 & 10, Yr 15 £3 £52 £26
15 & 10, Yr 18 £11,694
Special Tax, Yr 14 £6




Indirect Taxation £3,792 £400 £967




15 & 10, Yr 12 £3
15 & 10, Yr 15 £619 £1
15 & 10, Yr 18 £6,481 £1,025 £30 £200
Special Tax, Yr 14 £5 £8 £13
Indirect Taxation £2,657 £3,984 £2,090 £4,681
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Clerical Taxation £97
Alien Tax, Yr 18 £59 £36
Fictitious Loans
Indirect Taxation £1,121 £412 £333
Loans £1,000
Michaelmas, 1440-1
15 & 10, Yr 11 £1
15 & 10, Yr 1s5 £169
15 & 10, Yr 18 £6,691 £20 £6,413
Special Tax, Yr 14 £1
Indirect Taxation £919 £8,530 £2,817 £2,668
Clerical Taxation £1,480
Ordinary Revenue £100
Alien Tax, Yr 18 £47 £128 £2
Fictitious Loans
Indirect Taxation £3,671 £1,181 £481
15 & 10, Yr 15 £40
Alien Tax, Yr 18 £24
Loans £9,977
Easter, 1441
15 & 10, Yr 15 £51 £220 £333
15 & 10, Yr 18 £4,986 £196
Special Tax, Yr 14 £3
Indirect Taxation £3,938 £4,933 £886 £100
Alien Tax, Yr 18 £2 £25 £24
Fictitious Loans
Indirect Taxation £3,824 £522
15 & 10, Yr 18 £3,933
Alien Tax, Yr 18 £3 £10
Loans £333
Michaelmas, 1441-2
15 & 10, Yr 14 £40
15 & 10, Yr 15 £7
15 & 10, Yr 18 £7,936 £151 £105 £29
15 & 10, Yr 20 £4,672
Indirect Taxation £3,033 £4,049 £5,541
Alien Tax. Yr 18 £60 £148
Fictitious Loans
Indirect Taxation £1,949 £4,424 £1,967
15 & 10, Yr 20 £29




15 & 10, Yr 15 £1
15 & 10, Yr 18 £166 £37 £89 £67
15 & 10, Yr 20 £3,517 £9,081 £6,920
Special Tax, Yr 14 £2
Indirect Taxation £646 £2,693 £1,623 £692
Clerical Taxation £4,390
Ordinary Revenue £217
Alien Tax, Yr 18 £2 £4
Fictitious Loans
Indirect Taxation £2,790 £937 £2,400





15 & 10, Yr 14 £2
15 & 10, Yr 20 £2,774 £247 £10 £1,135
Indirect Taxation £2,036 £9,525 £2,100 £16,265
Clerical Taxation £19,39
Alien Tax, Yr 18 £88 £20
Alien Tax, Yr 20 £152 £5
Fictitious Loans
Indirect Taxation £2,752 £789 £3,297
Alien Tax, Yr 18 £17
Alien Tax, Yr 20 £50
Loans £12,570
Easter, 1443
15 & 10, Yr 18 £44
15 & 10, Yr 20 £415 £133 £1,507
Indirect Taxation £2,321 £6,662 £922 £291
Clerical Taxation £2,229
Ordinary Revenue £33
Alien Tax, Yr 18 £4
Fictitious Loans




15 & 10, Yr 18 £3
15 & 10, Yr 20 £833
Indirect Taxation £4,615 £412 £1,109 £6,333
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Clerical Taxation £100
Alien Tax, Yr 18 £4 £6 £5
Alien Tax, Yr 20 £9 £3
Fictitious Loans




15 & 10, Yr 18 £29 £66
15 & 10, Yr 20 £11 £13 £16
Indirect Taxation £19,304 £1,074 £2,881 £4,129
Ordinary Revenue £120
Alien Tax, Yr 18 £5 £2
Alien Tax, Yr 20 £2 £17 £4
Fictitious Loans
Indirect Taxation £272 £660 £2,145
Ordinary Revenue £300
15 & 10, Yr 18 £32
15 & 10, Yr 20 £57
Loans £6,711
Michaelmas, 1444-5
15 & 10, Yr 18
Indirect Taxation £9,447 £7,664 £1,278 £1,041
Clerical Taxation £4,830
Ordinary Revenue £21
Alien Tax £10 £4
Fictitious Loans





15 & 10, Yr 20 £10 £4
15 & 10, Yr 23 £141 £6,739 £8,253





15 & 10, Yr 23 £30
Ordinary Revenue £20




15 & 10, Yr 23 £329






Indirect Taxation £3,083 £1,687 £3,203
Loans £2,386
Easter, 1446
15 & 10, Yr 23 £19
15 & 10, Yr 24 £1,493




Indirect Taxation £15,179 £8,346 £500




15 & 10, Yr 24 £12,309 £1,170
Indirect Taxation £460 £4,924 £2,915 £603




Indirect Taxation £9,772 £12,389 £3,367
Loans £4,376
Easter, 1447
15 & 10, Yr 24 £583 £20 £22




Indirect Taxation £10,446 £12,397 591
Loans £700
Michaelmas, 1447-8
15 & 10, Yr 11
15 & 10, Yr 24 £12,863
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Indirect Taxation £8,686 £2,963 £220
Alien Tax £3
Fictitious Loans





15 & 10, Yr 24 £100 £4,050 £100
Indirect Taxation £7,521 £1,495
Clerical Taxation £500
Fictitious Loans
Indirect Taxation £2,278 £420
Loans £600
Michaelmas, 1448-9
15 & 10, Yr 24 £10,183 £27 £8
15 & 10, Yr 27 £475 £5,400 £667
Indirect Taxation £7,670 £7,936 £4,464 £159
Ordinary Revenue £265
Fictitious Loans
Indirect Taxation £5,701 £900 £432
Loans N/A
Easter, 1449
15 & 10, Yr 24 £111
15 & 10, Yr 27 £1,156 £2,417




Indirect Taxation £927 £1,814 £281
Ordinary Revenue £137
Clerical Taxation £80
15 & 10, Yr 27 £4,239
Loans £11,523
Michaelmas, 1449-50
15 & 10, Yr 24 £13 £1 £35 £17
15 & 10, Yr 27 £1,767 £2,429 £2,066 £12,282
Indirect Taxation £306 £4,915 £1,639 £2,966
Clerical Taxation £7,024
Ordinary Revenue £18
Alien Tax £14 £1 £88
Fictitious Loans
207




15 & 10, Yr 27 £6 £100 £277
Indirect Taxation £2,620 £1,963 £678 £608
Clerical Taxation £50
Ordinary Revenue £638
Alien Tax £3 £27
Fictitious Loans
Indirect Taxation £434 £311 £246




15 & 10, Yr 27 £38 £7 £42
Indirect Taxation £7,434 £1,634 £721 £1,200
Clerical Taxation £62
Ordinary  Revenue £270
Alien Tax £6 £10 £40
Fictitious Loans




15 & 10, Yr 24 £2 £9
15 & 10, Yr 27 £28 £55 £24 £556
Indirect Taxation £3,682 £3,131 £382 £660
Clerical Taxation £24
Ordinary Revenue £836
Alien Tax £29 £13 £6
Fictitious Loans





15 & 10, Yr 27 £163 £360 £113
Indirect Taxation £5,761 £1,437 £610 £717




Indirect Taxation £39 £316 £20
Ordinary Revenue £100
15 & 10, Yr 27 28
Loans £1,139
Easter, 1452
15 & 10, Yr 27 £15 £16 £20






15 & 10, Yr 27 £16 £6
15 & 10, Yr 31 £100
Indirect Taxation £6,132 £2,613 £2,516 £148











15 & 10, Yr 27 £2 £46
15 & 10, Yr 31 £67 £9,770 £1,278 £12,682
Indirect Taxation £1,377 £3,331 £1,750 £227




Indirect Taxation £2,720 £1,085 £533
Ordinary Revenue £49






TABULAR INFORMATION REGARDING GROSS AND NET LAY TAX 
REVENUE, 1429–1453
This table contains data regarding the gross yield (assessment) and net yield of the 
fifteenth and tenth of 1402 and each fifteenth and tenth granted during the reign of 
Henry VI.  
Sources: Abbott, ‘Taxation of Personal Property and of Clerical Incomes, 1399 to 
1402’, pp. 474–77; E 359/31, rots. 1-5, 5d-7, 8-9, 10-11, 12-13, 14-15, 16-18, 19-21, 
21d-23, 24-6, 27-9, 30-33.  
Year Assessment In Treasury
1402-3 £37,339 £36,398
1st 15 & 10 1429 £36,655 £35,864
2nd 15 & 10, 1429 £36,655 £35,545
1 & 1/3 15 & 10, 1431 £48,298 £46,688
1/2 15 & 10, 1432 £18,648 £17,940
15 & 10, 1433 £32,385 £30,837
15 & 10,1435 £32,290 £30,999
15 & 10, 1437 £33,623 £31,585
1  1/2 15 & 10s, 1440 £49,015 £48,025
15 & 10, 1442 £33,258 £31,973
1/2 15 & 10, 1445 £16,377 £14,952
1  1/2 15 & 10s, 1446 £44,855 £44,355
15 & 10, 1449 £30,803 £27,947




TABULAR INFORMATION REGARDING GROSS INDIRECT TAX 
REVENUE, 1422–1453
This table contains data regarding the gross yield of the parliamentary subsidies on 
trade – the maltolt and tonnage and poundage – and the wool and cloth customs.  
Sources: S. Jenks, The Enrolled Customs Accounts, vols. 319, 324 and 334.  
Year Maltolt T&P Wool Custom & Cloth Custom
1422-3 £29,406 £4,728 £11,462
1423-4 £27,801 £3,662 £10,199
1424-5 £20,307 £5,109 £9,103
1425-6 £22,509 £8,862 £9,122
1426-7 £25,064 £8,873 £9,348
1427-8 £22,619 £6,023 £8,857
1428-9 £29,739 £7,067 £11,083
1429-30 £12,620 £8,955 £7,007
1430-31 £20,152 £7,249 £8,489
1431-32 £16,915 £7,045 £6,649
1432-3 £15,012 £6,571 £6,114
1433-4 £3,338 £10,439 £4,961
1434-5 £23,947 £10,596 £9,835
1435-6 £7,157 £6,964 £4,318
1437-8 £3,330 £7,900 £6,153
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1438-9 £3,049 £6,706 £6,019
1439-40 £28,837 £8,397 £12,107
1440-1 £12,398 £9,000 £8,285
1441-2 £5,330 £8,701 £6,806
1442-3 £23,966 £8,327 £10,374
1443-4 £22,686 £8,322 £9,932
1444-5 £5,477 £7,541 £6,122
1445-6 £27,691 £6,993 £9,068
1446-7 £3,690 £7,525 £6,913
1447-8 £20,021 £8,243 £12,408
1448-9 £3,686 £6,417 £4,578
1449-50 £20,772 £6,061 £8,576
1450-51 £10,957 £6,183 £6,430
1451-52 £13,962 £5,073 £6,658
1452-53 £10,213 £6,130 £6,053
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BIHR Bulletin of the Institute of Historical Research
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EHR English Historical Review
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The National Archives: Kew
C           Chancery
C 47      Chancery Miscellanea
C 76      Treaty Rolls
E           Exchequer
E 101    Exchequer KR, Various Accounts
E 122    Exchequer KR, Customs Accounts
E 179    Exchequer KR, Lay and Clerical Tax Accounts
E 28      Exchequer TR, Council and Privy Seal
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E 159    Exchequer KR, Memoranda Rolls
E 163    Exchequer KR, Miscellanea 
E 356    Exchequer LTR, Customs Accounts, enrolled
E 359    Exchequer LTR, Subsidy Accounts, enrolled
E 368    Exchequer LTR, Memoranda Rolls
E 401    Exchequer of Receipt, Receipt Rolls
E 403    Exchequer of Receipt, Issue Rolls
E 404    Exchequer of Receipt, Warrants for Issues
SC        Special Collections
SC 8     Ancient Petitions
216
PRINTED PRIMARY SOURCES
Aquinas, T.  Selected Political Writings, ed. A. P. D’Entreves (Oxford, 1959).
Calendar of the Close Rolls (for Henry VI’s reign), 6 vols, HMSO (London, 1933–
9).
Calendar of the Fine Rolls, 15–19, HMSO (London, 1935–9).
Calendar of the Patent Rolls (for Henry VI’s reign), HMSO (Norwich, 1901–10).
Carafa, D.  De Regis et boni principis officio (Naples, 1668).  
Chronicle of John Strecche, ed. F. Taylor, Bulletin of the John Rylands Library, 16 
(1932).
Foedora, Conventiones et Litterae, ed. T. Rymer, 20 vols (London, 1727–35).
Fortescue, J.  De Laudibus Legum Anglie (Cambridge, 1942).
- The Governance of England, ed. C. Plummer  (Oxford, 1885).  
Gesta Henrici Quinti, ed. F. Taylor & J. S. Roskell (Oxford, 1975).
Henrici Quinti Gesta, ed. B. Williams (London, 1850).  
Inquisitions and Assessments relating to Feudal Aids, 1284–1431, 6 vols, HMSO 
(London, 1899–1920).
Letters and Papers Illustrative of the Wars of the English in France during the Reign 
of Henry VI, ed. J. Stevenson, 2 vols.  Rolls Series (1861-4).
Proceedings and Ordinances of the Privy Council of England, ed. H. Nicolas, vols 
1–6 (London, 1834–7).
Rotuli Parliamentorum, 6 vols, Record Com. (London, 1767–77).
Six Town Chronicles of England, ed. R. Flenley (Oxford, 1911).  
The Enrolled Customs Accounts, ed. S. Jenks, 11 vols (List and Index Society, 2004–
12).  
The Parliament Rolls of Medieval England, ed. & trans. P. A. Brand, A. Curry, C. 
Given-Wilson, R. E. Horrox, G. H. Martin, W. M. Ormrod & J. R. S. Phillips 
(Internet version, http://www.sd-editions.com/PROME. Scholarly Digital Editions, 
Leicester: 2005).  
The St Albans Chronicle, ed. V. H. Galbraith (Oxford, 1937).  
217
SECONDARY SOURCES
Abbott, I. R.  ‘Taxation of Personal Property and of Clerical Incomes, 1399 to 1402’, 
Speculum, 18 (1942), pp. 471–98. 
Acheson, I.  A Gentry Community: Leicestershire in the Fifteenth Century, c. 1422–
c. 1485 (Cambridge, 1992).  
Allmand, C. T.  Henry V (London, 1992).
Alsop, J. D.  ‘The Exchequer in Late Medieval Government, c. 1485–1530’, in 
Aspects of Late Medieval Government and Society. Essays presented to J. R. Lander, 
ed. J. G. Rowe (Toronto, 1986), pp. 179–212.  
Ashton, R.  ‘Deficit Finance in the Reign of James I’, Ec.HR, 2nd series, 10 (1957), 
pp. 15–29. 
- The Crown and the Money Market, 1603–1640 (Oxford, 1960).  
Baker, R. L.  The English Customs Service, 1307 – 1343: A Study of Medieval 
Administration (Philadelphia, 1961).  
Baldwin, J. F.  The King’s Council in England in the Later Middle Ages (Oxford, 
1913).  
Barron, C. M.  ‘The Tyranny of Richard II’, BIHR, 41 (1968), pp. 1–18.  
Bean, J. M. W.  ‘Landlords’, in The Agrarian History of England and Wales, 3: 
1350–1500, ed. E. Miller (Cambridge, 1991), pp. 526–86.
- 'The Financial Position of Richard, Duke of York', in War and Government 
in the Middle Ages: Essays in Honour of J. O. Prestwich, ed. J. Gillingham & 
J. C. Holt (Cambridge, 1984), pp. 182–98.
Bolton, J. L.  ‘London Merchants and the Borromei Bank in the 1430s: The Role of 
Local Credit Networks’, in Parliament, Personalities and Power: Papers presented 
to Linda S Clark, ed. H. Kleineke (Woodbridge, 2011), pp. 53–73.
- The Medieval English Economy, 1150–1500 (London, 1980).  
Bonney, R. J.  ‘Introduction’, in Economic Systems and State Finance, ed. R. J. 
Bonney (Oxford, 1995), pp. 1–18.  
- ‘Early Modern Theories of State Finance’, in Economic Systems and State 
Finance, ed. R. J. Bonney (Oxford, 1995), pp. 163–229.
Bonney, R. J. & Ormrod, W. M.  ‘Introduction.  Crises, Revolutions and Self–
Sustained Growth: Towards a Conceptual Model of Change in Fiscal History’, in 
Crises, Revolutions and Self–Sustained Growth: Essays in European Fiscal History, 
218
1130–1830, ed. W. M.  Ormrod, M. Bonney & R. J. Bonney (Stamford, 1999), pp. 
1–21.
Brennan, G. & Buchanan, J. M.  The Power to Tax: Analytical Foundations of a 
Fiscal Constitution (Cambridge, 1980)
Britnell, R. H.  ‘Tax–Collecting in Colchester, 1487-1502’, Historical Research, 79 
(2006), pp. 477-87.
- The Commercialisation of English Society, 1000–1500 (Cambridge, 1993). 
- ‘The Economic Context’, in The Wars of the Roses, ed. A. J. Pollard (New 
York, 1995), pp. 41-64.  
- The English Economy and the Government, 1450–1550’, in The End of the 
Middle Ages? England in the Fifteenth and Sixteenth Centuries, ed. J. L. 
Watts (Stroud, 1998), pp. 89–116.
Bridbury, A. R.  ‘English Provincial Towns in the Later Middle Ages’, Ec.HR, 2nd
series, 34 (1981), pp. 1–24.
- Medieval English Clothmaking: an economic survey (London, 1982).  
Brown, A. L.  ‘Parliament, c. 1377–1422’, in The English Parliament in the Middle 
Ages, ed. R. G. Davies & J. H. Denton (Manchester, 1981), pp. 109–40.
Brown, H. P. & Hopkins, S. V.  A Perspective of Wages and Prices (Abingdon, 
1981).  
Buck, M. C.  Politics, Finance and the Church in the Reign of Edward II
(Cambridge, 1983).  
- ‘The Reform of the Exchequer, 1316–1326’, EHR, 98 (1983), pp. 241–60. 
Carpenter, M. C.  ‘Henry VI and the Deskilling of the Royal Bureaucracy’, in 
English and Continental Perspectives, ed. L. Clark (Woodbridge, 2010), pp. 1–37. 
- Locality and Polity: A Study of Warwickshire Landed Society, 1401–1499
(Cambridge, 1992).
- The Wars of the Roses: Politics and the Constitution in England, c. 1437–
1509 (Cambridge, 1997).  
Carus–Wilson, E. M.  ‘Evidences of Economic Growth on some Fifteenth–Century 
Manors’, Ec.HR, 2nd series, 12 (1959), pp. 190–205.
Carus–Wilson, E. M. & Coleman, O.  England’s Export Trade, 1275–1547 (Oxford, 
1963).  
Cassidy, R.  ‘Adventus Vicecomitum and the Financial Crisis of Henry III’s reign, 
1250–72’, EHR, 126 (2011), pp. 614–27.  
Castor, H.  The King, the Crown and the Duchy of Lancaster: Public Authority and 
Private Power, 1399–1461 (Oxford, 2000).  
219
Cavill, P. R.  The English Parliaments of Henry VII, 1485–1504 (Oxford, 2009).
Cherry, M.  ‘The Struggle for Power in Mid–Fifteenth Century Devonshire’, in 
Patronage, the Crown and the Provinces in Later Medieval England, ed. R. A. 
Griffiths (Gloucester, 1981), pp. 123–44.
Childs, W. R.  ‘Anglo–Portuguese Trade in the Fifteenth Century’, TRHS, 6th series, 
2 (1992), pp. 195–219. 
Chrimes, S. B.  ‘The Pretensions of the Duke of Gloucester in 1422’, EHR, 45 
(1930), pp. 101-3.  
Curry, A. ‘Two Kingdoms, One King: the Treaty of Troyes (1420) and the Creation 
of a Double Monarchy of England and France’, in ‘The Contending Kingdoms’: 
France and England, 1430–1700, ed. G. Richardson (Aldershot, 2008), pp. 23–41.
de Roover, R.  Rise and Decline of the Medici Bank, 1397–1494 (Cambridge, 1963).  
Dobson, R. B.  ‘Urban Decline in Late Medieval England’, TRHS, 5th series, 27 
(1977), pp. 1–22.
Dockray, K.  ‘The Origins of the Wars of the Roses’, in The Wars of the Roses, ed. 
A. J. Pollard (New York, 1995), pp. 65–88.  
Dodd, G.  Justice and Grace: Private Petitioning and the English Parliament in the 
Late Middle Ages (Oxford, 2007). 
- ‘The Lords, Taxation and the Community of Parliament in the 1370s and 
early 1380s’, Parliamentary History, 20 (2001), pp. 287–310.  
Dyer, A.  Decline and Growth in English Towns, 1400–1640 (Basingstoke, 1991).  
Dyer, C.  ‘A Small Landholder in the Fifteenth Century’, Midland History, 1 (1972), 
pp. 1–14.
- ‘Costs and Benefits of English Direct Taxation, 1275–1525’, in La Fiscalita 
Nell'economia Europea Secc. XIII–XVIII, ed. S. Cavaciocchi (Prato, 2008), 
pp. 909-24.
- Lords and Peasants in a Changing Society: The Estates of the Bishopric of 
Worcester, 680–1540 (Cambridge, 1980).  
- ‘Taxation and Communities in Late Medieval England’, in Progress and 
Problems in Medieval England, ed. R. H. Britnell & J. Hatcher (Cambridge, 
1996), pp. 168–90.  
Edwards, J. G.  ‘Confirmatio Cartarum and Baronial Grievances in 1297’, EHR, 58 
(1943), pp. 147–71.
- ‘The Plena Potestas of the English Parliamentary Representatives’, in
Historical Studies of the English Parliament, ed. E. B. Fryde & E. Miller, 2 
vols (Cambridge, 1970), 1, pp. 136–49.
220
Elton, G. R.  ‘Taxation for War and Peace in Early Tudor England’, in War and 
Economic Development: Essays in Memory of David Joslin, ed. J. M. Winter 
(Cambridge, 1975), pp. 33–48.
- The Tudor Revolution in Government: Administrative Changes in the Reign 
of Henry VIII (Cambridge, 1953).  
Farmer, D. L.  ‘Prices and Wages, 1350–1500’, in The Agrarian History of England 
and Wales, 3: 1350–1500, ed. E. Miller (Cambridge, 1991), pp. 431–525.  
Fox, H. S. A.  ‘Tenant Farming and Farmers: Devon and Cornwall’, in The Agrarian 
History of England and Wales, 3: 1350–1500, ed. E. Miller (Cambridge, 1991), pp. 
722–43.
Fryde, E. B.  ‘Economic Depression in England in the Second and Third Quarters of 
the Fifteenth Century: Effective Resistances of Tenant to Landlords as one of the 
Consequences: Defiances and Rent Strikes’, in Violence and Medieval Society, ed. 
R. W. Kaeuper (Woodbridge, 2000), pp. 215–26.
- ‘Financial Resources of Edward III to the Netherlands, 1337–40’, Revue 
Belge de Philologie et d’histoire, 45 (1967), pp. 142–216.
- ‘Materials for the Study of Edward III’s Credit Operations, 1327–48’, BIHR, 
22 (1949), pp. 105–38.
- ‘Materials for the Study of Edward III’s Credit Operations, 1327–48’, BIHR, 
23 (1950), pp. 1–30.
- Peasants and Landlords in Later Medieval England, c. 1380–c. 1525
(Stroud, 1996).  
Fryde, E. B. & Fryde, M. M.  ‘Public Credit, with Special Reference to North 
Western Europe’, in The Cambridge Economic History of Europe, 3, Economic 
Organisation and Policies in the Middle Ages, ed. M. M. Postan, E. E. Rich & E. 
Miller (Cambridge, 1963), pp. 430–553.
Given–Wilson, C.  The Royal Household and the King’s Affinity: Service, Politics 
and Finance in England, 1360–1413 (New Haven, 1986).
Gray, H. L.  ‘English Foreign Trade from 1446 to 1482’, in Studies in English Trade 
in the Fifteenth Century, ed. E. Power & M. M. Postan (London, 1933), pp. 1–38.
- ‘Incomes from Land in England in 1436’, EHR, 49 (1934), pp. 607–39.
Green, J. A.  The Government of England under Henry I (Cambridge, 1986).
- ‘William Rufus, Henry I and the Royal Demesne’, History, 64 (1979), pp. 
337–52.  
Griffiths, R. A.  The Reign of Henry VI: The Exercise of Royal Authority, 1422–1461
(Stroud, 1981).
221
Hadwin, J. F.  ‘The Medieval Lay Subsidies and Economic History’, Ec.HR, 2nd
series, 36 (1983), pp. 200–17.  
Hare, J. N.  ‘The Wiltshire Rising of 1450: Political and Economic Discontent in 
Mid–Fifteenth Century England’, Southern History, 4 (1982), pp. 13–31.
- ‘Growth and Recession in the Fifteenth–Century Economy: the Wiltshire 
Textile Industry and the Countryside’, Ec.HR, 2nd series, 52 (1999), pp. 1–26.
Harriss, G. L.  ‘Aids, Loans and Benevolences’, Historical Journal, 6 (1963), pp. 1–
19.
- ‘Budgeting at the Medieval Exchequer’, in War, Government and 
Aristocracy in the British Isles, c. 1150–1500: Essays in Honour of Michael 
Prestwich, ed. C. Given–Wilson, A. Kettle & L. Scales (Woodbridge, 2008), 
pp. 179–96.  
- Cardinal Beaufort. A Study of Lancastrian Ascendancy and Decline (Oxford, 
1988).
- ‘Fictitious Loans’, Ec.HR, 2nd series, 8 (1955-6), pp. 187–99.
- ‘Financial Policy’, in Henry V. The Practice of Kingship, ed. G. L. Harriss 
(Oxford, 1985), pp. 157–79.
- King, Parliament and Public Finance in Medieval England to 1369 (Oxford, 
1975).
- ‘Marmaduke Lumley and the Exchequer Crisis of 1446–9’, in Aspects of Late 
Medieval Government and Society. Essays presented to J. R. Lander, ed. J. 
G. Rowe (Toronto, 1986), pp. 143–78.
- ‘Medieval Doctrines in the Debates on Supply, 1610–1629’, in Faction and 
Parliament. Essays on early Stuart History, ed. K. M. Sharpe (Oxford, 1978), 
pp. 73–103.
- ‘Medieval Government and Statecraft’, Past and Present, 25 (1963), pp. 8–
39.
- ‘Parliamentary Taxation and the Origins of Appropriation of Supply in 
England, 1207–1340’, in Gouvernés et Gouvernants (Sociéte Jean Bodin, 
Brussels, 1965), pp. 625–54.
- ‘Political Society and the Growth of Government in Late Medieval England’, 
Past and Present, 183 (1993), pp. 28–57.
- ‘Preference at the Medieval Exchequer’, BIHR, 30 (1957), pp. 17–40.
- ‘Richard, Duke of York and the Royal Household’, in Soldiers, Nobles and 
Gentlemen.  Essays in Honour of Maurice Keen, ed. P. Coss & C. Tyerman 
(Woodbridge, 2009), pp. 321–334.
- Shaping the Nation, England 1360–1461 (Oxford, 2005).  
222
- ‘The Management of Parliament’, in Henry V. The Practice of Kingship, ed. 
G. L. Harriss (Oxford, 1985), pp. 137–58.
- ‘The Struggle for Calais. An Aspect of the Rivalry between Lancaster and 
York’, EHR, 75 (1960), pp. 30–63.
- ‘Theory and Practice in Royal Taxation: Some Observations’, EHR, 97 
(1982), pp. 811–19.
- ‘Thomas Cromwell’s “New Principle” of Taxation’, EHR, 93 (1978), pp. 
721–38.
- ‘War and the Emergence of the English Parliament, 1297–1360’, Journal of 
Medieval History, 2 (1976), pp. 35–56.
- Review of Wolffe 1981, EHR, 97 (1982), pp. 840–2.
Harvey, P. D. A.  ‘The English Inflation of 1180–1220’, in Peasants, Knights and 
Heretics: Studies in Medieval English Social History, ed. R. H. Hilton (Cambridge, 
1976), pp. 57–84.  
Hatcher, J.  Plague, Population and the English Economy, 1348–1540 (London, 
1977).
- ‘The Great Slump of the Mid–Fifteenth Century’, in Progress and Problems 
in Medieval England, ed. R. H. Britnell & J. Hatcher (Cambridge, 1996), pp. 
237–272.  
- ‘Unreal Wages: Long–Run Living Standards and the ‘Golden Age’ of the 
Fifteenth Century’, in Commercial Activity, Markets and Entrepreneurs in 
the Middle Ages: Essays in Honour of Richard Britnell, ed. B. Dodds & C. D. 
Liddy (Woodbridge, 2011), pp. 1–24.  
Haward, W. I.  ‘The Financial Relations between the Lancastrian Government and 
the Merchants of the Staple from 1449 to 1461’, in Studies in English Trade in the 
Fifteenth Century, ed. E. Power & M. M. Postan (London, 1933), pp. 293–320. 
Hicks, M. A.  The Wars of the Roses (New Haven, 2010).  
Holt, J. C.  Magna Carta (Cambridge, 1992).
- ‘The Loss of Normandy and Royal Finance’, in War and Government in the 
Middle Ages: Essays in Honour of J. O. Prestwich, ed. J. Gillingham & J.C. 
Holt (Cambridge, 1984), pp. 92–105.  
Horrox, R.  ‘Financial Memoranda of the Reign of Edward V’, Camden Miscellany, 
29 (Camden Society, 4th series, 34, 1987), pp. 200–72.  
Hoyle, R. W.  ‘War and Public Finance’, in The Reign of Henry VIII: Politics, Policy 
and Piety, ed. D. MacCulloch (Basingstoke, 1995), pp. 75–100.
Isenmann, E.  ‘Medieval and Renaissance Theories of State Finance’, in Economic 
Systems and State Finance, ed. R. J. Bonney (Oxford, 1995), pp. 21–52.
223
Jenkinson, H. & Broom, D.  ‘An Exchequer Statement of Receipts and Issues, 1339-
40’, EHR, 58 (1943), pp. 210–16.  
Jurkowski, M., Smith., C. L. & Crook, D.  Lay Taxes in England and Wales, 1188–
1688 (London, 1998).
Kantorowicz, E.  The King’s Two Bodies (Princeton, 1957).  
Kershaw, I.  ‘The Great Famine and Agrarian Crisis in England, 1315–22’, Past and 
Present, 59 (1973), pp. 3–50.  
Kirby, J. L.  ‘The Issues of the Lancastrian Exchequer and Lord Cromwell’s 
Estimates of 1433’, BIHR, 24 (1951), pp. 121–51.
Kleineke, H.  ‘The Commission De Mutuo Faciendo in the Reign of Henry VI’, 
EHR, 116 (2001), pp. 1–30.
Korner, M.  ‘Public Credit’, in Economic Systems and State Finance, ed. R. J. 
Bonney (Oxford, 1995), pp. 507–38.
Lander, J. R.  ‘Council, Administration and Councillors, 1461–85’, in Crown and 
Nobility, 1450–1509 (London, 1976), pp. 191–219.  
- ‘Edward IV: the Modern Legend and a Revision’, in Crown and Nobility, 
1450–1509’ (London, 1976), pp. 159–70. 
- ‘Introduction: Aspects of Fifteenth-Century Studies’, in Crown and Nobility, 
1450–1509 (London, 1976), pp. 1–56.  
- Government and Community: England, 1450–1509 (London, 1980).
- The Limitations of English Monarchy in the Later Middle Ages (London, 
1989).  
Latham, R. E.  Revised Medieval Latin Wordlist from British and Irish Sources
(Oxford, 2008).  
Lloyd, T. H.  England and the German Hanse, 1157–1611 (Cambridge, 1991).
- The English Wool Trade in the Middle Ages (Cambridge, 1977).  
- The Movement of Wool Prices in Medieval England (Cambridge, 1973).  
MacKay, A.  Spain in the Middle Ages: From Frontier to Empire, 1000–1500
(London, 1977).
Maddicott, J. R.  ‘Magna Carta and the Local Community, 1215–59’, Past and 
Present, 102  (1984), pp. 25–65.
- ‘Parliament and the Constituencies, 1272–1377’, in The English Parliament 
in the Middle Ages, ed. R. G. Davies & J. H. Denton (Manchester, 1981), pp. 
61–87.  
- The Origins of the English Parliament, 924–1327 (Oxford, 2010).
224
Mate, M. E.  ‘Pastoral Farming in South–East England in the Fifteenth Century’, 
Ec.HR, 2nd series, 40 (1987), pp. 523–36.
- ‘Tenant Farming and Tenant Farmers: Kent and Sussex’, in The Agrarian 
History of England and Wales, 3: 1350–1500, ed. E. Miller (Cambridge, 
1991), pp. 680–703.
- ‘The Economic and Social Roots of Medieval Popular Rebellion: Sussex in 
1450–1’, Ec.HR, 2nd series, 45 (1992), pp. 661–76.
McFarlane, K. B.  ‘At the Deathbed of Cardinal Beaufort’, in England in the 
Fifteenth Century (London, 1981), pp. 115–37.
- ‘Bastard Feudalism’, in England in the Fifteenth Century (London, 1981), 
pp. 23–44.
- ‘England: the Lancastrian Kings, 1399–1461’, in The Cambridge Medieval 
History. Vol. 8, The Close of the Middle Ages, ed. C. W. Previte-Orton & Z. 
N. Brooke (Cambridge, 1936), pp. 363–416.
- ‘Henry IV’s Government: Council, Parliament, Finance’, in Lancastrian 
Kings and Lollard Knights (Oxford, 1972), pp. 78–101.  
- ‘Loans to the Lancastrian Kings, the Problem of Inducement’, in England in 
the Fifteenth Century (London, 1981), pp. 57–78.  
- The Nobility of Later Medieval England: The Ford Lectures and Related 
Studies (Oxford, 1973). 
- ‘The Wars of the Roses’, in England in the Fifteenth Century (London, 
1981), pp. 231–67.
- ‘War and Society, 1300–1600’, in England in the Fifteenth Century (London, 
1981) pp. 139–50.
McHardy, A. K.  ‘Clerical Taxation in Fifteenth–Century England: the Clergy as 
Agents of the Crown’, in The Church, Politics and Patronage in the Fifteenth 
Century, ed. R. B. Dobson (Gloucester, 1984), pp. 169–92.  
Miller, E.  ‘The Economic Policies of Governments’, in The Cambridge Economic 
History of Europe, 3, Economic Organisation and Policies in the Middle Ages, ed. 
M. M. Postan, E. E. Rich & E. Miller (Cambridge, 1963), pp. 281–376.
Mills, M. H.  ‘Adventus Vicecomitum, 1258–72’, EHR, 36 (1921), pp. 482–96.
- ‘The Reforms at the Exchequer, 1232–42’, TRHS, 4th series, 10 (1927), pp. 
111–33.  
Mitchell, S. K.  Studies in Taxation under John and Henry III (New Haven, 1914).
- Taxation in Medieval England (New Haven, 1951).
225
Munro, J. H.  ‘An Economic Aspect of the Collapse of the Anglo–Burgundian 
Alliance, 1428–1442’, in Bullion Flows and Monetary Policies in England and the 
Low Countries, 1350–1500 (Aldershot, 1992), pp. 225–44.
- ‘Bullionism and the Bill of Exchange in England, 1272–1663: A Study in 
Monetary Management and Popular Prejudice’, in Bullion Flows and 
Monetary Policies in England and the Low Countries, 1350–1500
(Aldershot, 1992), pp. 169–239.
- ‘Bullion Flows and Monetary Contraction in Late–Medieval England and the 
Low Countries’, in Bullion Flows and Monetary Policies in England and the 
Low Countries, 1350–1500 (Aldershot, 1992), pp. 97–158.
- ‘Industrial Transformations in the North–West European Textile Trades, c. 
1290–c. 1340: Economic Progress or Economic Crisis?', in Before the Black 
Death. Studies in the ‘Crisis’ of the Early Fourteenth Century, ed. B. M. S. 
Campbell (Manchester, 1991), pp. 110–48.
- Wool, Cloth and Gold. The Struggle for Bullion in Anglo–Burgundian Trade, 
1340–1472 (Toronto, 1972).
Myers, A. R.  ‘A Parliamentary Debate of the Mid–Fifteenth Century’, in Crown, 
Household and Parliament in Fifteenth Century England, ed. C. H. Clough (London, 
1985), pp. 69–86.
- ‘A Parliamentary Debate of 1449’, in Crown, Household and Parliament in 
Fifteenth Century England, ed. C. H. Clough (London, 1985), pp. 87–92.
- England in the Late Middle Ages (Harmondsworth, 1952).
Nicholas, D.  ‘The English Trade at Bruges in the Last Years of Edward III’, Journal 
of Medieval History, 5 (1979), pp. 23–61.
O’Brien, P. K.  ‘Contentions of the Purse between England and its European Rivals 
from Henry V to George IV: a Conversation with Michael Mann’, in Twenty Years 
of the Journal of Historical Sociology, Vol 1: Essays on the British State, ed. Y–S. 
Wong & D. Sayer (Oxford, 2008), pp. 321–43.
- ‘Finance and Taxation’, in A Companion to Eighteenth–Century Britain, ed. 
H. T. Dickinson (Oxford, 2002), pp. 30–9.
- ‘Fiscal Exceptionalism: Great Britain and its European Rivals from Civil 
War to Triumph at Trafalgar and Waterloo’, in The Political Economy of 
British Historical Experience, 1688–1914, ed. D. N. Winch & P. K. O’Brien 
(Oxford, 2002), pp. 245–65.
O’Brien, P. K. & Hunt. P.  ‘England, 1485–1815’, in The Rise of the Fiscal State, c. 
1200–1815, ed. R. J. Bonney (Oxford, 1999), pp. 53–101.
- ‘The Emergence and Consolidation of Excises in the English Fiscal System 
before the Glorious Revolution’, British Tax Review (1997), pp. 35–8.  
226
- ‘Excises and the Rise of a Fiscal State in England, 1586–1688, in Crises, 
Revolutions and Self-Sustained Growth: Essays in European Fiscal History, 
1130–1830, ed. W. M. Ormrod, M. Bonney & R. J. Bonney (Stamford, 1999) 
pp. 198–223.
- ‘The Rise of a Fiscal State in England, 1485–1815’, in Historical Research, 
66 (1993), pp. 129–76.
Ormrod, W. M.  ‘Agenda for Legislation, c. 1322–1340’. EHR, 105 (1990), pp. 1–
33.  
- ‘An Experiment in Taxation. The English Parish Subsidy of 1371, Speculum, 
63 (1988), pp. 58–82.
- ‘England in the Middle Ages’, in The Rise of the Fiscal State in Europe, 
1250–1500, ed. R. J. Bonney (Oxford, 1999), pp. 19–52.
- ‘Finance and Trade under Richard II’, in Richard II. The Art of Kingship, ed. 
A. Goodman & J. L. Gillespie (Oxford, 1999), pp. 155–86.
- ‘Government Records: Fiscality, Archives and the Economic Historian', in 
Dove va la Storia Economica? Metodi e Prospettive Secc. XIII–XVIII, ed. F. 
Ammannatti (Prato, 2011), pp. 197–225.
- ‘Henry V and the English Taxpayer’, in Henry V. New Interpretations, ed. G. 
Dodd (Woodbridge, 2013), pp. 187–216.  
- ‘Parliament, Political Economy and State Formation in Later Medieval 
England’, in Power and Persuasion. Essays on the Art of State Building in 
Honour of W. P. Blockmans, ed. P. Hoppenbrouwers, A. Janse & R. Steins 
(Turnhout, 2010), pp. 123–39.
- Political Life in Medieval England, 1300–1450 (London, 1995).
- ‘Political Theory in Practice.  The Forced Loan on English Overseas Trade of 
1317-1318’, BIHR, 64 (1991), pp. 204–15.
- ‘Poverty and Privilege. The Fiscal Burden in England (XIIIth to XVth
Centuries)’, in La Fiscalita Nell'economia Europea Secc. XIII–XVIII, ed. S. 
Cavaciocchi (Prato, 2008), pp. 637–56.  
- ‘State–Building and State Finance under Edward I’, in England in the 
Thirteenth Century, Proceedings of the 1989 Harlaxton Symposium, ed. W. 
M. Ormrod (Stamford, 1991), pp. 15–36.  
- 'The Crown and the English Economy, 1290–1348', in Before the Black 
Death: Studies in the 'Crisis' of the Early Fourteenth Century, ed. B. M. S. 
Campbell (Manchester, 1991), pp. 149–83. 
- ‘The Domestic Response to the Hundred Years War’, in Arms, Armies and 
Fortifications in the Hundred Years War, ed. A. Curry & M. Hughes 
(Woodbridge, 1994), pp. 83–101.
227
- ‘The English Crown and the Customs, 1349–63’, Ec.HR, 2nd series, 40 
(1987), pp. 27–40.
- ‘The English Government and the Black Death of 1348–9’, in England in the 
Fourteenth Century. Proceedings of the 1985 Harlaxton Conference, ed. W. 
M. Ormrod (Woodbridge, 1985), pp. 175–88.
- ‘The New Political History. Recent Trends in the Historiography of Later 
Medieval England’, in New Approaches to the Historiography of Late 
Medieval and Early Modern Europe. Selected Proceedings of Two 
International Conferences at the Royal Danish Academy of Sciences and 
Letters in Copenhagen in 1997 and 1999, ed. T. Dahlerup & P. Ingesman 
(Copenhagen, 1999), pp. 37–59.
- ‘The Origins of Tunnage and Poundage. Parliament and the Estate of 
Merchants in the Fourteenth Century’, Parliamentary History, 28 (2009), pp. 
209–27.
- ‘The Protecolla Rolls and English Government Finance, 1353–1364’, EHR, 
102 (1987), pp. 622–632.  
- 'The West European Monarchies in the Later Middle Ages', in Economic 
Systems and State Finance, ed. R. J. Bonney (Oxford, 1995), pp. 123–60.
Payling, S. J.  ‘The Ampthill Dispute: A Study in Aristocratic Lawlessness and the 
Breakdown of Lancastrian Government, EHR, 104 (1989), pp. 881–907.
Peterson, E. L.  ‘From Domain State to Tax State: Synthesis and Interpretation’, 
Scandinavian Economic History Review, 23 (1975), pp. 116–48.
Phelps–Brown, E. H. & Hopkins, S. V.  A Perspective on Wages and Prices
(London, 1981).  
Pollard, A. J.  ‘Estate Management in the Later Middle Ages: The Talbots and 
Whitchurch, 1383–1525’, Ec.HR, 2nd series, 25 (1972), pp. 553–66.
- North–Eastern England during the Wars of the Roses (Oxford, 1990).
- ‘The North–Eastern Economy and the Agrarian Crisis of 1438–40’, Northern 
History, 25 (1989), pp. 88–105.
- The Wars of the Roses (Basingstoke, 1988). 
Post, G.  ‘Plena Potestas and Consent in Medieval Assemblies’, Traditio, 1 (1943), 
pp. 355–408.  
Postan, M. M.  ‘Credit in Medieval Trade’, in Medieval Trade and Finance
(Cambridge, 1973), pp. 1–27.
- The Economic and Political Relations of England and the Hanse from 1400–
1475’, in Studies in English Trade in the Fifteenth Century, ed. E. Power & 
M. M. Postan (London, 1933), pp. 91–154.
228
- ‘The Fifteenth Century’, in Essays on Medieval Agriculture and General 
Problems of the Medieval Economy (Cambridge, 1973), pp. 41–8.
Power, E.  The Wool Trade in Medieval English History (Oxford, 1941).
- ‘The Wool Trade in the Fifteenth Century’, in Studies in English Trade in the 
Fifteenth Century, ed. E. Power & M. M. Postan (London, 1933), pp. 39–90.
Power, E. & Postan, M. M.  ‘Tables of Enrolled Customs and Subsidy Accounts’, in 
Studies in English Trade in the Fifteenth Century, ed. E. Power & M. M. Postan 
(London, 1933), pp. 321–64.
Prestwich, M. C.   ‘An Estimate by the Commons of Royal Revenue in England 
under Richard II’, Parliamentary History, 3 (1984), pp. 147–55.
- ‘Early Fourteenth–Century Exchange Rates’, Ec.HR, 2nd series, 32 (1979), 
pp. 470–82.
- Edward I (London, 1988).
- ‘Edward I’s Monetary Policies and their Consequences’, Ec.HR, 2nd series, 
22 (1969), pp. 406–16.
- English Politics in the Thirteenth Century (Basingstoke, 1990).
- ‘Exchequer and Wardrobe in the Later Years of Edward I’, BIHR, 46 (1973), 
pp. 1–10.  
- ‘Parliament and the Community of the Realm in Fourteenth Century 
England’, Parliament and Community, 14 (1983), pp. 5–24.
- ‘The Ordinances of 1311’, in Politics and Crisis in Fourteenth Century 
England, ed. J. Taylor & W. Childs, (Gloucester, 1990), pp. 1–18.
- War, Politics and Finance under Edward I (London, 1972).
Pugh, T. B.  ‘The Estates, Finances and Regal Aspirations of Richard Plantagenet 
(1411–60)’, in Revolution and Consumption in Late Medieval England, ed. M. A. 
Hicks (Woodbridge, 2001), pp. 71–88.
Ramsay, J. H.  Lancaster and York: A Century of English History, A.D. 1399–1485, 
2 vols (Oxford, 1892).
Ricca–Salerno, G.  Storia delle Dottrine Finanziarie in Italia (Palermo, 1881).
Rigby, S. H.  ‘Late Medieval Urban Prosperity: The Evidence of the Lay Subsidies’, 
Ec.HR, 2nd series, 39 (1986), pp. 411–16.
- ‘Urban Decline in the Later Middle Ages : Some Problems in Interpreting the 
Statistical Data’, Urban History Yearbook, 1979, pp. 46–59.
Roesenthal, J.  ‘The Estates and Finances of Richard, Duke of York (1411–1460)’, 
Studies in Medieval and Renaissance England, 2 (1965), pp. 115–204.
229
Rogers, A.  ‘Henry IV, the Commons and Taxation’, Mediaeval Studies, 31 (1969), 
pp. 44–70.
Ross, C. D.  Edward IV (London, 1974).
- ‘The Reign of Edward IV’, in Fifteenth Century England, 1399–1509: 
Studies in Politics and Society, ed. S. B. Chrimes, C. D. Ross & R. A. 
Griffiths (Manchester, 1972), pp. 49–66.
Ross, C. D. & Pugh, T. B.  ‘The English Baronage and the Income Tax of 1436’, 
BIHR, 26 (1953), pp. 1–28.
Roskell, J. S.  The Commons and their Speakers in English Parliaments, 1376–1523
(Manchester, 1965).  
- 'William Tresham of Sywell', Northamptonshire Past and Present , 2 (1957), 
pp. 189-203.  
Rothbard, M. N.  Economic Thought Before Adam Smith. An Austrian Perspective 
on the History of Economic Thought (Auburn, 1995).
Schumpeter, J. A.  History of Economic Analysis (New York, 1954).
- ‘The Crisis of the Tax State’, International Economic Papers, 4 (New York, 
1954), pp. 5–38.
Sherborne, J.  ‘The Cost of English Warfare with France in the Later Fourteenth 
Century’, in War, Politics and Culture in Fourteenth–Century England, ed. J. A. 
Tuck (London, 1994), pp. 55-70.  
Smith, W.  ‘The Financial Priorities of Lancastrian Government, 1450–55’, in Social 
Attitudes and Political Structures in the Fifteenth Century, ed. T. Thornton (Stroud, 
2000), pp. 168-183.
Somerville, R.  History of the Duchy of Lancaster (London, 1953). 
Stacey, R. C.  Politics, Policy and Finance under Henry III, 1216–1245 (Oxford, 
1987).
Stansfield, R. E.  Political Elites in South West England, 1450–1500: Politics, 
Governance and the Wars of the Roses (Lampeter, 2009).  
Steel, A. B.  ‘The Financial Background of the Wars of the Roses’, History, 40 
(1955), pp.  18–30.
- The Receipt of the Exchequer, 1377–1485 (Cambridge, 1957).
Stubbs, W.  The Constitutional History of England, 3 vols (Oxford, 1875–8).
Tout, T. F.  Chapters in the Administrative History of Medieval England, 6 vols 
(Manchester, 1920–33).
- The Place of Edward II in English History, ed. H. Johnstone (Manchester, 
1936).
230
Tracy, J. D.  A Financial Revolution in the Habsburg Netherlands: Renten and 
Renteniers in the County of Holland, 1515–1565 (Berkeley, 1985).
- ‘Taxation and State Debt’, in Handbook of European History, 1400–1600: 
Late Middle Ages, Reformation and Renaissance. 1. Structures and 
Assertions, ed. T. A. Brady Jnr, H. A. Oberman & J. D. Tracy (Leiden & 
New York, 1994), pp. 563–84.
Tuck, J. A.  ‘Nobles, Commons and the Great Revolt of 1381’, in The English Rising 
of 1381, ed. R. H. Hilton & T. H. Aston (Cambridge, 1984), pp. 194–212.   
- Richard II and the English Nobility (London, 1973). 
Vaughn, R.  Philip the Good: The Apogee of Burgundy (London, 1970).
Virgoe, R.  ‘The Death of William De La Pole, Duke of Suffolk’, Bulletin of the 
John Rylands Library, 47 (1965), pp. 489–502.
Watt, H.  ‘“On account of the frequent attacks and invasions of the Welsh”: The 
Effect of the Glyn Dwr Rebellion on Tax Collection in England’, in The Reign of 
Henry IV: Rebellion and Survival, 1403–1413, ed. G. Dodd & D. Biggs 
(Woodbridge, 2008), pp. 48–81.
Watts, J. L.  ‘“Commonweal” and “Commonwealth”: England’s Monarchical 
Republic in the Making, c. 1450–c. 1530’, in The Languages of Political Society, 
Western  Europe, 14th–17th Centuries, ed. A. Gamberini, J. P. Genet & A. Zorzi 
(Rome, 2011), pp. 147–66.  
- Henry VI and the Politics of Kingship (Cambridge, 1996).
- ‘Polemic and Politics in the 1450s’, in The Politics of Fifteenth–Century 
England: John Vale’s Book, ed. M. L. Kekewich, Colin Richmond, A. F. 
Sutton, Livia Visser–Fuchs & J. L. Watts (Stroud, 1995), pp. 3–42.
- ‘The Counsels of King Henry VI, c. 1435–1445’, EHR, 106 (1991), pp. 279–
98.  
- The Making of Polities. Europe, 1300–1500 (Oxford, 2009).
- ‘When did Henry VI’s Minority End?’, in Trade, Devotion and Governance. 
Papers in Later Medieval History, ed. D. J. Clayton, R. G. Davies & P. 
McNiven (Sutton, 1994), pp. 116–39.
Willard, J. F.  Parliamentary Taxes on Personal Property, 1290–1348.  A Study in 
Medieval English Financial Administration (Cambridge, MA, 1934).
Wolffe, B. P.   ‘Acts of Resumption in the Lancastrian parliaments, 1399–1456’, in 
Historical Studies of the English Parliament, ed. E. B. Fryde & E. Miller, 2 vols 
(Cambridge, 1970), 2, pp. 61–91.
- Henry VI (London, 1981).
231
- The Crown Lands, 1461–1536: An Aspect of Yorkist and Early Tudor 
Government (London, 1970).  
- ‘The Personal Rule of Henry VI’, in Fifteenth Century England, 1399–1509: 
Studies in Politics and Society, ed. S. B. Chrimes, C. D. Ross & R. A. 
Griffiths (Manchester, 1972), pp. 29–48.
- The Royal Demesne in English History. The Crown Estate in the Governance 
of the Realm from the Conquest to 1509 (London, 1971).  
Wright, T. E. F.  ‘Henry IV, the Commons and the Recovery of Royal Finance in 
1407’, in Rulers and Ruled in Late Medieval England. Essays Presented to Gerald 
Harriss, ed. R. E. Archer & S. Walker (London, 1995), pp. 65–81.
UNPUBLISHED THESES
Harriss, G. L.  ‘The Finance of the Royal Household, 1437–60’ (University of 
Oxford D.Phil thesis, 1953).
Jones, M. K.  'The Beaufort Family and the War in France' (University of Bristol 
PhD thesis, 1982).  
Kido, T.  ‘English Government Finance, 1399–1413’ (University of London PhD 
thesis, 1965).
Smith, W.  ‘Royal Finance and Politics in England, 1450–55’ (University of 
Manchester PhD thesis, 1998).
Wright, T. E. F.  ‘Royal Finance in the Latter Part of the Reign of Henry IV of 
England, 1406–1413’, (University of Oxford D.Phil thesis, 1984).
